Grégoire Canlorbe

Science and scientism, metaphysics and ontology, and psychology and economics

  Just like exploit is an act that is jointly characterized with exceptional creativeness (in the exploit’s author), as well as with the exploit’s author’s material subsistence’s being exceptionally endangered and with the exploit’s author’s (successfully) reaching some goal that is exceptionally hard to reach, three modalities of exploit are the following ones: namely that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of war, that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of entrepreneurship, and that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of helping the unfortunates and sharing their suffering. Those three genres of exploit are respectively military exploit, entrepreneurial exploit, and sainthood; and the respective authors of those three genres of exploit are the war hero, the business hero, and the saint. Besides military and entrepreneurial exploits, and sainthood, still another genre of exploit is cognitive exploit, a modality of which is artistic exploit; but all genres of exploit are characterized with the involvement of intellective virility on the part of the exploit’s author (i.e., on the hero’s part). Intellective virility, which is distinct (rather than indistinct) from the IQ, consists of the following set of intellective characteristics: an independent, critical intellect; creativeness; finesse at the level of principles; finesse at the level of ideas; and perseverance and perfectibility. Any concept is an idea, but not any idea is a concept; “idea” or “notion” can be used indiscriminately to refer to idea, just like “intellect” and “mind” can be used indiscriminately to refer to mind. Before returning a few sections later to the saint and the war hero, I intend to focus on the (sole) case of the business hero, and to proceed with some considerations in the field of economics (including the epistemology of economics) as part of my basing my approach to the business hero.

  An object of knowledge and the fact of approaching knowledge of some object of knowledge are respectively are respectively an object of which one endeavors to gain knowledge—and the fact of gaining some knowledge (of some object of knowledge) that is imperfect (rather than perfect), and which is, at best, approximate. A field of knowledge and a method of knowledge are respectively a field that covers the endeavors to gain knowledge of some object of knowledge—and a method that is employed for the purpose of gaining or approaching knowledge of some object of knowledge. Epistemology is that field of knowledge whose object is the proper method (or methods) of knowledge with respect to some object of knowledge. The empirical senses and the supra-empirical sense are respectively those senses that allow for the experience of one or more material entities—and that sense that allows for the experience of one or more ideational entities. Empirical and supra-empirical experiences are respectively the experience of one or more material entities through one or more empirical senses—and the experience of one or more ideational entities through the supra-empirical sense. Corroboration and confirmation respectively consist for some claim of being supported in a way that doesn’t prove the claim in question to be true; and of being supported in a way that proves the claim in question to be true. Just like empirical corroboration consists for some claim of being empirically supported in a way that doesn’t confirm the claim in question (i.e., of being supported through some empirical experience that doesn’t confirm the claim in question), conjecture consists of some claim that is guessed from reality (whether material), but which cannot be confirmed through empirical experience nor through supra-empirical experience. Just like empirical confirmation consists for some claim of being empirically supported in a way that confirms the claim in question (i.e., of being supported through some empirical experience that confirms the claim in question), empirical refutation confirms for some claim of being empirically refuted (i.e., of being refuted through some empirical experience). Just like verification consists of determining through some empirical or supra-empirical experience whether the experience in question confirms some claim, a numerical claim consists of a claim that involves one or more measured quantities. A prediction is a claim that expresses the future occurrence of one or more entities, and/or of one or more properties in some present entity (or entities). A conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level is a conjecture that does one or more predictions (whether numerical), and which would be empirically refuted should one or more of its predictions be empirically refuted. Science is a method of approaching knowledge that consists of elaborating some conjecture that is corroborated (rather than confirmed) through the empirical corroboration of one or more numerical, empirically verifiable predictions expressed in the conjecture in question, and which would be empirically refuted should the contrary of one or more of those predictions be empirically confirmed.

  Two mistakes in Karl Popper respectively lie in his approach to method as the criterion of distinction between metaphysics and science—and in his approach to science as a method of approaching knowledge that relies on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level. On the one hand, what distinguishes science from metaphysics is not some difference in what would be their respective methods; it is instead the fact that science and metaphysics are respectively a method of knowledge (rather than a field of knowledge), and a field of knowledge (rather than a method of knowledge). On the other hand, science is more than a method of knowledge based on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable through empirically falsifiable prediction: it is, more precisely, a method of knowledge that consists of approaching knowledge through elaborating some predictive conjecture whose prediction (or predictions) are numerical, not just empirically corroborated, and which would be empirically refuted should the contrary of its prediction (or of one of more of its predictions) be empirically confirmed. A claim that falls within that field of knowledge that is metaphysics can fall within that method of knowledge that is science just like it can fall within some method of knowledge that is other than science. Metaphysics is that field of knowledge whose object lies in that level of reality that stands beyond the material level. Metaphysics and ontology, instead of being indistinct from each other, are two distinct fields of knowledge that intersect. Ontology consists of studying the Being (i.e., that which, without existing itself, makes there is existence in the entities), and its articulation with the entities. Among the components of ontology, one has as its object the Idea of the Chi, which stands as the transition between the ideational Being and the Ideas; another one has as its object some material entity considered from the angle of those of its properties that do not singularize the entity in question at that level of reality at which the entity in question is situated. In other words, that other component of ontology is a field of knowledge whose object lies in those properties that, in some entity at some level of reality, are common to all entities situated at the level in question, and which form the ontological structure of that level of reality. Just like the Chi stands as the transition between the material Being and material existence, those properties in some entity (that do not singularize the concerned entity at its level of reality) stand as the transition between the Chi and the other properties present in the concerned entity.

  A claim that is objectively certain and a claim that is subjectively certain are respectively a claim that one is forced to recognize to be true when addressing it without the interference of any feeling or bias; and a claim that one believes to be true, but which may be not objectively certain. A law of logic and a valid law of logic are respectively a law one finds oneself following in the way one is elaborating some line of reasoning; and a law of logic that one cannot abstain from following in some line of reasoning without rendering that line of reasoning nonsensical. Just like one must be aware not to confuse science and scientism, one must be aware not to believe to be objectively certain those claims that are conjectural. Science is a method of approaching knowledge that relies on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the level of numerical prediction; but scientism (which can be referred to as “positivism” as well), for its part, is an epistemological, ontological claim that (strictly) holds the following positions. Namely that: any entity is subjected to the ontological laws of identity, of non-contradiction, and of the excluded middle; any property is numerical, i.e., is some measurable quantity; any property is, either an intrinsically necessary property, or an extrinsically necessary, intrinsically contingent property; no entity is self-produced; any extrinsically necessary property is identically repeated whenever some circumstances are identically repeated; any entity is material and endowed with some mass and extent, so is any property; science is the only effective way of gaining knowledge, and what science consists of is the experiencing in a numerical, empirical way, then describing in numerical terms, those extrinsically necessary properties that are numerical relationships of causation; the sole other base on which scientific statements, besides relying (inter alia) on empirical experience, are grounded is mathematical statements and, generally speaking, definitions, and definitions (including mathematical statements) are apodictically true by the sole operation of the laws of logic, which are themselves valid independently of reality; science allows for the making of objectively certain claims; science allows for omnipotence with regard to the universe, including the human society, and the latter can be centrally planned; imagination and intellective virility are burdens (rather than assets) for the pursuit of knowledge, just like they’re burdens (rather than assets) for the sound working of society. The harm that scientism did to that field of knowledge that covers human behavior includes, for instance, the restricting (human) intelligence to (human) IQ, as well as the approach to a cultural pattern as independent of human behavior and completely, strictly dependent of another cultural pattern. Further below, I will address more extensively that harm scientism did to the knowledge of human behavior, and that harm it did generally speaking.

  Sociology, economics, praxeology, and, generally speaking, psychology (whether they apply to human behavior rather than to some other-than-human animal behavior) cannot gain any knowledge (other than imperfect and, at best, approximate) of their respective object of knowledge. They can approach knowledge and, accordingly, they can produce claims which, instead of being objectively certain, are conjectural; no psychological claim that would be rendered objectively certain through empirical experience is nonetheless possible. A claim that would be rendered objectively certain through supra-empirical experience is no more possible in psychology than it is possible generally speaking; the same applies to that genre of claim that would be rendered objectively certain through apodicticity. An apodictic statement and an analytic statement are respectively a statement that would be true (or wrong) by its sole terms (and, accordingly, independently of reality); and an apodictic statement that would be true (or wrong) by the sole laws of logic. A synthetic statement is a statement that is true (or wrong) depending on reality (and on reality alone). A statement that is true (or wrong) a priori and a statement that is true (or wrong) a posteriori are respectively a statement whose truth (or falsehood) could be determined independently of any experience (whether empirical); and a statement whose truth (or falsehood) cannot be determined independently of any experience (whether empirical). No statement can be true (or wrong) a priori, no more than any statement can be apodictic. The alleged synonymy between some concept and the sum of those elements that its alleged definition claims to be its object’s constitutive properties cannot be true independently of reality, what applies to the mathematical concepts: accordingly definitions (including mathematical statements) aren’t true (or wrong) a priori. As for the laws of logic, they themselves cannot be valid independently of the ontological structure of that level of reality that is considered. Yet Emmanuel Kant made the claim that any statement is, either analytic, or synthetic, and that some synthetic statements—namely those synthetic statements that are about some line of reasoning that the human mind strictly elaborates from some concepts whose respective object can lie in the human’s spatio-temporal framework taken independently of that empirical experience it is assigned to—are nonetheless true (or wrong) a priori. In the Kantian approach to apodicticity, any apodictic statement is analytic, and, while a (true) definition falls within (and is the only genre of statement to fall within) that modality of a statement true a priori that is analytic, and a mathematical statement is no definition, a (true) mathematical statement falls within that modality of a statement true a priori that is synthetic. What’s more, in the Kantian approach to apodicticity, the mathematical statements—and some part of those statements which he says fall within metaphysics—are the expression of lines of reasoning that are strictly elaborated from concepts whose object can lie in the human mind’s spatio-temporal framework (taken independently of that empirical experience to which the framework in question is assigned). Whether a line of reasoning can, indeed, be strictly effectuated from concepts whose object can lie in the spatio-temporal framework (taken independently of empirical experience) is an issue I intend to address a bit later; but, were some statement the expression of such line of reasoning, it wouldn’t render that statement true (or wrong) a priori. Though mathematical statements are definitions, the fact still remains that no definition is analytical.

  That field of knowledge that is human economics is a component of that wider field of knowledge that is human psychology, and a component which, besides relying on, inter alia, that component of human psychology that is human praxeology, intersects with those components that are human thymology and human-crowd psychology. An instinct is, in some living entity, a genetic disposition for the occurrence of some intrinsically necessary or extrinsically necessary or extrinsically contingent property. Any instinct in some living entity is part of that living entity’s substantial essence. A law of nature and a pseudo-law of nature are respectively an extrinsically necessary (and intrinsically contingent) property that is a causation relationship, and which involves a substantial disposition for the forced occurrence of that causation relationship whenever some circumstances apply; and an extrinsically contingent property that is a causation relationship, and which involves a substantial disposition for the random occurrence of that causation relationship whenever some circumstances apply. Psychology is that field of knowledge whose object lies in the mind (including the human mind), and, accordingly, the mind-ruled behavior of mind-endowed entities and the way the meeting between the respective mind-ruled behaviors of some mind-endowed entities produces some order or disorder (or mix of order and disorder) at the level of that meeting. In psychology (whatever the considered component), the proper method of knowledge consists of approaching knowledge through that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level. Among the components of human psychology, three are the following ones: human praxeology, human thymology, and human-crowd psychology. Human praxeology is that component of human psychology whose object lies in the structure that, in some human behavior, lies between the pursued end and that (or those) means that are employed for the purpose of that end. The respective instinctual dispositions for the characteristics of such structure (like the fact that an imminent reaching of some pursued goal finds itself—were it only to some extent—preferred over its reaching at some point more distant in the future) are part of the substantial essence. Human thymology and human-crowd psychology, for their part, respectively deal with those pseudo-laws that are characteristic of that human behavior in which suspensible-kind operative effective free will is at work (rather than suspended); and those laws that are characteristic of that human behavior that is crowd behavior, in which suspensible-kind operative effective free will is suspended (rather than at work).

  While that genre of conjecture that is relevant in human praxeology is empirically falsifiable at a non-numerical prediction level (and only at such level), that genre of conjecture that is relevant in human thymology and human-crowd psychology is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that, depending on whether the addressed regularity is numerical (rather than non-numerical), is numerical (rather than non-numerical). A thymologic regularity in human behavior is a relationship of causation that is repeatedly, and, either in a trend manner, or without any exception, witnessed between some human behaviors (like the fact that supplying, of some genre of good or service, a quantity with some positive use value will result into a demand of all or part of that quantity at some global selling or leasing price that expresses a trade value which notably takes into account the involved abstract labor), or between some human behavior and some property other than falling within human behavior (like, for instance, the trend that the earlier availability that an increase in roundaboutness requires of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service leads those genres of good or service to be preferred as present rather than as future), but which, instead of being extrinsically necessary, falls within the pseudo-laws of nature. A crowd regularity in human behavior is a relationship of causation that is repeatedly, and without any exception, witnessed in human behavior whenever some humans are forming some crowd, and which, instead of being extrinsically contingent, falls within the laws of nature. Economics is that component of psychology whose object lies in that human behavior that consists of producing or exchanging some genre of entity or performance in some quantity, and in the way the meeting between some behaviors falling within that genre of behavior produces some order or disorder (or mix of order and disorder) at the level of that meeting. That genre of behavior is economic behavior, and the thymologic and crowd regularities in that genre of human behavior that is economic behavior, which is the object of human economics, are part of that object. That genre of conjecture that is relevant in human economics is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that is, either numerical, or non-numerical, and which is numerical especially when it comes to addressing those thymologic or crowd regularities (in economic behavior) that are numerical.

