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Grégoire Canlorbe

Grégoire Canlorbe

A conversation with Anne Marie Waters, for Gatestone Institute

A conversation with Anne Marie Waters, for Gatestone Institute

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Nov 16, 2021

Anne Marie Dorothy Waters is a politician and activist in the United Kingdom. She founded and leads the party For Britain.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Please tell us about the political party you founded and are currently leading, For Britain. What are its ambitions—and its strategy?

  Anne Marie Waters: Our ambitions are large (always think big!) We want to build a mass movement of the millions who have been sidelined and excluded from public life in the UK.  This is a movement for those who are not far right or racist but want to end this mass immigration that threatens our culture and identity, those who know and understand that Black Lives Matter are a neo-communist group intent on violently dismantling our society, those who can see that Islam is not peaceful and has brought horrors (including the gang rape of young girls and terror attacks) to our shores, and those who know that our government lies to us time and again. We live in a UK where free speech is a thing of the past, our media is merely a mouthpiece of government dictats, and where decent people are demonized and smeared for holding informed opinions. We are in a Britain that resembles the communist Soviet Union; fear, censorship, excessive government control.

  There are millions of British people who know this, even if they don’t yet verbalise it.  Those people are entirely unrepresented; For Britain will give them that representation.

  I believe we are on the precipice of great change. I intend to be at the forefront of bringing about that great change. We don’t want to ‘Build Back Better’ as the globalists keep demanding, we want to Bring Back Britain.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: How do you judge the British establishment’s attitude towards the alleged demographic, cultural Islamization?

  Anne Marie Waters: The British establishment is very enthusiastic about our Islamisation!  There are different reasons, depending on the person. For example, our Members of Parliament are either entirely ignorant of Islam and genuinely believe to object to its teachings is “racist” (such people are simply too unintelligent to understand). Others know what the truth is but are too focused on not rocking the boat, or risking attack by the media, that they stay silent. Others hate our society so much that they see Islam as a better option. None of these people should be serving in the British Parliament.

  The issue of course is mass migration. The political and media elite are entirely wedded to the global project of bringing down nation-states. This cannot be done without mass migration. If the British public was informed about the horrors of Islam, they may object to mass migration (almost all of which is Muslim) and that would be a fly in the ointment for the globalists. So the truth of Islam is hidden and those who speak it absolutely vilified in public. People therefore stay silent and the quiet death of Western civilization continues apace.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Could you expand on your point that Islam is incompatible with democracy? Do you think the same of Christianity?

  Anne Marie Waters: The incompatibility is easily observable. Europe has a long history of defying authority and demanding rights for citizens. The Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and beyond; all part of Europe’s story, and a history we are built upon as a continent.  Now we have opened our borders to medieval beliefs and behaviours.  “Death for blasphemy”, “death to apostates”, stonings, beheadings… In the Muslim world, the last 500 years of European history hasn’t happened.

  We are a society of science, and reason, and evidence, and just as we achieve that, we open to the door to medievalism and are catapulted back in time. Secularism and free speech, equal rights between the sexes, the protection of children, all of this is being sacrificed for Islam.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Do you recognize yourself in Enoch Powell’s so-called “Rivers of Blood” speech, in which he predicted (in 1968) that mass immigration would be like “watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre”?

  Anne Marie Waters: Absolutely. In his worst nightmares, Powell could not have predicted what was to come. He was speaking about 10,000s of migrants, what we have now is 100,000s per year. Most of these people are coming here illegally and this is simply allowed to take place while we watch. What is even harder to take is how these illegal immigrants are elevated above the native population. There are 1,000s of homeless British people in the UK, and yet illegal immigrants are housed in hotels until permanent accommodation is provided to them. No such relief or help is available to homeless Britons. Now that we are about to receive a massive influx of Afghans (who already responsible for grotesque crimes all over Europe), there are plans in place to give them homes, medical care, training and employment, and even free university attendance. Britons must pay £1,000s per year to attend university. It is a profound injustice.

  White Britons are legally excluded from applying for certain jobs, while white children are actively taught that they are racists and colonisers and oppressors. We hear endless propaganda about racial discrimination and disadvantage faced by non-white people in Britain, when the truth is that the only people who face this discrimination are white people.

  Powell was right, but he vastly underestimated the pace and scale of the destruction of our country.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. It has been twenty years since the 11 September attacks happened. What do you think should be done to prevail once and for all in the war declared against the West?

  Anne Marie Waters: We must stop the immigration first and foremost. We cannot deal with these problems while the borders are still open. Then we must begin the process of deporting those who came here illegally. We must scrap the Human Rights Act in order to prevent non-Britons taking precedence over Britons. The rights of terrorists and rapists are considered more important than the safety of the British public. This needs new laws to prevent activist judges allowing criminals to stay in our country.

  We must scrap all ‘hate speech’ laws and allow our citizens to speak freely. We must enact laws that prevent the press smearing political candidates as ‘fascists’ for daring to tell the truth.

  We must close all sharia councils, ban the burka, prosecute and deport those who engage in honour violence, FGM, or child marriage. We must ban halal. It is also absolutely essential that all of those who express support for jihad, who support terrorists, or who want sharia law, and who are not British citizens, are deported from our country. We owe them nothing.

  These steps are just the beginning but if we were to take them, we would be in a completely different place. The world would no longer see Britain as a soft touch or a hub of jihad.

  The truth is however that we will only take these steps if we change those who govern us. That is the first and most important thing we must do. Our current politicians will never do what is needed, therefore we must replace those politicians with people who will.

For Britain will.


That conversation was initially published on Gatestone Institute, in November 2021

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: Anne Marie Waters, Britain, Enoch Powell, Grégoire Canlorbe, Islam, Islamization

A conversation with Mohamed Qissi, for The Postil Magazine

A conversation with Mohamed Qissi, for The Postil Magazine

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Oct 1, 2021

Mohamed Qissi, known as Michel Qissi, is a Belgian-Moroccan actor, director, screenwriter, stuntman, and martial choreographer. He is notably known for having played alongside Jean-Claude Van Damme in Bloodsport, Kickboxer, and Lionheart; and choreographed the fights in Kickboxer, where he plays cult villain Tong Po.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: From Mohamed, your first name was changed into Michel; then became Mohamed again. How come?

  Mohamed Qissi: When I was little, and I helped Jean-Claude in his mother’s flower shop in Brussels, Avenue Buyl, his mother, whom I called mamie, and his father whom I called papi, both called me Michel. Jean-Claude, with whom we got to know each other when we were young, also called me that way; and when we both went to America in 1982, he continued to call me Michel. Today, it’s been twenty years since I returned to Morocco and took the first name of my origins, the one my parents gave me and that everyone continues to attribute to me here.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You were a choreographer on Kickboxer. Please tell us about that experience. What does distinguish dance choreography from fight choreography?

  Mohamed Qissi: I indeed took care of the choreography and of the casting of the fighters in Kickboxer, what was an extraordinary experience. The fact that Jean-Claude and I had trained together for years and years, since we were little, was of a huge help to us in our fight at the end of the film. There is dance in this fight, a visual beauty of the moves, which is why it looks so good on screen.

  Dance and fight choreographies are nonetheless completely different things. I wouldn’t be able to choreograph a dance scene; but a fight choreography where the movements are of impeccable fluidity, elegance, where a kind of dance is played, a warlike-style dance, is something that is possible for me. The risk of injury is much greater in combat choreography than it is in dance choreography. The actors recruited for fight scenes don’t just have to know how to act; they have to know how to fight, what is not something you learn in six months. They must be experienced fighters, who know how to control themselves, control their strength, and resist fatigue.

Kickboxer fanart by Stevan Aleksić ART

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Is Tong Po an entirely bad character? Or does he keep a part of light in him like Darth Vader?

  Mohamed Qissi: The utter nastiness of Tong Po is plainly evident in the film. It impressed the spectators. As for Tong Po’s past and why he has become such an evil being, devoid of any light, the film remains a mystery. While it is true that some are born with a mental disorder, we are never born wicked. We are all angels when we come to the world. An unhappy childhood, marked by mistreatment and sexual abuse, is one of the things that can explain why some take a fatal path while growing up. At the moment, I am being offered the launching of an opus that would explore Tong Po’s youth, the education he received, the life’s challenges that he encountered and which rendered him the brutal and cruel being that the Sloane brothers have to face in Kickboxer…

Mohamed Qissi as Tong Po in Kickboxer and Kickboxer 2: The Road Back

  Grégoire Canlorbe: What do you think of Dave Bautista as Tong Po in Kickboxer: Vengeance, remake of the original Kickboxer movie?

  Mohamed Qissi: It is an honor for me that Dave Bautista, someone who enormously matters in the cinema world, whom we have seen playing in important films like Blade Runner 2049, took over the character of Tong Po whom I was the first to bring to life. An honor and a pleasure.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Would you say that the “American dream” that you lived is still possible for a young person in Morocco today?

  Mohamed Qissi: Everything is possible in life, whether you are a Moroccan or someone from another country. Everything is possible provided that you are passionate, patient, and persevering; and that you work hard, get up early every morning, and enter those places where your passion brings you. If you are passionate about cinema, go where the cinema is. Whatever is the environment in which your passion finds itself, you will meet good and bad people there; go to the right people, those who will help you. With advances in communication, contacting the right person is easier today than it was in the 1980s.

Grégoire Canlorbe (in the middle) with the Qissi brothers

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. In the end, what message do you want to convey?

Mohamed Qissi: My message to everyone, especially young people, is the following. On the one hand, respect your body, stay away from all bad drugs. The good drug is sport; the bad one is stuff like cigarettes, alcohol, or cocaine. On the other hand, respect your parents whoever they are; listen to and respect their advice—especially when it comes from wise people.


That conversation was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s October 2021 issue

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: Grégoire Canlorbe, Jean-Claude Van Damme, Kickboxer, Michel Qissi, Mohamed Qissi, Tong Po

A conversation with Helmuth Nyborg, for The Postil Magazine

A conversation with Helmuth Nyborg, for The Postil Magazine

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Oct 1, 2021

Helmuth Sørensen Nyborg is a Danish psychologist and author. A former professor of developmental psychology at Aarhus University, Denmark and Olympic canoeist, his main research topics include the connection between hormones and intelligence, the inheritance of intelligence, and the relationship between sex and intelligence.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: How did you move from Olympic canyoning to academic career? Which of those two activities was the most physically, mentally demanding?

  Helmuth Nyborg: The change was easy. Preparation for the 1960-Olympiad in Rome took five years in advance with three hours training from 6-9 am. and again from 6-9 pm.– before dinner was an option – year-round. Such a program taxes social, family, and metabolic, and intellectual life considerably. So, as I shared a room in the Olympic village with gold medalist Erik Hansen, with whom and two others I won the bronze medal, I simply told him that my career in kayak ended at 3:08 pm. when we passed the goal line. He found it hard to believe, but I kept my promise and entered the academic halls instead.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You are currently working on a thermodynamic approach to the biocultural evolution of intelligence. How do you sum up your theory as it stands?

