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Ian Jacklin is documentary filmmaker, concert promoter, actor, and kickboxing champion. With three films produced and one world kickboxing title shot under his black belt, he’s a warrior who persists until the fight is won or the project is done.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You ended up being ranked number two in the world by the World Kickboxing Association. Please tell us about this irresistible ascent.

  Ian Jacklin: I like many young men saw a Bruce Lee movie and was hooked.  Especially when on the first day of grade 9 high school I had to watch a buddy of mine get beat up while being held back.  I went home that afternoon and told my mom to put me in Karate at 14 years of age and the rest is pretty much history. Ralph Chinnick was my master at Professional Self Defense Studios in London, Ontario Canada. I remember his early instruction was to learn the technique. To just keep coming to every class and learn the technique. Which I did and did well. By the time I was a yellow belt I was kicking like black belts. By the time I was a green belt I was beating black belts in sparring. And the great thing about Kenpo karate under the Ed Parker system was we actually kickboxed. No point sparring. Real fighting and I heard then that Bruce Lee said you learn to fight by fighting. So it was a natural progression to go to other dojos and spar their best guys which I did in Kitchener Ontario at Sifu Ron Day’s Kung Fu Academy where future PKA lightweight champion of the world, Leo Loucks. He became my idol and I learned from him on his rise to the top when he beat Cliff Thompson. Our trainer Jimmy Fields was the best in proactive, positive mental instruction while in the deepest and darkest moments of battles in that square circle. I had other trainers that would try to scare you into being better that night but that never worked for me. Militant instruction may work for some but it didn’t work for me. I needed love and light and Jimmy gave me that. I truly believe that if he and Ron Day were to be my handlers for my career I would have not only fought for the world title but would have won it and kept if for a long time. But alas… it wasn’t meant to go that way. Apparently, the universe had bigger plans for me.

  I won the Canadian ISKA title by beating Conrad Pla in Montreal when I was 18. I fought Mark Mongo Longo for the North American Title in Gleasons Gym – Brooklyn which went to a draw. Many including myself thought I won that fight but it was in the US and I was Canadian so… it was what it was. Not long after that Lennox Lewis won the Gold in the 88 Olympics and he was from Kitchener Ontario Canada so it was only fitting for his pro debut to be in Toronto. They trained in our Kitchener Kicks / Ron Days Kung Fu Academy for that fight so they got to see me in action. They saw a white boy that could fight and took me back to England with them. I actually started in boxing before karate as a kid hanging out at the Boys and Girls Club, London, Ontario, Canada. And although my kicks were my best weapon my hands weren’t too shabby either. But being in the Lennox Lewis pro boxing stable really improved my hands and I had a lot of fun living in London England for a while. John Davenport and Harold “The Shadow” Knight were my trainers. After about 4 months I decided I didn’t like where I was though. I mean Lennox and the guys were cool but London just rained every day and it was really depressing. My high school sweetheart was back in Canada and I really missed her and my family so I eventually quit and headed home. The main thing was I couldn’t believe how many shots to the head I was taking in boxing compared to kickboxing. I mean my legs were wicked so most guys never got the chance to punch me in the head but in boxing that’s all you do. I knew if I stayed in that sport I’d be punch drunk and ugly within a few years. Besides I had been watching Bay Watch on one of the 4 channels England had on their TV and had been California dreaming.

  Back in Canada, I worked the summer continuing my electrical apprenticeship with Gordon Electric in my hometown of London Ontario, Canada. I had no plans I just knew that I wasn’t done fighting and still had my dream of fighting for the world title as Leo did. And then it happened. With 3 days’ notice, I broke up with my girlfriend, quit my job and packed up my motorcycle with a tent and sleeping bag, and headed to Hollywood California. Although heartbroken due to making that decision to follow my dreams which didn’t accommodate a girlfriend whom I dearly did love… I also felt more alive than I ever had knowing I was going to take a shot at not only pursuing my dream to fight for the title but maybe even get into Hollywood as an actor. After all Jean Claude Van Damme was there making all his martial art movies so I figured it was worth a shot. It was such a dichotomy leaving your girlfriend, family, friends, and career on a whim for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. I sped through the mountains in various areas on the way to Cali with no abandon. So much so that I even crashed once and almost fell off a cliff if it weren’t for that 3-foot-high cement barrier. It was like I wanted to die for what I left but wanted to live for what lay ahead… hard for me to put into words. But apparently, somebody up there likes me and after picking the rocks out of my flesh and a quick stop at a local motorcycle shop I was back on the road. It was the summer of 1990. It wasn’t my time to die yet. Hollywood here I come.

  I stayed in Whittier California with Les Sickles, one of my home boxing trainers, brother. Jack Sickles was my mentor in Canada and his brother became that in California. He was 85 when I first met him. We became fast friends and I truly had some of the best years of my life with him as a newbie in Southern Cal. He was now a widower and had been a pro boxer when he was young so just loved tagging along with me to the gyms. I fought and won the North American WKA championship and eventually went to fight Javier Mendez for the world ISKA Cruiser Weight title fight in 1993. I fought him a few years earlier and beat him then he beat me this night and took the title. But the point is my dream was to fight for the world title and I did that! Also I wanted to star in a Hollywood movie which I quickly achieved thanks to befriending legend, Don “The Dragon” Wilson. He became my sparring partner which elevated my fighting skills and put me in a bunch of his movies like Ring of Fire II where I played the lead bad guy.

  My film career included Kickboxer 3 as this article is about… the bad guys of the Kickboxer movies. I remember the night my agent told me I got the role. It was about a year to the date of me arriving in Tinsel Town. I was working as the VIP bouncer at the Roxbury which many know was the Studio 54 of the day. I babysat more drunk actors and rock stars than I could count in those days. And sure enough, Jean Claude Van Damme was in the Roxbury that night. I asked Elie Samaha, one of the owners, to introduce me to him, which he did. I thanked him for doing Kickboxer the movie so I was able to get the lead bad guy role in Kickboxer 3. He looked at me and squeezed my cheeks and said with a face like that you should be the star! I laughed and said maybe someday man! Maybe someday! And sure enough, that did happen. I ended up being the good guy in Expert Weapon and Death Match down the line.

  Many of you have heard that to make it in Hollywood you have to sell your soul. I’m not 100 on that but I was offered a multi-picture movie deal if I would have slept with a gay producer. I said no thank you and left Hollywood. I had put 10 years into that place and was tired of the rat race and if that was the only way I was going to make it I knew it was time to leave.

  Long story longer… I went to NYC and became a filmmaker.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Which leads me in to my next question. How did you move from being a kickboxing-champion to championing holistic medicine and alkaline?

  Ian Jacklin: So Hollywood wasn’t a total waste of time. While doing a play I met an actress, J. Cynthia Brooks who like myself had been on Days Of Our Lives among many other shows and movies over the years. We actually had met at the Roxbury years earlier and now working together on a play called Spoiled Women I found out she had just cured herself of terminal cervical cancer. I over heard this at a rehearsal one day and it light a fire under me like few other things have. I said, “What?! You can’t cure cancer what do you mean you cured yourself of cancer?” And as I’ve said before the rest is history. Turns out instead of doing the usual chemo, radiation and surgery she followed a friends advice and did holistic medicine and dropped meat, dairy, sugar. Used a “Rife” machine and meditated a lot. Cured her terminal cervical cancer (of which she was given one year to live if she did the western medical treatments) in 8 months. I had thought cancer ran in my adopted moms family so worried for her I dove in deeper. It was when the internet first started so I researched others that claimed they too cured their cancers with holistic methods and then I would call them too so I could validate via their voice if they were real or not. And they were. So I decided to make a documentary about it and called it the website I also started ICureCancer.com. Thanks to doing that I learned a lot about health and wellness and have been a cancer coach ever since. The key is to drop the acidic lifestyle from what you eat, drink, think, breath and these days the wifi radiation you sit in. You can book a health coaching session with me at IanJacklin.com if interested.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: I must say that your fight with Sasha Mitchell at the end of Kickboxer III: The Art of War easily ranks among the dramatic highpoints in the Kickboxer saga.

  Ian Jacklin: Wow thank you for that compliment. My favorite bad guy of the series (me included) was Tong Po! He was the best actor. The original kickboxer film with Van Damme was shot so well, too. Edited well. But for a sequel I thought KB3 was done quite well too. And we had Shuki Ron as the choreographer who let me be the pro kickboxer I was to make it what I thought one of the most realistic fight scenes in the series for sure. I mean I was actually still fighting pro kickboxing in the ring in between movies and I don’t know how to movie fight. Just fight. And luckily by time Sasha Mitchell and I worked together he had been training as a kickboxer for a few years so he was much more believable for Kickboxer III: The Art Of War.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: How did it feel to play a good guy (and leading character) in Death Match?

  Ian Jacklin: I loved being the good guy! I mean I’ve always said in real life I’m not an actor, I’m a super hero. But they don’t pay super heroes, so I have to moon light as an actor.

Grégoire Canlorbe: Do you believe a great action-movie could be made about what you call the “scamdemic”? Would you be ready to act in such movie?

  Ian Jacklin: Lol yes that would be great! It would be me and a bunch of human beings fighting the reptiles like in They Live! I have the power to decipher who is one and who isn’t and boom we take out the ones that are. Finally planet earth will be run by human beings, not Draconians!

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. Please feel free to add anything.

  Ian Jacklin: I’d just like to say for everyone that wants to be a hero in real life start local. Go to your board meetings and vote out the leftist demoncrats. Watch the movie 2000 Mules to see the truth. Trump won end of story! Not saying he’s perfect but come on. Biden? What joke the bankers played on us!

  Get to know your cops and sheriffs and band together. We cannot let the Illuminati scum run us anymore. The whole scamdemic thing must never happen again. They just rebranded the flu and turned on 5G. That’s it! I wrote my 3rd book (all avail on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Ian-Jacklins-Health-Life-Books-3-book-series/dp/B09HP8S7JR) ConVid 1984 – Antidote which explains the hows and whys humanity got raped and pillaged by the bankers. I explain how to detox for anyone that got suckered in to the shots. Or just want to be healthy. You must get Alkaline which both my earlier books I Cure Cancer and Alkaline – Dr. Robert O Young’s Diet & Mindset explain. Take good supplements: Whole food supplements: https://ij1111.juiceplus.com Grow your own organic food year round: https://ij1111.towergarden.com

That conversation was originally published in The Postil Magazine‘s July 2022 issue

The motif of a god sharing the human suffering and death, then rising to reign in heaven, is not an invention of Christianity. Hercules suffering from the effects of the poisoned tunic, then going to the stake and ascending to Olympus, or Osiris dying drowned before being dismembered, then reconstituted, resurrected, and erected into sovereign of the afterlife, are all earlier iterations of a conception transmitted to Christianity, which it nevertheless pushed a step forward in recognizing a properly human character in Jesus, either as a human incarnation of God (in the case of the Trinitarian doctrine), or as a (made divine) son strictly distinct from his own father (in the case of radical-kind Arianism). My approach to God, while drawing inspiration from the Trinitarian Christian god, envisions the latter as, incidentally, symbolizing God and His relationship to the universe. I indeed approach God as an infinite, eternal, substantial, volitional, and conscious field of ideational singular models that completely incarnates itself into the universe while remaining completely external to the universe, completely ideational, and completely subject to a vertical (rather than horizontal) time; and which is not only completely sheltered from any forced effect (whether ideational or material) with one or more efficient causes in its willingness but traversed, animated, efficiently-caused, and unified by a sorting, actualizing, pulse that both stands as the acting part of God’s will and as the apparatus, the Logos, through which God incarnates Himself while remaining distinct from His incarnation. In the Trinity, I envision the Father as the symbol of the infinite, eternal, substantial, volitional, and conscious field of ideational singular models as that field both incarnates itself into the universe and remains distinct from the universe; the Son as the symbol of the universe as the latter is both the ideational field’s incarnation and an entity distinct from the ideational field; and the Holy Spirit as the symbol of the sorting, actualizing, pulse through which God incarnates Himself into the universe and yet remains distinct from the universe. The present discourse, which stands as a direct continuation to my “Preliminary considerations on the dignity of man, the Idea of the Good, and the knowledge of essences,” intends to bring whole new preliminary considerations on my part on a number of topics including the substance, emergence, creation, the Chi, war, predestination, mindfulness, freedom, decentralized competition, the pineal gland, and the soul’s (earthly) journey and (divine) origin. On that occasion, I will deliver an assessment of what Benedictus de Spinoza, René Descartes, and Aleister Crowley (and a few other philosophers) respectively wrote on some of those topics.

  Beforehand a few remarks concerning my respective definition for some of my concepts should be made. A moment-relative property in an entity (whether ideational—or material) is a property (whether existential—or non-existential) that deals with the point (or points) in time at which the entity itself or one or more properties in the entity are taking place; whether time for the entity is horizontal—or vertical. In an entity (whether ideational—or material), a property preexistent to one or more other properties is a property for which one chronological point, at least, in its existence is chronologically anterior to the existence of the other property or properties in question; whether its existence is already extinguished before the existence of the other property or properties in question. An entity preexistent to one or more other entities (whether it occupies the same realm as the one or more other entities in questions) is an entity for which one chronological point, at least, in its existence is chronologically anterior to (the existence of) the other entity or entities in question; whether its existence is already extinguished before the existence of the one or more other entities in question. In a realm of reality taken in isolation (whether it is the ideational realm—or the material one), any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary property existing in an entity at some point has strictly three kinds of cause, which are all operating for any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary property in any entity. Namely a relational cause (i.e., one or more relations on the entity’s part at some point before), an existential cause (i.e., the existence of the entity both presently and at the anterior point), and an intrinsically necessary cause (i.e., an intrinsically necessary property in the entity at the anterior point). What’s more, in a realm of reality taken in isolation (whether it is the ideational realm—or the material one), any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary entity existing at some point has strictly three kinds of cause. Namely a relational cause (i.e., one or more relations on another entity’s part: at some point before the concerned caused entity’s existence, except in a few cases), an existential cause (i.e., the existence of the other entity and hypothetically of some other entities which it is having one or more relations with: at the anterior point, except in a few cases), and an intrinsically necessary cause (i.e., an intrinsically necessary property in the other entity and hypothetically in those hypothetical other entities: at the anterior point, except in a few cases). The relational cause for some (extrinsically necessary or extrinsically contingent) property or entity is that kind of cause that can also be called the “efficient cause.” Saying of an entity that it is an efficient cause (were it the only efficient cause) for one or more extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary other entities is a convenient way of saying that one or more relations on that entity’s part are efficient causes (were the relations in question only between the entity and itself) for the one or more entities in question; just like saying of an entity that it is an efficient cause (were it the only efficient cause) for one or more extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary properties in that entity or in one or more other entities is a convenient way of saying that one or more relations on that entity’s part are efficient causes (were the relations in question only between the entity and itself) for the properties in question. An efficiently uncaused property is one with no efficient cause; what is only the case of any (strong-kind or weak-kind) intrinsically necessary property. An efficiently uncaused entity is one with no efficient cause; what is only the case of any (eternal or self-produced) intrinsically necessary entity and the case of that modality of an extrinsically contingent entity that is a randomly self-produced entity. A self-produced entity (whether it is intrinsically necessary) is a temporal-starting-endowed entity that is, besides, self-caused and efficiently uncaused (whether it is intrinsically necessary). When it comes to those extrinsically necessary entities that are the supramundane souls and the ideational essences (whether their realm is taken in isolation), the combination between relational, existential, and intrinsically necessary causes which results into their existence (in the ideational realm) is both internal to the ideational realm and temporally simultaneous to their existence (in the ideational realm). When it comes to those material entities (including the universe) that are considered from the angle of their incarnation-relationship to God, the combination between relational, existential, and intrinsically necessary causes which results into their existence (in the material realm) is both internal to the ideational realm and temporally simultaneous (in the ideational realm) to their existence (in the material realm). Ditto for the properties in those material entities that are considered from the angle of their incarnation-relationship to God.