  Any human thymologic regularity (whether it concerns economic behavior) is, either universal to all human beings, or unique to one or more genres of society, or unique to one or more genres of group within some society (or societies), or within all societies; but any human-crowd regularity is universal to all human crowds. Except when it comes to the case of a Robinson Crusoe economy, human economics is a component of human sociology, and one that—whenever it deals with that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology—intersects with human strong sociology. Sociology and strong sociology, when applied to human behavior, are respectively that component of psychology whose object lies in that human behavior that is effectuated in the context of some society; and that component of sociology whose object lies in that human behavior that is effectuated in the presence of some environment (in some society) making it impossible or especially hard to resort to one or more means (and/or to one or more of the respective ways of using a number of means) for the purpose of some goal, or in the presence of the respective social pressure that is exerted in support of one or more cultural patterns present in the considered society. That genre of conjecture that is relevant in human sociology is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that is, either numerical, or non-numerical, and which is numerical especially when it comes to addressing those regularities (whether thymologic or crowd-relative) falling within its object that are numerical; the same applies to human strong sociology. Whenever some genre of human behavior is part of the object of human sociology, but outside of the object of human strong sociology, that genre of human behavior, either finds itself not falling within that genre of human behavior that is the object of human strong sociology, or finds itself happening independently of whether it falls within that genre of human behavior that is the object of strong sociology. Among the proper ways of approaching knowledge of that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology, one is contrafactual. Namely that it consists of endeavoring to approach knowledge of some genre of behavior (falling within that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology) from how the genre of behavior in question would be if it found itself in the absence of one or more cultural patterns whose social pressure it is actually faced with, and/or in the absence of some social environment it is actually faced with.

  Just like, among the modalities of social pressure, one is that genre of social pressure that is coercive, coercion consists of the threat of harming an individual’s physical integrity, or one or more of his possessions, against his consent and in order to get the individual in question to proceed with one or more behaviors or to abstain from proceeding with one or more behaviors. A voluntary behavior is a behavior that, in some volitional entity, proceeds from its willingness (whether self-determined), and which doesn’t comply with any coercion. The theory of trade value is the theory of the way the trade value common to those respective quantities of some genres of good and services that are voluntarily and indirectly, via the money medium, traded for each other is determined and finds a money expression. The theory of trade value, while falling within that component of human sociology that is human economics, is almost completely outside the scope of strong sociology. Besides those thymologic regularities that are characteristic of the trade value’s determination and expression being non-numerical, those genres of human behavior—labor, saving, entrepreneurship, compensation, and the use of money—that are involved with the determination of trade value, and with its expression in money terms, are involved with those determination and expression in a way that, except when it comes to the law, is completely independent of culture and social environment. The way the trade value in some indirect trade that is effectuated via the money medium is determined and expressed is completely dependent on whether the law in some society finds itself coercing the trade value—for instance, through value-added tax—of those quantities which, in the considered society, are voluntarily and indirectly (and via the money medium) traded for each other. Capitalism is that genre of economy that would be characterized with entrepreneurship, saving, money, trade value, and the division of labor; as well as with the complete private ownership both of the consumption factors and of the production and paraproduction factors, what excludes any interference of the law with the trade value’s determination and expression. Though a completely capitalist economy can hardly be, endeavoring to approach knowledge of the trade value’s determination and expression from endeavoring to approach knowledge of how the trade value would be determined and expressed in a completely capitalist economy is a proper application of the contrafactual method in human strong sociology. Thus the insights I’m about to present about the determination, and expression, of trade value, before addressing the case of trade value in an economy that is, either capitalist to some extent, or not capitalist at all, will first restrict themselves to the case of trade value in the framework of a completely capitalist economy.

Understanding trade value, profit, and diamond-and-water: the flaws of the abstract-labor and particular-utility approaches

  A commodity is an entity or performance that is distinct from money, and which is, if not endowed with some positive trade value and use value, at least put on the market and intended to be endowed with some positive trade value and use value. Trade value and use value are concepts I intend to define a few lines below. A supplier and a demander are respectively an individual who is handling some supply process—and an individual who is demanding some quantity of some genre of good or service. A good and a service are respectively an entity that is a commodity—and a performance that is a commodity. A supply process is the process through which some genre of good or service is produced or extracted in some quantity and then brought to the market in the quantity in question in order for that quantity to get offered at some point, and at some place. “Supplied” and “offered” can be used indiscriminately when it comes to designating the supplied character of some supplied quantity. The reproduction of some genre of good or service in some quantity, and the modification of some genre of good or service in some quantity, are both among those modalities of the production of some genre of good or service in some quantity. A consumption good or service is a good or service that is, if not intended (by its supplier) to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of that genre of commodity that is the workforce commodity, at least intended to meet some genre of emotional need; and which is, if not able to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of the workforce commodity, at least unable to get—and intended to not get—involved with the supply process of any supply good or service other than (that genre of supply service that is) the workforce commodity. As for a supply good or service, it is a good or service that is, if not able to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some genre of good or service other than that genre of commodity that is the (generic) workforce commodity, at least unable to get involved with the supply process of any quantity of the workforce commodity; and which is intended (by its supplier) to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some good or service other than the workforce commodity. A direct supply good or service and an indirect supply good or service are respectively a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some consumption good or service—and a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some supply good or service. Likewise a production good or service and a paraproduction good or service are respectively a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with some supply process through contributing to the production of that genre of good or service that is offered in some quantity at the end of the supply process—and a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with some supply process through contributing to the extraction, transportation, reparation, or advertising of that genre of good or service that is offered in some quantity at the end of the supply process.

  Demand at some unitary price and the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at some unitary price are respectively the sum of the respective quantities that, of some quantity offered of some genre of good or service at some point and place, are bought or rented at some unitary price by a number of demanders—and the sum of the respective quantities that all those standing ready (and able) to demand some quantity (of some genre of good or service) at some unitary price, and at some point and place, stand ready (and able) to buy or rent, at the price in question, of some quantity offered (of the concerned genre of good or service) at the concerned point and place. A proposed unitary price (i.e., a unitary price at which the supplier of some offered quantity proposes to sell or lease the quantity in question) must be distinguished from a unitary price that is indeed practiced, and at which all or part of some offered quantity is indeed sold or leased. A practiced unitary price equalizing supply and demand is a practiced unitary price at which the quantity supplied at that price is equal to the quantity that is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at that price. A practiced equilibrium unitary price is more than a practiced unitary price equalizing supply and demand: it is a practiced unitary price that, besides equalizing supply and demand, equalizes the quantity supplied at that price, the quantity demanded at that price, and the quantity that one stands both ready and able to demand at that price. Any proposed unitary price at which supply is standing above demand is a unitary price that, besides having the quantity supplied at that price outweigh the quantity demanded at that price, is a unitary price at which the supplied quantity is standing above that quantity one stands both ready and able to demand at that price; but not any proposed price equalizing supply and demand is a price that, besides equalizing supply and demand, is equalizing the quantity demanded at that price and that quantity one stands both able and ready to demand at that price. The global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased is the unitary price (at which that quantity that is sold or leased is demanded) times the demanded quantity. A supply field is that field that covers the various supply processes of a same genre of good or service that is offered in some respective quantities offered at some respective points, and at some respective places. An entrepreneurial field is that field that covers the various supply processes which, of a same genre of good or service that is offered in some respective quantities offered at some respective points, and at some respective places, are handled by entrepreneurs. An entrepreneurial field is, either some supply field in which all suppliers are entrepreneurs, or that component that, within some supply field (in which not all suppliers are entrepreneurs), only includes those suppliers who (within the concerned supply field) are entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur is a supplier who acquires, hypothetically through demanding (i.e., buying or renting), a number of supply goods, and then allocates them to that supply process he is handling.

  A (particular) utility of some (particular) good or service is its utility to satisfy some (particular) goal if the latter happens to be pursued. A generic good and a generic service are respectively a genre of good common to a number of particular goods and a genre of service common to a number of particular services. A generic utility of a generic good or service is a genre of utility common to those units which fall within the genre of good or service in question. Just like a generic good or service may have several generic utilities, a particular good or service may have several particular utilities. A particular utility of a generic good or service is the very same thing as a particular utility of some particular good or service that is a unit of the genre in question. In some economy that is, either completely, or to some extent, capitalist, the degree of importance attributed to some generic utility and the degree of importance attributed to some particular utility are respectively the degree of importance someone attributes to the utility of some generic or particular commodity to reach some genre of goal (whether he is demanding the generic or particular commodity in question, and whether he is enjoying the generic or particular commodity in question), and the degree of importance someone attributes to the utility of some generic or particular commodity to reach some particular goal (whether he is demanding the generic or particular commodity in question, and whether he is enjoying the generic or particular commodity in question). Just like giving more importance to the generic utilities of some generic good or service than to the generic utilities of some other generic good or service supposes those genres of goal the former generic good or service allows to reach are given more importance than those genres of goal the latter generic good or service allows to reach, giving more importance to some generic utilities of some generic good or service than to some other generic utilities of that same generic good or service supposes that the former generic utilities are given more importance than the latter generic utilities. A marginal particular utility of a generic good or service is that (particular) utility some demander or enjoyer of some generic good or service in some quantity expects from that unit he intends to consume or invest lastly. The marginal particular utility of some quantity (of some generic good or service) one is demanding or enjoying is, accordingly, that least prioritized particular utility among the particular utilities common to each of the demanded or enjoyed units of the generic good or service in question.

  Any generic commodity has a number of particular use values and a number of particular trade values; but no generic commodity has any generic use value, no more than a generic commodity has any generic trade value. A particular use value of some generic commodity in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist lies in the sum of the respective degrees of importance the demanders of all or part of some quantity offered (at some place, and at some point) of the generic commodity in question (in the economy in question) are giving to the sum of those particular utilities they plan to have their respective demanded quantities of that offered quantity accomplish. Likewise a particular trade value of some generic commodity lies in the degree to which some quantity offered at some place, and at some point, of that generic commodity in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist is able to get traded for the sum of some respective quantities of those generic commodities that, at some respective places in the considered economy, are offered at the considered point in some quantities or will be offered at some ulterior point in some quantities. The particular use values of some generic commodity are too varying from some quantity offered in some place (and at some point) to an equivalent quantity offered in some other place (but at the same point), and too varying over time (as concerns some quantity repeatedly offered in the same place), in order for the generic commodity in question to have some generic use value; just like the particular trade values of some generic commodity are too varying from some quantity offered in some place (and at some point) to an equivalent quantity offered in some other place (but at the same point), and too varying over time (as concerns some quantity repeatedly offered in the same place), in order for the generic commodity in question to have some generic trade value. Whenever a number of entrepreneurs are competing in some entrepreneurial field, they’re offering at some respective points, and at some respective places, some respective quantities of a same generic good or service.

  The global price at which all or part of some quantity offered of some generic commodity at some point (and in some place) is demanded, i.e, the unitary price at which all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is sold or leased at some point (and in some place) times the demanded quantity, is the money expression of the particular trade value of the offered quantity. Saying that the particular trade value of some generic commodity is, in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist, greater than the particular trade value of some other generic commodity is a convenient way of saying that the particular trade value of any offered quantity of the former generic good (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered) is, in the considered economy, greater than the particular trade value of any equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered). Likewise, saying that the particular use value of some generic commodity is, in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist, greater than the particular use value of some other generic commodity is a convenient way of saying that the particular use value of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered) is, in the considered economy, greater than the particular use value of any equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered). A necessary, sufficient condition in order for everyone in some economy to give more importance to any of the generic utilities of some generic commodity than to any of those of some other generic commodity is that everyone in the considered economy also gives more importance to any of the particular utilities of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) than to any of those of an equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered). Likewise a necessary, sufficient condition in order for the particular use value of any offered quantity of some generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) to outweigh that of an equivalent offered quantity of some other generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) is that everyone in the considered economy also gives more importance to any of the particular utilities of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) than to any of those of an equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered).