  Helmuth Nyborg: Actually, already back in 1994 I wrote a book on Hormones, Sex, and Society: The Science of Physicology, where I argued that science would advance by skipping much abstract philosophical thinking about Man’s nature and instead turn to the study of Molecular Man in a Molecular World. The jump from there to thermodynamics is short. Currently I am trying to quantify 275.000 years of prehistoric competition between individuals in the struggle for capturing and transducing available energy (Wm-2), survival, and procreation, in a retrospective, pseudo experimental design, that is, to redefine classic Darwinian thinking along the lines suggested back in the 18th century by the two famous physicists Ludwig Boltzmann and Alfred Lotka.

Helmuth Nyborg (on the right) and Grégoire Canlorbe

  Grégoire Canlorbe: When it comes to intelligence, what does imply the second law of thermodynamics? (Namely, that the entropy of an isolated system like is allegedly the universe is necessarily increasing) Do you believe the universe’s average intelligence is necessarily decreasing?

  Helmuth Nyborg: The second law of thermodynamic is about isolated systems and is therefore not of great use for understanding the way humans work, because they are open systems. We therefore need to call upon a fourth thermodynamic model for open non-equilibrium systems. It is easy to understand why global intelligence has been declining steadily since 1850: Low IQ people become more numerous and have more surviving children than high IQ people.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: A line of criticism occasionally heard against the coevolution idea (i.e., the idea that gene and culture are influencing each other in their mutual evolution) is that cultural patterns in a population are indeed influencing genes in said population—but that genes do not have the slightest influence on cultural patterns in turn. Thus any population subject to the influence of a certain culture is allegedly led to becoming biologically adapted to said culture at the end of a few generations: that is how, for instance, the Berber, Afghan ethnicities, and various populations who were conquered by the Islamic Arabs allegedly ended up becoming culturally Arabized—and biologically adapted to the Arabic culture. What is your take on such claims?

  Helmuth Nyborg: The whole idea of biocultural coevolution assumes that cultural aspects can be measured and quantified as accurate as the biological aspects. This is not the case, and this makes, in my opinion, the whole idea of biocultural coevolution untenable, as previously argued in Nyborg (1994).

  As said above, we better entirely circumvent stubborn problems based on how more or less abstract culture works, for example by trying to retrospectively define and quantify the prehistoric circumstance under which different peoples around the world have evolved, which polygene adaptation they were forced to make in order to survive and prosper and which left surprisingly lasting polygene traces reflected in existing global differences in traditional behavior, which even the naked eye can see so readily today. The recent failing attempts to make Afghanistan democratic illustrate the point well in blood, violence, tradition, and despair.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: An early investigator of the evolution of intelligence, Hippolyte Taine expressed himself as follows in 1867. ““The man-plant,” says Alfieri, “is in no country born more vigorous than in Italy”; and never, in Italy, was it so vigorous as from 1300 to 1500, from the contemporaries of Dante down to those of Michael Angelo, Cæsar Borgia, Julius II., and Macchiavelli. The first distinguishing mark of a man of those times is the integrity of his mental instrument. Nowadays, after three hundred years of service, ours has lost somewhat of its temper, sharpness, and suppleness (…) It is just the opposite with those impulsive spirits of new blood and of a new race [that were the Italians of the Late Middle Ages and of the Renaissance].” Do you sense that analysis is grounded at a thermodynamical level?

  Helmuth Nyborg: The mathematician and physicist, Lord Kelvin (1824-1907) said in 1883 something to the effect that: If you cannot measure a phenomenon and express it in numbers, you don’t know what you are talking about. You may be at the beginning of knowledge but have certainly not advanced to the state of science, whatever the matter may be.

  This problem is not only Taine’s but has been with us since dawn. People think of a phenomenon, say “impulsive spirit” or “motivation”, then they reify it and ascribe it causal value. Suddenly they have an explanation. Why did I do it? Well, I was motivated. They don’t see that this is a circular explanation: How do you know you were motivated? Well, I did it.

  This kind of muddled thinking was common in the past and is still widespread today. One current widespread form is Social Constructivism, exemplified by, say, unsubstantiable theories of “systemic racism” or, “glass ceiling” in “Gender research” (where Gender is loosely what you feel; a lived cultural proxy for real, measurable, biological sex differences).

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. Please feel free to add anything else.

  Helmuth Nyborg: It worries me to think that the political scientist Charles Murray (2003) has a valid point, when he concluded that Western thinking has been decaying since 1850. This most likely has to do with declining global and local average IQ.

  In that connection it hurts to watch the numerally quantifiable left-oriented political activist overtake of many modern universities and media, with their associated unprofessional “Cancel Culture”, “Critical Race Studies” and politically motived data-poor gender and LGBTQ+++ activist reports.

  It is terrifying to realize that so many weak academic administrators today carelessly allow left-oriented student hooligans to attack and have sacked serious researchers they have a political distaste for, instead of furiously defending free speech and independent research in the Academy.

  It is saddening to see that so many modern universities seem to have completely forgotten the Humboldtian ideals of a free University, and instead have allowed their organization to degrade into mindless mass-producing institutions, where political correctness all too easily overturns rational science and IQ research(ers) are tabooed.

  All this bode well neither for the future of European democracy nor the sustainability of enlightened societies.

O Tempera. O Mores.


That conversation was initially published in The Postil Magazine‘s October 2021 issue

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: coevolution gene-culture, dysgenic fertility, Grégoire Canlorbe, Helmuth Nyborg, Hippolyte Taine, Italian Renaissance, Lord Kelvin, Olympic canyoning, second law of thermodynamics

A conversation with Kenya Kura, for The Postil Magazine

A conversation with Kenya Kura, for The Postil Magazine

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Sep 1, 2021

  Kenya Kura is currently an associate professor at Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University in Gifu prefecture, Japan. He graduated from the University of Tokyo (B.A. in Law) and obtained Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, San Diego in 1995. His original papers regarding the following conversation are “Why Do Northeast Asians Win So Few Nobel Prizes?” (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.2466/04.17.CP.4.15) and “Japanese north–south gradient in IQ predicts differences in stature, skin color, income, and homicide rate” (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289613000949).

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Could you start by reminding us of your main findings about IQ differences?

  Kenya Kura: My first motivation about IQ study, basically, came from the simple fact that some IQ researchers, way back, like Richard Lynn and Arthur Jensen among others, reported that East Asians are higher in their IQ. And I was just wondering if it was true or not, and then, I went into the field of whether or not there is some kind of gradient of intelligence among Japanese prefectures. And so far, what I have found is very much in line with other findings that the Northern Japanese are somewhat more intelligent than the Southern residents on these islands. About the gradient amount Japanese people, what I have found is not at all unique: in Northern Japan IQ tends to be probably about three points higher than the average Japanese. And in the Southern Island of Okinawa, for example, it is like seven points lower than the average. And pretty much, it varies. Sort of stylized pattern that I figured out for many times and very consistently. That’s pretty much it. Also, I’ve been probably more interested in the psychological differences between the East Asians and the Europeans than most of the European Psychologists.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Do you have something to say about the dysgenic patterns (i.e., the factors of genetic decline at the level of things like fertility gaps) in contemporary Japan—compared with the West?

  Kenya Kura: Actually, Richard Lynn has been asking me for probably more than a decade, probably 15 years or so, if I can get some kind of evidence about this genetic effect in Japan. But unfortunately, I haven’t got a very solid dataset on the negative correlations—the so-called the famous dysgenic trend found almost everywhere in the world that more intelligent women tend to have fewer children. But, having said that, it’s very, very obvious that in Japan, this genetic effect is going on as much as in Western society. For example, Tokyo has the lowest fertility rate. And where most intelligent men and women tend to migrate when they are going to college or when they get a job and stuff like that. So, it’s apparent that most intelligent people are gathering in the biggest city areas like Tokyo, and Tokyo has the lowest fertility rate. So, it gives us some kind of evidence but, unfortunately, this is not a really solid analysis. I also figured out that the more educated you are, the fewer children you have. This is a very much stylized or prominent sort of phenomenon also found in Japan. So, I’m sure of this genetic effect.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Is it true that the taboo about genetic differences in intelligence is far less prevalent in Japan (and the other East-Asian countries) as it is in the West?

  Kenya Kura: I have been working on this subject matter for at least 20 years, and I got the impression that the real taboo of this kind of research is pretty much the same as in Western society. But there is one very big difference: in Western culture you can always pursue your scientific theme or scientific field and prove you are right. And it’s a very Western idea: individuals have a right to speak up and try to prove they are right, but Asian culture doesn’t have that. So, the problem is that Japanese scholars are scholars in some sense, including myself, but, actually, most of them are just mimicking or repeating what Western people are doing. So, there aren’t many people actually trying to show or present their own thesis, their own theory, so to speak. So in that sense, if Western society or Western Science Society says A is right, B is wrong, in the Japanese society, it is pretty much subordinate to the whole attitude.

  So, I would say that mainstream Japanese scholars tend to just follow the mainstream Western culture. Personally, as for this sensitive scientific field, I really don’t have any friend working on this matter. People, including myself, are afraid to be regarded as a very strange, cranky person who is saying: “look, in group data, we are so different that there isn’t much we can do to, for example, alleviate poverty in the third world or in developing countries.” If you say that, then people think, “What?” Even though you might be right—many people think you might be right—but it is not part of our culture to speak up, that’s why I don’t expect anything to come out of the Asian scientific society to have an influence on the Western science society.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: While any evolutionary psychologist agrees, in principle, that human individuals are not tabula rasa genetically, most of them nonetheless refuse to admit that it applies to groups as well, i.e., that human groups exhibit as much specific genetic characteristics as do human individuals. In other words, all agree that a human individual (whoever he is) is endowed with a specific individual genome that contributes to shaping his psychological identity; but only a minority agrees that a human society (whatever it is) is also endowed with a specific collective genome that contributes to shaping its cultural identity. How do you account for that duality?

  Kenya Kura: For this sort of question, I have pretty much the same opinion as other IQ researchers of this kind. Basically, as you said, many people agree about the genetic differences between individuals whereas, when it comes to group differences, they try to negate the existence of genetic differences. So, yes, there is a dichotomy, here. But I understand this idea because their point of view—because everybody wants to be a nice person. Right? So, if you are seeking for truth only as a scientist, that is fine. But we are not some sort of abstract existence without any physical reality because everybody around you feels awkward probably if you say: yeah, but, you know, group difference makes a lot of sense. And most of the sort of talk that inequality existing in this world is probably explained by genetic differences, as Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen said, makes all the people around you feel very, very awkward or strange about your political sort of personality or your political view, itself. I can say only probably this much. So, many people are just politically persuaded not to mention—not only that—not to recognize, trying to make a lot of effort not to recognize the difference and try to negate the fact. That’s my understanding.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: It seems the Indo-European cultural pattern that is the tripartite hierarchy of society for the benefit of a warlike, sacerdotal aristocracy with a heroic ethos (i.e., the ethos of self-singularizing and self-immortalizing oneself through military exploits accomplished in contempt for material subsistence) has been present or paralleled in traditional Japan. Do you suspect an Indo-European influence in Japan?