  Any entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is both a caused and causing entity: more precisely, a caused (though not systemically an efficiently caused) and efficiently causing entity. Any act of creation falls within production; but not any act of production falls within creation. Production is to be taken in the sense for a cause (whether it is relational, existential, or intrinsically necessary) of causing the existence of one or more properties that are (not eternal but instead) endowed with a temporal beginning; or the existence of one or more entities that are (not eternal but instead) endowed with a temporal beginning. As for creation, it is to be taken in the sense of the fact for a cause (whether it is relational, existential, or intrinsically necessary) of producing one or more (temporal-starting-endowed) properties other than moment-relative that are (completely or partly) novel with respect to what characterizes the (existential or non-existential) properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality (i.e., the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of the entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the concerned realm of reality); or the existence of one or more (temporal-starting-endowed) entities that are (completely or partly) novel in their properties (other than moment-relative) with respect to what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality. Not only any efficiently caused entity (i.e., any entity with one or more efficient causes) that is temporal-starting-endowed is a produced entity (i.e., a caused entity that is endowed with a temporal beginning); but, reciprocally, any produced entity is an efficiently caused entity that is temporal-starting-endowed. Not only any efficiently uncaused entity (i.e., any entity devoid of the slightest efficient cause) is a self-caused entity (i.e., a caused entity that is randomly self-produced or intrinsically necessary); but, reciprocally, any self-caused entity is an efficiently uncaused entity. A self-produced entity (i.e., a self-caused entity whose existence is, besides, endowed with a temporal beginning) and a substance (i.e., a self-caused entity whose existence is, besides, intrinsically necessary and, at every point, endowed with a strong intrinsically necessary eternity remaining throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity) are two distinct modalities of a self-caused entity; but both a self-produced entity and a substance are efficiently uncaused. Any entity that is (completely or partly) novel in its properties (other than moment-relative) with respect to what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality falls within emergent entities in the concerned realm of reality; just like any property other than moment-relative that is (completely or partly) novel with respect to what characterizes the (existential or non-existential) properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality falls within emergent properties in the concerned realm of reality. Any emergent entity is either ideational or material; just like any emergent property is either a property in an ideational entity or one in a material entity. In a few lines, I will deal more closely with the concept of emergence; and with the respective concepts of existential and non-existential properties. It is worth clarifying that, while the way one understands some concept lies in the way one identifies (what one believes to be) all or part of the properties in the concept’s object, the way one defines some concept lies in the way one identifies (what one believes to be) the whole of the constitutive properties in the concept’s object. One’s “understanding of some concept” and one’s “approach to some concept” are phrases that can be used interchangeably.

Emergence and creation, the substance and the Chi

  A material entity is an entity endowed with some kind of firmness, consistency (for instance: a quark, the void, an idea in a parrot’s mind, a movie, or the Chi); just like an ideational entity (i.e., an Idea) is an entity devoid of any firmness, consistency. A property is what is characteristic of an entity (whether the entity in question is ideational—or material) at some point (whether time for the entity in question is horizontal—or vertical). Any property is either existential or non-existential. A non-existential property in an entity (i.e., a property in the entity that is not relative to the entity’s mode of existence) is either compositional or formal or a composite of form and of composition; what is tantamount to saying: a composite of formal and compositional properties. An existential property is a property that is, if not relative to the entity’s existence’s origin or relative to whether and how the entity’s existence is (at some point) permanent or provisory, at least relative to the entity’s mode of existence, i.e., the entity’s way of existing. A strong existential property is a property that, among the properties relative to the entity’s mode of existence, deals with the entity’s existence’s origin or deals with whether and how the entity’s existence is (at some point) permanent or provisory. Just like any strong existential property in a material entity is part of the entity’s substantial natural material essence, any strong existential property in an entity (whether it is ideational) is remaining throughout the entity’s existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, i.e., remaining throughout the entity’s existence with the entity’s existence at some point being a necessary, sufficient, condition for its remaining throughout the entity’s existence. An eternal entity is one with no (temporal) beginning and with no (temporal) ending; what falls within the entity’s strong existential properties. Not any eternal entity is an intrinsically necessary entity; but any eternal entity is eternal (at some point) in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and remains eternal (throughout its existence) by strong intrinsic necessity. A substance is an intrinsically necessary eternal entity whose eternity at some point not only occurs in a strong intrinsically necessary mode but remains throughout its existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind. Not any intrinsically necessary entity is a substance; but any entity eternal by strong intrinsic necessity (at some point) is remaining eternal (throughout its existence) by strong intrinsic necessity (and reciprocally). An innate property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is one that is, if not remaining in the entity throughout the entity’s existence, at least accompanied with the strong existential property of a temporal beginning for the entity and present in the entity at the moment of the entity’s temporal beginning; just like an eternal property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is one that, besides remaining in the entity throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity, takes place within an entity both eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and eternal in a strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. A property that is arising at some point in an entity is a property in the entity that is neither innate nor eternal in the concerned entity; just like an entity that is arising at some point is an entity (in some realm of reality) that is neither innate nor eternal in the concerned realm. Any property eternal in an entity is present at some point by strong intrinsic necessity and remaining (and eternal) in the entity throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity; just like any entity eternal in a realm of reality is eternal at some point by strong intrinsic necessity and remaining eternal by strong intrinsic necessity.

  In an entity (whether it is ideational—or material), whether its realm is taken in isolation, a property other than moment-relative that is irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity is one that is neither completely characterized identically to any of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity nor completely characterized identically to a combination between all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity (whether all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative are still existent—or now inexistent); just like, in a realm of reality (whether it is ideational—or material), whether that realm is taken in isolation, an entity that is irreducible in its properties other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence is one for which one of its properties other than moment-relative, at least, is neither completely characterized identically to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative found in the set of those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence nor completely characterized identically to a combination between all or part of the properties other than moment-relative found in the set of those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence (whether all or part of those entities are still existent—or now inexistent). An emergent property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is a property other than moment-relative that is, if not irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity, at least arising at some point in the entity (instead of being innate or eternal in the entity); just like an emergent material entity is a material entity that is, if not arising at some point in the universe (instead of being the universe itself or one of the very first entities chronologically in the universe), at least irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence. A strong emergent property and a strong emergent material entity are respectively a property other than moment-relative that, besides arising at some point in the concerned entity (instead of being innate or eternal in the entity), is irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity; and a material entity that, besides being irreducible in its properties other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence, is arising at some point in the universe (instead of being the universe itself or innate in the universe).

  Any emergent property is either a quality (i.e., a non-existential property) other than moment-relative or an existential property other than moment-relative; but not any quality other than moment-relative nor any existential property other than moment-relative fall within emergent properties. An emergent entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is an entity that is, if not arising at some point in its realm of reality, at least irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence; just like an emergent ideational entity is an ideational entity that is not only eternal but irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence. A strong emergent property and an emergent entity are both introducing—when (and only when) the strong emergent property in question and one property, at least, in the emergent entity in question are characterized in a way that is then unprecedented (whether completely or partly) in the concerned realm of reality—a certain novelty (whether complete—or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm (i.e., the properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the concerned realm). Any novelty (whether complete—or partial) introduced (at some point) in the field of what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the ideational or material realm’s entities having been witnessed (i.e., the properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the ideational or material realm) is introduced by (and through) an (other than moment-relative) property that is either a strong emergent property or a property in an emergent entity or a property that is both; but not any strong emergent property introduces some novelty in that field, no more than does any emergent entity. The universe is both an extrinsically contingent emergent material entity from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe; and, from the angle of its relationship to God, an extrinsically necessary emergent material entity (distinct from God and yet identical to Him) whose incarnation-relationship to God is an eternal (rather than emergent) property in God Himself. Whether it is from the angle of its relationship to the chronologically anterior nothingness or from the angle of its relationship to God, the universe isn’t an intrinsically necessary entity endowed (at every point) with an eternity both intrinsically necessary in a strong mode and intrinsically necessarily remaining in a strong mode (i.e., a substance); no more than it is, generally speaking, an intrinsically necessary entity.

  In the field of philosophy, translating into one’s language another philosopher’s concepts consists of expressing the latter’s concepts—and the way they’re understood and defined in the latter—through one’s concepts (such as one understands and defines them) in a way that nonetheless stays completely faithful to what are that someone else’s concepts and his understanding and definition of his concepts. To put it completely in my language, Spinoza’s approach to God in Ethics correctly portrays Him as an intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode whose eternity is remaining (throughout His existence) by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, and which is composed (at every point) of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties; and as the only entity that is composed (at every point) of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties—and as the only entity that is a substance, i.e., the only entity that is endowed (at every point) with an intrinsically necessary existence and with an eternity both intrinsically necessary in a strong mode and remaining in a strong intrinsically necessary mode throughout the entity’s existence. That approach nonetheless commits a mistake that lies in its confusing the being an eternal entity and the being an entity with no temporal ending; and in its confusing the being an intrinsically necessary entity with no temporal ending and the being an entity devoid of any temporal ending. Any eternal entity (as is the case of a substance) and any entity devoid of any temporal ending (as is the case of a substance) are respectively eternal—and devoid of any temporal ending—in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode; but, just like an eternal entity is only a modality (i.e., only a certain kind) of an entity with no temporal ending, an intrinsically necessary entity with no temporal ending is only a modality of an entity devoid of any temporal ending. Though the universe cannot end in time (whether it is with regard to the nothingness—or with regard to God), it is an extrinsically contingent (rather than intrinsically necessary) entity with regard to the nothingness chronologically anterior to the universe; and, with regard to God, an extrinsically (rather than intrinsically) necessary entity. Accordingly the fact of being devoid of any temporal ending is not (as Spinoza wrongly asserts) unique to the eternal entity that is a substance; though there is indeed only one substance as Spinoza rightly asserts. Another mistake Spinoza’s approach to God commits lies in its confusing the being an efficiently uncaused entity and the being an intrinsically necessary eternal entity whose eternity takes place in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode (i.e., a substance); and in its confusing the being an intrinsically necessary entity and the being a substance. An extrinsically contingent and efficiently uncaused entity (i.e., a self-produced entity) and an intrinsically necessary and efficiently uncaused entity (whether it is a substance) are two distinct modalities of an efficiently uncaused entity; just like an intrinsically necessarily eternal (in a strong mode), intrinsically necessarily remaining eternal (in a strong mode), and intrinsically necessary entity—and an intrinsically necessary entity that is, if not devoid of any temporal ending, at least endowed with a temporal beginning—are two distinct modalities of an efficiently uncaused entity. The universe and God are respectively an efficiently uncaused entity of an extrinsically contingent kind (with regard to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe) and an efficiently uncaused entity of an intrinsically necessary kind; just like God and the universe’s very first components chronologically (such as the quarks and the Chi) are respectively an efficiently uncaused and intrinsically necessary entity of an intrinsically necessarily remaining eternal (in a strong mode) kind and (with regard to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe) efficiently uncaused entities that are intrinsically necessary but devoid of any eternity at any point.

  Accordingly the fact of being intrinsically necessary is not (as Spinoza wrongly asserts) unique to the substance; though there is indeed only one substance. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God’s complete coincidence with the universe to exclude the slightest degree and form of independence of God with regard to the universe. God is both completely identical and completely external to the universe—in that He gets completely incarnated into the universe while remaining completely distinct from the latter. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding time for God to be horizontal (rather than vertical); and in its misunderstanding God’s non-existential constitutive properties to exclude any ideational property. Though God (as Spinoza rightly asserts) is indeed the only substance, God finds itself placed under a vertical (rather than horizontal) time; and its non-existential constitutive properties find themselves to be exclusively composed of ideational properties (including ideational essences). Neither the “extension” realm nor the “thought” realm nor the indeterminate other realms which Spinoza thinks to be non-existential constitutive properties in God qualify as ideational realms (in my language). Another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God’s non-existential constitutive properties to be both infinite and of an infinite number; and God’s non-existential properties not to be all constitutive. Though the substance is indeed composed of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties (since the ideational essences are of an infinite number), Spinoza as much misses the fact that all the substance’s non-existential properties are constitutive as he misses the fact that not all of them are infinite. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God not to be endowed with some willingness and not to expect something from the human. Though God is indeed identical to the unique substance (as Spinoza rightly asserts), the substance is (at every point) a volitional entity (i.e., an entity endowed with willingness) and even a conscious volitional entity (i.e., an entity endowed with conscious willingness); and a conscious volitional entity that expects something from the human. Namely that the human, through rendering himself sufficiently like-divine in the material realm, render his soul completely divine in the ideational realm. I won’t discuss here whether the notion of entities or properties that are arising at some point (instead of being innate or eternal) or irreducible is lacking (were it partly) in Spinoza’s philosophy; but the cosmos in Spinoza, besides being identified to God in a way that wrongly excludes any externality of God with regard to the cosmos, is just as wrongly envisioned as a perfect and achieved entity that excludes the slightest novelty (with respect to the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed within the cosmos).