  Abstract labor means some duration of labor that is involved with the supply process of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity, and which is considered from the angle of those of its properties that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity is taking into account (rather than from the angle of all its properties). The use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, of which the diamond-and-water conundrum we will address a few lines later is a particular case, can be put as follows: does the particular use value of some offered quantity (at some place, and at some point) of some generic commodity in some (completely) capitalist economy have any involvement with the determination of that quantity’s particular trade value? And if it does have some involvement, what does the involvement in question consist of? The respective answer given to those two conundrums—the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, and the diamond-and-water conundrum—will vary depending on which approach to the particular trade value it relies on. The abstract-labor approach to the particular trade value understands the particular trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity at some point, and at some place) in some capitalist economy as equal, or close, to the amount of that abstract labor that was involved with the supply process of that quantity of the concerned generic commodity. Whenever some offered quantity is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at a unitary price equalizing the quantity in question and that quantity that one plans (and is able) to buy (or rent) at the price in question, the abstract-labor approach says, the unitary price times the demanded (i.e., bought or rented) quantity is the money expression of the involved abstract labor. Whenever that equality doesn’t occur, the abstract-labor approach adds, the practiced unitary price times the demanded quantity is nonetheless close to the money expression of the involved abstract labor and stands either above the money expression of the involved abstract labor (in the case of an offered quantity standing above the quantity one plans, and is able, to demand at the practiced unitary price), or below that money expression (in the case of an offered quantity standing below the quantity one plans, and is able, to demand at the practiced unitary price). As for the particular-utility approach to the particular trade value, it understands the particular trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity at some point, and at some place) in some capitalist economy as fixed at some level that is both lower than the offered quantity’s use value in the demanders, and greater than the degree of importance the offered quantity’s supplier attributes to (the sum of) those particular utilities of the offered quantity that matter to him, and which is such that its money expression is the multiplication of an equilibrium unitary price by the demanded quantity. Whenever some offered quantity is offered, the particular-utility approach says, it is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at a unitary price that, besides the fact that the multiplication of that price by the demanded quantity produces an amount that is both lower than the use value (in the demanders) and greater than the importance the supplier attributes to (the sum of those particular utilities that matter to him in) the offered quantity, finds itself equalizing the quantity in question and that quantity one plans (and is able) to buy (or rent) at the unitary price in question. While the abstract-labor approach to the particular trade value denies any involvement of the particular use value with respect to the particular trade value’s determination, which it conceives of as completely, strictly determined from the conjunction between abstract labor and the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand, the particular-utility approach to the particular trade value denies any involvement of abstract labor with respect to the particular trade value’s determination, which it conceives of as completely, strictly determined from the conjunction between the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the supplier and of the demanders) and the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand.

  The abundance of some generic commodity on the market means the commodity in question is offered in quantities that are big and plentiful, and which are offered at cheap unitary prices. The diamond-and-water conundrum can be put as follows: if one supposes any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond to be given less importance (by everyone in some capitalist economy) than is any of the generic utilities of the generic water, may the particular trade value of the generic water be still lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond? The abstract-labor answer given to the diamond-and-water conundrum is that, if everyone in some capitalist economy finds himself giving more importance to any of the generic utilities of the generic water than to any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond, and the abstract labor that is involved with any of the offered quantities of the generic water is nonetheless lower than the abstract labor that is involved with any equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond, then the particular trade value of the generic water will be lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond. The particular-utility answer given to the diamond-and-water conundrum is that, if everyone in some capitalist economy finds himself giving more importance to any of the generic utilities of the generic water than to any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond, and the generic water is nonetheless more abundant on the market than is the generic diamond, then everyone in the considered economy will give more importance to any of the particular utilities of the generic diamond than to any of the particular utilities of the generic water, then the particular trade value of the generic water will be lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond, and the fact the particular trade value of the generic diamond is greater than that of the generic water will allow, precisely, the generic diamond to be less abundant than the generic water on the market.

  The abstract-labor answer to the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum is flawed at several levels, one of which is that its identifying to the involved abstract labor the particular trade value of some offered quantity that is sold at an equilibrium unitary price (i.e., a unitary price at which the quantity one stands able, and willing, to demand is both equal to the demanded quantity and equal to the offered quantity) brings about the implication that some demanded quantity (of some generic commodity), which is demanded at a unitary price equalizing the offered quantity and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at that price, and which is nonetheless endowed with a use value lower than the involved abstract labor, will be demanded at a unitary price that is still high enough in order for that price times the demanded quantity to equal the money expression of the involved abstract labor. The alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some non-trending thymologic regularity universal to human behavior: actually, whenever some demanded quantity of some generic commodity finds itself demanded at an equilibrium price, but associated with an abstract labor greater than that quantity’s use value, the demanders will only consent to a unitary price that is such that the quantity’s trade value is lower than that abstract labor that is involved with the supply process of that quantity. Similarly one level at which the abstract-labor answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum is flawed is that its premise that the trade value is equal to—or, failing that, situated around—the involved abstract labor brings about the following implication: any generic commodity whose particular use value is lower than the particular use value of some other generic commodity, but whose offered quantities (at some respective places, and some respective points) are associated with a respective abstract labor that is greater than the abstract labor respectively associated with those equivalent quantities that (at some respective places, and some respective points) are offered of the other generic commodity, will have each of the demanded amounts of its offered quantities demanded at a unitary price that is high enough in order for the concerned global selling or leasing price to surpass the global selling or leasing price of an equivalent demanded amount of some offered quantity of the other generic commodity, no matter whether the use value of that quantity that, of the former generic commodity, is (whether completely or partly) demanded is lower than the abstract labor involved with the supply process of that quantity. The alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some thymologic trend universal to human behavior: actually, were the generic diamond endowed with a particular use value lower than that of the generic water, and that abstract labor that is respectively involved with any of the offered quantities of the generic diamond greater than that abstract labor that is respectively involved with any equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond, but the particular use value of some of the offered quantities of the generic diamond lower than that abstract labor involved with the concerned quantities, those offered quantities of the generic diamond may be (just like they may be not) endowed with a respective particular trade value lower than that of those equivalent quantities that are offered of the generic water.

  As for the particular-utility answer to the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, it is also flawed at several levels, one of which is that its identifying the trade value of some offered quantity to that level that both satisfies the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the demanders and of the supplier) and ensures the equality between supply and that quality one stands ready (and able) to demand, brings about the implication that some offered quantity (of some generic commodity), whenever it is endowed with a (particular) use value lower than the (particular) use value of some offered quantity of some other generic commodity, will be endowed with a (particular) trade value that is also lower than the (particular) trade value of that quantity that is offered of the other generic commodity. Here again the alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some thymologic trend universal to human behavior: actually, when some offered quantity of some generic commodity finds itself endowed with a use value lower than that of some quantity offered of some other generic commodity, but also finds itself costlier in terms of abstract labor than does the latter quantity, the demanders of the former quantity may be (just like they may be not) willing to pay a unitary price that covers the involved abstract labor and which, accordingly, renders the trade value of the former quantity greater than that of the latter quantity. The particular-utility answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum is also flawed at several levels, including the two following ones: on the one hand, the particular-utility answer is circular in its addressing the effect of the difference between the respective degrees of abundance of the generic diamond and water on the market with respect to the difference between the respective particular use values of the generic diamond and water. If diamond is less abundant than water on the market (whether the generic utility of the generic diamond is lower than that of the generic water), the particular-utility answer says, that lower abundance will make the particular use value of (any quantity offered of) the generic diamond greater than that of (any equivalent quantity offered of) the generic water, and the fact the diamond’s particular use value is greater than that of water will allow, in turn, the diamond to be less abundant on the market than water. On the other hand, the particular-utility answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum supposes that some asymmetry can be found between the difference in the importance given to any of the generic utilities of some generic commodity and that given to any of those of some other generic commodity, and the difference in the importance given to any of the particular utilities of the former generic commodity and that given to any of the particular utilities of the latter generic commodity. Yet no generic commodity (including water) can see the importance that is given to any of its generic utilities outweigh the importance that is given to any of the generic utilities of some other generic commodity (like diamond) without (and without that difference of importance being due to) the same difference’s finding itself between the importance that is given to any of the former generic commodity’s particular utilities and that which is given to any of the latter generic commodity’s particular utilities.

  Besides the trade-value-and-use-value and diamond-and-water conundrums, another conundrum that relates to the trade value is the profit conundrum, which can be put as follows: in a capitalist economy, how can all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity (whether the supplier is an entrepreneur) be sold or leased at a global price outweighing the global cost of supply? To put it differently: upstream of money expression, how can the trade value of some offered quantity, in a capitalist economy, be greater than the sum of the respective trade values of those respective quantities which, of some supply goods or services, were demanded in the framework of the supply process (whether the latter is entrepreneurial)? Two answers—respectively by Karl Marx and Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk—were proposed to the profit conundrum on the respective basis of those two approaches to the trade value that are the abstract-labor and particular-utility approaches. The global cost of supply of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is the sum of those global prices which the supplier of the offered quantity had to pay in order for the supply process to get carried out. Just like the global cost of supply of some offered quantity whose supplier is no entrepreneur is the sum of those global prices which the supplier had to pay in order to get that quantity he is offering, the global cost of supply of some offered quantity whose supplier is an entrepreneur is the sum of those respective global prices at which the entrepreneurial supplier bought or rented (in those quantities that were involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity) the generic production or paraproduction goods or services that were involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity. Profit lies in the margin between the global cost of some offered quantity’s supply and the global price at which all or part of that quantity is sold or leased. That margin is either positive (with the global selling or leasing price then exceeding the global cost of supply), or negative (with the global cost of supply then exceeding the global selling or leasing price), or neutral (with the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply being then equal to each other). The Marxian and Böhm-Bawerkian answers to the profit conundrum, to the best of my knowledge, restrict profit to the case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some offered quantity whose supplier is entrepreneurial, thus leaving aside the case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some offered quantity whose supplier is non-entrepreneurial. Accordingly I’ll focus on the (sole) case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some entrepreneurially offered quantity when discussing their respective answers to the profit conundrum.

  Direct and indirect abstract labors are respectively that part of abstract labor that is present within some supply process without being inherited; and that part of abstract labor that is present within some supply process while being inherited from some other, anterior supply processes that are integrated within it. The Marxian answer to the profit conundrum is that profit in the global selling or leasing price at which all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is sold or leased is equal to, or situated around, the money expression of some portion of that direct abstract labor that was involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity. The portion in question is the margin between the delivered direct abstract labor and the abstract labor required in order for that former abstract labor to get repeated, i.e., in order for the involved quantity of generic workforce that proceeded with that former abstract labor to get reproduced and brought to the market. Profit, the Marxian answer adds, is equal to the money expression of the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor when (and only when) the supplied quantity is equal to the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the practiced unitary price. It is positive whenever equal or superior to the money expression of that surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor, but is negative whenever inferior to the money expression of that portion. Granted the involved quantity of generic workforce is paid a global selling or leasing price equal to (rather than situated around) the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market: whenever the supplied quantity is equal to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the practiced unitary price, profit in the global selling or leasing price is both positive and equal to the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor. Under the same assumption: whenever the supplied quantity is equal to that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, but inferior to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question, profit is positive while outweighing the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor. Under the same assumption: whenever the supplied quantity is inferior to that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, profit in the global selling or leasing price is both negative and inferior to the money expression of the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor.

  To the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, profit (strictly) has two components: namely entrepreneurial profit and the interest on that capital (whether borrowed) that the supplier handling some supply process involves with the process in question, which Böhm-Bawerk claims to be the originary genre of interest, that which allows for the other genres of interest (including that interest that is paid to some money or capital lender). Interest and entrepreneurial profit are respectively the remuneration of saving (which I will define a few lines below)—and that part of profit (in the case of an entrepreneurial supply process) that is the remuneration of the handling some entrepreneur does of some supply process whose handler he is. Though Böhm-Bawerk, who prefers that qualifier that is “originary interest,” doesn’t use the following term, a proper way of calling that modality of interest that is indeed originary, which is related to capital (setting aside the case of those supply processes that are non-entrepreneurial and, accordingly, uninvolving any capital), is also “supply interest.” The Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum has supply interest and entrepreneurial profit be respectively proportionate, positively, to the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders); and proportionate, positively, to the degree to which the entrepreneur has been successful both at the level of entrepreneurial comparative fastness and at the level of price anticipation. Temporal preference in some demander and comparative fastness in some entrepreneur are respectively the degree to which some demander of all or part of some offered quantity has been preferring the imminent purchase or rental of that presently demanded quantity over its purchase or rental at some tardier point—and the degree to which some entrepreneur has been faster in ensuring the existence (in some quantity, and at some place) of some generic commodity on the market (and at the moment of its being demanded in some quantity) than have been the other suppliers operating in the same supply field. As for entrepreneurial price anticipation, it is the degree to which some entrepreneur has properly anticipated the unitary price that is indeed practiced now that the quantity he intended to offer of some generic commodity has been put on the market.