  Kenya Kura: Oh, I have sort of an idea. It’s not very much proven, but Japanese society or Japanese people are basically a hybrid, about 30 percent of the original so-called Jomons before the Chinese or Koreans came, about two thousand years ago. And this Korean or, I would say, Chinese genetic factor constitutes about 70 percent. So 70 percent of Chinese plus 30 percent of indigenous Japanese people is the basic genetic mix of current Japanese people. And this kind of huge 70 percent explains the East Asian characteristics. Basically, it gives us looks like mine, right? Probably, any European can notice that Japanese, Korean, Chinese typically have different face characteristics. And although, as I said, Japanese people have 70 percent of retaining this genetic tendency, the 30 percent remains in our genetic structure. And I suspect that this natural 30 percent gives us more of a war prone personality than the Chinese or the Koreans. So, that’s why we put a lot of war emphasis, like the Samurais’ theory, as you might know: more martial arts, real battle and war, and really domination, all over Japan. That’s my understanding.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: The traditional Japanese have been highly creative and sophisticated in the martial-arts field—to the point of surpassing the Westerners from that angle. Yet only the traditional Westerners have come to transpose to the field of science the art of fighting, i.e., to transpose to science the spirit of competition, innovation, and assertiveness associated with physical combat. How do you make sense of it?

  Kenya Kura: It’s a very good point—an interesting point for me, too. My understanding about it is that, for example, French people seem to like judo a lot. I have heard that it’s very popular. So, for example, judo, or we have a similar sort of art that is huge called kendo. But that kind of martial art, as you said, has been very sophisticated in this country, and also in China, to some degree, maybe even more so. But that gives me an idea of science itself because science itself is equally into any kind of sort of natural—not only natural reality, but also the analytical view for every kind of phenomenon. So, for example, we don’t have social science, and we just import it from the West. It’s the same. I mean, natural science was imported from the West. And when it comes to science, it’s also based on logic—a heavy dose of logic and mathematics, usually. None of the Asians were interested in mathematics, at least not as much as Western people had been. So, when it comes, for example, to geometry, even the ancient Greeks were very much interested in it. The Chinese people never developed the equivalent of that kind of logic. And it’s also true that mathematics has been developed almost exclusively in Northern Europe within the last five hundred years. And Chinese people, although they were in higher numbers than White Europeans, they didn’t develop anything. Neither did the Japanese or the Koreans.

  So, the problem is that East Asians tend to neglect the importance of logic. They don’t see that much. They just talk more emotionally, trying to sympathize with each other, and probably about political rubbish, more than Western people, but they don’t discuss things logically, nor try to express their understanding and make experiments to determine if something is true or not. Scientific inquiry is very much unique to Europeans. That’s my understanding. So, although it seems like East Asians are very quick to learn things—the Chinese are probably the quickest to learn anything—but they’ve never created anything. That’s my idea. So, they don’t have the scientific mentality, a sort of inquiry or sufficient curiosity to make science out of sophisticated martial arts.

  It may be true that the “traditional Japanese have been highly creative and sophisticated in the martial-arts field—to the point of surpassing the Westerners from that angle.” But I guess nowadays even judo or any kind of martial arts is more developed or more sophisticated, a lot more sophisticated, in European countries. The Japanese or Chinese created the original martial arts. But their emphasis—especially the Japanese, they put too much emphasis on their psychic rather than physical power. So, when you look at any kind of manga or anime, the theme is always the same: the rather small and weak main character has got some kind of psychic power and a special skill to beat up the bigger and stronger enemy. And it’s pretty much like “the force” in the Star Wars movies. But in the case of Japan, it’s a lot more emphasized. So, they tend to sort of think less about physical power and more about the psychic personality kind of thing. That’s the sort of phenomenon that we have, which shows some lack of analytical ability from my point of view.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: A common belief is that the Japanese people is both indifferent to the culture of Western peoples—and genetically homogenous to the point of containing no genius. Yet contemporary Japan is displaying a variety of geniuses in videogames (like Shigeru Miyamoto), music (like Koji Kondo), etc., and is quite opened to the Western world culturally. Videogames like Zelda and Resident Evil are highly influenced by the West: the Western heroic fantasy in the case of the former; and George Romero’s movies in the case of the latter. Some Japanese actors (or movie directors) enjoy worldwide fame, like Hiroyuki Sanada who is portraying Scorpion in the new Mortal Kombat movie.

  Kenya Kura: About the sort of personality and the intelligence mixture of the geniuses, I guess—Dr. Templeton and Edward Dutton—I’m sure that you talked with him—Edward Dutton wrote a very good book about why genius exists and what kind of mixture of personality and intelligence we need to make a real genius. And I do agree basically with Edward Dutton’s idea that we don’t have the sort of nice mixture of intelligence and, at the same time, a sort of very strong mindset to stand out from other people. The Japanese tend to be among others too much. So, they can’t really speak up and have a different kind of worldview from other people. As I said, Japanese scholars tend to rather avoid discussion or serious conflict of some point of view against other scholars so, that’s why there is no progress or no need to prove what you’re saying is true or not. That is a problem.

  Okay, so, this is just a part of answering your question. And the other thing is—oh, but I’ve been talking about science—in order to be a scientist, you have to basically propose some kind of thesis and at least show some evidence that your thesis is right or proved in pieces. But when it comes to fine arts or Manga, Anime or literature or movies or games, you don’t really have to argue against other people. You just create what you feel is beautiful or great—whatever. So, because Japanese culture basically avoids discussions or arguments against each other, they are more inclined to create something like visual arts. That’s why I believe Japanese manga or anime have been very popular also among Europeans. Probably including yourself, right? I’m sure you’ve played or traded video games from Japan.

  You talked about Hiroyuki Sanada. He’s one of the most famous action movie stars, like Tom Cruise type. So, I understand what you wrote, here. And the other thing is—it’s pretty much the same. In the Edo period, about 300 years ago, there was fine arts called ukiyo-e. These paintings and printings were sold to the public. And the French impressionists in the 19th century were, as far as I know, very attracted to those ukiyo-e and they got some inspirations from them and how to draw the lighting or nature itself. So, I do believe that Japanese people are probably genetically talented to some degree. I would dare to say they’re talented in visual arts. But it does not mean that they are talented in science. These activities are totally different, which gives me a very interesting sort of contrast.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: In intergroup competition, the Empire of Japan was highly successful militarily—until 1945’s nuclear bombing, obviously. How do you account for that performance?

  Kenya Kura: A German soldier was a very effective soldier, even compared with Americans or Swedes. So, I believe it’s very similar in the case of Japan. The Japanese tend to be tightly connected to each other, which gives them a very high advantage in military activity. That’s why they first tried to really dominate the whole of Asia, and, eventually, they had a war against the US in order to sort of get the whole Chinese continent. And, of course, Japan was defeated. But Japan is not so much endowed with natural resources like oil or coal, or whatever. In some sense, we’re very strong in military actions, it’s true. So, it’s very similar to the story that the Chinese are probably more inclined to study and learn original things like Confucius or the old stuff in order to show how intelligent they are, whereas the Japanese tend to be more war prone, more warmongers. They think more seriously and put more emphasis on military actions than the Chinese or Koreans. So, that’s why Japan, in the last century, first invaded Korea, and then, moved into the Chinese continent and defeated Chinese army. That’s just how I understand it. It’s very similar to German history.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Democracy is commonly thought to allow for an “open society” in which every opinion can be discussed—and in which ideological conflict can be settled through exclusively peaceful, electoral means, without the slightest drop of blood. Does the democratic regime in Japan since 1947 corroborate that vision?

  Kenya Kura: You’re right. Exactly. You are French, so you have a serious understanding of how people can revolt against the ruling class because of the French Revolution, which is the most famous revolution in human history. So you have a serious understanding about the existence of conflict and that the product of this conflict may be fruitful, good for all human beings. But, unfortunately, Asia does not have that sort of culture that if you say something true and then, have a serious conflict of opinions about it, it may turn out to have a fruitful result. That’s very Western to me.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. Would you like to add a few words?

Kenya Kura: I’ve probably said pretty much everything in a scattered manner, but let me emphasize one thing: usually, for any kind of European person, the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese look very similar or the same, but genetically, we are probably somewhat different, much as, for example, Slavic language people and the Germanic language group. So there might be some kind of microdifference of this kind which may, especially in the future, explain the dynamics of History. That is what I want to know and try to understand.


That conversation was initially published in The Postil Magazine‘s September 2021 issue

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: aristocratic-warlike ethos, Grégoire Canlorbe, Japan, Kenya Kura, Richard Lynn, samurai ethics, Tatu Vanhanen

A conversation with Drew Fraser, for American Renaissance

A conversation with Drew Fraser, for American Renaissance

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Juil 17, 2021

A Canadian-born academic, Andrew William Fraser was an associate professor in the Department of Public Law at Macquarie University in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. He is best-known for his book The WASP Question. [The views here expressed are not to be confused with those of American Renaissance nor with those of Canlorbe.]

  Grégoire Canlorbe: A striking contemporary trait in the WASP people is what may be called extra-ethnic individualism, i.e., the propensity to assess foreigners (including those non-white) as self-determined, free “individuals” who can transition fluidly from an ethnic group to another one—and to welcome them on one’s territory and to provide them with national citizenship. Is extra-ethnic individualism an acquired, “cultural” trait—or is such feature one biologically anchored?

  Drew Fraser: There is no radical break between biology and culture. Racial differences generally are, in large part, biologically or genetically grounded. But culture, too, is more than a social construct; it, too, has a substantial biological component. Deeply entrenched cultural differences between racial groups may be reflected in their respective genomes. The culture of any given racial group is never static; it changes and develops, sometimes in tandem with genetic changes.

  One example of the interaction between biology and culture was the emergence of lactose tolerance among peoples who gave up a hunter-gatherer way of life to engage in animal husbandry. The concept of bioculture presupposes the co-evolution of biology and culture.

  But any such co-evolution is a long process occurring within stable gene pools over millennia. Negroes have been in America for a little over four centuries without assimilating into the dominant white culture, much less undergoing genetic changes as a consequence. Paradoxically, American Negro culture, having been released from the disciplinary matrix formerly imposed by slavery and Jim Crow, is becoming steadily more remote from WASP bioculture. Contemporary black Americans dependent on public welfare are reverting to the fast-life strategies (e.g., low investing parenting of many children) associated with their sub-Saharan African ancestors.

  WASP biocultures are generally characterized by predispositions towards individualism, exogamy, and small nuclear families. As a consequence, WASPs display a relative lack of ethnocentrism. Kevin MacDonald explains these biocultural traits as an evolutionary adaptation to the rigors of life in cold, ecologically adverse climates. Natural selection worked there to favor the reproductive success of individuals capable of sustaining “non-kinship-based forms of reciprocity.”