  The fact for the human of being “in the image of God” is to be taken in the sense for the human of being endowed (in his substantial natural material essence) with suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to matter; of being in a position, not to remedy the cosmic order (were it partly), but instead to bring reparation and completion to the universe in strict conformity with the universe’s underlying order and laws; and of being in a position to know reality and the universe in a way that is irremediably perfectible. The Spinozian approach to God is a complete offense to Him in that it demeans Him to the level of nature instead of envisioning nature as His incarnation or product or even as an emergent property in Him; just like the Spinozian approach to the human grandly (though not-completely) offenses what, in the human being, is “in the image of God.” It denies just as much the slightest degree of self-determination in the human will with regard to the efficient causes at work in nature as the slightest possibility of novelty (with respect to the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities that have been witnessed) and therefore of creation in the realm of nature as the slightest role to be played for the human’s creation with regard to an allegedly perfect nature where nothing would be to be repaired nor to be perfected. The Spinozian offense to what, in the human being, is “in the image of God” remains incomplete in that Spinoza, instead of envisioning the human as able to reach perfect knowledge of the nature, holds him for irremediable unable to have the slightest knowledge of any other “attribute” in the “substance” than the “thought” and than the “extension.” As concerns creation on a human’s part, it is worth noting that, while an idea created in a human’s mind (or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is a produced idea introducing some novelty (either complete or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties (other than moment-relative) having been witnessed in those ideas having been witnessed in the universe, a creative idea created in a human’s mind (or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is an inspirationally produced idea introducing some novelty (either complete or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties (other than moment-relative) having been witnessed in those ideas having been witnessed in the universe. In other words, a creative idea (created in a human’s mind or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is a modality of a created idea—namely that it is a created idea the efficient cause of which lies in an inspiration-relationship of the mind in question with respect to all or part of those entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality. Not only not any creation on a human’s part consists of a created idea; but not any created idea on a human’s part consists either of a creative idea. An exploit is to be taken in the sense of an act that is jointly exceptionally creative (i.e., characterized with the mind’s creation of one or more exceptionally creative ideas), exceptionally successful (i.e., characterized with the complete fulfillment of an exceptionally hard goal), and exceptionally endangering for one’s subsistence. The Spinozian ethics, in that it exclusively situates the human’s happiness in the “persevering in one’s being” here below, is a (complete) offense to what in the human’s happiness cannot be reached in an earthly lifetime exclusively or primarily dedicated to the persevering in one’s material existence. That part in the human’s happiness, the highest, noblest, part, which lies in the accomplishment of exploits (i.e., the accomplishment of acts that are jointly exceptionally creative, exceptionally successful, and exceptionally endangering for one’s subsistence), is basically dismissed in what can be called Spinoza’s “conatus ethics,” which is basically an ethics of mediocrity.

  Just like the entities are subdivided between those inhabiting the ideational realm and those inhabiting the material realm (which stands as the materially incarnated ideational realm), the Being (i.e., what allows for the entities to exist without being itself an entity) contains both a realm correspondent to the ideational entities; and a realm correspondent to the material entities, which stands as the material incarnation of the latter realm. “The materially incarnated Being” and “the ideational Being” are convenient ways of designating respectively that realm of the Being correspondent to the material entities; and that realm of the Being correspondent to the ideational entities. Any intrinsically necessary entity is an emergent entity; but not any extrinsically necessary entity is an emergent entity, no more than any emergent entity is an intrinsically necessary entity. Though the universe is God’s incarnation, the universe’s ideational essence does not lie in God Himself—but instead in the Idea of the universe, which is not only infinite and incomplete but in constant updating. Just like any material entity other than the universe stands as the incarnation of some ideational essence, any material entity other than the Chi and other than the universe stands as the incarnation of some finite and achieved ideational essence. The Chi stands as the incarnation of what I previously called (following Plato) the “Idea of the Good,” which would be more judiciously called the “Idea of the Chi” and that is genuinely the sorting, actualizing, pulse at work in the ideational field; but the Idea of the Chi, though it gets incarnated (like any Idea other than the Idea of the universe), is jointly infinite (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea), incomplete (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea), and in constant updating (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea). I approach that entity known in Chinese and Japanese ontologies to be the “Chi” as a material entity (internal to the universe) that can be described as mere energy enveloping, at every point, every other entity in the universe; and which, without efficiently-causing itself the slightest entity nor causing itself (whether efficiently) the slightest property, makes it possible to cause (whether efficiently) the emergent properties (including the strong emergent properties) present (at some point) within some entity (whether innate—or arising) present (at some point) in the universe and makes it possible to cause (whether efficiently) some entity (whether innate—or arising) present (at some point) in the universe (including those entities in the universe that are emergent). Just like the Chi stands as the incarnation of the sorting, actualizing, pulse through which, at every point in the ideational realm (for which time is strictly vertical), some ideational models see their correspondent hypothetical material entities being introduced, concretized, in the material realm and others their correspondent hypothetical material entities being denied, not-concretized, in the material realm, the sorting, actualizing, pulse itself stands as the Idea of the Chi, i.e., the Chi’s ideational essence. A mistake in the Spinozian approach to the substance is to confuse the being a substantial entity and the being an entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Though there is indeed only one substance (as Spinoza rightly asserts), an intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode (i.e., a substance) is only a modality of an entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Just like the Idea of the Chi is an eternal (in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode) but extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose efficient cause lies in the substance that is God, the ideational essences other than the Idea of the Chi are eternal (in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode) but extrinsically necessary emergent entities the efficient cause of which lies in the Idea of the Chi. Just like the Chi stands as the transition between the materially incarnated Being and the other material entities (including the universe), God stands as the transition between the ideational Being and the ideational essences (including the Idea of the Chi).

  The universe is a God-production (i.e., a temporal-starting-endowed entity whose efficient cause lies in God) and even a God-creation (i.e., a temporal-starting-endowed entity whose efficient cause lies in God and whose introduction in the material realm has been bringing novelty there in terms of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative); but it is so not in that the universe would be in God an emergent property (and even strong emergent property introducing such novelty in the material realm) that finds its efficient cause in God—but instead in that the universe stands as a God-incarnation. More precisely, the universe is God-created neither as a product (i.e., a production to which its efficient cause or causes remain strictly external) nor as an emergent property; but instead as a production in which God gets completely incarnated while remaining completely external to His incarnation. In any entity, the whole is only the unified sum of the parts: except in the case of the universe and in the case of the substance. As much the substance taken as a whole as its parts (and therefore the ideational essences it contains) are eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode; but the substance taken as a whole exists independently of its parts though simultaneously to its parts, to which it communicates its eternity intrinsically necessary of the strong kind and remaining throughout existence by strong intrinsic necessity. When considered independently of their incarnation-relationship to God, as much the universe taken as a whole as its very first parts (i.e., those of its parts that, including the Chi, appeared with the “big bang”) are self-created; but the universe taken as a whole exists as much simultaneously to its parts as independently of its parts: including its very first parts, which are intrinsically necessary while the universe itself is extrinsically contingent. The substance, as it is intrinsically necessary, is self-caused and efficiently uncaused; but the substance, as it is not only intrinsically necessary but remaining eternal throughout its existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, is not only self-caused and efficiently uncaused but devoid of any self-produced character. The incarnation-relationship from God into the universe is, in God, neither an efficiently uncaused strong-emergent relational property nor, generally speaking, an emergent relational property; though it is indeed efficiently uncaused. While the universe (when considered from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to God) is an emergent extrinsically necessary entity finding in God its efficient cause, which is not only irreducible (in its properties other than moment-relative) to (all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in) God but introducing novelty (in terms of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative) in the material realm, the incarnation-relationship from God into the universe is, for its part, an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary relational property. When considered from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe, the latter is an extrinsically contingent emergent entity whose existence is even devoid of any efficient cause; but, when considered from the angle of its relationship to God, the universe is an extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is the forced rather than random effect of the combination (concomitantly to the universe’s material existence in the strictly vertical time applying to the ideational realm) between God’s existence, God’s incarnation-relationship to the universe, and the character of that incarnation-relationship as an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in God. When considered from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe, the Chi is an intrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is therefore devoid of any efficient cause; but, when considered from the angle of its relationship to God, the Chi is an extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is the forced rather than random effect of the combination (concomitantly to the Chi’s material existence in the strictly vertical time applying to the ideational realm) between God’s existence, God’s incarnation-relationship to the universe, and the character of that incarnation-relationship as an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in God.

The role of genetic similitude in a society’s cohesion—and in the Providence’s maneuvers

  The way the sorting, actualizing, pulse operates in the ideational realm expresses a part of God’s will, but only a part precisely. Namely that part of God’s will that is acting (i.e., using means for the purpose of goals); and which must be distinguished from that part of His will that involves goals without involving any means. The Providence is to be taken in the sense of the acting part of God’s will as His will’s acting part is at work in cosmic and human history. War is to be taken in the sense of a physical, coercive, struggle between groups (whether the latter are groups of living beings). When he presented war as “the world’s only hygiene,” Marinetti would have done better to present it as “one of the world’s hygienes,” alongside famine and epidemics notably. Above all, he should have specified that the hygiene of war is “God’s hygiene for His incarnation as the latter is a world tirelessly in search of progress in order and complexity.” For war is one of the hygienic apparatuses (and even one of the privileged ones) through which the Providence strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that the least sophisticated groups in terms of order and complexity (both internal and at the level of intergroup relations) at some point, instead of encumbering God for the rest of the universe’s days, end up disappearing in the short run or, failing that, in the long run. Also, war is one of the incentive apparatuses (and even one of the privileged ones) through which God strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that geniuses in the cognitive field be promoted (rather than devalued) in society; and, accordingly, their sexual reproduction (and therefore their genetic frequency) favored rather than hindered in society. Another incentive apparatus through which the Providence strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that geniuses in the cognitive field be promoted (rather than devalued) in society consists of a culture that values ​​(instead of disdaining), if not the search for exploit in the military field, at least the transposition of the search for military exploit to the cognitive field; in other words, a culture that values ​​(instead of disdaining), if not the search for exploit on the military battlefield, at least the search for exploit on the respective cognitive battlefield of painters, mathematicians, engineers, writers, philosophers, physicists, or movie directors (among other examples). I will come back to those two incentive apparatuses later. In addition to its character as hygiene for the world, a nevertheless fallible hygiene, war is one of the laws which God (infallibly) wanted for this world and which He (infallibly) wanted to frame the human’s reparation and completion of the divine creation. With regard to those wars implemented among societies of living beings, they as much involve societies characterized by a degree of kin-relatedness such that their members form an “extended family” or even a single family (or what is strongly or moderately a single family) as societies whose members form neither an “extended family” nor (were it only to some strong or moderate extent) a family stricto sensu.

  Just like a group whose all members, at some point, are kin-related (to each other) is to be taken in the sense of a group whose members, at some point, are all biological brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, or first cousins with each other, a group whose all members, at some point, are kin-related (to each other) to some extent (rather than to a complete extent) is to be taken in the sense of a group whose members, to some extent (rather than to a complete extent), are all biological brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, or first cousins with each other at some point. Just like the degree of kin-relatedness at some point in some group is to be taken in the sense of the degree to which people in the group in question are all kin-related (to each other) at some point, the degree of genetic similitude at some point in some group is to be taken in the sense of the degree to which the respective sets of genes present in each of the members of the group in question have similitude with each other at some point. Setting aside the case of a hypothetical future group whose reproduction would occur through cloning (whether solely or partly), the level of genetic similitude in some group is necessarily a reflection (and measurement) at the genetic level of the level of kin-relatedness in the group in question. The levels of kin-relatedness and of genetic similitude are both part of the substantial natural material essence in any group of living beings. The notion that selection over the course of biological evolution (i.e., over the course of the evolution of the respective genomes in each of the individual members of the different species) only occurs at the level of the individual’s genes and at the level of those genes shared in individuals who are completely kin-related or, failing that, kin-related to a strong or moderate extent can be understood in two distinct ways strictly. On the one hand, a modality of the notion in question claiming that the struggle for life and reproduction (whether it occurs in a coercive, physical, way) only involves individuals facing other individuals and groups whose members are, at every point, all kin-related (were it only to a strong or moderate extent—rather than to a complete extent) facing other groups of that kind. On the other hand, a modality claiming that survival in the short run (i.e., over the scale of a few decades) is impossible to any group whose members are neither completely nor strongly nor moderately all kin-related to each other. Both modalities are wrong. While the former is disproved by the fact that, in some species (including the human), the intergroup struggle for survival occurs between groups who are not systemically composed strictly of individuals who are, at least to some strong or moderate extent, all kin-related to each other, the latter is disproved by the fact that, in some species (including the human), the intergroup struggle for survival doesn’t witness—whether it is in the long run or in the short run—a systematically compromised situation nor a systematic disintegration of those groups whose members are not, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, all kin-related to each other.

  A commonly invoked argument in favor of the claim that, in humans, those groups whose members are not all, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, kin-related are unlikely (though not unable stricto sensu) to survive in the short run is that a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its propagation in the decades yet to come (and, generally speaking, in the centuries or millennia yet to come) only through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns favoring instead of compromising said propagation. Yet the fact that such groups sometimes manage to survive in the short run (or even in the long run, i.e., in the centuries or millennia yet to come) doesn’t only disprove the claim that those groups whose members are not all, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, kin-related to each other are unable to survive in the short run. It also corroborates the claim that, in humans, a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its propagation in the long run (and therefore in the short run) not systemically through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of its genes or, failing that, those of its genes shared with a group whose members, whether completely or to an extent that is strong or moderate, are all kin-related to each other; but instead through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of those genes it shares with (and in) a group whose members, while being not all kin-related to each other to an extent that is either complete or strong or moderate, still possess some level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of the concerned group as an “enlarged kinship,” “extended family.” Society is to be taken in the sense of that kind of group (not necessarily human), sometimes called a “superorganism,” that unites (and encompasses) children, parents, and grandparents; and which hypothetically falls within some larger group like, say, an empire. In view of a number of male partners for a queen oscillating between three and eight in the vespula maculifrons, or between four and ten for a queen in the acromyrmex octospinosus (hence a genetic similitude between sisters around 33%), or even between seven and twenty for a queen in the apis mellifera (hence a genetic similitude between workers around 30%), societies in the hymenoptera are not all a case of a society whose all members are completely (or, at least, strongly or moderately) kin-related to each other. A thus corroborated claim is that the duplicative success (in the very next decades) of those genes shared among the members of a hymenoptera society, instead of being systemically the result of kin selection (i.e., the result of that kind of group selection dealing with the genes common to some group in which the degree of kin-relatedness is either complete or strong or moderate), is not systemically proportionate to the degree to which people in a hymenoptera society are all kin-related to each other. Yet it seems that, in some species like the wasp, the ant, the bee, and the human, the duplicative success of those genes shared among the members of a society can be the result of a kind of group-selection dealing with those genes common to groups whose members, without being all kin-related to each other to a degree that is either complete or strong or moderate, nevertheless possess a certain degree of genetic similitude which remains strong enough to allow speaking of said members as forming an “extended family,” “enlarged kinship.”