  In the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to temporal preference, which his answer to the profit conundrum relies on, three thymologic trends universal to human behavior are respectively the following ones: the fact that the presently enjoyed quantities are usually (rather than universally) too scarce with regard to the present wishes leads to the trend that, granted the quality remains equal, enjoying some present quantity of some generic good or service is—whether completely or to some extent—preferred over enjoying that quantity at some future point; so does the fact that present wishes as concerns demanding are usually over-estimated with respect to future wishes as concerns demanding; so does the fact that, in order for roundaboutness to be increased (what, in turns, leads to productivity gain), some respective quantities of some generic supply goods or services must have earlier availability. That resulting trend that anyone, were it only to some extent, prefers his enjoying some quantity of some generic good or supply to be present rather than future (granted the quality remains the same) results, in turn, into the fact that those quantities that are presently demanded (of some respective generic supply goods or supply) as means for the purpose of some future quantity (of some generic good or supply) are like-future quantities, i.e., are quantities with an attributed importance that is both equal to that importance that is presently attributed to the future quantity (taken as a future quantity), and inferior to that importance that will be attributed to the future quantity once it has become a present quantity. In the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, the spread between (the sum of) those degrees of importance assigned, in the present, to some present quantity and (the sum of those) degrees of importance assigned, in the past, to those like-future quantities that were involved with the present quantity’s supply process results into supply interest. To put it differently: in the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, that component of profit that is supply interest is determined as positively proportionate to the margin between the (particular) use value of the offered quantity and the sum of the respective (particular) use values of the respective involved quantities of those various generic supply goods or services that were involved with the supply process of the offered quantity. What’s more, in that answer, the fact that any of those involved quantities is a means for the offered quantity’s purpose renders the sum of the respective use values of the involved quantities equal to—and completely, strictly determined from—the sum of those respective degrees of importance the respective demanders of the involved quantities are attributing to those utilities they’re respectively expecting from that (presently) future quantity that is yet to be offered; in turn, the future (rather than present) character of that quantity that is yet to be offered renders the sum of the respective use values of those quantities (of some genres of supply good or service) that are means for the future offered quantity’s purpose lower than (what will be) the use value of the offered quantity. Yet the degree to which the involvement (of the involved quantities) as means for the offered quantity’s purpose renders the offered quantity’s use value greater than the sum of that importance that was attributed to it (as a future quantity) is considered to be indistinct (rather than distinct) from the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the offered quantity’s demanders, which is a sum to which supply interest is (positively) proportionate.

  As the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum considers supply interest to be positively proportionate to the sum of the respective degrees to which the demanders (i.e., buyers of renters) of some offered quantity have been preferring the imminent demand of (what they’re respectively demanding of) the offered quantity over that demand at some tardier point, it proposes the following relationship between temporal preference (in the demanders) and the margin between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply: the more the demanders have been preferring some imminent demand over that demand at some point more remote in the future, the higher supply interest is, the more the trade value’s money expression (i.e., the global selling or leasing price) finds itself outweighing the global cost of supply. In the Böhm-Bawerkian answer, the other component of profit (in addition to supply interest) is proportionate to the degree to which some entrepreneur has been both successful in terms of comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of some offered quantity on the market (at the moment of that quantity’s being integrally or partly demanded); and in terms of anticipation of the practiced unitary price. In the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to the (particular) trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity), some offered quantity of some generic commodity is always sold in its integrality, and at a unitary price that equalizes the demanded quantity and the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question; but the entrepreneur may have failed to properly anticipate the unitary price at which the offered quantity is integrally sold or leased. Whenever the unitary price has been properly anticipated, and the entrepreneur rapider than his rivals in the same entrepreneurial field, the practiced unitary price is at such level that the trade value’s money expression (i.e., the global selling or leasing price) finds itself outweighing the sum of supply interest and of the global cost of supply. The more the practiced unitary price has been properly anticipated, with the entrepreneur being also rapider than his competitors in the same entrepreneurial field, the more the trade value’s money expression finds itself outweighing the sum of supply interest and of the global cost of supply. About the origin of supply interest, Böhm-Bawerk nonetheless treats his claim that such origin lies in (the sum of the respective degrees of) temporal preference in the demanders as compatible with—and just as true as—some other claim he also makes. Namely: any supply process that finds itself resorting to more indirect, roundabout methods of production (than does some other supply process involving the same labor duration) is thus rendered more productive (than is the other supply process), what results, in turn, into its being associated with a greater supply interest (comparatively to that supply interest that is associated with the other supply process).

  The Marxian answer to the profit conundrum is flawed at several levels, one of which is that it mistakenly believes the direct abstract labor involved with the supply of some quantity offered (at some place, and at some point) of some generic commodity to be in a position to outweigh the abstract labor required in order for that quantity of generic workforce (i.e., that quantity of some genre of workforce) that delivered the direct abstract labor that was involved with the concerned supply process to get reproduced and brought to the market. Just like the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of some offered quantity of some generic commodity restricts the trade value in question to the involved abstract labor (or, failing that, a level situated around the involved abstract labor), the Marxian approach to abstract labor restricts abstract labor to the duration of that labor involved with the supply process of some generic commodity. Accordingly the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of that quantity of generic workforce that delivered the direct abstract labor that was involved with the supply process of some quantity of some generic commodity restricts the trade value in question to the labor duration that is required in order for that quantity of generic workforce to get reproduced (or, failing that, a level situated around the labor duration in question). In other words, the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of some quantity of generic workforce restricts that trade value to the labor duration that is required in order for that direct abstract labor the concerned quantity of generic workforce delivered in some supply process’s framework to get repeated (or, failing that, a level situated around that required labor duration). Yet no labor duration is in a position to outweigh that labor duration that is required in order for it to get repeated. From that alleged fact that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic workforce that delivered some direct abstract labor is equal to, or situated around, the labor duration required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market, the Marxian approach to the trade value in question wrongly infers that the trade value in question, instead of being equal to (or situated around) the delivered direct abstract labor, is equal to (or situated around) the labor duration required in order for that direct abstract labor to get repeated. From that (illogically inferred) conclusion, it (logically) infers, in turn, that the sum of the wages paid to some quantity of generic workforce, instead of being equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that direct abstract labor that was delivered by the concerned quantity of generic workforce, is actually equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the concerned quantity of generic workforce to get reproduced and brought to the market. If one follows the premise that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic workforce that delivered some direct abstract labor within some supply process is equal to, or situated around, the labor duration required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market, one should instead infer that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic workforce is equal to (or situated around) the direct abstract labor which that quantity of generic workforce delivered within the concerned supply process, with that delivered abstract labor being itself equal to the labor duration required in order for that delivered abstract labor to get repeated (and, accordingly, in order for the quantity of generic workforce to get reproduced and brought to the market). From that (logical) conclusion, it follows, in turn, that the sum of the wages paid to that quantity of generic workforce that delivered some direct abstract labor within some supply process is equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that direct abstract labor that was delivered by the concerned quantity of generic workforce, with the money expression of that delivered direct abstract labor being itself equal to the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the concerned quantity of generic workforce to get reproduced and brought to the market.

  As for the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, here are two levels at which it is flawed when it comes to supply interest. On the one hand, its joint claim that some component of profit is completely, strictly determined as proportionate, positively, to the degree to which the (sum of the) importance attributed to the sum of those means employed for the offered quantity (when it was yet to be offered) finds itself (in the demanders of those means) lower than the importance attributed (in the demanders of those means) to that offered quantity once rendered present, and that the degree to which the importance attributed to that quantity as a present quantity outweighs that attributed to the sum of the means for the purpose of that quantity as a future quantity is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the offered quantity’s demanders, notably relies on the following premise. Namely: the (sum of the respective degrees of) importance attributed to that yet-to-be-fulfilled goal that is some offered quantity is equal to the importance attributed to the sum of those means for the purpose of that future quantity, but is lower than the importance (retrospectively) assigned to that goal once the future offered quantity has been rendered present. Yet that premise is wrong: actually, the importance attributed (in someone) to the means for some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal is equal to the importance attributed (in someone) to that yet-to-be-fulfilled goal; but the importance attributed (in some individual) to some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal and the importance (in the individual in question) retrospectively attributed to that goal once fulfilled are equal to each other, except when the individual in question retrospectively thinks the goal in question should have been given less importance. The sum of those degrees of importance someone respectively attributes to his respective means for some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal is equal to the importance he attributes to that goal whenever he expects that goal to be certainly rather than hypothetically reached; it is also equal to the importance in question whenever he expects that goal to be hypothetically rather than certainly reached. Nonetheless the importance presently (and retrospectively) given to some goal that was reached is equal or inferior to that importance that was given to the goal in question when it was yet to be reached. Accordingly, were profit determined as (positively) proportionate to the degree of spread between the presently offered quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity when it was future (rather than present) and yet to be offered (rather than presently offered), and that degree itself indistinct (rather than distinct) from the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of that quantity, then the trade value’s money expression could be high to the point of equaling the global cost of supply (or low to the point of being inferior to the cost in question), but couldn’t be high to the point of outweighing the cost in question.

  No sum of degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of some offered quantity) can be high enough in order for the trade value’s money expression—were profit determined as proportionate to the sum in question and were that sum, in turn, indistinct (rather than distinct) from the spread between the supplied quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity when it was still future (rather than presently supplied)—to witness some positive margin between the global cost of supply and the global selling or leasing price. In turn, were some component of profit determined in (positive) proportion to the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference and that sum, in turn, indistinct (rather than distinct) from the spread between the supplied quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity when it was still future (rather than presently supplied), such component of profit wouldn’t be in a position to render profit positive: that positivity would require another component, and one that precisely allows for a positive margin. On the other hand, the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum is contradictory about the origin of supply interest, which it locates in temporal preference while claiming the location in question to lie in the productivity of some supply process. The contradiction that is characteristic of such approach to the origin of supply interest results into another contradiction between two respective implications of those two indiscriminately alleged origins: the higher the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part) of some offered quantity, the shorter the required length of the supply process (with respect to the sum of those degrees of temporal preference), but the higher the supply interest; in turn, the greater the roundaboutness of some supply process, the higher the productivity, the higher the supply interest. Were supply interest all the higher as the supply process is more roundabout (and, accordingly, longer), it couldn’t be all the higher as the supply process has to be shorter—and reciprocally. When it comes to entrepreneurial profit, the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum is notably flawed at the following level: it approaches the effect of entrepreneurial price anticipation with respect to trade value in a circular mode. Whenever there is a practiced unitary price that the entrepreneur—whether he was rapider than his competitors in the concerned entrepreneurial field—properly anticipated, that price, it says, finds itself practiced due to the entrepreneur’s properly anticipating the price in question.

Trade value, entrepreneurial profit, and originary interest: a new approach beyond Karl Marx and Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk

  Böhm-Bawerk’s claim that profit in the global price at which some offered quantity (that is entrepreneurially supplied) is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) is subdivided into entrepreneurial profit and supply interest (which he calls “originary interest”) remains true; so does his claim that temporal preference in the demanders intervenes in the determination of the profit witnessed in the money expression of the trade value of some entrepreneurially supplied quantity. Unlike with the way Böhm-Bawerk answers to the issue of knowing whether use value has some involvement with regard to trade value, the trade value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is not determined from the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the supplier and of the demanders), nor is it determined from the equality between supply and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand. In other words, trade value isn’t determined in such a way as to be necessarily linked to an equilibrium unitary price nor is it determined in such a way as to necessarily lie at a level that is both lower than the use value and greater than that importance the offered quantity is attributed in the supplier. The use value (in the demanders) is admittedly involved with the trade value’s determination, but in an indirect (rather than direct) mode. Unlike with the way Marx answers to the issue of knowing whether use value has some effect with regard to trade value, the trade value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is indirectly (rather than not) dependent on its use value. Marx’s claim that abstract labor intervenes in the determination of trade value nonetheless remains true. The use value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is consistent with some range of hypothetical global selling or leasing prices that all derive from the use value (without any of them being a money expression of the use value), each of which is lower than the use value. Though the money expression of the trade value is coincident with one (and only one) of those hypothetical prices that derive from the use value, the trade value’s determination is not directly (but instead indirectly) related to the use value. Accordingly, whenever some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is (whether completely or partly) demanded, that amount that is demanded of the offered quantity is sold or leased at a unitary price whose multiplication by the demanded quantity is the offered quantity’s trade value’s money expression, but the trade value doesn’t have to conform to any of those hypothetical global selling or leasing prices that are consistent with, and derived from, the offered quantity’s use value; it just happens to have some money expression that is coincident with one of those hypothetical prices. Temporal preference is the intermediary through which the use value is involved with the trade value’s determination. The amount of the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part of) some offered quantity is, either equal to the amount of the use value of that quantity, or equal to half of the amount of the use value of that quantity, or situated between the amount of the use value of that quantity and half of that amount. The greater the use value, the greater the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference; but that sum cannot surpass the use value.

  The global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased is the money expression of—and, on the same occasion, the money compensation for—the sum of three components that are added to each other within the trade value of the offered quantity, each of which has some inherited part and some non-inherited part. The trade value, in that it compensates for the sum of those three components each of which became involved with the supply process through the supplier’s handling of the supply process, is indeed determined in such a way as to be greater than the importance the offered quantity is attributed in the supplier. Two of those three components of the trade value are respectively the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors—and the sum of the direct and indirect abstract savings. A third and last component is some component that, at the level of its non-inherited part, witnesses the use value’s indirect intervention through the direct intervention of temporal preference. Saving lies in removing some (relative) portion of one’s money income (whether that portion is an amount of money that one has been lent) from consumption and hoarding as a way of increasing one’s ulterior consumption. Two modalities of saving are respectively the fact of spending (completely or partly) one’s money income into the demand (i.e., purchase or rental) of some respective quantities of some generic supply goods or services and then allocating those quantities to some supply process; and the fact of spending (completely or partly) one’s money income into the demand (i.e., purchase or rental) of some quantity of some generic good or service and then supplying the quantity in question. Those two modalities are respectively that modality of saving that is carried out by some entrepreneur (from the entrepreneur’s money income), and which occurs within the framework of the supply process of some quantity whose supplier is the entrepreneur in question; and that modality of saving that is carried out by some non-entrepreneurial supplier (from the supplier’s money income), and which occurs within the framework of the supply process of some quantity whose supplier is the non-entrepreneurial supplier in question. The capital, which Böhm-Bawerk mistakenly defines as that genre of production good or service that is intermediate between land and labor, on the one hand, and some produced quantity of some genre of good or supply, on the other hand, is instead that genre of good or service that is involved with an entrepreneurial supply process. “Capital good or service” and “supply good or service” are, accordingly, qualifiers that can be used indiscriminately to refer to some supply good or service.