  The Anglo-Saxon Männerbünde who invaded and settled in England were bound together originally more by covenant than kinship. The prominent place accorded to oath-taking and covenants in early England was associated with the growth of the individualism later manifested in the development of the English common law of contract, private property and eventually impersonal corporate forms of business enterprise. All of these legal norms required sustained co-operation between and among strangers.

  The distinctive culture that emerged from the interaction between the genotype of the English people and their environment can be understood as what Richard Dawkins calls an extended phenotype. Like the spider’s web or the beaver’s dam, the extended phenotype of WASP bioculture creates a feedback loop between genes and environment. If the WASP bioculture creates a “society of strangers,” its most characteristic extended phenotype is perhaps the modern nation-state. WASPs can be said to have invented the nation-state as the primary institutional expression of their collective identity.

  The problem is that Anglo-Saxon states, like Frankenstein’s monster, have escaped control of, by, and for the people who created them. WASP bioculture emerged within a high-trust society of strangers within which the state was expected to act as trustee for the interests of society as a whole. Today, those Anglo-Saxon nation-states have been absorbed into a more or less autonomous and self-perpetuating, globalist system of governance.

  WASPs are now vulnerable to the machinations of transnational corporate welfare states determined to open up every formerly Anglo-Saxon country to an unending flood of mass immigration. Predominantly non-white immigrants come from low-trust societies predisposed to elevate kinship and tribal loyalties above impersonal norms of fairness and justice.  Individual WASPs are ill-prepared to compete with racial strangers co-operating with each other to advance their collective interests.

  Clearly, the survival of WASP biocultures depends upon the successful adaptation to these altered circumstances.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: What is your take on Samuel Huntington’s classification of contemporary civilizations—and on his claim that the XXI century’s struggles will be neither economically nor racially motivated, but instead “civilizational” clashes? Did Huntington have a satisfying, perspicacious understanding of WASP civilizational model?

  Drew Fraser: Huntington contended that clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but, at the same time, looked to an international order based on civilizations as the best safeguard against war. He probably overestimated the unity, cohesion, and cultural continuity of the major civilizations. Nowhere is that more obvious than in the case of Western civilization.

  The United States, according to Huntington, is the core state of Western civilization. He believed that the United States possesses a core “Anglo-Protestant culture.” Recognizing that mass immigration represented a serious threat to the survival of that core culture, Huntington held to the vain hope that new immigrants could and would assimilate into the host culture.

  His analysis rested, as well, upon the presupposition that the core Anglo-Protestant culture established in the British North American colonies has survived intact down to the present day. In fact, the character of the American people was altogether different in the colonial and early republican periods. Sociologist David Riesman described the dominant character-type of those days as “inner-directed.” Knowing the difference between right and wrong, early Americans were “rugged individualists,” possessing a sort of inbuilt psychic gyroscope that enabled them to stay on course, whatever the obstacles.

  Nowadays, most Americans (especially those in the managerial-professional elites) display an “other-directed’ character of the sort essential to success in corporate, governmental, and academic bureaucracies. According to Robert Jackall, the moral ethos prevalent in managerial circles is “most notable for its lack of fixedness.” The other-directed character requires, not an internal gyroscope, but a sort of radar able to pick up minute shifts in the fluctuating relationships with significant others in a mass-mediated social order.

  The rootless cosmopolitanism of an other-directed corporate culture is driven by an “essential, pervasive, and thoroughgoing pragmatism.” In modern multiracial mass societies, the early republican constitution of liberty was replaced by a corporatist constitution of control promoting the enhanced growth and vitality of an increasingly plutocratic globalist system.

  Amidst the ruins of their ancestral bioculture, WASPs throughout the Anglosphere have been abandoned by Woke corporate welfare states which no longer even pretend to represent them. WASPs are now de facto, if not yet de jure, a stateless people. Only by falling back upon their ancestral racial and ethnic identity will ordinary WASPs find the spiritual strength to turn the tables on cosmopolitan elites.  It is those faithless elites, not other civilizations that pose the greatest existential threat to the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: In your most recent article, you enjoin “virtuous WASPs” to “challenge the corrupt globalist plutocracy misgoverning the Anglosphere.” Who are exactly those plutocrats—and how should they be fought?

  Drew Fraser: The modern Anglo-American business corporation is a product of the managerial revolution. For more than a century now, ownership of the business corporation has been separated from control. Shareholders are no longer responsible for the governance of the corporate system. Complex systems of corporate finance have created interlocking structures of corporate control concentrating power in the hands of an irresponsible plutocratic oligarchy.

  That plutocracy is made up of people from a wide range of ethnicities. Throughout the Anglosphere, Jews play prominent roles in finance, media, academia, the law, and politics. Other ethnic groups have found niches of their own, such as the Indians involved in Silicon Valley. While no one ethnic group dominates the globalist plutocracy numerically—even WASPs can still be found within its ranks—there is little doubt that what E. Michael Jones calls “the Jewish revolutionary spirit” provides what amounts to its guiding ideology.

  WASPs are largely responsible for the invention of both the nation-state and the modern business corporation. I believe WASPs have an ethnoreligious duty, therefore, to clean up the mess that they and others have made of their biocultures and its extended phenotypes (or Lebenswelt as a German might put it, more poetically). Having become a stateless people, the WASP diaspora ought to re-model itself to some degree on the experience of the other, once-stateless, diaspora which became our chief ethnic rival; namely, the Jews.

  In other words, like the Jews, WASPs should be more than the ethnomasochistic people-in-itself that they are at present; they can and should become instead an ethnocentric people-for-itself.  The one essential lesson they must learn from the Jews is that it is morally permissible, indeed obligatory, to ask of every public policy, corporate institution, and religious practice one simple question; namely, “Is it good for the WASPs?”

  WASPs need to regenerate the ethnoreligious spirit of the early medieval Angelcynn church.  In the time of Alfred the Great (849-899), the church provided the embryonic English people with the first intimation that they, too, could become, a “holy nation” destined to do God’s work in healing a wounded world. The most important task of a resurrected Angelcynn church and its ancillary educational institutions will be to prepare WASPs to play a leading role in the reconstitution of a responsible ruling class.

  Just how one major aspect of such a program might be accomplished is the subject of my forthcoming book on the republican reformation of corporate governance. It is to be published shortly by Arktos Media. It is entitled: Reinventing Aristocracy in the Age of Woke Capital: How Honourable WASP Elites Could Rescue Our Civilization from Bad Governance by Irresponsible Corporate Plutocrats.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You addressed the “German Church Struggle” in the 1930s—and how the victory of the side most famously represented by Karl Barth would encourage the cosmopolitan character of Christianity in the whole West. What alternative is there to the deracinated universalism of mainstream Christianity?

  Drew Fraser: The story of the conflict within German Protestant churches between supporters and opponents of the National Socialist regime is known as the Kirchenkampf.  Mainstream historical writing on the church struggle typically rests upon one unshakeable premise; namely, that, even before the war, the National Socialists, generally, and Adolf Hitler, in particular, were culpably criminal and irredeemably evil.

  Karl Barth played a leading role in organizing ecclesiastical opposition to Hitler’s regime and its German Christian supporters. At the end of the war, Barth emerged as the clear victor over his völkische rivals in the Protestant churches. By the 1960s, he was a world renowned religious thinker, even appearing on the cover of Time magazine. He gave an enormous boost to cosmopolitan Christianity by rejecting any Volkskirche by denying that either nations or nationality were any part of the divinely-ordained order of creation.

  Barth refused to acknowledge that the Church can “be regarded as a human production.” He insisted that the Church does not owe its existence to this world; rather its being is “secured, unthreatened, and incontestable only from above, only from God, not from below, not from the side of its human members.”

  By contrast, the ideal of the Volkskirche rejected by Barth and his ecclesiastical allies held that “in the national determination of man we have an order of creation no less than in the relationship of man and woman and parents and children.” But mainstream Christians in every erstwhile Anglo-Saxon country now regard their own peoples as merely historical constructs whose purely contingent national identity cannot be identified as a command of God or a presupposition of the divine order of things.

  Barth’s complete ideological triumph has effectively licensed the virtual extinction of Christian nationhood throughout the Western world.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: When it comes to the Anglican Church in Australia—how do you assess the extent of its fall compared to Western Christianity’s other sub-movements?

  Drew Fraser:  The Anglican Church of Australia, especially in its Sydney Diocese, regards itself as Christian first, evangelical second, and Anglican in a distant third place.  In his 2012 Presidential Address, the then-Archbishop of Sydney, Peter Jensen lent his fulsome support to the transformation of Sydney into a multiracial global city. He celebrated the fact that between 2006 and 2011 over 300,000 migrants arrived in Sydney from over 216 countries.  He was not at all concerned that China and India now dominate the countries of origin.

  Just this year, the Sydney Diocese elected as its new Archbishop a Buddhist adult convert to Christianity whose Sri Lankan parents migrated to Australia when he was a young child.  Clearly, Sydney Anglicans have no interest in the survival of a national church nurturing and preserving the ethnoreligious identity of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants whose ancestors founded the Church of England in Australia.

  This represents a sharp departure from the hopes invested in the Broad-Church movement in the nineteenth-century Church of England.  1 John 5:6-8 tells us that the Trinitarian character of a holy people is found in the “three who bear witness on earth: the Spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three agree as one.”  At least one Anglican theologian, Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872), located the Spirit, the water, and the blood in the tripartite spiritual constitution of every national church.

  Maurice defended the Trinitarian unity of family, church, and nation. Unfortunately, the Anglican Church of Australia and elsewhere has rejected such a traditionalist theology. Instead, WASPs in the Australian Church have embraced the secular cult of human equality with all the enthusiasm their middle-class English souls can muster.

  Anglo-Australian Anglicans have missed altogether the theological point and purpose of Australian nationhood. Indeed, the Church has joined forces with the State to siphon off the Spirit and the water from the blood-faith of its Angelcynn forbears. The amorphous mass of individualistic WASP Anglicans must be satisfied with the thin gruel offered them by a “public theology” engaged in the competitive (indeed pathological) display of out-group altruism which characterizes evangelical mission in a post-Christian world.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You suggest holding theology as the “queen of the racial sciences”—and race as a trinitarian phenomenon paralleling the trinitarian deity. Thus you envision “race-as-biology,” “race-as-ethnicity,” and “race-as-theology” are the three constitutive elements of race—especially in the white man. Please tell us more about it.

  Drew Fraser: There are three dimensions to racial and ethnic identity. The first, race-as-biology, promises to shed light on the relationship between blood and behaviour as manifested in measurable group differences such as average intelligence, temperament, and reproductive strategies.

  By contrast, race-as-ethnicity deals with the myths and symbols which move men to collective action. As Hannah Arendt observed, to act, “in the most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin…to set something in motion.” The actor is someone who starts something new. Applied to the birth of an ethno-nation, her insights suggest that action promotes the process of ethnogenesis in two stages: (1) the beginning made by a charismatic leader; and (2) the subsequent construction of a novel collective identity by his followers.