  Group cohesion for an individual in some group is to be taken in the sense of the joint fact of identifying oneself as a member of that group one happens to belong to, of acting on behalf of one’s perceived group-interests (i.e., the interests of one’s group such as one perceives them), of privileging in one’s relationships (including economic and professional) the other individual members within one’s group, of behaving in a way that favors (instead of compromising) the survival of one’s group (were it through compromising one’s own survival or one’s reproduction), and of being faithful, docile, with respect to the axiological and organizational principles foundational in one’s group. The average level of group-cohesion in a group’s individual members is part of the group’s substantial natural material essence. It is regrettable that, all too often, the (other) investigations of the genetic and instinctual underpinnings of a society’s group-cohesion (i.e., group-cohesion among the members of a given society) in homo sapiens remain anchored in the confusion between group-selection and kin-selection; and in the mistaken approach to the intensity of group-cohesion in a given human society as (positively) proportionate to the degree of genetic similitude in the concerned society. The differences between human societies in the degree of intra-society genetic similitude are no more systemically at the origin of the differences between human societies in the intensity of intra-society group-cohesion than the inter-species differences in the intra-species average degree of genetic similitude in the intra-species societies are systemically at the origin of the inter-species differences in the intra-species average degree of group-cohesion in the intra-species societies. It is true that a complete degree of genetic similitude in some society (whether it is one human) and a high degree of genetic similitude in some society (whether it is one human) cannot but result respectively into a correspondingly complete degree of group-cohesion—and a correspondingly high or complete degree of group-cohesion—in the concerned society; but it is just as true that a low degree of genetic similitude in a human society doesn’t result into a correspondingly low degree of group-cohesion in said society systemically. In the human, those societies who manage to survive (whether it is in the short run only or in the long run), what necessarily requires a degree of group-cohesion that is either strong or complete, are societies who are, if not composed of people all kin-related to each other to an extent that is complete, strong, or moderate, at least composed of people in which group-cohesion is strong or complete. In the human, just like those societies in which group-cohesion in people is complete (and those societies in which group-cohesion in people is high) are not systemically societies in which all people are kin-related to an extent that is either complete or strong or moderate, those societies in which the displayed degree of genetic similitude is such that their members form what can be called extended kinships are systemically societies in which the extent to which people are all kin-related to each other is neither complete nor strong nor moderate.

  What’s more, in the human, those societies in which group cohesion is complete include (strictly) as much societies with an either complete or strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness as societies who—instead of approaching or forming a (single) kinship stricto sensu—are forming an extended kinship as societies who are neither approaching a single kinship nor forming a single kinship nor forming an extended kinship. Likewise those societies in the human in which group-cohesion in people is high include (strictly) as much societies with an either complete or strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness as societies who—instead of approaching or forming a (single) kinship stricto sensu—are forming an extended kinship as societies who are neither approaching a single kinship nor forming a single kinship nor forming an extended kinship. Whatever the degree of group-cohesion and whatever the degree of genetic similitude, it nonetheless turns out that, in the human (and perhaps in some other species), culture is never totally independent from genetics. Culture is to be taken in the sense of the set of those behavioral patterns in a society that are inculcated in the society in question (whether it is one human). Some of the cultural patterns (but not all) in a society are part of the society’s substantial natural material essence. When it comes to a culture totally or partly endowed with an endogenous origin, culture is not only able to contradict, in part, the average genetic features—but wholly able to include patterns that have no connection to genetics (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics). More precisely, it is then, on the one hand, wholly able to include behavioral patterns that are not genetically rooted at all (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics); on the other hand, unable to contradict the slightest average biological-ability in the group but able to contradict a part (but only a part) of those average genetic features that are about emotions and emotional needs (rather than about abilities). When it comes to a culture totally endowed with a foreign origin, culture is wholly able to include patterns with no connection to genetics (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics); but, also, it is wholly able to contradict the average genetic features—except that it cannot go against the average levels of biological-abilities. In turn, culture (whether its origin is completely exogenous—or instead completely or partly endogenous) has an effect on genetics in that it hampers the social integration (and therefore sexual reproduction) of those individuals unsuited to the established cultural patterns; in that it influences the tenor of the fertility gap in those individuals managing to reproduce; and in that it influences the propagative success of a certain genetic mutation through influencing the ability of those individuals endowed with the genetic mutation in question to reproduce (and their reproduction’s magnitude). It is regrettable that the (other) investigations of the gene-culture coevolution (i.e., the mutual influence between gene and culture over the course of their respective evolutions) all too often overlook the complexity of said coevolution, treating (more or less surreptitiously) a group’s culture at some point as strictly equal to the group’s average genetic features at that point in time.

In humans, just like one way a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its duplication (in the long run besides in the short run, i.e., over the scale of several centuries or millennia besides over the scale of several decades) is through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of those genes it shares with (and in) a group whose members, while being not all kin-related to each other (were it only to some strong or moderate extent), still possess some level of genetic similitude allowing to speak of them as forming an extended kinship, one way the duplication of a gene or team of genes can be compromised rather than favored (in the short run besides in the long run) is through the individual’s inhabiting a society whose members, besides being not all kin-related to each other to a degree that is either complete or strong or moderate, exhibit some level of genetic similitude that is not sufficient to allowing to speak of them as forming an extended kinship. A human society whose members exhibit neither a level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of them as forming an enlarged family nor a level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of them as forming or approaching a single family is necessarily compromising (rather than helpful) in the short as much in the long run to the duplication of the genes present in its members; regardless of whether the society in question manages to survive (over the scale of several centuries or millennia or, failing that, over the scale of several decades) and regardless of whether group-cohesion is strong in the society in question. Group-identification here means the fact of identifying oneself as a member of some group (whether the latter is real). I guess that two instincts for group-identification successively emerged over the course of the biological evolution of homo sapiens: two instincts which are now superposed and in conflict with each other. Namely an earlier instinct for group-identification to one’s kinship—and a tardier instinct for group-identification to indeterminate groups whose level of genetic dissimilitude exceeds the level found in a kinship or in a group whose members are all kin-related to some strong or moderate extent. At first, the tardier instinct for group-identification was a blessing (rather than a curse) to the long-run duplication of genes in humans in that it contributed (and was necessary) to the constitution of societies with a strong or complete group-cohesion who, while being not restricted to kinship nor to some strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness, exhibit a level of genetic similitude that remains strong enough to allow speaking of those societies as being extended kinships. Over time, that instinct, thus becoming both a blessing and a curse to the duplication of genes (whether it is in the long run or in the short run), ended up contributing to the constitution of societies with a strong or complete group-cohesion who, besides being not restricted to people kin-related to an either strong or moderate or complete degree, don’t qualify either as extended kinships; what has been compromising (rather than helpful) to the duplicative success of genes in the short as much in the long run in that it has been allowing for such societies to survive in the long run (besides in the short run) at the expense of the duplicative success in question. In the cosmos taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to God, the emergence of that second instinct for group-identification that is the instinct for group-identification to (indeterminate) groups standing below any level of kin-relatedness that is either strong or moderate or complete is only a double-edged sword to the duplication of genes; but in the cosmos as incarnation, the cosmos as God incarnated, the emergence of such instinct is also a cunning of God. More precisely, a trick on His part falling within His wider strategy of detaching the human society, if not from any enlarged kinship, at least from any strong, moderate, or complete level of kin-relatedness, in order to bring about (and experiment) unprecedentedly high and sophisticate new forms of order, complexity, in the cosmos.

That first part was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s May 2022 issue.

The freedom-and-predestination conundrum—and what it means to be a star

  St. Paul’s efforts to detach the nascent Christian message from the Jewish genome, but also from the Torah and from the Old Testament’s eschatology (i.e., the belief that human history would witness a final era of universal peace under the Torah’s universal rule), were carried out in a way reflecting what can be called the humanitarian sacrificial ethnic mind. That is, the concern for promoting what one perceives to fall within the interests of the whole of mankind even at the expense of what one perceives to fall within one’s ethnic interests. In St. Paul’s case, it consisted of condoning the collective sufferings of Jews as the counterpart of the duplicative success of Jewish-originated memes, those of Christianity (in its Paulinian version), intended to bring “salvation” to humanity. In St. Paul, the emotional, behavioural, manifestation of the tardier instinct for group-identification—that for group-identification to one or more indeterminate groups whose level of genetic dissimilitude exceeds the level found in any group whose members, at least to some strong or moderate extent, are all kin-related to each other—was characterized by the coexistence (and tension) between, at least, group-identification of some (incomplete) intensity to one’s ethnicity (beyond the level of one’s kinship within the ethnicity in question) and group-identification of some stronger intensity to the whole of mankind. In St. Paul, both the former group-identification to the whole of one’s ethnic group (and, accordingly, the whole of the Jewish ethnicity in St. Paul’s case, both including the Jews of Judea and those of the diaspora) and the latter group-identification to the whole of mankind stood beyond the level of group-identification to one’s kinship; but the latter group-identification fueled a concern for perceived humanitarian interests (i.e., what one perceives to fall within the interests of the whole of mankind) the intensity of which was stronger than the intensity of the concern for what one perceives to fall within one’s ethnic interests. Hence Saul of Tarsus came to present his own people as the deicide people (thus legitimizing in his eyes the Christian hatred and persecution against them), while highlighting what he claimed to be the God-election of Jews to prepare the coming of Jesus to propose salvation to all humans. Whether the whole of St. Paul’s destiny was both God-undesigned and nonetheless known (perfectly) in God before even St. Paul’s birth is an issue that cannot be properly addressed without addressing (and properly addressing) the distinction between the earthly soul and the supramundane soul. It cannot be properly addressed either without addressing (and properly addressing) the distinction between the two kinds of operative effective free will respectively found in an earthly soul’s human material host and in a supramundane soul.

  Just like any property is either relational or un-relational, any relational property is either active (i.e., consisting of some past or present active relation on the entity’s part) or passive (i.e., consisting of some past or present passive relation on the entity’s part). Any active relational property falls either within the entity’s relations with itself or within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities; but any passive relational property falls within the entity’s relations with itself (rather than within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities). Any passive relational property is an intrinsically necessary property (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind); just like any active relational property—except when it comes to that active relational property that is God’s incarnation into the universe—is an extrinsically necessary property. Any extrinsically necessary property (at some point) is the forced effect of the combination between the entity’s existence (at the concerned present point—and, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point as well), an intrinsically necessary property in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point instead), and one or more relational properties (whether of the active kind—or of the passive kind) in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at the anterior point instead); just like any relational extrinsically-necessary property (at some point) is an active-kind relational property (either falling within the entity’s relations with itself—or within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities) that comes as the forced effect of the combination between the entity’s existence (at the concerned present point—and, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point as well), an intrinsically necessary property in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point instead), and one or more relational properties (whether of the active kind—or of the passive kind) in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at the anterior point instead). The active-kind relational property in God (at some point) that is God’s efficiently-causing some soul is an extrinsically necessary property whose existential, relational, and intrinsically-necessary causes are temporally simultaneous (rather than anterior or ulterior) to the relational property in question (and to the soul in question); but the active-kind relational property in God (at some point) that is God’s incarnating Himself into the universe is a strong-kind intrinsically necessary property remaining throughout God’s existence by strong-kind intrinsic necessity. Any soul at some point is either supramundane or earthly: it is supramundane when inhabiting the ideational realm (rather than the material realm), and earthly when inhabiting the material realm (rather than the ideational realm). Though any soul finds itself (at every point) to be an ideational entity, any earthly soul finds itself (at every point) part of the material realm. As any earthly soul finds itself lodging within a material entity in the material realm and endowing its material host with, only, consciousness, a conscious material entity can be called a material entity even though the soul inhabiting it is, for its part, an ideational entity.

  At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), free will consists of a will in which not a single effect with one or more efficient causes is present; what is both tantamount to speaking of a will in which not a single effect is present—and tantamount to speaking of a will that is not operating at all. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), effective free will consists of a will in which not a single forced effect with one or more efficient causes is presents. Yet effective free will both admits an operative modality, which consists of a will in which effects are present, but effects that are all random effects with one or more efficient causes; and a not-operative modality, which consists of a will in which not a single effect (whether random or forced) with one or more efficient causes is present. What is tantamount to speaking of a will that is not operating at all. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), servile operative will consists of a will in which effects are present, but effects that are all extrinsically necessary properties. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any effect present in willingness is either a goal or a means: in both cases, an object in willingness. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any object in an operating will that is then completely servile is the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the entity’s present existence, the entity’s existence at some anterior point, one or more relations on the entity’s part at that anterior point, and that intrinsically necessary property (whether of the strong kind) in the entity at that anterior point that is servile operative willingness; just like, at any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any object in an operating will that is then completely-effective free will is the random (rather than forced) effect of the combination between the entity’s present existence, the entity’s existence at some anterior point, one or more relations on the entity’s part at that anterior point, and that strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in the entity at that anterior point that is operative effective free will. In volitional-kind material entities, the endowment with operative effective free will cannot be exhibited at the anterior point in question without being part of the substantial essence, i.e., without being a strong-kind intrinsically necessary constitutive property both innate and permanent by strong-kind intrinsic necessity; but, for its part, the endowment with servile operative will can be exhibited at the anterior point in question while being external to the substantial essence.