  The remuneration of that set of capital goods or services that is involved with some entrepreneurial supply process is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the remuneration of that abstract saving that is involved with the concerned entrepreneurial supply process. Abstract saving means some duration of saving that is involved with the supply process of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity, and which is considered from the angle of those of its properties that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity is taking into account (rather than from the angle of all its properties). Those properties (that, of saving, are taken into account within the trade value of some offered quantity) are: the duration of the supply process (which is the very same thing as the sum of the respective durations of the various involved savings), the sum of the respective degrees to which some money incomes were saved, and the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion to proceeding with those savings. In some supply process, the final quantity and the anterior quantities are respectively that offered quantity that, of some generic good or service, is offered at the end of the supply process—and those demanded quantities that, of some generic supply goods or services, are demanded in the framework of the supply process. As for abstract adjustment, it means the degree to which the comparative fastness with which the respective existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market (at the moment of their being completely or partly demanded) has been ensured is adjusted to that doable comparison between the supply process and the demanders that is taken into account within the trade value of the offered quantity (rather than from the angle of all comparisons that can be done between the supply process and the demanders). Accordingly abstract adjustment lies in the degree to which comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market at the moment of their being bought or rented (whether completely or partly) is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of abstract labor and saving.

  The degree to which some labor is non-dominated is the degree to which the laborer is in a position to challenge the instructions of his master, patron, or client. The two properties of abstract labor are respectively labor duration and the degree to which the involved labor is non-dominated. Those respective parts of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment the supplier of some offered quantity introduces within the supply process of the concerned quantity without inheriting them must be distinguished from those respective parts of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment the supplier introduces within the supply process while inheriting them from some other, anterior supply processes that the supplier integrates within the supplier’s own supply process. Those inherited and non-inherited parts are respectively the indirect and direct parts. The particular trade value of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity in some capitalist economy is the sum of three components that are the labor value, the saving value, and the adjustment value, each of which is subdivided into some direct part (i.e., some part that is present within the supply process without being inherited), and some indirect part (i.e., some part that is present within the supply process while being inherited from those anterior, other supply processes that are integrated within it). The labor value, the saving value, and the adjustment value are respectively the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors (which is the involved abstract labor), the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract savings (which is the involved abstract saving), and the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract adjustments (which is the involved abstract adjustment). While abstract labor lies in the multiplication of the involved labor’s duration by the degree to which the involved labor was non-dominated, abstract saving lies in the multiplication of the supply process’s duration, of the sum of the respective degrees to which a number of money incomes were dedicated to the involved savings, and of the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion with which the involved savings were carried out. As for abstract adjustment, it lies in the multiplication of comparative fastness in having ensured the existence of the final and anterior quantities at the respective moments of their being completely or partly demanded by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of abstract labor and saving. Entrepreneurial profit is the money expression of the non-inherited part of abstract adjustment.

  The direct and indirect abstract labors respectively lie in the multiplication of the duration of that non-inherited labor involved with the supply process by the degree to which that labor is non-dominated—and in the multiplication of the duration of that inherited labor involved with the supply process by the degree to which that labor is non-dominated. The direct and indirect abstract savings respectively lie in the multiplication of the duration of that non-inherited saving that is involved with the supply process, of the degree to which some money income is dedicated to that non-inherited saving, and of the degree of psychological aversion to proceeding with that non-inherited saving; and in the multiplication of the sum of the respective durations of that number of inherited savings that are involved with the supply process, of the sum of the respective degrees to which a number of money incomes is respectively dedicated to some inherited saving, and of the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion to proceeding with some inherited saving. As for the direct and indirect abstract adjustments, they respectively lie in the multiplication of the non-inherited comparative fastness by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders (of all or part of the offered quantity) outweighs the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment; and in the multiplication of the inherited comparative fastness by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of those respective quantities (of some genres of supply good or service) that were involved with the supply process outweighs the sum of the indirect abstract saving and labor. While the (global) cost of supply of some offered quantity of some generic commodity lies in the money expression of the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, and of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, that were involved with the supply of that quantity, profit in the (global) price at which that quantity is completely or partly demanded lies in the money expression of the sum of the direct abstract saving and adjustment. Accordingly a necessary, sufficient condition in order for the selling or leasing global price to outweigh the global cost of supply is that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity outweighs the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, and of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, that were involved with the supply of that quantity.

  My equation of trade value is as follows. Trade value = labor value + saving value + adjustment value = (labor duration x degree to which labor is non-dominated) + (degrees to which a number of money incomes are saved x duration of the supply process x degrees of psychological aversion to saving) + (comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market at the moment of their being partly or completely demanded x degrees to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of labor value and saving value). That equation holds whether the practiced unitary price finds itself equalizing the supplied and demanded quantities, and whether the practiced unitary price finds itself equalizing the demanded quantity and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question. It also holds whether the supplier of the commodity is an entrepreneur or a non-entrepreneurial supplier. Adjustment profit and supply interest respectively lie in the money expression of the direct adjustment value—and in the money expression of what remains of the direct saving value once the three components of the trade value have been added to each other. Supply interest, which admits both an entrepreneurial modality and a non-entrepreneurial modality, is the originary genre of interest indeed. The indirect and direct labor values are both positive, so are the indirect and direct saving values; but the indirect adjustment value is either positive or null or negative, so is the direct adjustment value. Virtual supply interest is what supply interest would be if it were equal to the money expression of the direct abstract value prior to the addition of the trade value’s three components. Whenever the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is an entrepreneur, the money expression of the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors, lies in the global cost at which the involved generic production or paraproduction goods or services were bought or rented in those respective quantities that were involved. Whenever the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is a non-entrepreneurial supplier, the money expression of the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors, lies in the global price at which the supplier bought or rented the quantity in question. Whether the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is an entrepreneur, profit in the global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased lies in the money expression of that margin (between trade value and the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors) that is the sum of the direct abstract saving and adjustment.

  Entrepreneurial supply interest is that modality of supply interest that is associated with the (money expression of the) trade value of an offered quantity that results of an entrepreneurial supply process, and which, accordingly, remunerates that modality of direct abstract saving that an entrepreneur proceeds with. Whenever a number of entrepreneurs are competing in some entrepreneurial field, they’re both competing to be the quickest to offer some quantity of the concerned generic good or service; and competing to get that global selling or leasing price that is the most outweighing with respect to the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply. Entrepreneurial comparative fastness (i.e., the fastness with which some entrepreneur in some supply field has sold or leased all or part of the offered quantity more rapidly than the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial other suppliers in the same supply field have sold or leased all or part of some rival offered quantity of the same generic good or service) is precisely a modality of comparative fastness in selling or leasing (i.e., the fastness with which some supplier in some supply field has sold or leased all or part of the offered quantity more rapidly than the other suppliers in the same supply field have sold or leased all or part of some rival offered quantity of the same generic good or service). Adjustment profit is the money expression of the margin between the trade value and that of which (within the trade value) the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply is the money expression. The sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity (whether the supplier is entrepreneurial) is indeed taken into account within the trade value of the offered quantity; but it is taken into account within that component of trade value whose money expression lies in adjustment profit (rather than within that component whose money expression lies in virtual supply interest). Adjustment profit and entrepreneurial adjustment profit are respectively that component of profit that is the money expression of the degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supply process is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment; and that modality of adjustment profit that is the money expression of the degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supply process that is handled by some entrepreneur outweighs the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment.

  The degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supplier (whether entrepreneurial) is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which the sum of inherited and non-inherited comparative fastnesses is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of those degrees of temporal preference outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors and direct and indirect abstract savings. It is also indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which some supplier (whether entrepreneurial) both manages to be rapider than the other suppliers in the concerned supply field; and to offer an integrally demanded quantity whose demanders have been planning to demand immediately (rather than later) the quantity in question. Just like entrepreneurial adjustment profit is the very same thing as entrepreneurial profit, the handler (whether entrepreneurial) of some supply process always proceeds with that saving that is direct saving; for its part, indirect saving is always some saving which the handler of the supply process retrieves from some anterior supply process, but which he doesn’t proceed with himself (except when he is also the handler of that anterior supply process). Marx, who failed to discern that feature of abstract labor that is the degree to which the involved labor is non-dominated, was wrong in his restricting abstract labor to labor duration; but he was just as wrong in his restricting trade value to abstract labor (or, failing that, a level situated around abstract labor). Böhm-Bawerk, who failed to discern the fact that temporal preference (in the demanders) intervenes at the level (and at the sole level) of adjustment profit (including entrepreneurial), was wrong in his situating the intervention of the demanders’s temporal preference at the level of supply interest; but he and Marx both failed to discern that component of trade value that is abstract saving. They, accordingly, not less failed to discern that money expression that is virtual supply interest, which is the money expression of direct abstract saving as it stands prior to the addition of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment to each other. The relationship of (positive) proportionality that the sum of the degrees of temporal preference finds itself having with regard to use value was just as much absent in their considerations.

Whenever the supplied quantity and the demanded quantity and that which (at the practiced unitary price) one stands ready and able to demand are equal, the global selling or leasing price is: either inferior to the global cost of supply, or situated between the cost in question and the sum of that cost and of the virtual supply interest, or equal or superior to the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply. The same applies whenever the supplied quantity is equal to the demanded quantity, but inferior to that quantity one stands able and ready to demand at the practiced unitary price. Whenever the demanded quantity is inferior to the supplied quantity, the global selling or leasing price is inferior to the global cost of supply. The jointly discerning that relationship of addition that lies between abstract labor, saving, and adjustment within trade value—and that relationship of (positive) proportionality that the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference finds itself having with respect to use value—is the key that allows for the diamond-and-water-conundrum to get solved. The demanders of (all or part of) some offered quantity of some generic commodity, if the quantity’s use value is lower than that of some equivalent quantity offered of some other generic commodity, but is still high enough in order for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the former quantity) to outweigh the sum of abstract saving and labor, and indirect abstract adjustment, that are involved with the supply process of the former quantity, may still consent to a unitary price that is high enough in order for the trade value of the former quantity to outweigh the trade value of the latter quantity. Accordingly the generic diamond, of which any offered quantity is costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water, may be endowed with a (particular) trade value that is also greater than that of the generic water. If the generic diamond—besides any of its offered quantities being costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water—is endowed with a (particular) use value that is lower than that of the generic water, but which is still high enough to allow for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of any quantity offered of the generic diamond to outweigh the sum of those abstract labor, abstract saving, and indirect abstract adjustment that are involved with the supply process of that offered quantity of diamonds, then the (particular) trade value of the generic diamond will be greater than that of the generic water. If the generic diamond—besides any of its offered quantities being costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water—is endowed with some (particular) use value that is higher than that of the generic water, but which is too low to allow for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of any quantity offered of the generic diamond to outweigh the sum of those abstract labor, abstract saving, and indirect abstract adjustment that are involved with the supply process of that offered quantity of diamonds, then the generic diamond’s (particular) trade value will be equal to, or bigger or lower than, that of the generic water.

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That third, non-final part of Preliminary discourse on mindfulness, freedom, and the soul’s journey and origin was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s February 2015 issue. The two first parts can be found here on this website; they can be found on The Postil Magazine’s website too.

By Grégoire Canlorbe

Here, I will endeavor to try to grasp the way in which the symbol of light is deployed on several levels of meaning, which are themselves linked to correspondent levels in the architecture of reality. Namely: those levels of meaning that are God considered in His ideality, God considered in His relationship to contra-material nothingness, God considered in His incarnation into the universe, and the consciousness of God considered in its incarnation into the consciousness of Jesus. On that basis, I will endeavor to overcome those three philosophical cleavages that are the opposition between radical Arians and the Trinitarians on the issue of whether Jesus is divine; the opposition between Gersonides and saint Thomas Aquinas on the issue of whether there was formless matter instead of a temporal beginning of matter; and the opposition between Averroes and saint Thomas Aquinas on the issue of whether the mind of God (rather than the human mind) is what conceptualizes in the human mind.

  I understand God, let us recall, as follows: an infinite, eternal, substantial, volitional, and conscious field of singular ideational models which is completely incarnated into the universe while remaining completely external to the universe, completely ideational, and completely subject to a vertical (rather than horizontal) time; and which is not only completely sheltered from any forced effect (whether ideational or material) with one or more efficient causes in its willingness, but which, besides, is traversed, animated, efficiently-caused, and unified by a sorting, actualizing pulse which stands both as the active part of God’s will and as the apparatus, the Logos, through which God incarnates Himself while remaining distinct from His incarnation.

  Considering some entity from the angle of one of its (present at some point) properties consists of considering how the property in question is inscribed within the whole of the entity’s (present at that point) properties. Considering some entity independently of one of its (present at some point) properties consists of considering what are the other (present at that point) properties in the entity when the property in question is ignored. In the majority of ideational entities and of material ones, the fact of ignoring some property lets all the other properties apply. In the case of that material entity that is the universe, some of its properties present at some point apply depending on whether the universe is considered from the angle (or instead independently) of that substantial relational property that is the incarnation relationship of the universe with respect to God.