  No wonder, then, that the imagined community of Christians appeared in late antiquity “in the guise of a miracle.” Not even the most devout Jews longing for the messianic restoration of national Israel expected what actually came to pass. Against all the odds, Christians—this new race of men—were moved by the Spirit to accomplish their divinely-appointed mission.

  Race-as-theology helps us to understand how Spirit and blood mingled with the life-giving power of water to sustain the first, embryonic Christian communities. Since then, Christian nationhood has been nourished by the continuing interplay of Spirit, water, and blood. But disorder or dysfunction in one or more of those elements has led many nations to defeat and destruction.

  Even the most atheistic practitioners of race-as-biology concede that a shared religious faith is likely to enhance the inclusive fitness of any race or nation. Conversely, the essentially trinitarian character of Christian nationhood is subverted when the unitarian logic of biology suppresses the theological dimension of racial or ethnic identity.

  But a one-dimensional obsession with race-as-theology is no less productive of disastrous consequences. The now-dominant unitarian theology of cosmopolitan Christianity asserts that there is only one race, the human race. The denial by “anti-racists” of the fixed, intractable, biological character of the observable differences between various population groups provides ideological cover for the deliberate displacement of white European populations in favour of non-white immigrants.

  Differences between Negroes, white Europeans, and Orientals are part of the divinely-ordered nature of things. Race is a theological not just a biological or cultural phenomenon.  Those who refuse to recognize the theological significance of race do so at their peril.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Could you remind us of your case for a “patriotic king” in Australia, a wording you openly borrow from a book by Henry St. John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)?

  Drew Fraser:  Royalty plays a central role in the bible story. Jesus the Christ traced his descent to King David. As the very model of an English David, Alfred the Great established a Christian kingdom in England. The hereditary monarch of the British dominions once served as trustee-in-chief for his realm. The religious significance of the monarchy was given formal recognition when Henry VIII, his heirs, and successors were declared to be Supreme Governors of the Church of England. The Royal Supremacy played a significant role in the rise of the Broad-Church movement in the nineteenth-century Church of England.  Nowadays, it has since become little more than a hollow simulacrum of the putative royal authority vested in a shapeshifting Crown. As in secular matters, the reigning monarch exercises the Royal Supremacy as a rubber stamp for any government of the United Kingdom commanding a majority in the House of Commons.

  A major objective of a future network of Angelcynn churches throughout the Anglosphere should be the rescue of the captive Crown in right of the Royal Supremacy from corrupt politicians with no demonstrable interest in the spiritual welfare of Anglo-Saxons “at home” or in the diaspora. Once Royal Supremacy over the Church of England has been insulated from political control, it should be extended to every reformed Angelcynn Church, not just in the United Kingdom, but throughout the British dominions as well.  In time, it may become possible for the Crown to charter Angelcynn churches, even in what remains of the American republic.

  In the eighteenth century, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, appalled by the blatant corruption of the ruling Whig oligarchy, hoped that the idea of a Patriot King would re-awaken the English nation from its spiritual slumbers. The appearance of such a patriot prince would have been a miracle indeed. In our own time, it is doubly hard to imagine a British prince daring to stand against a government determined to maintain its control over the royal prerogative in ecclesiastical affairs. But, as Bolingbroke wrote, those who pray for such a deliverance must not neglect such means as are in their power “to keep the cause of reason, of virtue, and of liberty alive.” The blessing of a patriot prince might indeed “be withheld from us” but to “deserve at least that it be granted to us, let us prepare to receive it, to improve it, and to co-operate with it.”

  Bolingbroke knew that were a patriot prince to campaign in defence of the monarchy, he would be subject to a raging torrent of criticism and abuse. Yet when a good prince is seen “to suffer with the people, and in some measure for them…many advantages would accrue to him.” For one thing, the cause of the British peoples generally “and his own cause would be made the same by their common enemies.”

  What is the nature of that cause? In short, acting as the Supreme Governor of an Angelcynn communion extending throughout the Anglosphere, a patriot prince will call forth a spirit of resistance to both managerial statism and the abstract universalism of globalist plutocracy. He will do everything in his power to civilize those wild and immoral forces. But the appearance of a Patriot King is not inevitable. Indeed, only a people whose lost liberties are restored to memory will recognize his coming as an opportunity to reshape their allegedly preordained future.

  Anglo-Saxon republicans may yet be compelled to call upon God to save the King. As things stand now, the ritual absence of the monarch from everyday life is but one more sign that we are no longer a serious people. Forswearing the faith of our fathers, we surrender our bodies to the state and our souls to the degenerate society of the spectacle. It would be a sign of spiritual and moral progress were we to wish that a Patriot King will come to save us.

  In effect, the idea of a Patriot King would serve as a Sorelian myth, inspiring WASPs to act in opposition to an irresponsible and corrupt plutocratic system demanding automatic obedience and mindless conformity. For the radical French syndicalist Georges Sorel (1847-1922), men cannot be galvanized into action through discourse or considered analysis. According to historian Irving Louis Horowitz, Sorel viewed action as “the outcome of an appeal to imagination and intuition, which dramatizes the consequences of an act rather than [offering] a reasoned prediction of those consequences.”

  An ethnoreligious appeal to the idea of a Patriot King will nourish WASPs around the world “on the strength of kinship and community feeling; on the ability to act as a collective unit.” To act as a whole, as a united people, WASPs will need to focus on a single unifying element. As a Sorelian myth, the pragmatic value of the idea of a Patriot King will not depend upon its “objectively primary content as such, but simply the quality of making men cohere in a common endeavour.”

  Remember, though: a king is, indeed, like unto God; he cannot save those who will not save themselves. Those who pray for the miraculous appearance of a Patriot King must make themselves worthy of such a blessing. The resurrection of the Angelcynn church will be but the first step in the salvation of the WASPs. Much else will need to be done if virtuous WASPs are to create and secure “little republics” of their own on the fiercely-contested terrain of a transnational civil society.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You studied the “theological significance of the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in AD 70.” What would be the political, “theological significance” of the reconstruction of the Jerusalem temple—and of the reestablishment of the priestly caste attached to its service?

  Drew Fraser: Mainstream Christianity rests upon some version of a futurist eschatology. That is to say, the most Christians, Catholics and Protestants alike, believe that the Bible reveals the salvation history and destiny of humanity from the creation of planet earth in Genesis until the end of the world at the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Belief in the prophesied end of the world takes several forms. Most Christians are “amillennialists” who take no firm position of when or how the Second Coming will take place. “Post-millennialists,” by contrast, believe that Christ will return only after the kingdom of God has established its dominion to the ends of the earth.

  Christian Zionists (aka “dispensationalists”) believe that the reconstruction of the Jerusalem Temple will inaugurate the Millennial (thousand-year) reign of Jesus Christ here on earth in preparation for the Last Judgement. On this view, the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 was in partial fulfillment of God’s promise of salvation to all Christians.

  Not all Christians, however, accept the deeply-entrenched (though competing) ecclesiastical traditions grounded in a futurist eschatology. Preterists (from the Latin praeter meaning “past”) hold that the Bible story effectively comes to an end with the destruction of the Temple in AD 70. Their reading of the bible story suggests that those who look forward to the return of Jesus Christ at the end of the world are misinterpreting the Bible in accordance with presuppositions grounded in a false hermeneutic. Futurist eschatology, preterists say, is simply unbiblical.

  Preterists hold to a covenantal eschatology grounded in a Hebrew hermeneutic according to which the bible story has to do with the rise and fall of Old Covenant Israel. They insist that the clear text of Scripture shows that all of the biblical prophesies of a new heaven and a new earth, not just those in Revelations, were fulfilled in AD 70. In August of that year, Christ came (the Parousia or Second Coming) to oversee the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem, the physical centre of the old heaven and old earth occupied by God’s first people. In Revelation, we see the Old Covenant world of Israel sinking into lakes of fire, while the New Covenant enters into history to create a new heaven and new earth. The Jerusalem Temple makes its exit in a spectacular cataclysm. The new creation becomes incarnate in the church, the ecclesiastical Body of Christ, which by AD 70 has been carried to the ends of the known world. There the bible story ends.

  The Old Covenant bound the holy nation of Israel to God; the New Covenant extended the grace of God to every nation (ethnos) of the oikumene. The leaves of the tree of life in the New Jerusalem were to serve for “the healing of nations.” Old Israel was no more. On Judgement Day, Christ sentenced the stiff-necked synagogue of Satan to spiritual death. Only a righteous remnant was left to carry the holy seed of Israel unto the nations. For almost two thousand years, every Christian nation adjured Jews within their realm to recognize their Redeemer, thus ending their age-old rebellion against God. In sharp contrast to the Jews, Anglo-Saxons eagerly entered into the new covenant world.

  A preterist biblical hermeneutic is clearly opposed to Christian Zionist dispensationalism.  The reconstruction of the Jerusalem Temple by the modern Israeli state cannot be justified theologically within the framework of covenant eschatology. (It would, of course, signal a blasphemous desire to reverse the divine judgement on Old Covenant Israel.)

  On a positive note, preterism provides a warrant for an Angelcynn ethnonational church aiming to raise up WASPs as a holy nation in their own right. Such a warrant was clearly exercised when the early Christian church recognized a biocultural affinity between the covenantal language of the Bible itself and the prominent place occupied by covenants in tribal social structures of Old England.

  Conversely, once Anglo-Saxon churches downplayed the importance of blood covenants to the spiritual life of both family and nation, the ancestral attachment of Anglo-Saxon Protestants to the Body of Christ began to fade away. The civil religion of the modern Anglican church, focused as it is on personal salvation, refuses to recognize itself as the spiritual home of the large, partly-inbred extended family that constitutes the Anglo-Saxon ethny. No such bloodless faith will ever give birth to a holy nation in the eyes of God.

  Contemporary WASPs drawing upon the wisdom enshrined in Holy Scripture will recognize that their own ethnonation, no less than ancient Israel, must ground itself in a divinely-ordained covenant between the dead, the living, and the unborn. The living members of a godly nation will see themselves as the trustees of the family blood, rights, property, name, and position for their lifetime. They have an inheritance from the past to be developed and preserved for the future. Along with its warrant for nationhood and a storehouse of wisdom for all ages, the biblical fate of Old Covenant Israel stands as a clear warning to any nation breaching its covenantal obligations to God and man.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. Please, feel free to add anything else.

Drew Fraser: Thanks for the opportunity to do this. I found your questions quite stimulating.