  In the human (taken independently of the ideational realm), the substantial property that is operative effective free will is indeed of a suspensible kind, i.e., of a kind consisting of allowing for the suspension every now and then of operative effective free will for the benefit of servile operative will. When occurring in a human, one way such suspension can occur is as the work of some emotional instinct whose solicitation is then too much powerful with respect to the degree to which (at the considered moment) one’s operative effective free will is not suspensible; but another way such suspension can occur is as the work of some bewitcher whose spell has rendered one unable (at the considered moment) to resist any of the bewitcher’s instructions. Accordingly two modalities of servile operative will in the human are willingness in which all objects (at some point) are the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the concerned human’s existence at that point in time, his existence at some anterior point, the especially intense solicitation of one or more emotional instincts in him at the anterior point, and the strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in him at the anterior point that is his willingness’s inability to resist such intensity in the solicitation of the instincts in question when the degree to which his effective operative free will is un-suspensible is such as the degree found at the anterior point; and willingness in which all objects (at some point) are the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the concerned human’s existence at that point in time, his existence at some anterior point, his receiving instructions from some bewitcher at the anterior point, and the strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in him at the anterior point that is his inability to resist any of some bewitcher’s commandments when completely put under the latter’s grip. In the human (taken independently of the ideational realm), the substantial property that is operative effective free will is not only of a suspensible kind; it is, besides, of a praxeologically forced kind, i.e., of a kind consisting for the articulation between means and goals (at some point) of being ruled by a number of praxeological laws. A praxeological law in a volitional entity’s willingness (at some point) consists of a formal regularity in the articulation between means and goals (at some point) that is correspondent to a dispositional innate property in the entity in question with strong intrinsic necessity and strong intrinsically necessary permanence that is, in turn, of the strong kind, i.e., of a kind that consists for the disposition in question of operating whenever some circumstances are present. At every point in the supramundane soul (taken independently of the material realm), willingness is not only of an operative effective free will; it is, besides, of a praxeologically-random and not-suspensible kind, i.e., of a kind consisting for willingness in the supramundane soul of being neither ruled by the slightest praxeological law nor prey to the slightest risk of suspension. At every point in a human’s mind, consciousness and willingness are respectively a property in the ideational entity that is the earthly soul inhabiting his brain—and a property in the material entity that is the brain in question. Precisely the mind (in the strict case of those mind-endowed entities that are material), instead of being itself an entity, is an assemblage between two entities, one ideational (which is the earthly soul) and one material (which is the brain).

  At every point in a supramundane soul, both willingness and consciousness fall within the properties found in the supramundane soul; but, at every point in an earthly soul, the properties found in the latter exclude willingness. In any volitional entity endowed at some point with operative effective free will (whether it is a supramundane soul), self-determination in one’s willingness cannot but be extrinsic (rather than intrinsic), i.e., relative to one or more efficient causes (rather than independent of the slightest efficient cause). Just like any operative effective free will is self-determined willingness, any self-determined willingness is extrinsically (rather than intrinsically) self-determined willingness. Just like any operation of willingness at some point is either of an active kind or a passive kind, it is of an active kind when exhibiting one or more means (and not only one or more goals) among its objects, and of a passive kind when all its objects are goals (rather than means). At every point, the part of God’s willingness that is His active willingness is (completely) expressed through the sorting, actualizing, pulse that unifies God and which stands as the efficient cause of all the ideational essences other than the Chi. Both the souls (whether earthly or supramundane) and the ideational essences (including the Idea of the Chi) are extrinsically necessary entities that are (at every point) both eternal by strong-kind intrinsic necessity and eternal in a strong-kind intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Accordingly both the souls and the ideational essences are unsubstantial though eternal entities. What’s more, while any ideational essence other than the Chi’s Idea is an extrinsically necessary ideational entity whose efficient cause is jointly internal (rather than external) to the ideational realm, situated in the Chi’s Idea, and temporally simultaneous (rather than prior) to the ideational sorting, actualizing, pulse’s existence, both the Idea of the Chi and the souls (whether earthly or supramundane) are extrinsically necessary ideational entities whose efficient cause is jointly internal (rather than external) to the ideational realm, situated in God, and temporally simultaneous (rather than prior) to their existence. The Chi’s idea and, beyond the Chi’s Idea, all the ideational essences are respectively a God-causation and God-components of which God is nonetheless independent; but, for their part, the souls (whether extramundane or earthly) are all God-causations that are external (rather than internal) to God. In metaphorical terms, God is a fire whose sparks the souls are; but those are sparks whose efficient cause, their erupting from the fire’s crackling, is simultaneous (rather than anterior) to their existence outside of the fire. Also, those are sparks which, instead of being made of fire throughout their existence, are irremediably made of water so long as they do not prove worthy (in God’s eyes) of being turned into fire-made sparks. Those are—until they prove worthy of becoming fire-made and, accordingly, divine—water-made sparks in which nothing is divine. Those liquefied sparks of God that are the earthly souls are not-volitional components of volitional material entities endowed with suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness in the material realm (taken independently of the ideational realm); but those sparks of Him that are the supramundane souls are volitional entities endowed with not-suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness in the ideational realm (taken independently of the material realm).

  The freedom-and-predestination conundrum can be put as follows. Does God perfectly, completely, know the destiny of every human being (for instance, St. Paul) even before his birth because the destiny of every human being is God-designed? Or does He perfectly, completely, know the destiny of every human being because, despite Him having nothing to do with the destiny of any human being, His omniscience allows Him to know the use any human being will make of his suspensible-kind operative effective free will? The answer I propose, which comes as a synthesis between those two approaches, is that the destiny of every human being is both God-designed in the material realm taken from the angle of its (passive) incarnation-relationship to God; and nonetheless chosen by a correspondent supramundane soul whose choice, made in the ideational realm taken from the angle of its (active) incarnation-relationship to the material realm, is both God-undesigned (as the choice in question makes use of un-suspensible-kind operative effective free will) and completely, perfectly, God-known even before the choice is made. One’s destiny (as a material entity) is to be taken in the sense of a path, unfolding, for one’s material existence that has been prefixed, pre-established, before one’s starting-to-exist and even before the starting-to-exist of anything in the universe. In the material realm taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm, any human being is (at every point) completely endowed with operative effective free will (though of a suspensible-kind) in his substantial essence; what, despite the suspensible character of operative effective free will in humans, prevents the path, unfolding, of material existence in any human being from being ruled by some destiny. In the material realm taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm, any human being is (at every point) both completely endowed in his substantial essence with suspensible operative effective free will with regard to matter; and nonetheless completely endowed with servile operative will with regard to his ideational essence, in which the whole of his material existence’s path, unfolding, is engraved. Destiny is real for any material entity (whether it is human); but, instead of being a property in a material entity, it is a property in one’s ideational essence as a material entity. At every point in the sorting, actualizing, pulse’s operation in the ideational realm (taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), some ideational essences are God-concretized and others, for their part, God-dismissed, i.e., God-selected to get forever un-concretized. As, at every point in the ideational realm (taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), time is vertical (rather than horizontal) and every supramundane soul has a complete, perfect, vision both of the whole of the ideational essences and of the whole operation of the sorting, actualizing, pulse, every supramundane soul enjoys, at every point, perfect omniscience with respect to the past, present, and future of the universe. Accordingly, when (at some point in the ideational realm taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), a supramundane soul is embarking for an earthly stay, i.e., embarking for its becoming an un-volitional, earthly, soul that will be inhabiting a volitional conscious material entity (whether of a human kind), the supramundane soul knows everything (in a perfect mode) about what will be the path, unfolding, of the material existence it’s about to enter. That is, the supramundane soul knows everything about the destiny that awaits it here below, which is engraved within the ideational essence correspondent to that material entity which the supramundane soul is about to enter. Even though any supramundane soul, when choosing some material entity here below for its upcoming earthly stay, makes such choice with un-suspensible operative effective free will, the vertical (rather than horizontal) character of time in the ideational realm allows in God perfect omniscience (at every point) about which earthly stay any of the supramundane souls will choose at some point.

  Any earthly soul is part of a conscious-kind and volitional-kind material entity (whether it is, besides, of a human kind). Though any of the different material existences that are, here below, experimented in earthly souls is God-designed (with the material realm being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm), the choice in supramundane souls that is, in the beyond, made of one or the other of those different material existences is, for its part, God-undesigned (whether the ideational realm is taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm). Both the God-designed earthly stay experimented in some earthly soul—and the God-undesigned choice made (of some earthly stay) in some supramundane soul—are nonetheless God-known (and God-known in a perfect, complete, mode) before even starting to exist. Upon a conscious volitional material entity’s death, the earthly soul which used to inhabit the entity in question becomes supramundane again and, accordingly, gains back its willingness (and un-suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness). Only those supramundane souls who, just after some earthly stay (as an earthly supramundane soul), are turned into divine supramundane souls see the whole of their earthly stays (experienced over the course of their eternal existence) becoming part of their pasts for the rest of their eternal existence. A divine entity is to be taken in the sense of a creative conscious volitional entity (i.e., a creating conscious volitional entity which creates in the field of ideas, and the creation of which in that field is inspirationally rather than descriptively made) that is, if not worthy of being adored, at least able to intervene with exceptional creativeness (i.e., exceptionally inspirationally made creation of exceptional novelty in terms of ideas, whether such creation is translated into other-than-idea matter) in the regulation, creation, and renewal of the cosmos (or in part of all of that); and which is even able to transgress the rules of the cosmos in its creation powers (whatever the extent of those powers). Any divine entity is ideational (rather than material); but only God is that kind of divine entity that is worthy of being adored. Any divine entity that is other than God is a supramundane soul; but, just like no earthly soul is divine, not any supramundane soul is divine. Reconnecting oneself with God (as a supramundane soul) is to be taken in the sense, not of merging with God again, but instead of becoming fire-made while remaining (strictly) distinct from the divine fire. In order for some supramundane soul to reconnect itself with the divine fire of which it is a water-made spark, a necessary, sufficient, condition consists of the divine fire’s turning the spark in question into a divine, fire-made, spark. In order for the divine fire to turn some water-made supramundane soul into a divine supramundane soul, a necessary, sufficient, condition consists of the divine fire’s judging the spark in question worthy to be turned (into a fire-made spark) and proposing the spark in question to turn the latter (into a fire-made spark); and of the water-made spark’s accepting to get God-turned (into a fire-made spark). Any supramundane soul which, at some point, is God-proposed to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul is one which, at that point in time, is wanting (and about to accept) to get God-turned into a divine supramundane; just like any supramundane soul which, at some point, is God-judged to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul is one which, at that point in time, is God-proposed (or about to get God-proposed) to get turned into a divine supramundane soul.

  A necessary, sufficient, condition in order for some supramundane soul to get God-judged worthy (and God-proposed) to become fire-made, divine, lies in the supramundane soul’s having experienced (as an earthly soul) a number of earthly stays in which it rendered itself worthy (at the end of the last of those stays), in the eyes of God, to become fire-made, i.e., divine. In turn, a necessary, sufficient, condition in order for some supramundane soul to have, in a number of past earthly stays, rendered itself worthy (at the end of the last of those stays), in the eyes of the divine fire, to get turned into a fire-made, i.e., divine, soul, lies in the supramundane soul’s having rendered itself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic (at the end of the last of those stays) to get God-judged to be worthy to get turned into a divine supramundane soul. Heroism and exploit are to be taken respectively in the sense of the accomplishing (as a material entity) of one or more exploits; and in the sense of an act that is jointly exceptionally creative (i.e., characterized with the mind’s creation of one or more exceptionally creative ideas), exceptionally successful (i.e., characterized with the complete fulfillment of an exceptionally hard goal), and exceptionally endangering for one’s material subsistence. No earthly stay in a conscious volitional material entity other than human can allow to render oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic (at the end of the stay in question) to get God-judged (as a supramundane soul) to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul (after the stay in question); even when adding the degree to which one would render oneself heroic in the stay in question to the respective degrees to which one would render oneself heroic in a number of past other stays in some conscious volitional material entities other than human. To render oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic at the end of one’s ongoing earthly stay (to get God-judged, as a supramundane soul, to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul), one inescapably has to have been experiencing a number of human material existences; and to become sufficiently heroic (to get God-judged, as a supramundane soul, to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul) at the end of a human material existence (whether one also experienced a number of material existences other than human). When some supramundane soul reconnects itself with God, i.e., becomes divine alongside God (while remaining strictly distinct from God), the soul systemically does it just after getting out of its experiencing (as an earthly soul) a human material existence. What’s more, when some supramundane soul reconnects itself with God, i.e., becomes divine alongside God (while remaining strictly distinct from God), the soul is systemically about to admire and advise the sorting, actualizing, pulse’s operation for the rest of the soul’s eternal existence; and all its earthly stays experienced over the course of its eternal existence are systemically about to become part of the soul’s past for the rest of the soul’s eternal existence. As soon as a supramundane soul was just turned into a divine soul, it is divine for the rest of its eternal existence and, for the rest of its eternal existence, henceforth in a position to intervene with exceptional creativeness in the regulation, creation, and renewal of the cosmos and even in a position to transgress the rules of the cosmos in its creation powers; but, when it comes to regulating, creating, or renewing the cosmos directly, the soul in question, throughout the rest of its eternal existence, won’t make a single use of any of its creation powers. Instead the soul that was just turned into a divine soul will only make use of its creation powers in a way consisting of making use of its creativeness to advise God in His regulation and renewal of the cosmos.