Neantial, ideational, and material conceptual objects

  A concept is a unit of meaning: it signifies a certain object taken from the angle of its constitutive properties (rather than from the angle of all of its properties). The properties (including constitutive) of a conceptual object coincide with the properties (including constitutive) that are imputed to the concerned conceptual object depending on whether material or ideational reality validates the imputation of the imputed properties. In a material or ideational conceptual object, its existential properties of (i.e., those of its properties that are relating to whether the object exists, and to how it exists or inexists) rank among the constitutive properties of the conceptual object in question. A neantial conceptual object is a conceptual object that contains no existential properties; just as every neantial conceptual object is contra-material or contra-ideational, no neantial conceptual object is material nor is it ideational.

  Just as every conceptual object is material or ideational or neantial, every conceptual object is fictitious (in a weak or strong mode) or matching (in a weak or strong mode). Just as a fictitious material conceptual object and a matching material conceptual object are respectively a material conceptual object which happens to not exist (in the material field) and a material conceptual object which happens to exist (in the material field), a fictitious ideational conceptual object and a matching ideational conceptual object are respectively an ideational conceptual object which happens to not exist (in the ideational field) and an ideational conceptual object which happens to exist (in the ideational field). Just as a fictitious neantial conceptual object and a matching neantial conceptual object are respectively a neantial conceptual object which is a type of nothingness having not actually preceded the universe and a neantial conceptual object which is a type of nothingness having actually preceded the universe, a contra-ideational neantial conceptual object and a neantial contra-material conceptual object are respectively a type of nothingness substituted for the field of the Idea and a type of nothingness substituted for the field of matter.

  A concept and its linguistically accepted definition (i.e., its definition accepted in a certain language) are considered synonymous in the considered language; that synonymy, instead of being true or false independently of reality (whether ideational or material), is nevertheless true or false according to ideational reality (in the case of the ideational objects and of the contra-ideational neantial object), or according to material reality (in the case of the material objects and of the contra-material neantial object). Just as the ideational reality validates or invalidates the synonymy between an ideational object (for example, God) and its accepted definition depending on whether the ideational reality validates whether the constitutive properties (including existential) of the concerned ideational object are those alleged by the accepted definition, material reality validates or invalidates the synonymy between a material object (for example, Chi) and its accepted definition depending on whether material reality validates whether the constitutive properties (including existential) of the concerned material object are those alleged by the accepted definition. As for the neantial objects, material reality validates or invalidates the synonymy between a contra-material neantial object and its accepted definition depending on whether material reality validates whether the constitutive properties of the concerned conceptual object are those contained in the accepted definition; just as the ideational reality validates or invalidates the synonymy between a contra-ideational neantial object and its accepted definition depending on whether the ideational reality validates whether the constitutive properties of the concerned conceptual object are those contained in the accepted definition.

  The object of the concept of light is a matching material conceptual object, i.e., a material conceptual object that happens to exist in the material field. The concept of light means light taken from the angle of its constitutive properties; the linguistically accepted definition of light, which evolves as language evolves, must be judged true or false in the light of material reality. The currently accepted definition of light is as follows: “electromagnetic radiation whose wavelength, between 400 and 780 nm, corresponds to the sensitivity zone of the human eye, between ultraviolet and infrared.” Our knowledge of reality remaining irremediably perfectible, that definition is subject to a hypothetical revision one day or another (under the hypothetical progress of physics on that level); we will start from that definition, which we know is “true” until further notice.

Light, symbol of the ideality of God

  Every light has: its source (i.e., what it emanates from), and its object (i.e., what it illuminates). We cannot correctly grasp what the symbol of light refers to without focusing on that conceptual trio—luminaire (i.e., source of light), illuminated object, and light. The light of a candle manifests itself via the flame which envelops the wick, and via the wax which the light of the candle illuminates; however the light of the candle is not visible itself. More generally, light manifests itself without making itself visible: in other words, it manifests itself in a mode other than that which would consist for it of making itself visible. In order for light to manifest itself via its source, a necessary, sufficient condition is that light manifests itself via the illuminated object; it is by illuminating its object that light manifests itself via what it illuminates, but it is, besides, by manifesting itself via the illuminated object that light manifests that it emanates from a certain luminary (and manifests which is its luminary). In other words, just as it is by illuminating that object it illuminates that light manifests itself through the illuminated object, it is by illuminating that object that light manifests itself through the luminaire.

  A symbol is a concept that allows one or more other concepts to be glimpsed while leaving them in obscurity; it is both an incomplete path towards those other concepts, and a completely hermetic enigma about them. Let us endeavor to see what the concept of light opens up to: to begin with, the ideality of God. Just as matter is that which exists in a consistent, firm mode, the Idea is that which exists in a mode devoid of the slightest consistency and firmness. Just as materiality is what a material entity is composed of, ideality is what an ideational entity is composed of. Reality is subdivided into a material field and an ideational field; the universe occupies (and summarizes) the material field, but God occupies (without summarizing) the ideational field. The supramundane field is to be not confused with the ideational field: the supramundane field, in that it encompasses everything that is beyond the world, encompasses the ideational field as well as the neantial field (i.e., the field of the nothingness prior to the temporal beginning of the material field).

  Interstellar vacuum, energy, or thought are modes of matter: they are as consistent as is wood or fire, but consistent in a different way. Light is a certain mode of matter; but it is a mode of matter which is so “fine” in its consistency that it evokes the ideality of which God is made. Let us specify that the Idea (which Plato and Pythagoras deal with) must be distinguished from the idea: the Idea is that which exists in a mode devoid of the slightest consistency and firmness, but the idea is a material entity (in the case of an idea lodged in the mind of a material entity) or an ideational entity (in the case of an idea lodged in the mind of an ideational entity). God is an Idea; but the concept of God in the mind of a certain human is an idea lodged in the mind of said human. Let us also clarify that physics only deals with a certain mode of matter: namely that mode of matter which has mass and extent. Thought (which has neither mass nor extension), as well as the void (which has extension but is devoid of mass), are both excluded from the field of physics; they nonetheless remain modes of matter. Light, although it falls within that mode of matter which occupies physics, evokes a mode of being which is beyond physics; although light is material, it evokes a mode of being that is truly immaterial.

Light, symbol of God considered in His relationship to contra-material nothingness

  The light which crosses the void where the celestial bodies “float” barely manifests itself because it barely illuminates the celestial bodies; in other words, the void is black because the light emanating from the stars barely illuminates the celestial bodies. In that regard, light is a symbol of God considered in His relationship to contra-material nothingness. Namely that God—just as starlight barely illuminates the black of the interstellar void that it travels through—does not dissipate at all the contra-material nothingness that it overhangs.

  Every conceptual object is either supramundane or intramundane. Just as every supramundane object is ideational or neantial, every intramundane object is material. Just as every conceptual object is intra-mundane or supramundane, every intra-mundane conceptual object is: either fictitious in a weak mode, or fictitious in a strong mode, or matching in a weak mode, or matching in a strong mode; the same is true of every supramundane conceptual object. A fictitious object in a weak mode is a fictitious object which could have been a matching object had this world been different or had another world existed; a fictitious object in a strong mode is a fictitious object which would have been fictitious even if this world had been different or if another world had existed. A matching object in a weak mode is a matching object which could have been a fictitious object had this world been different or had another world existed; a matching object in a strong mode is a matching object which would have been matching even if this world had been different or if another world had existed.

  Every intra-mundane object matching in a strong mode is a material object; but a supramundane object matching in a strong mode is either ideational or neantial. Every matching intra-mundane object is a material object matching in a weak or strong mode; but a matching supramundane object is either an ideational object matching in a strong mode, or a neantial object matching in a strong mode. Every fictitious intramundane object is a fictitious material object in a weak or strong mode; but a fictitious supramundane object is either an ideational object fictitious in a strong mode, or a neantial object fictitious in a strong mode. A supramundane object of an ideational type is either matching in a strong mode, or fictitious in a strong mode; the same applies to every supramundane object of the neantial type. Every intramundane object (and, thus, every material object) is either matching in a strong mode, or matching in a weak mode, or fictitious in a strong mode, or fictitious in a weak mode.

  Two modalities of the concept of nothingness are valid: a matching modality (in a strong mode) that is contra-material nothingness, i.e., that sort of nothingness that is substituted for the existence of matter; a fictitious modality (in a strong mode) that is contra-ideational nothingness, i.e., that sort of nothingness that is substituted for the existence of the Idea. Of those two modalities of the concept of nothingness, the former has as its object the contra-material nothingness (i.e., the absence of matter) which effectively preceded (chronologically) matter: at least, matter considered independently of the incarnation relationship of matter with regard to God. The latter modality has as its object contra-ideational nothingness (i.e., the absence of any ideational entity), which is fictitious. That the absence of matter was chronologically prior to matter (at least, matter considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God) is a fact which would have occurred even if our world had been different or if another world had existed; thus, contra-material nothingness is a modality of the concept of nothingness whose object is matching in a strong mode. God exists from all eternity (whether matter is considered from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God), and His existence would be eternal even if our world were different or if another world had existed; contra-ideational nothingness is thus a modality of the concept of nothingness whose object is fictitious in a strong mode.

  Matter, in that it had a temporal beginning (if we consider it independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God), was preceded by contra-material nothingness. By Himself, however, God cannot dissipate contra-material nothingness; no more than starlight can dissipate the black of the interstellar void. Precisely, the black of the interstellar void symbolizes contra-material nothingness. By itself, the ideality of which God is made cannot dispel that darkness; what is ideational cannot get substituted for the absence of what is material, no more than it can generate ideational effects substituted for the absence of what is material. The only way God can dispel that darkness, and introduce matter in place of darkness, is for Him to change Himself into what He is not: matter.

Light, symbol of the incarnation of God into the universe

   “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” the Gospel of John tells us. The sorting, actualizing pulse which unifies, animates, and traverses the field of ideational essences present within God, and which operates the incarnation of God into the world (while allowing Him to remain external to the world which is His incarnation), is that “Word” whose mystery occupied the apostle John (or the Johannine community). It is inaccurate to say of God that He is His Word; the Word of God is nevertheless the active part of His will, as well as the apparatus of His incarnation. The Word, although it unfolds in a time that is eternal (i.e., which has neither beginning nor end) and vertical (i.e., where past, present, and future are simultaneous rather than successive), does unfold; in other words, the Word operating in the ideational field is gradual as is every speech formulated in the material field. Just as God creates (by incarnating Himself) in a gradual mode, the universe exists in a gradual mode; like a discourse that is being held, the universe is unfolding. That joint gradualness in the creation on the part of God, and in the existence of the universe, lets itself be glimpsed in these terms in the Koran: “And, with Our powers, We have built the sky, and assuredly, We continue to extend it.” For its part, the fact that God creates through His Word lets itself be glimpsed here as follows: “When He decides a thing, He simply says: “Be”, and it is immediately!”

  What light is a symbol of is not only God considered from the angle of His ideality or of His relationship to contra-material nothingness; it is also God considered from the angle of His incarnation into the universe. Light, let us recall, does not manifest itself in the way that would consist for it of making itself visible. Instead of making itself visible, it manifests itself through its source (what illuminates), and its object (what is illuminated); and it is by illuminating its object that it manifests itself both through its object and its source. Let us see how the symbol of light illuminates the creation by God through incarnation. God is (symbolically) a light that stands out in three ways from the light of this world. In the first place, that light is its own source; it is both the lighting and the light that illuminates, the luminaire and what emanates from it. In the second place, that light that is God does not manifest itself by what it illuminates; God certainly enlightens the universe, but the universe does not manifest the presence of God who enlightens it. In the third place, the light that is God engenders what it illuminates; the light of God brings the world into being by illuminating it. To those three properties of light taken as a symbol of God incarnated into the universe correspond three properties of the incarnation of God into the universe. In the first place, God is substance, i.e., exists from all eternity and without having any efficient cause. In the second place, God remains external to the universe; that exteriority of God with respect to His own incarnation, that independence of God with respect to His own creation by incarnation, it follows from it that the universe does not manifest the presence of God. In the third place, God remains that which created (and is incarnated into) the universe; God is certainly external to His creation, the universe nonetheless remains what God created by means of His incarnation.

Light, symbol of the incarnation of the consciousness of God into the consciousness of the Son of God

  It is useful to remember that the light of God is ideational, whereas the light of our world is a modality of matter. God, who hardly manifests Himself through His creation by incarnation that is the universe, nevertheless inspired the words of the prophets; that inspiration, although it did not manifest God through the speech of the prophets, allowed the prophets to express themselves about God. God inspired what was said about Him; His inspiration, however, was not His manifestation. The Gospel according to John, however, says of God that while “no one has ever seen God [until then],” “the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, is the one who has made him known.” That inspired symbolic language can be deciphered in these terms: God, who until then had no more manifested Himself (were it partly) in His creation than His consciousness had been incarnated within the world, saw His consciousness become a human consciousness (i.e., the consciousness of the earthly soul of a certain human), but neither His consciousness nor anything of God manifested itself on that occasion.