That interview was initially published in American Renaissance, in July 2021

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: alt-right, coevolution gene-culture, Drew Fraser, German Church Struggle, Grégoire Canlorbe, Hannah Arendt, Henry St. John 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, Karl Barth, Race and theology, Samuel Huntington, Temple at Jerusalem, WASP

A conversation with Göran Adamson, for Gatestone Institute

A conversation with Göran Adamson, for Gatestone Institute

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Juin 6, 2021

Göran Adamson is an associate professor in sociology with a PhD from the London School of economics. He is engaged in public debate in Sweden focusing on free-speech issues, populism and diversity. He is an outspoken critic of multiculturalism from a left-wing political perspective. March 2021, his new book—Masochist Nationalism – Multicultural Self-hatred and the Infatuation with the Exotic—was published by Routledge.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You have been working on a statistical study of the relationship between ethnic background and crime in Sweden. Is the Islamic faith in migrants a strong predictor of delinquency?

  Göran Adamson: That’s a good question. I just want to give a little background on the report because the report builds on, or is an updated version of, a report by the crime prevention agency from 2005. It had been almost 20 years since the Swedish state had done any research about the relationship between migration and crime. And so, this was a completely private initiative. And I was the head of this study. And I can just tell you that the two most salient features in this study were that we found that among people who were suspects or, with reason, were suspected of a crime, about six out of 10 in Sweden were migrants, which is more than half of every second people, the suspect of crime in Sweden is a migrant. And when it comes to the murder rate people who were, with reason, suspected of murder, it was about 73 or 74 percent. You know what I mean? So, about three out of four people suspected of murder in Sweden in 2017 are migrants. So, these figures are frightfully high. But the funny thing is that the Swedish Social Democrats and people you might call multiculturalists—the politically correct—they have not been interested in investigating this even though these are issues that people have been talking about. Maybe the most important issue and the reason why the Swedish Democrats have become so huge over the last 10 years—they are now almost the biggest party in Sweden—it is like Front National—what is it called? Something else now. But you know, Marine Le Pen’s party. So, but talking about if there is a link between Islam and crime, I think you could say yes because if you check the migrants who are the most likely suspects of crime, the proportion of the—I mean, it is called overrisk. An overrisk is a term—it indicates the risk of any person on the street being the suspect of a crime. And when it comes to people from the Middle East, the overrisk is about three, generally speaking. So, the overrisk means that the person from the Middle East—and many of these people are regrettably Muslims—the risk that this person has committed a crime is about roughly three times higher than for a Swede. So, clearly, you could say that there is a link. So, if you were to say that crime among migrants has to do with culture, I think it is fair to say that association has to be made. But in Sweden—what people are talking about in Sweden is something different, namely socioeconomic factors, if you know what those are.

  Socioeconomic factors mean that the causes behind crime and rape and everything are marginalization, exclusion, unemployment and financial issues that are linked to our country and, notably, something we are to blame for, which is something completely different as if you would talk about culture, which is something that people bring when they come to Sweden. And so, the socioeconomic explanation, so to speak, has been completely dominant among left-wingers and among Social Democrats in Sweden for decades. They have been repeating the idea of socioeconomic factors as the main cause behind crime among migrants. And they have repeated that like parrots—with the persistence of parrots. They have kept repeating: “Culture has nothing to do with it” over and over again. So, that’s what they’ve been saying. And then, other critics and I, we have asked them: “Okay, but if socioeconomic factors are the reason behind crime among migrants then, how do you explain the fact that migrants from, say, Vietnam or Thailand, have a much, much lesser propensity for crime than migrants from other parts of the world, if you know what I mean?”

  If the socioeconomic factors have to do with marginalization then, how come marginalized people who come from other cultures, such as Thailand and, basically, the Far East—Thailand, Vietnam, etc.—how come these people are actually underrepresented in crime? They are less likely to commit a crime than Swedes! So, the socioeconomic factors do not give a proper explanation for that because you can clearly say that there are people who come from much worse circumstances, actually, than some people from the Middle East. And even so, these people who come from much worse circumstances—for instance, the Vietnamese, just to give a case in point—they are much less prone to committing violence than other migrants. So, my point here is that the socioeconomic explanation doesn’t quite hold water, which leads to my suggesting—and other people suggesting—that there has to be another explanation, which is cultural. Which is for instance, how you see women. For instance, how you see the state. For instance, whether you have any respect for the state, or whether you’d rather live in clan based societies. All of these things. And, again, I’m not criticizing individuals, but if you turn a blind eye to cultural differences, you will end up with this very appealing, sweet, self-critical left-wing explanation, saying that everything has to do with socioeconomic factors. And people walk about—politicians, members of the media and academics, they walk about repeating these things—this particular explanation—without realizing that it doesn’t quite explain huge differences in criminal propensity between groups of migrants from various regions of the world. So, I think that’s an important point to make.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: To what extent is Sweden losing its culture—compared with those other Western countries prey to Islamization? How does the Church of Sweden react to the Islamic presence?

  Göran Adamson: I think the interesting thing with Sweden is that we—I say it in my new book: it has to do with a kind of masochistic attitude. And the masochistic attitude is an interesting combination between—it’s the fact that we are somehow enticed and we simply like to paint our own culture, our own religion and our own history, background, identity in rather dark colors, and we are happy to compare our own culture unfavorably to other cultures. And I think this is not only Sweden. This has been going on in Britain and in many other countries, maybe less in France. But you should mention that George Orwell wrote about this—and this is actually the basis of my new book—in an essay called Notes on Nationalism in 1945 where he talks about two concepts—and I’d like you to bring this up in the interview. One concept is the idea of negative nationalism, which is: you’re obsessed with your own culture, not in order to trace it, but in order to criticize it. The second one is transferred nationalism. It’s a kind of exported nationalism, you know what I mean? It’s the same sentimental, idealistic, romantic, self-eulogizing bullshit as a far right winger. But the only difference is geographic. It’s not done on behalf and for the benefit of your own country. It’s done for the benefit of Syria, it’s done for the benefit of Iraq or Somalia, or any other distant culture or country, of which you know next to nothing. And George Orwell says this—and this is something I’d like you to bring up. He says that I know—because he’s written about similar things, about the working class. He says, “I know enough about the working class not to idealize it.” If you know what I mean. So, you can turn this around and say that the thing that enables these kinds of left-wing, loony ideas, images, and fantasies about exotic cultures is the fact that the left knows very little—next to nothing—about these cultures because if they knew enough—like, I have lived, over the last 10, 12 years, in six, seven countries. I’m not an expert, but I know a little bit about these countries, like in Jordan, now. You would not idealize these countries the way the left-wing academics in Sweden are doing it or in Paris, possibly, and in London, because you’d know too much. And there’s another aspect, here. I think it’s very important. It relates to when people come to Sweden, for instance—if migrants come to Sweden. So, what’s happening? They are greeted by those who know very little about their own culture, who care very little about their own culture, and again, who are very happy to make unfavorable comparisons with other cultures. Almost like a pastime. Like saying, “Oh, you know, the way we treat homosexuals in Sweden… oh, you know, the way we treat women in Swede… oh, the way we treat migrants in Sweden, and structural racism” and all that kind of nonsense. This is not true. If you were to wake up one of these left-wing people in the middle of the night, they might admit, “I know this is not true, but it’s great fun.” And everyone else does the same. We have all these dinners and we just sit around and harass our own country, our own dance traditions, and we love it. And so my question is: if people come to Sweden, how are they supposed to respect Swedish culture if we don’t do it ourselves? I think that’s an important question. Because, in basically every other culture, every other country, people have a certain respect—even in dictatorships, they love their country, the tradition, etc. But in Sweden, we are not allowed to do that. And of course, how are other people supposed to find any kind of respect for Sweden if the Swedish Establishment has nothing but contempt for its own tradition and culture? I don’t understand. And there is an illogical and very bizarre thing also going on because if Sweden is such a bad place, then why is everyone coming here? Why is everyone who’s escaping trying to come to France, to Germany and especially to Sweden, if it’s such a bad country? No one is escaping from Sweden to Yemen. People are escaping from Yemen or from Somalia to Sweden. It’s as if we simply cannot accept the fact that we are fortunate and privileged because it goes against our own self-deception. This whole self-critical, self-harassing attitude is a perfect let-out, so to speak, for our country. It’s a perfect excuse and it’s a perfect way to avoid and evade the kind of shame of being privileged. One more thing. It is all made-up, you know. This self-critical attitude among scores of western elites can only occur in wealthy societies. It is an odd fruit among those who are troubled by the fact that they are privileged and fortunate. But why on earth be troubled by it? Why be ashamed by all those before us who made our country so successful? This is just head-spinningly grotesque.

  But to get back to Sweden losing its culture, I remember when I was teaching in Malmö many years ago, and there was a huge poster in one of the corridors, and the question on the big poster was: “What do you know about Ramadan?” And I was wondering, “I don’t know anything about Ramadan, and frankly, I’m not interested.” And then, in order to protest, I wrote in small letters: “What do you know about Yom Kippur?” in the corner of the big poster. And then, I had lunch. This is a good case in point. You should bring this up. And then, when I came back, I had a look at the poster again. But to my great surprise, my question was gone. And it wasn’t gone, nobody had erased it. I was completely sure that within an hour, somebody had seen my question and they had taken down the whole poster, replaced it with a different one, identical, and put it back on. So, that made me think about some of these forces behind the scenes going on in Sweden where I would say that foreign cultures and most prominently Islam are being pushed forward and promoted to the detriment of Swedish culture.

  And, of course, also to the detriment of, for instance, Jewish culture. Because if you tried to put up a poster informing about Jewish traditions like Yom Kippur or any other Jewish tradition, it would be taken down, it would be set on fire. So, you have this escalating self-harassment going on in Sweden and in many other cultures. Humility and self-criticism are fine, and to invite other cultures, that’s a good thing. But it is dangerous if all of these things become one-sided. If this means that other cultures, and Islam, most prominently among them, is allowed to be marketed and fostered, cherished while Swedish traditions are no longer seen as important, Christian traditions are no longer seen as important–because what will happen—then, you will see the slow, gradual shift of focus from Swedish traditions. All of these things people actually escape to. That’s the reason why they come to Sweden, and gradually, these ideas–I’m not saying these things will happen within the next five years, but there will be a slow shift of attention towards values, traditions and customs that might not have proven to be so successful throughout the years. You could take another case in point: the big community center a few blocks from Ground Zero in New York. There was a Muslim community center, but it was on for a few years and then, I don’t know what happened to it. And then, people said, “We don’t know if this is the right spot for a Muslim community center, just around the corner from Ground Zero where almost 4,000 people perished.” But then, again, you could say that this might not be a bad idea for cross-religious tolerance. But then, you need to think of the prospects for any church to be created and inaugurated in a Muslim country, in a Muslim culture. There are slim chances you could have a church, for instance, in many Muslim countries. They are not allowed. So, this is one-sided tolerance where justified self-criticism is replaced by self-annihilation. An idea fostered from above by the political left-wing elites whereby Western cultures, Western traditions, Western ideas are being dismissed for the benefit of some kind of multicultural veneration and idealization of anything exotic. And the more exotic, the better. And it seems as if the most exotic culture and religion has a name these days. And the name is Islam. And you should ask yourself–Douglas Murray, he asked this question: “What’s so great about Islam?” Ask yourself that question. This is an empirical question. And check. Ask yourself why. What is the benefit? Because there has to be some hidden scheme behind all of these tendencies, not only in Sweden, but in many other countries, also France. But I think France is somehow changing now with Macron’s speech and the decapitation of the teacher, etc. I mean, these are horrendous events, and things are likely to change. To sum it up, I think this kind of self-humiliating attitude only exists among a very thin layer of our societies: within the elites. Among the people, if you ask anybody living in a small town in Sweden if they are part of this self-harassing, self-hating agenda, of course not! They like Sweden. They like their country. They like their traditions. They celebrate Christmas and all of these things. So, what we’re witnessing is that there is a tiny elite with a huge impact in the media, in science, in the universities and in politics. And this also connects to another important aspect, namely the tension between the people and the elites. And this is increasing, this is intensifying all the time, and it doesn’t look good. If you would say that society rests on a close sense of solidarity between classes, then, in the West, we have a problem. Brexit is a problem. Trump is a huge problem from this point of view of solidarity between classes. Because there are clear tendencies of a political polarization. And the political polarization, I would say, is mostly polarization between classes.