  It is worth specifying that, though God is (at every point) in a complete position to transgress the rules of the universe in His continuous creation, He completely abstains (at every point) from doing such a thing. Also, it is worth specifying that, though any divine ideational entity is (at every point) able to produce ideas in its very own mind, any idea it may produce is irremediably of an ideational (rather than material) kind, i.e., of a firmness-less (rather than firmness-endowed) kind. Besides the mistake in René Descartes that was his claiming (in his Discourse on the Method notably) the absence of mind in any other-than-human living material entity, another Cartesian mistake was his identifying (in The Passions of the Soul notably) the mind to the soul—and, in turn, the soul to a substance. The mind is to be taken in the sense of what, in some mind-endowed ideational or material entity, produces and hosts ideas. Just like mind is either of an ideational or material kind, it is either of a volitional or un-volitional kind; but mind in some mind-endowed entity is systemically conscious, what is tantamount to saying that any mind-endowed entity is conscious. Though any mind-endowed volitional entity is a conscious entity, not any conscious entity is a mind-endowed volitional entity; no more than any mind-endowed volitional entity is an ideational entity. Though any ideational entity is a consciousness-endowed entity, not any ideational entity is of a volitional nor of a mind-endowed kind; no more than any volitional conscious entity is of a material kind. Not any creation occurs in the field of ideas; but any creation made by a mind-endowed entity either consists of some creation in the field of ideas (whether the created idea or ideas are creative, i.e., inspirationally made rather than descriptively) or of some creation in the field of other-than-idea matter that occurs as the translation of some creation on the entity’s part in the field of ideas. In conscious volitional material entities, not any creative act (i.e., not any act characterized with one or more creative created ideas) is an exploit; but any exceptionally creative act (whether creativeness is translated from the mind into other-than-idea matter) in conscious volitional material entities is an exploit. The soul is to be taken in the sense of that kind of conscious ideational entity that is a spark of God (rather than a component of Him), which is either volitional and mind-endowed (when supramundane) or un-volitional and mindless (when earthly). In any conscious material entity (including human), the mind, instead of being a full-fledged entity (like Descartes wrongly believes), is actually an assemblage between the soul and the brain; just like, in any conscious material entity (including human), willingness, instead of being a property found in the soul (like Descartes wrongly believes), is actually one found in the brain. When occurring (at some point) in a conscious material entity, any volition (i.e., any operation of willingness), any thought-process, and any intellective creation (i.e., any creation of one or more ideas, whether descriptively or inspirationally) occur within the brain (rather than within the earthly soul); but consciousness, when present (at some point) in a conscious material entity, is present as a substantial property (i.e., a property falling within the substantial natural material essence) whose presence in the material entity has nothing to do with the brain but instead everything to do with the soul. The substantial property in that generic material entity that is the human of being made in God’s image is to be taken in a virtual sense. Namely that man (in his substantial natural material essence), on the one hand, finds himself to be occupying an intermediate rank between that kind of a living material entity that is endowed with chaotic instincts and that kind of entity that is like-divine (rather than divine stricto sensu); and, on the other hand, finds himself endowed with suspensible operative effective free will which he cannot but make use of (and make use of in some specific, correspondent, way) if he’s to fulfill what in him is virtually in God’s image. The constitutive (though neither natural nor substantial) property found at some point in some human who, at that point in time, has rendered himself like-divine of being like-divine is to be taken in the concrete (rather than virtual) sense of having fulfilled what in him is virtually made in God’s image. Such fulfillment is one that consists, not of reaching some final, optimal, degree in the fulfillment in question, but instead of progressing sufficiently (though endlessly) in the fulfillment in question, in which no optimal degree (whether attainable) is conceivable. Just like heroism and exploit are the (sole) key to fulfilling sufficiently what in oneself (as a human) is in God’s image, such fulfillment through heroism and exploit is reached, finalized, only in one’s ongoing material existence (as a human) though its execution occurs in a number (not necessarily one) of human earthly stays for one’s earthly soul (as a human).

    The Cartesian approach to a human’s soul as an ideational entity finding itself located (exclusively) within the pineal gland is nonetheless a worthy-of-being-saved approach, which is quite consistent with the location of a human’s suprasensible ability (i.e., a human’s ability to reach direct perception of all or part of the ideational realm) within (exclusively) the pineal gland. Divination is to be taken in the sense of the gaining knowledge of all or part of the future in the cosmos (though irremediably in a mode that is, at best, approximative) through perceptual access to some step of reality that stands above the step that is other-than-Chi and other-than-angel matter. That material entity that is the Chi, which both allows the emergent properties to get caused (whether efficiently) and the entities to get caused (whether efficiently), without efficiently-causing itself the slightest entity nor causing itself (whether efficiently) the slightest property, finds itself enveloping (at every point) every other entity in the cosmos as mere energy. That energy is, besides, of a vibratory kind. An entity that is, at some point, finalized is to be taken in the sense of an entity that is, at some point, spurred (whether appropriately) in some direction, whether the direction in question is internal (i.e., pursued by the entity—whether means are mobilized) or external (i.e., fixed by another entity) or both. Any entity that is, at some point, internally finalized is, at every point, a volitional entity (and reciprocally); but not any entity that is, at some point, externally finalized is, at that point in time, a volitional entity. (Any entity that is, at some point, volitional is volitional at every point; just like any entity that is, at some point, mind-endowed is mind-endowed at every point. Any material entity that is, at some point, conscious is conscious at every point; just like any conscious material entity is, at every point, of a volitional kind.) At every point, the Chi is un-finalized (both internally and externally) when considered independently of its incarnation-relationship to the sorting, actualizing, pulse in the ideational realm; and nonetheless finalized (both internally and externally) when considered from the angle of that incarnation-relationship. Accordingly, the Chi, at every point, is both deprived of any directional vibration when taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the sorting, actualizing, pulse in the ideational realm; and endowed with some directional vibrations when taken from the angle of that incarnation-relationship. A directional vibration in the Chi (with the latter being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship) is to be taken in the sense of a vibration in the Chi that indicates some Chi-pursued goal (in view of which a number of other vibrations in the Chi serve as means—and appropriate means appropriately used—in the Chi); and which, accordingly, reveals part of the future in the cosmos. Any vibration serving as some means in the Chi is an appropriate means appropriately used. As the Chi envelops every other entity in the universe (at every point), the vibrations constitutive of the Chi are spread out throughout every other entity in the universe. As concerns those vibrations constitutive of the Chi (with the latter being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship) that are directional, two ways as a human of gaining knowledge of all or part of the directional vibrations that are, at some point, enveloping oneself, resonating around oneself, respectively lie in tarotmancy—and in the use of a divinatory pendulum. In both cases, the knowledge one may gain is, at best, approximative. While tarotmancy and the divinatory pendulum both fall within a modality of divination that lies in perceptual access to that level of reality that is the Chi, a whole other modality of divination is the one that lies in perceptual access to the ideational realm.

  Yet another modality of divination, which has nothing do with the Chi-level of reality nor with the ideational level of reality, is the one that lies in perceptual access to a number of revelations made by one or more angels about all or part of the future in the cosmos. In his writing The Book of the Law under the guidance of Aiwass, Aleister Crowley enjoyed divination of that sort, which is, at best, approximative in any human (even Crowley) as angels cannot but communicate in such a way that their message’s reception is, at best, approximative in any human. That modality of freedom that is implicitly dealt with in The Book of the Law, which can be called starlit freedom (as it is relative to what it, metaphorically, means for some conscious volitional material entity to be a star), is claimed in the book in question to lie in doing (and wanting) what one’s will would want should one know (and espouse) one’s destiny. Crowley’s received-from-Aiwass precept that one (as a human) should do (and want) what one’s will would be should one know (and espouse) one’s destiny is (quite cryptically) put as follows in The Book of the Law. “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.” As for “Every man and every woman is a star,” another claim made in The Book of the Law, it makes use of the star’s metaphor in, at least, two distinct ways. Namely, on the one hand, that every human is endowed with that eternal and immaterial entity that is a soul, which makes him look like that seemingly eternal and immaterial entity that is a star in the night sky; and, on the other hand, that every human has some unique and precise destiny ascribed to him here below (like every star has some unique and precise position ascribed to it in the night sky). In Crowley’s writings, the (respective) soul found in every human contains some divine part, the deepest part, which expects him to fulfill his destiny through fulfilling what his will would be should he be knowing (and espousing) his destiny: in Crowley’s terms, through fulfilling his “true will.” Unless made use of in some imprecise way (like it is in Crowley’s writings), the star’s metaphor applied to a human being should be intended as follows. What makes every human being a star is not only that every human has some unique destiny that is unique to him; it is that every human has some unique destiny which, besides, is engraved from all eternity within his Idea. As for the star’s freedom, it is not to want what one would want (and do) should one fulfill (and espouse) one’s destiny; it is to know directly the Idea where one’s destiny is fixed. In other words, to be free is not (for some star) to fulfill its very own destiny written in heaven (which is inevitable for any human being); it is to grasp directly what the highest will wants for the star in question, that will that expresses itself in the slightest recesses and dust heaps in the universe. Precisely that psychical state (in the human) that is mindfulness, which cannot but be enjoyed (at some point) in a way that is, at best, approximative, is one which allows one to gain (at some point) direct suprasensible knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content; what is tantamount to speaking of direct knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence. That psychical state (in the human) that is mindfulness is also one which allows one to increase (at some point) the degree of one’s enjoyment (throughout one’s existence) of that component of human happiness that is human plenitude—namely that component of happiness in the human that applies throughout a human’s existence.

  Though that component of plenitude in the human that lies in persevering in one’s intactness throughout one’s material existence, which I propose to call “natural plenitude,” is to be distinguished from that component that I propose to call “supranatural plenitude,” which lies in authoring exploits regularly throughout one’s material existence, both natural and supranatural plenitudes in the human can see the degree to which they’re (throughout a human’s existence) enjoyed being increased (at some point) through mindfulness. In humans, both the enjoyment degree of any component of plenitude—and the enjoyment degree of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—cannot be experienced fully at some point. When occurring in some human, the direct suprasensible knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content cannot but occur in an ideationally, materially, interfered mode, i.e., in a mode that both witnesses a number of ideational interferences (preventing any precision in one’s suprasensible reach) and a number of material interferences (preventing any precision in one’s suprasensible reach). Some kind of ideational interference intervening in any suprasensible reach of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—and some kind of material interference intervening in any suprasensible reach of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—respectively lie in that interference that is one’s suprasensible reach’s finding itself majorly blinded by the light emanating from the ideational essence in question; and in that interference that is one’s suprasensible reach’s finding itself majorly diverted, lowered, by one’s perception (whether visual) of some material entities surrounding us. The human’s pineal gland’s ability to perceive in a direct suprasensible mode (though only with a number of interferences, both ideational and material) all or part of the ideational realm (or of some ideational essence within the latter) is the mark of the fact for the earthly soul occupying the gland in question of possessing the ability in question as a kind of connection with the ideational realm from which it originates. Though the earthly soul only brings consciousness within its material host (instead of bringing also willingness and mind), and is deprived of any mind and willingness within the material host, the fact that the material host’s consciousness is located within the soul (and within the soul only) both makes that the use the material host makes of its very own mind and willingness is to be imputed (and imputed only) to the host throughout the host’s (material) existence; and that the use in question is to be imputed (and imputed only) to the soul as soon as the soul has become supramundane again. In other words, when some soul leaves what was its material host here below (and, accordingly, becomes supramundane), it inherits from its past material host the imputatibility to oneself (and to oneself only) of everything the host did throughout the host’s material existence. In any earthly soul, elevation towards God, what can be called spiritual elevation, lies in rendering oneself sufficiently heroic in one’s experiencing of a number of earthly stays; just like, in any (un-divine) supramundane soul, having rendered oneself sufficiently heroic (as an earthly soul) to get God-judged worthy (as an un-divine supramundane soul) to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul lies in having rendered oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic and, accordingly, sufficiently like-divine. In humans, not any earthly soul finds itself occupying a human who renders the soul whose host he is sufficiently like-divine at the end of the soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but any earthly soul finds itself occupying a human who, at every point in the soul’s ongoing earthly stay, finds himself unable to escape (whether fully or partly) compliance with what his ideational essence’s content and will are about.

A renewal and unification of freedom’s understanding—and additional remarks on Spinoza and Aleister Crowley

  A material entity is to be taken in the sense of an entity endowed with some kind of firmness, consistency (for instance: an atom, the void, an idea in a dog’s mind, an information, or mere energy); just like an ideational entity (i.e., an Idea) is to be taken in the sense of an entity devoid of any firmness, consistency. As much the souls as the ideational essences as God are Ideas, i.e., are ideational entities; but no entity, whether it is material or ideational, is devoid of any compositional property. To be endowed with one or more material efficient causes is to be taken in the sense of having one or more of one’s efficient causes (or even all of one’s efficient causes) that are material, i.e., that are lying in one or more material other entities; just like to be endowed with one or more ideational efficient causes is to be taken in the sense of having one or more of one’s efficient causes (or even all of one’s efficient causes) that are ideational, i.e., that are lying in one or more ideational other entities. Self-determination in one’s willingness is commonly thought to be free will; but self-determination in one’s willingness is instead a modality of that component of free will that I propose to call “effective free will.” While free will actually lies in the absence (at least, at some point) of any endured effect with one or more efficient causes in one’s willingness, the component of free will that is effective free will, which is commonly thought (wrongly) to be free will itself (rather than a component of the latter), lies in the absence (at least, at some point) of any endured forced effect with one or more efficient causes in one’s willingness. Precisely, the fact for one’s willingness of jointly enduring not a single forced effect efficiently-caused—and enduring some efficiently-caused effect nonetheless—at some point, i.e., the fact for one’s willingness of completely self-determining at some point, comes as the operative modality of effective free will. Just like the operative modality of the material component of effective free will lies in the fact for one’s willingness of self-determining (at least, at some point) with regard to matter (i.e., of jointly enduring not a single forced effect with one or more material efficient causes and enduring some effect with one or more material efficient causes nonetheless: at least, at some point), the operative modality of the ideational component of effective free will lies in the fact for one’s willingness of self-determining (at least, at some point) with regard to Idea (i.e., of jointly enduring not a single forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes and enduring some effect with one or more ideational efficient causes nonetheless: at least, at some point). Just like any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, for an ideational entity’s willingness completely self-determined, at that point in time, with regard to Idea comes as an extrinsically contingent property (of a certain kind), any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, for a material entity’s willingness completely self-determined, at that point in time, with regard to matter comes as an extrinsically contingent property (of a certain kind).

  Conscious will is only a certain kind of will; just like effective free will (whether it is conscious) and conscious effective free will are respectively a certain kind of will and a certain kind of effective free will. Just like any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a volitional entity’s (operative) willingness is a property in said willingness (and reciprocally), any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a volitional entity’s (operative) willingness endowed, at that point in time, with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible) is an extrinsically contingent property that comes as a random (rather than forced) product of the fact that the entity’s present existence finds itself added to the combination (at some point before) between the entity’s existence, one or more relations on the entity’s part, and the property innate (or eternal) and intrinsically necessary (of the strong kind) not less than permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is the entity’s endowment with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible). Thus any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a conscious volitional entity’s willingness endowed, at that point in time, with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible) is an extrinsically contingent property that comes as a random (rather than forced) product of the fact that the entity’s present existence finds itself added to the combination (at some point before) between the entity’s existence, one or more relations on the entity’s part, and the property innate (or eternal) and intrinsically necessary (of the strong kind) not less than permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is the entity’s endowment with conscious operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible). No volitional entity (whether it is conscious—and whether it is ideational) is ever in a position to experiment the absence of the slightest object in its willingness at some point (i.e., in a position to experiment complete free will at some point); just like no volitional entity (whether it is conscious—and whether it is ideational) is ever in a position to experiment (whether completely—or partly) operative effective free will in an intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) mode at some point. At every point, operative effective free will is complete in supramundane souls both with regard to matter and with regard to Idea; but, at every point, it is also completely inexistent in humans with regard to Idea as any human is (at every point) both completely endowed with suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to matter—and, with regard to Idea, completely endowed with operative willingness completely subjected to his ideational essence’s will. The endowment with suspensible-kind operative effective free will (with regard to matter) is part of the substantial essence in a human; but said endowment both implies that the (complete) loss of willingness in a human cannot but be part of a ceasing-to-exist in the latter and that the (complete) suspension of operative effective free will (with regard to matter) in a human cannot be part of a ceasing-to-exist in the latter. At every point, God’s will—including when it comes to that part of His will that expresses itself through the way the sorting, actualizing, pulse operates—is both operative effective free will of a not-suspensible kind with regard to Idea and, with regard to matter, not-operative effective free will (i.e., willingness uncharacterized by the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes); but, for its part, the ideational essence’s will—including when it comes to that ideational essence that is the sorting, actualizing, pulse—is both not-operative effective free will with regard to matter and, with regard to Idea, servile operative will (i.e., willingness in which all objects are forced effects with one or more ideational efficient causes).