  Just as, in any novel, the plot can be considered from the angle of the creation relationship of the novel with regard to the novel’s author, or considered independently of said relationship of creation, a same statement with respect to a novel’s plot can be true or false depending on whether the novel is considered from the angle of the creation relationship of the novel with regard to the novel’s author, or considered independently of said relationship of creation. Let’s take a novel whose plot ends on a cliffhanger: in the novel considered from the angle of its relationship of creation with regard to its author, the plot ends on the cliffhanger in question; but, in the novel considered independently of its relationship of creation with regard to its author, the plot continues after the cliffhanger (instead of stopping at the end of the novel). The universe is a novel whose author is God, which He writes by means of his Word; but it is a novel whose words are incarnated into what they say (while remaining external to that material incarnation). Just as God’s words are those ideational essences that He selects and actualizes, the respective incarnation of God’s words is the respective incarnation of those ideational essences that He selects and actualizes. Jesus, in that he is the incarnation of the ideational essence of Jesus, is the incarnation of a certain part of God; but, in his consciousness, Jesus is also the incarnation of a certain (other) part of God in that the consciousness of God is incarnated into the consciousness of Jesus.

  The consciousness of Jesus is symbolically a light, but it is a light that stands out in three ways from the non-symbolic light. In the first place, that light is its own object; it is both what illuminates and what is illuminated, the light and what the light illuminates. In the second place, the light that is the consciousness of Jesus illuminates its object while nevertheless leaving it in the shadows; that light illuminates itself without making itself visible. In the third place, the light that is the consciousness of Jesus does not manifest the source from which it emanates, no more than it manifests that it is an emanation. To those three properties of light taken as a symbol of the consciousness of Jesus correspond three properties of the consciousness of Jesus. In the first place, the consciousness of Jesus is at the same time the incarnated consciousness of God (regarding his consciousness in the universe considered from the angle of the relationship of incarnation of the universe with regard to God) and the consciousness of the soul nestled in the human Jesus; thus the consciousness of Jesus is both a property present in God (regarding the consciousness of Jesus in the universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God) and a property present in that non-divine entity that is the soul of the human Jesus. In the second place, the consciousness of Jesus, although it existed in the world, was no more manifested in the world than the consciousness present in some conscious material entity is in a position to manifest itself in the world; what is ideational and nevertheless in the world cannot manifest itself alongside any material entity. In the third place, the consciousness of God taken in its exteriority with regard to its own incarnation into the consciousness of the earthly soul of the human Jesus was not manifested in its incarnation; it was incarnated without that incarnation being manifestation.

  Grasping what, of Jesus, is of God requires that we go beyond what John (or the Johannine community) seemed to understand from his own symbolic language when he expressed himself in these terms in his Gospel: “And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father.” What, of God, became flesh is not His word, but it is the respective ideational essence of those entities endowed with flesh (including the entity Jesus); what makes Jesus a Son of God is that are respectively incarnated a certain ideational essence into Jesus, and the consciousness of God into the consciousness of Jesus. The word of God is what operates the selection and actualization of some ideational essences; the ideational essence of Jesus, in witnessing its selection and actualization get carried out, witnesses Jesus come into the world with a substantial essence that includes the property (that is itself inscribed in the ideational essence of Jesus) of the incarnated consciousness of God. The universe is indistinct from God (although distinct from God who remains external to His own incarnation that the universe is); for his part, Jesus is indistinct from the ideational essence of Jesus and, thus, from a part of God (although distinct from his ideational essence which, while incarnated into Jesus, remains external to Jesus), but the consciousness of Jesus is indistinct from the (totality of the) consciousness of God (although distinct from the consciousness of God which, while incarnated into the consciousness of Jesus, remains external to the consciousness of Jesus).

Overcoming the cleavage between radical Arianism and the Trinitarian doctrine

  The entire universe, not just Jesus, is the incarnation of God; but, although God is entirely incarnated into the entire universe, the consciousness of God is only incarnated into the consciousness of one or more human individuals precisely elected so that their respective consciousnesses be the incarnated consciousness of God. The consciousness of God, while incarnating itself into one or more human consciousnesses, does not see the object of the consciousness of God incarnate itself into the object of those human consciousnesses in which the consciousness of God gets incarnated. The object of God’s consciousness is (at every point) one’s existence and the entire field of the ideational essences and the (simultaneous) past, present, and future of the operation of the sorting, actualizing pulse, as well as the entirety of the (successive) past, present, and future of the universe; but the object of the consciousness of the one or those in whom the consciousness of God is incarnated is (at every point) one’s existence and a certain part of the universe, and hypothetically (and in a mode which is, at best, approximative) a certain part of the field of the ideational essences. Only a handful of humans (rather than all or the majority of humans) or a single human (rather than several humans) sees the consciousness of God incarnate itself into theirs; Jesus was either the only human whose consciousness was the incarnated consciousness of God, or one of those few humans (through the ages) whose respective consciousness is the incarnated consciousness of God.

  In the universe considered from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, the consciousness of Jesus is both the incarnated consciousness of God and the consciousness of the soul of Jesus; but, in the universe considered independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, the consciousness of Jesus is only the consciousness of the soul of Jesus. Likewise, in the universe considered from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, Jesus is at the same time a human endowed with a consciousness indistinct from the consciousness of God (in that his consciousness is the incarnated consciousness of God) and a human who in his consciousness has nothing divine nor anything of God; but, in the universe considered independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, Jesus is in his consciousness only human (instead of being endowed with a consciousness indistinct from the consciousness of God). In that the consciousness of God is co-eternal with God, the consciousness of Jesus is co-eternal with God in the universe taken from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God; but, just as much in the universe taken from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God as in the universe taken independently of said relationship of incarnation, Jesus (instead of being co-eternal with God) has a temporal beginning and end.

  The soul, as I expressed myself on that subject in a previous writing, is an Idea which, like the ideational essence, is eternal although endowed with an efficient cause (through God); but which, unlike the ideational essence (which remains within God, and which sees God communicate to it His consciousness and will), is endowed with a consciousness distinct from the consciousness of God, and with an existence external to God. The soul retains its consciousness both when the soul is supramundane (i.e., located in the ideational field) and when it is earthly (i.e., located in a living entity within the material field); but, whereas the earthly soul is without any willingness and without any mind (although every terrestrial soul is nested in an entity that is, if not endowed with a mind, at least endowed with a willingness), the supramundane soul has a willingness and a mind respectively distinct from the willingness of God and from the mind of God. The (supramundane) soul rises to the rank of a god in the ideational field by having experienced, during its stay or stays (as an earthly soul) in the material field, a heroism that is sufficient in order for God to grant it a divine rank. Every divine soul is supramundane; but no earthly soul is divine, just as not every supramundane soul is divine. Although the soul of Jesus became divine at the end of the earthly stay it effectuated in the biological entity that Jesus is, the soul of Jesus had nothing divine during the stay in question.

  Heroism and exploit, as I expressed myself on that subject in the same previous writing, must be taken respectively in the sense of the accomplishment (as a conscious material entity) of one or more exploits; and in the sense of an act that is jointly exceptionally creative (i.e., characterized by the mental creation of one or more exceptionally creative ideas), exceptionally successful (i.e., characterized by the complete achievement of an exceptionally difficult goal), and exceptionally endangering for one’s material subsistence. The (earthly) soul of Jesus rendered itself divine (on its return to the ideational field) by experiencing an earthly stay (as Jesus) which saw Jesus accomplish an exploit great enough for that stay to be sufficient to render divine the (supramundane) soul of Jesus. That exploit is that of having created a new, semi-worldly, and multi-millennial religion by dying on the cross. Each supramundane soul knows perfectly the content of each ideational essence; thus each supramundane soul pre-knows perfectly what its earthly stay will be when it opts for a certain earthly stay. God, although each supramundane soul makes use of a self-determined willingness in its decision to opt for some particular earthly stay rather than for another one, perfectly pre-knows the decision of each supramundane soul on that level. God, although He elected the (supramundane) soul of Jesus so that his (earthly) soul be the earthly soul (or one of the earthly souls) whose consciousness is the incarnated consciousness of God, saw the (supramundane) soul of Jesus make use of a self-determined willingness in its choice of an earthly stay characterized by the incarnation of the consciousness of God into the consciousness of the (earthly) soul.

  God, while incarnating Himself in the world, remains external to the world which is His incarnation; but the world, for its part, remains indistinct (rather than distinct) from God whose incarnation it is. A same statement can nevertheless be true or false depending on whether we consider it in the world taken from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, or in the world considered independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God. In the world taken from the angle of the incarnation relationship of the world with regard to God, Jesus is endowed with a consciousness that is both indistinct from the consciousness of God and distinct from the consciousness of God; but, in the world taken independently of the incarnation relationship of the world with regard to God, Jesus is endowed with a consciousness distinct from the consciousness of God (rather than indistinct from all or part of the consciousness of God). Accordingly, the overcoming of the cleavage between radical Arianism and the Trinitarian doctrine is constitutive of a correct answer to the question of the divinity of Jesus (i.e., the question of knowing whether Jesus is divine). Moderate Arianism considers Jesus as a human who, in that he is the incarnated Father, was both created by the Father and created as indistinct (though distinct) from the Father; and who, in that he has a temporal beginning and end, is not co-eternal with the Father whose incarnation he is. For its part, radical Arianism envisages Jesus as a human who has nothing divine and who, in that he was created by the Father in a mode other than a creation by incarnation, is human (rather than God) and distinct from the Father (rather than indistinct from the latter); and as a human who, in that he has a temporal beginning and end, is not co-eternal with the Father. Whereas, according to moderate Arianism, Jesus is (incarnated) God without being co-eternal with the Father, Jesus, according to radical Arianism, is neither God nor endowed with anything divine nor is he co-eternal with the Father (although he is created by the Father).

  Intermediate positions are found between radical and moderate Arianisms; but all modalities of Arianism have in common that they are opposed to the Trinitarian doctrine, for which Jesus is both the incarnation of God (instead of being a creature without anything divine nor anything of God) and an entity co-eternal with God. Knowing which modality of Arianism was the one that Arius actually defended is a problem on which I will not take position here. The cleavage between radical Arianism and the Trinitarian doctrine sees my position on the question of the divinity of Jesus operate an overcoming in these terms. The entire universe (and not only Jesus within the universe) sees God incarnate Himself into it, what is beyond the understanding of the Trinitarian doctrine and of radical Arianism (as well as of all modalities of Arianism). The assertion (in the Trinitarian doctrine) that Jesus is both human and indistinct from God (rather than a part of God) is partially true in that, in the case of the world taken from the angle of its incarnation of God (rather than in the case of the world taken independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God), Jesus is his incarnated ideational essence (and thus an incarnated part of God), and a human endowed, besides, with a consciousness which is both the consciousness of the (earthly) soul of Jesus and the incarnated consciousness of God. For its part, the assertion (in radical Arianism) that Jesus has nothing divine is partially true in that, in the case of the world taken independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, Jesus is a human who is no more an incarnated ideational essence than he is a human endowed with a consciousness indistinct from the consciousness of God.

  In the case of the world taken from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, the consciousness of Jesus is co-eternal with the consciousness of God; but (whether the world is taken independently of its incarnation relationship with regard to God) Jesus himself does have a beginning and an end in (horizontal) time. As such, the assertion (in radical Arianism) that Jesus is not co-eternal with God is true; but the affirmation (in the Trinitarian doctrine) that Jesus is co-eternal with God retains a part of truth in that the consciousness of Jesus in the world taken from the angle of the incarnation relationship of the world with regard to God is indeed co-eternal with the consciousness of God.

Overcoming the cleavage between Gersonides and saint Thomas Aquinas

  The question of formless matter (i.e., the question of whether the universe, instead of having known a temporal beginning from contra-material nothingness, experienced a formless matter that was without any temporal beginning) is another question which demands the overcoming of a certain philosophical cleavage: here, the cleavage between Gersonides and saint Thomas Aquinas. Whereas formless matter is matter that exists without entering into the composition of any material entity, arranged matter is matter that enters into the composition of a certain material entity (within which it coexists with formal properties). The Gersonidean position on the question of formless matter is that the universe, instead of having experienced a temporal beginning (from contra-material nothingness), experienced a formless matter (which had always been) from which God operated to create a universe which be endowed with form and not only matter; for its part, the Thomist position on the question of formless matter is that the universe, instead of having experienced a formless matter (without any temporal beginning), had a temporal beginning which saw the universe begin with an already arranged matter.

  Each of those two positions has a part of truth (depending on whether the universe is considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God, or from the angle of said relationship), and a part of falsehood (depending on whether the universe is considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God, or from the angle of said relationship). The relationship of incarnation of the universe with regard to God is co-eternal with God; but the relation of incarnation of a given entity within the universe with regard to its own ideational essence is no more co-eternal with the ideational essence in question than a given entity within the universe (whether the latter is considered independently of the relationship of incarnation of the universe with regard to God or from the angle of said relationship of incarnation) is co-eternal with its own ideational essence. The universe is nevertheless co-eternal with God when it comes to the universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God; regarding the universe considered independently of said relationship of incarnation, the universe, instead of being co-eternal with God, is endowed with a temporal beginning. The universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God certainly saw arranged matter begin temporally; but, whereas the universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God sees the temporal beginning of arranged matter follow a phase (without any temporal beginning) of the universe that was characterized by formless matter, the universe considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God saw the universe begin temporally (from contra-material nothingness) and begin with an already arranged matter.