  The church in Sweden, now that’s a case in point. There’s this fantastic book. And you know what you should try to do? You should try to have this book translated into French and English. It’s called The Art of Surviving the Swedish Church. It was written by a close friend of mine: Helena Edlund. She is a priest in Sweden. You should write about this. You should actually bring this up. Please, mention this in your article. The story is this: when she studied to become a priest, she was warned—people warned her about the so-called “Dark Coats.” Well, people who were labeled the Dark Coats, people who were supposed to be almost like Darth Vader: these were priest students who would be dangerously conservative. They would be terrifyingly religious. They’d be against homosexuals. They would be like monsters. But after a few weeks, she realized that she was one of them. She was a Dark Coat, too. She had these views herself. She had a belief in religion. She thought that reading the Bible was a good thing because when she was studying, the teachers kept saying, ‘Well, you don’t need to study that, it is just the Bible. Forget about the sacraments! Ignore all that! You can study other books instead.” And all of these religious traditions were seen as unimportant by the people in charge of the Swedish church. So, she wrote a book about this called The Art of Surviving the Swedish Church. And she, for being a religious person, she has been harassed, humiliated to an extent you would not believe could happen in the Western community. Her book came out a few years ago. And this book is a shocking example of what happens when the church is being kidnapped by left-wingers. And you should mention this. And so, her book is a very interesting case in point of what Rudi Dutschke, the German left-winger said, he said what the Left needs to do is to “march through the institutions.” You know what that means, to march through the institutions? So, this is what the Left has been doing in Sweden. Institution after institution: universities, the media, the entire educational sector from kindergarten all the way up, and in the Swedish Defense, we are promoting transsexual soldiers, and we have drafting campaigns for our army asking things like: “Suppose I came out as a gay while I’m out fighting for my country? » I mean, are these questions interesting? This is the rhetoric. And also, most importantly, the Left has been marching through the church, the Swedish Church. So, the Swedish Church is now hijacked by left-wingers and the archbishop in Sweden, she is famous for ignoring Swedish religious traditions. She’s much more keen on other more exotic religious traditions. And you might understand there is a particular religion she’s very, very keen on. This is Islam, because it’s connected to the whole idea of multiculturalism and the multicultural idealization of everything exotic. So, even if you go to the Swedish Church where you think you might find some—what do you call it?—refuge from the mayhem of political correctness, you end up from the ashes into the fire. And now, there is an increasing number—it’s been going on for many years—of people who are leaving the Swedish Church. They leave the Swedish church not because they are not religious, but because they are religious. They leave the Swedish Church because they have faith in God and they think that Christian traditions are important. And if you think that Christian traditions are important, you tend to stop paying your membership. You tend to send in an application saying, “I want to stop paying, I want to leave the Swedish Church and buy a few books per year instead.” So, when it comes to religious convictions, the Swedish Church is not what it looks like. I love churches, but I also left the Swedish Church a few months ago for precisely this reason. But you should actually mention the book. It’s called The Art of Surviving the Swedish Church. It’s a fantastic book. And if this book were available in English, it would have an impact. It’s a shocking witness to the state of Sweden.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: A common left-wing criticism against multiculturalism says that the capitalist class uses immigration to place at its disposal a large, cheap workforce—and the occasioned ethnic struggle to divert the indigenous workers from the class struggle. Do you share such line of criticism?

  Göran Adamson: Well, to some extent, I do. And I’ve written about it, myself, in my previous book—The Trojan Horse – A Leftist Criticism of Multiculturalism in the West. I have a discussion about it, saying that this is a classic left-wing criticism, that instead of uniting—instead of being able to unite against the globalizing elites—the elites are manufacturing these silly, whimsy wars between the lower classes, between workers, Swedish workers versus Muslims, and Swedish workers versus migrants, whatever. To some extent this is true. And clearly, you could say that this whole focus on LGBTQ, sexual identities etc. sounds very much to me like not only sidetracking, but also an attempt to confuse, engage people into playing games or engage in futile, silly unimportant battles while there are much more important battles to be fought. For instance, or actually most prominently, the battle against globalization, neoliberalism and the dismantling of national borders, I think that is clearly the most important battle to fight. And so, I think there is a class issue here, which is important. Then again, of course, you need to realize that even if you were to somehow foster the lower classes’ unity against the exploitation by the European Union, the neoliberal elites and all those international organizations, etc., you would clearly bang your head against the wall of cultural differences because, simply, even though both are poor and in need of assistance to be aided into a better life, the Swedish worker and an unemployed person from the Turkish countryside might have—save for the fact that they are both low-income—very, very little in common. It is sometimes easy—if you’re faced with the whole amount of cultural agenda, you are really tempted to just shout that this is all bogus and this is actually a class issue. But then again, this is also often taken too far. Because if you do that, if you’re a Marxist and you only talk about class identities and the need to fight against the globalizing elites, then, you simply forget the fact that there are cultural differences between people. And if you would like to unite the Swedish worker with an elderly illiterate woman from the Turkish countryside, or a man from Somalia, go ahead.

  Then, you should also mention a little bit my attitude towards the idea of islamophobia. I think the entire idea of islamophobia is ridiculous. I think that if you use the words islamophobia and islamophobic, you are playing a sordid partisan game because nobody would be called liberalophobic if they criticized liberalism. So, there is only one religion, there’s only one structure out there where you can use this: it’s Islam. If you’re critical towards Islam, you’re seen as phobic in some way, which is a very strange idea, hugely strange idea that shouldn’t be used. And you could actually say that to people who are likely to suffer the most from this kind of on-the-surface tolerant idea are not people in the West because we try to go by as good as we can and have learned to handle criticism. But it is the people in the Muslim community because they are somehow seen as so childish, so fragile and so helpless that they cannot stand any solid, open, rational, reason-based discussion about certain shortcomings within Islam. So, under the surface, it’s an absolutely amazingly arrogant attitude towards an entire religion. The idea of islamophobia rests under the surface on arrogance against Muslims. And also, the funny thing is that people who use islamophobia, they, of course, can capitalize on this. They can use it. They use it, and then, they engage in one project or another where they are often fabricating problems, exclusions, marginalization, and suddenly our academics, social workers and politicians are sitting with a handful of nicely marginalized groups of migrants—helpless and uneducated to be used and exploited as tools for our own careers, and our quest for moral haughtiness, under the pretense of tolerance and anti-racism. It is all a rather fearful sight. This is how I see it.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Over the course of human history, only the Western man has come to morally condemn xenophobia and scientific, political racism—for the benefit of the “open society.” All other peoples on the face of the earth are keeping on praising racial pride and distance with respect to the foreigner. What’s more, Chinese or Japanese scientists are notoriously more open to discussions on racial inequalities in intelligence, etc., than are Western scientists. As a sociologist, how do you make sense of that cultural originality of contemporary Westerners?

  Göran Adamson: That’s a very good question. I don’t know. I have a friend. He wrote a book years ago. It’s called Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truth. Rumy Hasan is his name. Razor-sharp, fantastic. And he’s so good, he will probably never be professor. Anyway, he has a concept called the “Western post-colonial sense of guilt.” We had colonialism, and colonialism provides us forever with a wonderful excuse to go about attacking ourselves. I mean, Hitler and all the rest. We can attack ourselves as much as we please because it gives us this thrilling idea of self-hatred, which is so dominant among the educated classes, among the intellectual middle-class in Sweden, today. You wouldn’t believe it. And also, in many other countries. And I don’t know, because if we talk about—I mean in Sweden, there are courses in post-colonial studies. I mean, studies in what? Sweden was never a colonial power in the first place. It’s like you can have a course about Swedes murdering people from other cultures. And then, you say, “Well, we never murdered people from other cultures. We never took slaves.” And then, they would say, “Well, maybe, but stop talking about that. It’s such a nice thing to have a course harassing your own country.” But you’re asking about what the root of it is. If you think about it today, I think you can say the root somehow lies in the particular, peculiar Western interest in lack of reflection. And it’s like an ever-present desire among intellectuals to idealize people below, as it were, oneself, be it workers or migrants, or even kids. And maybe, I can finish off by—I had a glimpse of insight this morning because my youngest daughter, she’s nine years old. She’s not a toddler, she’s nine years old. And she tends to leave a mess all over the place. For instance, she was sitting, shelling an egg. And then, I saw the eggshells lying there. And then, I thought, “That’s quite wonderful” because it was real, it wasn’t intellectual, just a pile of eggshells. And I picked them up and felt some very primitive pleasure in doing it. And then, I thought, “Well, this is the problem because as an intellectual, I long for precisely this: some kind of authenticity.” And authenticity precludes intellectual reflection, if you know what I mean. And this authenticity, you may find it on a table among the eggshells of your little child, or you can find it among workers who don’t reflect all the time. Or you can find it among migrants. It’s the kind of desire, aspiration, longing for what you are not. It’s a longing for a lack of thought. It’s a longing, it’s an anti-intellectual endeavor. And this endeavor is not only strong among people who have read Friedrich Nietzsche, it’s strong among everybody. If you’re an intellectual in Europe, you like this, you like the lack of—you basically tend to appreciate what you are not. I think this is part of it. And then, you see people walking about, acting like migrants. They are not feminists. And then, Swedish women, they tend to love it because they see authentic men. They see authentic guys. And these authentic guys, they might be dangerous. They might be angry. They might possibly be rapists. I have no idea. But these Swedish women, they think, “We don’t give a damn because we think there is something genuine about these guys.” They are Swedish feminists. Can I give you a fine example of this? You should bring this up, put this in. A friend of mine was working for Sida, which is the Swedish Ministry of Global Aid. These two ladies who’d just come back from Afghanistan, gave a presentation. And then, Jens, my friend, he noticed that they were smiling all the time and almost bursting out laughing. Eventually, one of them apologized. And they showed pictures of some Talibans and said: “You know, these Talibans, with their beards and their Kalashnikovs, they are so manly!” Did you hear that? And then, my friend said, “Well, they might be manly on a primitive level, but if they ever got their hands on you, they might rape you. Or kill you. Those are not nice guys like your Swedish husband.” But when they go home from work, they might just start harassing their nice, feminine husband who might actually be a better guy—better man—than the Talibans in Afghanistan. But here you go: you have this kind of intellectual middle-class women in Sweden idealizing everything exotic to the extent they would even idealize the man who might kill them or rape them, and who certainly would not accept this woman walking about not covered. But this also brings us back to what I was talking about at the beginning of our discussion, namely that you have these politically correct left-wing intellectuals who idealize exotic cultures. And the reason why they can idealize exotic cultures is that they know next to nothing about them. This is why they can go on doing this.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: In your article “Was Nazism anti-sex? – On left-wing fantasies and sex as the dark matter of politics,” you challenged the view that Nazism was wholly conservative on sexual freedom. Do you want to add something about left-wingers’ confusion on the matter?