  As much God as the supramundane souls are, at every point, endowed with not-suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to Idea; but, at every point, the (respective) will the ideational essences are endowed with is completely configured by God’s will, which expresses itself through the ideational essence’s will. Any supramundane soul, through entering that part of the body that is the brain (whether it is a human’s brain), loses both its willingness and its remembrance of its past existence in the supramundane realm; but, while some humans are likely (rather than unlikely) to remember (though only in a sporadic and fuzzy mode) some moments of their soul’s past existence in the ideational realm, willingness in any human’s mind is irremediably a property of the brain rather than a property of the soul that entered the brain. Contrary to what Aleister Crowley claims, no part in a human’s soul is actually divine: a human’s soul is admittedly a spark of God, but a spark that is no more divine in some of its parts than it is globally divine. Accordingly, and contrary to what Aleister Crowley claims, fulfilling one’s destiny (as a human) in one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay doesn’t lie in the fulfillment of what the purported divine part in one’s soul, throughout that earthly stay, wants one to do on the occasion of that earthly stay. Actually the fulfillment of one’s destiny (as a human) instead lies in the accomplishment of what one’s ideational essence (in which one’s destiny is engraved) wants one to do on the occasion of one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay. Just prior to its embarkation for the earthly stay in question, one’s soul admittedly wants for the earthly stay in question the fulfillment of one’s ideational essence’s content (and therefore of one’s ideational essence’s will); but the fact that this coincidence (just prior to one’s soul’s embarkation) between what one’s soul wants and what one’s ideational essence wants is necessarily presupposed by one’s soul’s embarkation for one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay (though not necessarily reiterated at some point of the earthly stay in question) renders Crowley only partly right in his claim that one’s destiny’s fulfillment (as a human) lies in fulfilling what the divine part in one’s soul, throughout one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay, wants one to want (and to do). What elevates one’s earthly soul in its ongoing earthly stay indeed lies, as Crowley claims, in exceptional uniqueness for one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but it should be specified, what Crowley doesn’t do, that this exceptional uniqueness itself lies in exceptional creativeness (i.e., exceptionally inspirationally made creation of exceptional novelty in terms of ideas, whether such creation is translated into other-than-idea matter) and that exceptional creativeness itself lies in exploit and, accordingly, cannot but be reached in defiance of material subsistence. Love is indeed indispensable, as implied in Crowley’s precept that “Low is the law, love under will,” to an exceptional uniqueness of one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but it should be specified, what Crowley doesn’t do, that one kind of love concerned here is that which consists of praising (rather than denying) the wisdom characteristic of the cosmic order and of taking part in the repair and completion of the divine creation in strict compliance with its underlying order. Any soul which is elevating itself through its successive earthly stays has nothing divine prior to any of its earthly stays nor in any of its earthly stays; but completing its elevation here below through rendering itself (sufficiently) like-divine-here-below is what renders a soul divine-in-the-beyond after the elapse of all its successive earthly stays. To make you a star in the nocturnal firmament, there is no other way than to make you like a star under the daytime sky.

  Just like speaking of a strong intrinsically necessary property permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is either innate or eternal in a material entity is tantamount to speaking of a property remaining with intrinsic necessity of the strong kind in a material entity throughout the latter’s material existence, speaking of a component of the essence is tantamount to speaking of a component of a certain kind of essence. Just like the essence for any material entity is subdivided into two kinds of essence, its Idea (i.e., its ideational kind of essence) and its material essence, one way to classify the material essence’s components (including in the universe’s case) is to distinguish between the natural material essence, the substantial natural material essence, and that component of the substantial natural material essence that is strictly composed of those innate constitutive properties both intrinsically necessary of the strong kind and permanent with intrinsic necessity of the strong kind that fall within compositional substratum. A formal property and a compositional property are respectively a property that, in an entity, deals with how the entity in question is arranged, shaped, organized, and a property that, in an entity, deals with what the entity in question is composed of. While a substratum property is a non-existential property that, in an entity, finds itself endorsing one or more other non-existential properties (whether it is itself endorsed by one or more other non-existential properties) in the entity in question, an affection property is a non-existential property that, in an entity, finds itself endorsed by one or more other non-existential properties (whether it is itself endorsing one or more other non-existential properties) in the entity in question. Any affection property is either one formal or one that is the sum of one or more formal and of one or more compositional properties; just like any substratum property is either one compositional or one that is the sum of one or more formal and of one or more compositional properties. Any non-existential property falls either within substratum or within affection or within both; but, no more than any property falling within affection falls within form, not any property falling within substratum falls within composition. Any compositional property (rather than formal or a compound of form and composition) and any formal property (rather than compositional or a compound of form and composition) respectively fall within substratum (rather than within affection) and within affection (rather than within substratum); just like any property falling within affection or within substratum or within both—and any property that comes as a compound of form and composition—are respectively one non-existential (rather than existential) and one falling within substratum or within affection or within both. In any material entity (including the universe), the substantial natural material essence includes a compartment strictly composed of substratum properties, some of which are compositional and others are a compound of form and of composition; but, no more than those substratum properties in a material entity that are compositional can be found within what, in the entity in question, stands beyond the substantial essence, those substratum properties in a material entity that are other than compositional cannot be found only within the substantial essence. In any material entity (including the universe), the substantial natural material essence includes a compartment strictly composed of affection properties, some of which are formal and others are a compound of form and of composition; but, no more than those affection properties in a material entity that are formal are restricted to those formal-kind affection properties which, in the entity in question, occupy the substantial essence, those affection properties in a material entity that are other than formal cannot be found only within the substantial essence.

  Though Spinoza conceives of the “thought” and of the “extension” as two distinct “attributes” in God, any of the entities inhabiting any of God’s Spinozian “attributes” can be translated as a material entity in my language. Two mistakes in Spinoza respectively lie in his refusing to recognize the slightest separation between God and the universe—and in his pretending to prove God’s existence from God’s constitutive properties. Just like God is both identical (completely) to the universe and distinct (completely) from the latter, in that He gets incarnated (completely) into the universe while remaining (completely) external to the universe, the existence of God in an intrinsically necessary mode—and in a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternal mode remaining by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind throughout God’s existence—is both constitutive of God and not-provable from the fact that His existence in an intrinsically necessary mode—and His existence in a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternal mode remaining by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind throughout His existence—are two existential properties that fall within His constitutive properties. God’s existence could be proved from His essence if—and only if—the property of God’s existence were implied by all or part of the non-existential properties in God; but none of the existential properties in God has something to do with all or part of His non-existential properties. More about my assessment of the Spinozian approach to God can be read above. Another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse what, in its non-existential properties, is constitutive of that entity that is the universe and what, in its non-existential properties, not only remains in the universe (throughout its existence) by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind but endorses one or more formal-kind affections instead of being itself an affection; and, besides, to confuse what, in its non-existential properties, falls within affection (rather than within substratum) and what, in its non-existential properties falling within affection (rather than within substratum), falls within the formal component of affection. What Spinoza respectively calls a “mode” and an “attribute” of the substance that he claims the universe to be is, thus, respectively a formal affection that isn’t part of the substance’s constitutive properties (whether it is remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence); and a compositional substratum-property that is part of the substance’s constitutive properties and which, besides, remains by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence. Besides reducing any affection in any entity (including any substance) to a formal affection and any substratum property in any entity (including any substance) to a compositional substratum property, Spinoza reduces the set of any entity’s constitutive properties (were the entity a substance) to its formal properties, thus calling “formal essence” the set of any entity’s constitutive properties (were the entity a substance). Spinoza contradicts himself in that he both believes the set of the formal properties in any entity (were it a substance) to (strictly) coincide with the set of its constitutive properties—and the set of the constitutive properties in that kind of entity that is a substance to (strictly) coincide with the set of a substance’s “attributes.” What’s more, he mistakenly believes the universe to be a substance (i.e., an intrinsically necessary entity endowed at every point with a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternity that remains with strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the entity’s existence); and the set of the universe’s constitutive properties (and, accordingly, the set of a substance’s constitutive properties) to be an infinite set of “attributes,” i.e., an infinite set of non-existential constitutive properties which are all compositional (rather than formal or a compound of form and composition), all remaining in the universe by strong-kind intrinsic necessity, and all endorsing one or more formal affections (rather than one or more affections other than formal).

  No more than the non-existential constitutive properties in the universe entity, in a substance entity, or in any entity include only those non-existential constitutive properties which, by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, remain throughout existence, those non-existential constitutive properties which, by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, remain throughout existence exclude neither those non-existential constitutive properties which, besides remaining by intrinsic necessity (of the strong kind) throughout existence, fall within affection (whether they fall within substratum as well) nor those non-existential constitutive properties which, besides remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout existence, fall within the other-than-compositional compartment of substratum. Accordingly, those non-existential properties in the universe which, besides remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the universe’s existence, fall within formal affection, which Spinoza judges to be what he calls “immediate infinite modes,” i.e., formal affections that are remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence but which are external to the substance’s constitutive properties, are actually part of the universe’s constitutive properties (without the universe being a substance). Yet another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse the universe’s contingent properties with those of the universe’s contingent properties that are intrinsically (rather than extrinsically) contingent; and to miss, accordingly, the existence—and inscription within the universe’s field of contingent properties—of those of the universe’s properties that are extrinsically contingent. Thus Spinoza’s approach to the cosmos excludes as much the occurrence of the slightest random (rather than forced) effect in the cosmos as the presence in the latter of the slightest self-determined willingness (whether it is completely or partly self-determined) with regard to matter; what is tantamount to excluding as much the occurrence of the slightest extrinsically contingent property, generally speaking, as the occurrence of the slightest extrinsically contingent object (whether it is a means or a goal) in the slightest willingness. Two other mistakes in Spinoza respectively lie in his identifying the “striving to persevere in one’s being” to a kind of essence he calls “actual essence;” and in his substituting the ideational essence with an alleged kind of essence he calls “objective essence,” which would consist of the (true) idea one happens to have of a material entity’s material essence. Just like the idea (whether it is true or wrong) one happens to have of a material entity’s material essence is itself neither a kind of essence nor a component of a kind of essence, the “striving to persevere in one’s being,” though it is a property included within the substantial natural material essence in some material entities, is itself neither a kind of essence nor a component of a kind of essence. The “striving to persevere in one’s being”—to put Spinoza’s idea here in more precise terms than those by Spinoza himself: the striving to persevere in one’s integrity throughout one’s existence—is not a kind of essence; but, instead, a property included within the material essence in a certain kind of entity characterized by the presence of that striving in its constitutive properties.

  More precisely, the “striving to persevere in one’s being” is really a property included within the substantial stage of the material essence in a certain kind of entity defined by the presence of that striving in the substantial stage of its constitutive properties. In the human, that striving coexists at the substantial essence’s level—and, more precisely, at the instinctual level (in which it exists as an emotional impulse not necessarily translated into action) included within the human’s wider substantial essence—alongside the contrary striving to erode one’s integrity. That coexistence is not less beyond Spinoza’s understanding than is the impossibility of identifying the “striving to persevere in one’s being” to a genre or component of the essence. Another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse an entity’s “nature”—whose meaning in Spinoza’s thought and articulation with the Spinozian notion of “formal essence” are quite unclear—with what “nature” in an entity would be should the entity be wholly intact throughout its existence. Thus Spinoza says of “freedom” that it consists for an entity of being and acting by “the sole necessity of its nature;” though a more precise formulation for Spinoza’s idea here would be that freedom consists for an entity of being completely—rather than partly—compliant throughout is existence with the “necessity of its nature,” for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the “necessity of its nature” is neither wholly nor partly constrained—but instead wholly endured by the entity—throughout its existence, for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the entity remains wholly intact throughout its existence, for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the entity remains uncharacterized by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes. In my language, “nature” is clarified as follows. Namely that a material entity’s nature lies in the set of those of the entity’s constitutive properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) that are intrinsically necessary whether of the strong kind (namely when their occurrence at some point finds a necessary, sufficient, condition in the entity’s existence at the concerned point) or of the weak kind (namely when their occurrence at some point finds a necessary, sufficient, condition in the entity’s existence and intactness at the concerned point in time). As for that kind of freedom that Spinoza judged to be the only one existent in the cosmos, which he confusedly defined as the fact of being and acting by “the sole necessity of its nature,” it is clarified in my language as that kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of being completely compliant (throughout its existence) with what its nature would be should the entity remain uncharacterized (throughout its existence) by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes. Any cracking-effect that happens at some point with regard to one’s intactness (as a material entity) is either an efficiently-caused effect or one for which a necessary, sufficient, condition lies in the entity’s existence or intactness at the considered point in time. What I propose to call “virtual nature” in a material entity is what its nature would be should the entity be completely intact throughout its existence. What is tantamount to saying: what its nature would be should all the intrinsically necessary properties of the weak kind in the entity be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining (wholly) intact throughout its existence.