  What renders partially true the Thomist affirmation of the temporal beginning of the universe (from contra-material nothingness) is that the universe considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God is (unlike the universe considered from the angle of said relationship of incarnation) effectively endowed with a temporal beginning. Likewise, what renders partly true the Gersonidean assertion that the universe, instead of having experienced a temporal beginning (from contra-material nothingness), experienced a formless matter is that the universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God has (unlike the universe considered independently of said relationship of incarnation) actually passed through the phase (without any temporal beginning) of a formless matter rather than through the phase of an arising from contra-material nothingness. Every entity (whether ideational or material) is a compound of form and composition: the universe considered from the angle of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God was therefore a semi-entity so long as the matter which composed it was a formless matter. For its part, the universe considered independently of its relationship of incarnation with regard to God was an entity as soon as its existence began temporally.

Overcoming the cleavage between Averroes and saint Thomas Aquinas

  Conceptualization consists of producing a concept or a definition of said concept or a description of all or part of the object of said concept; conceiving a concept consists of conceptualizing, or judging that a concept or a certain definition of said concept or a certain description of all or part of the object of said concept are valid. The question of conceptualization in the mind of God (i.e., the question of whether it is the mind of God, not the human mind itself, which conceptualizes in the human mind) has been the subject of a cleavage between Averroes and saint Thomas Aquinas. Whereas the former conceives of the human mind as incapable of conceptualizing, and the mind of God as that mind which conceptualizes in the human mind, the latter conceives of the human mind as capable of conceptualizing (just like the mind of God), and the conceptualization in the human mind as the work of the human mind itself.

  Every concept (i.e., every unit of meaning) is an idea; but every idea is either a concept or an association of concepts. Every definition is an association of concepts; but not every association of concepts is a definition. The willingness (i.e., the pursuit of one or more ends) is either acting (i.e., employing one or more means for the purpose of an end), or non-acting (i.e., pursuing an end without employing any means for the purpose of that end); in God, the sorting, actualizing pulse, the Word, is the acting willingness. An object of willingness (i.e., an end that a willingness pursues, or the means or the various means that it employs for the purpose of an end) is never an idea; in every conscious volitional entity, willingness (whether it is acting or non-acting) is nevertheless accompanied by the idea of the object of willingness. Just as a volitional idea is an idea that accompanies an object of willingness (without causing the object in question), an actional volitional idea and a non-actional volitional idea are respectively a volitional idea that accompanies an end or means present in an acting willingness; and a volitional idea which accompanies an end in a non-acting willingness. In God, the sorting, actualizing pulse, in that it merges with acting willingness, is distinct from volitional ideas; each operation of said pulse is nevertheless accompanied by a correspondent idea in the mind of God. Just as an actional volitional idea in God is a volitional idea which corresponds to a certain operation of the sorting, actualizing pulse, an actional volitional idea which, in God, corresponds to a means in acting willingness and a non-actional volitional idea which, in God, corresponds to an end in acting willingness are respectively a volitional idea which corresponds to a selection and actualization; and a volitional idea which corresponds to an incarnated ideational essence. From an ideational entity present in the material field, nothing can be the object of an experience by a material entity; but it is possible for a human material entity to have an experience (which nevertheless is, at best, approximative) of all or part of an ideational essence, as well as of the consciousness of God or of a supramundane soul, as well as of all or part of (what are at the moment of that experience) the non-actional volitional ideas in the mind of God, as well as of all or part of (what are at the moment of that experience) the ideas in the mind of a certain supramundane soul.

  A non-actional volitional idea in God is an idea corresponding to an end which is certainly in the will of God, but which does not relate to the operations of the sorting, actualizing pulse. Just as an ideational essence present in God must be distinguished from that essence’s concept present in the mind of God, the direct grasping of an ideational essence in God must be distinguished from the direct grasping of an idea in the mind of God. In the mind of God, ideas that are other than non-actional volitional ideas are also those ideas that God does not allow humans to grasp; in the mind of God, non-actional volitional ideas are those ideas that God allows humans to grasp, but a grasp that is, at best, approximative and whose effectiveness varies from one individual to another. The mind of God, although capable of conceptualization, is no more the mind that conceptualizes in the human mind than humans are incapable of conceptualizing; the Thomist position that the human mind, like the mind of God, is itself a conceptualizing mind (instead of the mind of God being that mind which conceptualizes in the human mind) is true. The Averroist position that the human mind, although incapable of conceptualization, sees the mind of God conceptualize in it remains partially true: on the one hand, in that the human mind is capable of conceptualizing from a direct grasping of all or part of the non-actional volitional ideas in the mind of God, a grasp whose effectiveness is, at best, approximative and varies from one individual to another. On the other hand, in that the human mind is capable of conceptualizing from a direct grasp of all or part of the ideational essences contained in God, a grasp whose effectiveness is, at best, approximative and varies from one individual to another.

  A non-actional volitional idea in God is an idea corresponding to an end which is certainly in the will of God, but which does not relate to the operations of the sorting, actualizing pulse. Just as an ideational essence present in God must be distinguished from that essence’s concept present in the mind of God, the direct grasping of an ideational essence in God must be distinguished from the direct grasping of an idea in the mind of God. In the mind of God, ideas that are other than non-actional volitional ideas are also those ideas that God does not allow humans to grasp; in the mind of God, non-actional volitional ideas are those ideas that God allows humans to grasp, but a grasp that is, at best, approximative and whose effectiveness varies from one individual to another. The mind of God, although capable of conceptualization, is no more the mind that conceptualizes in the human mind than humans are incapable of conceptualizing; the Thomist position that the human mind, like the mind of God, is itself a conceptualizing mind (instead of the mind of God being that mind which conceptualizes in the human mind) is true. The Averroist position that the human mind, although incapable of conceptualization, sees the mind of God conceptualize in it remains partially true: on the one hand, in that the human mind is capable of conceptualizing from a direct grasping of all or part of the non-actional volitional ideas in the mind of God, a grasp whose effectiveness is, at best, approximative and varies from one individual to another. On the other hand, in that the human mind is capable of conceptualizing from a direct grasp of all or part of the ideational essences contained in God, a grasp whose effectiveness is, at best, approximative and varies from one individual to another.

Conclusion

  Genesis distinguishes between primordial light and the light of the sun and the moon; the primordial light was created before the first day, with “the heavens and the earth,” but the sun and the moon were created only on the fourth day. Genesis tells us of God that He creates by “speaking,” and that the primordial light is His creation. As God invites humans to complete His creation that is the universe, the word that He inspires invites humans to deepen the symbolism it contains. The primordial light, we think, is a symbol of God envisaged in that ideality that is evoked by the finesse of the mode of matter that is light; a symbol of God envisaged in His inability to replace contra-material nothingness so long as He is only a light in the darkness; a symbol of God envisaged in the fact that He incarnates Himself into the world as a light which would create, by illuminating it, the illuminated object itself; and a symbol of God envisaged in the fact that His consciousness, while seeing itself incarnated in the consciousness of Jesus, remained hidden in that incarnation like a luminaire that its light would not manifest.

  The “beginning” with which Genesis and the Gospel according to saint John open is no chronological beginning, but a pre-chronological one. In other words, the time of origins, instead of being the beginning of the time of this world, is that time without beginning and without succession from which the beginning of the succession of time in this world stems. Saint John, who symbolically identifies “the Word” to “the true light, which, when coming into the world, enlightens every man,” adds that this light “was in the world, and the world was made by it, and the world did not know it.” The deciphering of those inspired symbolic words involves the overcoming of these three ancient philosophical cleavages: the cleavage between radical Arians (for whom Jesus is a creature with a temporal beginning and end, and a creature who is God-created without being incarnated God) and Trinitarians (for whom Jesus is a creature co-eternal with God, and a creature who is incarnated God) on the question of the divinity of Jesus; the cleavage between Gersonides (for whom a formless matter without temporal beginning, not contra-material nothingness, was prior to the compound of form and matter in the universe) and saint Thomas Aquinas (for whom the universe had a beginning in time and began as a composite of form and matter) on the question of formless matter; and the cleavage between Averroes (for whom it is the spirit of God which conceptualizes in the human spirit) and saint Thomas Aquinas (for whom it is the human spirit which conceptualizes in the human spirit) on the question of conceptualization in the mind of God.

•   It is false that God is entirely incarnated into Jesus; it is no less false that there is nothing of God that is incarnated into Jesus. Jesus sees a part of God incarnate itself into Jesus, and an (other) part of God incarnate itself into a part of Jesus. What, of God, is incarnated into Jesus is a certain ideational essence; but what, of God, is incarnated into that part of Jesus that is the consciousness of Jesus is the consciousness of God. Jesus (whether the world is taken from the angle of its incarnation relationship with regard to God, or independently of said incarnation relationship) has a beginning and an end in time; but the consciousness of Jesus in the world considered from the angle of the incarnation relationship of the world with regard to God is indeed co-eternal with the consciousness of God.

•   The universe considered from the angle of the incarnation relationship of the universe with regard to God has experienced—instead of a temporal beginning which would have seen it begin with an already arranged matter—a formless matter which never began temporally, but from which God operated to create a universe which be veritably a composite of form and matter. Concerning the universe considered independently of the incarnation relationship of the universe with regard to God, the latter—instead of having passed through a formless matter whose phase would never have begun in time, but would have temporally preceded the phase of a universe composed of arranged matter—has effectively begun in time with an already arranged matter which temporally began from contra-material nothingness.

•   The human mind (rather than the mind of God) is what conceptualizes in the human mind; the human mind, with an efficiency which varies from one individual to another, and which is, at best, approximative, is nevertheless in a position to conceptualize from a direct experience of all or part of the ideational essences contained in God. Besides, the human mind, with an efficiency which varies from one individual to another, and which is, at best, approximative, is in a position to conceptualize from a direct experience of the consciousness of God and of all or part of the non-actional volitional ideas contained in the mind of God. Precisely, the mystical experience is the suprasensible experience a conscious material entity makes of the consciousness of an entity that is ideational (and present in the ideational field), or of one or more ideas contained in the mind of an entity that is ideational (and present in the ideational field). To humans, God allows the grasp (in a mode that is, at best, approximate) of all or part of His non-actional volitional ideas; of His mind, it prevents him from grasping (even in an approximate mode) the slightest idea other than a non-actional volitional idea.

  The Word, which incarnated the consciousness of the ideational entity that is God into the consciousness of the soul of the human entity that is Jesus, made himself the object of the symbolic discourse inspired to Jesus; thus it can be said symbolically of the Word that he is “the true light, which, when coming into the world, enlightens every man.” Jesus saw his consciousness incarnate the consciousness of God in the world, and the (global) incarnation of God into the universe, while having formless matter precede the universe considered as incarnation, caused the beginning in horizontal time of the universe considered independently of that incarnation, and the consciousness of God, although it manifests itself in the mystical experience of the consciousness of God, was not manifested in its incarnation; thus it can be said symbolically of God that He is a light which “was in the world, and the world was made by it, and the world did not know it.” God, who no more manifests Himself in His incarnation into the world than He manifests Himself in the incarnation of His consciousness into the consciousness of (the earthly soul of) the human Jesus, manifests in suprasensible experience (which is carried out in a mode which is, at best, approximative) all or part of the ideational essences contained within Him, as well as all or part of the non-actional volitional ideas contained in His mind. Suprasensible experience—when it has as its object all or part of the field of the ideational essences in God, or all or part of the non-actional volitional ideas contained in His mind—is that through which God illuminates us; the grasp of what are (at a given moment) all or part of those non-actional volitional ideas present in the mind of God (at the concerned moment) is that by which God reveals to us the content (at the concerned moment) of that which is sometimes considered His heart.

The fact that a certain human entity, at a given moment, is grasping in an approximative mode all or part of what the non-actional volitional ideas are at the moment in the mind of God is inscribed in the ideational essence of the human entity in question, just as is inscribed in the ideational essence in question what are those non-actional volitional ideas present in the mind of God at the moment of the grasping. The same applies to a grasping whose effectiveness is less than approximative. God is not constrained by any actualized ideational essence to have some non-actional volitional ideas in mind at a given time; He nevertheless ensures in the operation of His Word that, when a certain actualized ideational essence states what all or part of His non-actional volitional ideas are at a given moment, what His non-actional volitional ideas are effectively at the moment in question validates what the ideational essence states about all or part of those ideas. Likewise, no supramundane soul is constrained by any actualized ideational essence to have some ideas in mind at any given moment; but God, in the operation of His Word, ensures that, when a certain actualized ideational essence declares what all or part of the ideas are at a given moment in a given supramundane soul, what the ideas are effectively in the soul in question at the moment in question validates what the ideational essence states about all or part of those ideas. If the parallel between what a certain actualized ideational essence states about a certain idea present in the mind of God at a given moment and the content of the mind of God at the moment in question were to fail, then the universe would not fail to implode and to experience a reset; the same is true of the parallel between what a certain actualized ideational essence states about a certain idea present in the mind of a certain supramundane soul at a given moment and the content of the concerned supramundane soul at the concerned moment. Although God makes Himself capable of errors in His quest to make the universe evolve towards ever-increasing order and complexity, He is (and forever remains) incapable of errors in His approach to ensuring that never any of those parallels fails.

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That article was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s March 2024 issue.