  Self-determination in one’s willingness with regard to matter, of which Spinoza wrongly denied the slightest degree at any point in the human, is another component of the human’s freedom in addition to that component of the human’s freedom that is the one consisting of remaining wholly uncharacterized by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes throughout one’s material existence; but one’s willingness’s self-determination with regard to matter cannot be complete at every point in a human’s material existence, no more than compliance with one’s virtual nature (or even with what one’s nature would be should one not endure a single cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes throughout one’s material existence) can be complete at some point in a human’s material existence. Besides his mistake that is his denying the slightest degree of self-determination (at any point) in the human’s willingness with regard to matter, another mistake in Spinoza lies in his identification of the human’s body to the human’s mind, thus saying that both are a “same thing” considered from the respective angle of those two “attributes” that are the “extension” (in the body’s case) and the “thought” (in the mind’s case). While the “extension” and the “thought” are, in Spinoza, conceived of as two realms completely distinct from each other, the body and the mind are, in him, conceived of as one single entity both belonging completely to the extension realm and belonging completely to the thought realm. As for those two sets of effects respectively endured by the body and the mind, they’re, in Spinoza, conceived of as two parallel sets of effects respectively operating in the “extension” realm only and in the “thought” realm only; so that any effect endured by the body in the “extension” realm finds its (complete) equivalent in some effect concomitantly endured by the mind in the “thought” realm, and reciprocally. On the issue of the relationship between a human’s mind and a human’s body, while Spinoza is wholly wrong, Descartes is partly right. Just like the mind and the body in the human, contrary to what Spinoza claims on the issue, are not one single entity considered from the respective angle of two constitutive properties in a certain substance (i.e., a certain intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode whose eternity remains throughout its existence by strong intrinsic necessity) identical to the universe, the mind and the body in the human, contrary to what Descartes claims on the issue, are not two distinct entities linked to each other through the pineal gland hosting that (thinking) substance that Descartes claims the soul to be. A human’s mind, instead of being a substance (as Descartes claims) or even an entity (were it identical to the body as Spinoza claims), is actually an assemblage composed (strictly) of that ideational entity that is the soul and of that part of the body that is the brain. As the soul (which neither Descartes nor Spinoza have the lucidity to distinguish from the mind) is indeed an entity (though it is not a substance) distinct from the body, and one which, in humans, indeed nests within the pineal gland, Descartes remains partly right against a completely wrong Spinoza.

  Right now I intend to address further my take on freedom. Freedom lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time (whether time is horizontal—or vertical), the slightest effect with one or more of its causes that are efficient; and that, whether one or more of the effect’s efficient causes are material rather than ideational, whether one or more of the effect’s efficient causes are external rather than internal, and whether the effect itself is forced rather than random. No entity (whether it is material—or ideational) can be completely free at some point. The component of freedom that is ideational freedom lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal), i.e., the slightest effect finding one or more of its efficient causes in an ideational entity (whether the latter is another entity than the entity in question). As for the component of freedom that is material freedom, it lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal), i.e., the slightest effect finding one or more of its efficient causes in a material entity (whether the latter is another entity than the entity in question). As much material freedom as, generally speaking, freedom cannot be completely experimented (but only experimented to a partial extent) in the human at some point; but, just like the human is both endowed (at every point in his material existence) with material freedom to a partial extent and unable to experiment (were it only at some point in time) the slightest degree of ideational freedom (i.e., unable to experiment, whether completely or partly, the ideational component of freedom), the supramundane soul is both endowed with complete material freedom (at every point in its existence) and endowed with partial ideational freedom (at every point in its existence). The modalities of material freedom include, at least, the volitional-effective, natural, and starlit modalities of material freedom, which respectively lie in the fact for a volitional entity (whether the latter is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest forced effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of one’s willingness; the fact for a material entity at some point of not enduring (not only at that point in time but at every point in its material existence) the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of one’s intactness; and the fact for a conscious volitional material entity at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest interference-effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of the direct suprasensible reaching of the whole of one’s ideational essence’s content.

  Though freedom (generally speaking) consists for an entity at some point of enduring, at least at that point in time, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes, the kind of material freedom that is natural material freedom cannot be (completely) experienced at some point in time without being (completely) experienced at every point in one’s material existence. The kind of freedom that is volitional freedom, which contains both a material component and one ideational, consists (for a volitional entity, i.e., an entity endowed with willingness) of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness; what is tantamount to not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest effect in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. Just like the material component of volitional freedom consists of not enduring in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes, the ideational component of volitional freedom consists of not enduring in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes. Just like the component of material volitional freedom that is material volitional-effective freedom consists for a volitional entity of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest forced effect with one or more material efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, the component of ideational volitional freedom that is ideational volitional-effective freedom consists for a volitional entity of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. No volitional entity (whether it is material—or ideational) can experiment, at some point, a state of complete volitional freedom, i.e., experiment, at some point, the absence of the slightest endured effect (whether the latter is forced—or random) with one or more efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness; but as much the ideational essences as the supramundane souls are experimenting, at every point, a state of complete material volitional freedom, i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest endured effect (whether the latter is forced—or random) with one or more material efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. No volitional material entity can experiment ideational volitional freedom (whether it is completely—or only to some extent); but, just like the supramundane souls are experimenting, at every point, a state of complete ideational volitional-effective freedom (i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in their respective wills), the ideational essences are experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest degree of ideational volitional-effective freedom (i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in their respective wills that is other than forced).

  In other words, the ideational component of effective free will, i.e., the absence in (the exercising of) one’s willingness of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes, is completely experimented in the supramundane souls at every point; but, just like the ideational component of effective free will is neither completely nor partly experimented in the ideational essences (whatever the point in time considered), the ideational component of effective free will is neither completely nor partly experimented in the material volitional entities (whatever the point in time considered). As for the material component of effective free will, i.e., the absence in (the exercising of) one’s willingness of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more material efficient causes, it is, at some point, either partly or completely or not at all experimented in any human; but, just like the material component of effective free will is completely experimented in the supramundane souls at every point, the material component of effective free will is completely experimented in the ideational essences at every point. Just like the modality of material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the human is suspensible-kind operative-kind material effective free will, the modality of material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the supramundane soul and in the ideational essence is of a not-operative kind, i.e., is of a kind consisting of not enduring a single effect (whether forced or random) with one or more material efficient causes. Just like the modality of operative-kind ideational effective free will that is present (at every point) in the supramundane soul is both not-suspensible and praxeologically-random (i.e., not ruled by the slightest praxeological law), the modality of operative-kind material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the human is both suspensible and praxeologically-forced (i.e., ruled by a number of praxeological laws). The degree to which material operative effective free will in humans is suspensible not only varies, at some point, from a human to another; the degree of suspensibility even varies over the course of one’s lifetime as a human. The kind of freedom that is starlit freedom, which consists for a conscious volitional material entity (at some point) of the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence (at least at that point in time), contains an ideational component, which consists for a conscious material entity of experimenting not a single ideational interference (i.e., not a single interference with one or more ideational efficient causes) with the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence; just like starlit freedom contains a material component, which consists for a conscious volitional material entity of experimenting not a single material interference (i.e., not a single interference with one or more material efficient causes) with the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence. Any supramundane soul is experimenting, at every point, a direct suprasensible reach of every ideational essence (both taken in isolation and in its globality) with the absence of the slightest (either ideational or material) interference; but, in humans, the direct suprasensible reach (what is tantamount to speaking of the direct reach) of some ideational essence (both taken in isolation and in its globality) is occurring sporadically (rather than at every point) and, besides, in a mode that is prey to ideational and material interferences (rather than in a mode uncharacterized with the slightest interference, be the latter ideational or material). What’s more, it is occurring (when occurring) with an efficiency varying from an individual to another.

  While a material entity’s nature, its natural material essence, lies in the sum of all the entity’s intrinsically necessary properties (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind), a material entity’s virtual nature, its virtual natural material essence, lies in what would be the sum of its intrinsically necessary properties (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind) should all the intrinsically necessary properties of the weak kind in the entity be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining (wholly) intact throughout its existence. Whether one speaks of the ideational essence (i.e., the ideational sum of all the properties of a material entity over the course of its existence), the material essence (i.e., the sum of all those properties in a material entity over the course of its existence that are constitutive), the natural material essence (i.e., the sum of all those constitutive properties that are intrinsically necessary—whether of the weak kind or the strong kind), or the substantial natural material essence (i.e., the sum of all those intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the strong kind that are both innate and endowed with intrinsically necessary permanence of the strong kind), a material entity cannot but be in (complete) compliance with its essence. More precisely, and whether one speaks of the ideational essence, the material essence, the natural material essence, or the substantial natural material essence, complete compliance with essence is itself an intrinsically necessary constitutive property of the strong kind that is both innate and endowed with intrinsically necessary permanence of the strong kind. Yet, in a material entity, the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature (i.e., what would be the natural material essence in the entity in question in the case where all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the entity in question would be those witnessed should the entity be remaining wholly intact throughout its existence) is no guarantee. More precisely, just like a necessary, sufficient, condition for the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature in a material entity is that the material entity in question remains wholly intact throughout its existence, the fact that a necessary, sufficient, condition for the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature in a material entity is that the material entity in question remains wholly intact throughout its existence is itself a substantial natural material property in the entity in question. The compartment of plenitude that is natural plenitude is that compartment of plenitude consisting for a material entity of being (throughout its material existence) in (complete) compliance with its virtual nature, i.e., in (complete) compliance with what its natural material essence would be should all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the material entity in question be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining wholly intact throughout its existence. As for the kind of freedom that is natural freedom, it is the kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of being (throughout its material existence) in (complete) compliance, not with its virtual nature, but instead with what its natural material essence would be should the entity’s complete compliance with its virtual nature be prevented (throughout the entity’s existence) by not a single effect with one or more efficient causes.

  In other words, it is the kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes (whether those efficient causes are material—or ideational) consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded. Though freedom (generally speaking) consists for an entity at some point of enduring, at least at that point in time, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes, the kind of freedom that is natural freedom cannot be (completely) experienced at some point in time without being experienced at every point in one’s material existence. Not any cracking-effect (with respect to one’s intactness as a material entity) is efficiently caused; but, just like any interference-effect (with respect to one’s direct suprasensible reach of the whole of one’s ideational essence as a conscious material entity) is efficiently caused, any object in one’s willingness (as a volitional entity) is efficiently caused. Just like the component of natural freedom that is material natural freedom is the kind of material freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more material efficient causes consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded, the component of natural freedom that is ideational natural freedom is the kind of ideational freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more ideational efficient causes consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded. Just like the degree to which that kind of material freedom that is natural material freedom can be reached (at some point) in humans is, at best, approximative, the degree to which that kind of ideational freedom that is natural ideational freedom can be reached (at some points) in humans is null. The fact for one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), at some point, of completely self-determining (in its exercising) is tantamount to the fact for one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), at some point, of enduring—and only enduring—one or more random (rather than forced) effects with one or more efficient causes (in its exercising); but the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, in (complete) compliance with one’s material essence is neither tantamount to the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, in (complete) compliance with one’s virtual nature nor tantamount to the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, endowed (and in complete compliance) with some material essence prohibiting (at every point) the slightest degree of self-determination in one’s willingness. Those three components of freedom in the human that are volitional-effective material freedom, natural material freedom, and starlit freedom respectively deal with one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), one’s intactness (as a material entity), and the direct suprasensible knowledge of the whole of one’s ideational essence (as a conscious volitional material entity). Obeying to one’s ideational essence’s will—and obeying to the latter completely rather than partly—are completly unavoidable in any human being throughout his material existence. Precisely, starlit freedom does not consist of obeying—whether partly or completely—to the will of one’s ideational essence; but instead consists of reaching in a direct suprasensible mode (the whole of) one’s ideational essence (taken in isolation) and, accordingly, what the will of one’s ideational essence is about. At every point, just like no human being can avoid obeying (and obeying completely) to his ideational essence’s will, no human being can avoid reaching directly what his ideational essence’s will is about to a degree that is, at best, approximative. Just like the degree to which those kinds of freedom that are material volitional freedom, natural material freedom, and starlit freedom can be reached in humans at some point is, at best, approximative, the degree to which ideational volitional freedom can be reached at some point in humans is null.   In his investigating freedom in the human, Spinoza (to put his thought in my language completely) not only misunderstood natural plenitude (i.e., compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with one’s virtual nature, i.e., compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with what one’s nature would be should one remain wholly intact throughout one’s material existence) to equate natural freedom. He also misunderstood natural freedom (which should be understood as compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with what one’s nature would be should one’s integrity, throughout one’s existence, not be prey to a single cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes) to lie in the fact of finding oneself (throughout one’s material existence) in compliance with one’s nature (without him even clearly distinguishing one’s nature from one’s essence); and, accordingly, the degree to which one experiments natural freedom to lie in the degree to which one finds oneself (throughout one’s material existence as a material entity) in compliance with one’s nature. What’s more, Spinoza, indeed denying the existence (at any point) of any other (partly enjoyed) kind of freedom in the human than natural freedom (which he even misunderstood), misunderstood (the partial enjoyment throughout one’s material existence of) natural freedom in the human to be never coexistent (in one’s material existence) in the human with the slightest degree (at some point) of self-determination (with regard to matter) in one’s willingness, i.e., the slightest presence (at some point) in one’s willingness of a random rather than forced efficiently-caused object (with all or part of its efficient causes lying in matter). A human being, throughout his material existence, cannot but find himself in complete compliance with his nature; but both the fact for a human being of not finding himself in full compliance with his virtual nature (i.e., in full compliance—throughout his material existence—with what his nature would be should all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the human in question be those which would be witnessed in the scenario with the human in question remaining wholly intact throughout his material existence) and the fact for a human being of not finding himself in full compliance—throughout his material existence—with what his nature would be should his integrity endure throughout his material existence not a single cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes are completely unavoidable in any human being. Precisely, Spinoza as much missed the distinction between nature and virtual nature—and the coexistence (throughout one’s material existence) in the human of (some partial enjoyment of) the natural kind of freedom with (an extent-varying enjoyment of) suspensible-kind self-determination in one’s willingness with regard to matter—as he failed to correctly identify the essence’s different kinds and components, thus missing the ideational kind of essence (in turn for his belief in what he called the “objective essence”) and the impossibility of identifying the “conatus” to some kind or component of the essence. As for Crowley, indeed believing (wrongly) the accomplishing of one’s destiny (as a human individual) to be completely dependent on the knowing (and espousing) of one’s destiny, he misunderstood starlit freedom (which should be understood as the direct suprasensible knowledge of one’s ideational essence—and therefore of one’s destiny here below—as a conscious volitional material entity without the slightest interference, whether ideational or material) to lie in (complete) compliance (throughout one’s material existence) of one’s will as a human with what one’s will (throughout one’s material existence) would be should one be completely knowing (and espousing) one’s destiny here below. Just like no human being can ever find himself in complete compliance with his virtual nature at some point of his material existence, no human being can ever find himself in infringement (whether completely or partly) with his ideational essence at some point of his material existence.

That second part was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s September 2022 issue.