  Göran Adamson: The Left seem to think that because they have reached the conclusion that National Socialism is the worst thing on Earth, all of its traits must also be equally repulsive, including the Nazis’ approach to sex. So, since Nazism is such a terrible idea, they must also be strongly opposed to sexual promiscuity. They must also be anti-sex. But judging from my own research, it seems that the Nazis, in terms of sex, at least in terms of sex among ordinary Germans, were basically looking at it as business as usual. There was nothing special about it. But what the Left has been doing ever since the end of World War II has been to buy into this idea of National Socialism as anti-sex. And if National Socialism is anti-sex, then sexual promiscuity and basically fucking around with everybody is an emancipatory anti-Nazi endeavor. So, if you check out the left-wingers, the 1968ers and people like John Lennon and Yoko Ono, they were basically thinking that their sexual promiscuity, collectivist living and all of that anti-authoritarian attitude generally was an anti-Nazi attitude. And I think you could basically say that the 1968ers and the left-wingers at the time and their huge focus on sexual promiscuity and sleeping around with everybody, to a great extent had its origin in a misconceived approach, misconceived understanding of sex during the epoch of the Nazi regime, namely believing that the Nazis were sex hostile. And if you were a good left-winger, you would be pro-sex. You would be promiscuous like mad, and you would just make kids left, right and center. And there is this famous dictum. It says: “Make love, not war,” as if the act of sex itself would be an act of peace, as if the act of sex would be an antiracist, anti-nazi antiwar, peaceful activity. I think this entire idea rests on a misunderstanding. If you study the sources—if you study the material, the empirical evidence, there is very little evidence proving that the Nazis were antisex. You can just check it out. There were condoms lying all over when they had their party rallies. There’s nothing antisex about that. So, again, the Left invents enemies, and then, they run like sheep in the other direction. And then, you have the entire anti-authoritarian movement, and all of these huge implications for the educational sector in the West. There are huge, extremely tragic implications for the education sector in the West. And this rests to a very great extent on the misconceived ideas of sexuality under National Socialism. That’s it.

See: Göran Adamson, Masochistic Nationalism – Multicultural Self-Hatred and the Infatuation with the Exotic (Routledge, March 2021)


That conversation was initially published in an abridged version by Gatestone Institute, in June 2021

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: Church of Sweden, ethno-masochism, George Orwell, Göran Adamson, Grégoire Canlorbe, Islam, Nazism, Sweden

A conversation with Bo Winegard, for The Postil Magazine

A conversation with Bo Winegard, for The Postil Magazine

by Grégoire Canlorbe · Mai 1, 2021

Bo Winegard is a former assistant professor and independent scholar and writer who is currently working on a book on human nature and conservatism.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: The “coalitional value theory,” which you have contributed to devise, asserts that humans evolved unique mental mechanisms for assessing each other’s marginal value to a coalition. Could you tell us more about those mechanisms—and how they intervene in artistic, scientific production?

  Bo Winegard: The basic idea is that we evolved some kind of mental system—I’m not sure exactly how this is instantiated in the brain/mind—to assess each other’s value to coalitions. For example, suppose that we form a soccer team. Pretty quickly we would understand who is better (more valuable) at soccer, and who is worse (less valuable). Ceteris Paribus, we defer to those who have more coalitional value (e.g., if Messi were on your team, then you would defer to him); and we often assert ourselves over those who have less value.

  My colleagues and I hypothesized that these mechanisms might partially explain the creation and display of certain cultural artifacts such as paintings, poems, history books, scientific articles. The idea is that cultural displays signal underlying traits (e.g., intelligence, ambition, education) that generally contribute to a coalition, that make it (the coalition) more formidable and successful. In politics, for example, being able to persuade other people is valuable; it helps a coalition to achieve its goals. Therefore, politicians might signal their value by delivering eloquent speeches. And those in the coalition might respond to such speeches with awe and admiration.

  The grand idea, which is not entirely novel, I should say, is that human coalitions are cooperative status-exchange systems. Leaders and other revered coalitional members have high coalitional value; they make the coalition better. And in exchange for their service, members defer to them, giving them priority access to coveted resources such as food, material wealth, and mates. In this way, the coalition benefits (by having the person high in coalition value) and the high-status person also benefits (by getting priority access to evolutionary relevant resources).

  Grégoire Canlorbe: A whole field of investigation lies in sex differences as concerns cognition and the relationship to knowledge. What did your long-standing collaboration with Cory Clark allow you to learn in that area?

  Bo Winegard: Ha! I’m not sure I understand the question. I think you are asking what did I learn about sex differences by collaborating for so long with Cory Clark? If so, I will just say a few things. First, Cory is atypical for females, so I would not generalize from my experience with her. And second, I do think that men on average are more tolerant of direct confrontation. My brother and I often get into vehement debates while working on projects, for example. I spare Cory from that because that’s not how our relationship works.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: It is sometimes doubted that intellectual manhood (i.e., the ability to think for oneself and to be intellectually innovative and dissident) is substantially correlated with IQ. What is your take on that issue?

  Bo Winegard: I’m not aware of research on this topic. (And it would be arduous to operationalize “think for oneself.” Even creativity is incredibly difficult to operationalize, and I’m not sure I trust much of the research on it.) I do think originality and innovation require a certain minimum level of cognitive ability. However, once one is above that level, I doubt there’s much correlation. I know many brilliant people who are intellectual cowards. In fact, I would contend that American universities are filled with craven professors who are afraid even to voice their true beliefs on a wide variety of taboo topics. I suspect that intellectual cowardice and cognitive ability are completely orthogonal.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: It can be easily noticed that the greatest military strategists in human history have been, if not bisexual (like Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar), at least misogynist (like Napoléon Bonaparte). Is there a coalitional value theory of that phenomenon?

  Bo Winegard: I’m not sure that I completely understand the question. But I think that some misogyny is likely a result of coalitional value mechanisms. For men’s coalitions, women, on average, simply aren’t as valuable as other men. Consider, for example, a sports’ team. Clearly men are better, on average, than women at sports. Thus men often deride other men who are bad at sports as being effeminate (e.g., “throwing like a girl,” “crying like my sister,” et cetera).

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You challenged the idea of a “panhuman nature.” Could you remind us of your argument? Do you also contest, more specifically, the idea of a certain psychological, physical structure invariant across those human populations that are racially European?

  Bo Winegard: The idea behind a panhuman nature is this: Most human-specific traits evolved before the end of the Pleistocene; and, more specifically, most probably evolved before humans expanded across the globe to face novel selection pressures. Therefore, most human psychological traits are shared across populations. There is thus a panhuman nature. I think the concept is useful in some ways but mistaken in others. Think about a different example that is more clear: Dogs. It is the case that one can generalize about a canine nature. Dogs of different breeds share many tendencies. On the other hand, it is wrong or misleading in my view to say there is a pancanine nature in a strong way because dog breeds also vary in behavior proclivities in important and fascinating ways. A Yorkshire Terrier is quite different behaviorally from a Whippet, for example. If you purchased one expecting the behavior of the other, then you might be surprised!

Human groups are not so different from each other as dogs are, obviously. But they are different. And for similar reasons: selection. Of course, dogs were artificially selected and humans were more or less naturally (sexually and socially) selected. And the intensity of selection dogs faced was probably much higher. But humans lived in different environmental conditions from each other for many thousands of years. They faced different selection pressures (probably primarily related to climate). This is phenotypically obvious. People whose immediate ancestors evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, look different from those whose immediate ancestors evolved in Northern Europe. The most obvious difference is skin color, which is related to the intensity of ultraviolet radiation in such a way that darker skin is associated with more intense radiation. In my view, psychological traits are no different from other physical and anthropometric traits.

Thus groups have slightly different psychological traits from each other. Unfortunately, in the United States at least, this is a very controversial topic—probably more taboo than any other in the social sciences. If groups are different from each other, then some groups might score higher on average on certain socially desired traits such as intelligence and compliance and self-control. And this offends the sensitivities of many progressives, who appear to believe in what I have called “cosmic egalitarianism,” or the notion that all human groups are equal on all socially desired traits. I think this belief, this cosmic egalitarianism, is no more plausible than Greek mythology or leprechauns at the end of a rainbow. It’s almost impossible to imagine, that is, that human populations are the same on all psychological traits. Now, they aren’t terribly different. So we can make generalization about human nature that apply, I think, to all human populations. But we have to consider group differences if we want to understand basic social phenomena such as income and crime disparities between populations, et cetera. Again, it is hard if not impossible to talk about these things honestly in the United States because of the dominance of progressives in the media and academia. But I don’t think it helps anybody to concoct a fantastical fiction about group sameness and to use it to then promulgate the myth that systemic racism is the cause of all group disparities.

  As for the second part of your question—again, that depends upon what one means by “invariant psychological structure.” Do I think that European populations differ slightly in traits and propensities? Yes. I think that is quite likely. Do I think that they have fundamentally different psychological structures? No. In a paper, my colleagues and I once compared this to guitars, and I think that’s a good comparison. So guitars are pretty similar to each other. They share a certain structure, if you will. But, there are also subtle differences among them that lead to different tones and tendencies. A Fender sounds slightly different from a Gibson. And an acoustic guitar sounds different from an electric guitar. I think the same holds for human populations, even within Europe.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You covered some of the bias present in politically liberal scientists. What are those? Do you also identify some political bias in hereditarian research about intelligence?

  Bo Winegard: Cosmic egalitarianism. And what we have called “equalitarianism.” Equalitarianism is really a set of biases about group differences. Primarily, liberal scientists repelled by the idea that groups might differ in socially desirable traits in ways that appear to favor white people. At this point, I have no confidence in social science in the United States because of how pervasive this bias is. It’s simply impossible to write about or study topics that are related to race honestly. This is especially true of hereditarianism, because the IQ gap “favors” whites in that whites have a roughly 15-point advantage on average in IQ inside the United States. (The gap appears to be globally consistent, although the exact number depends upon the country, and our data are much more copious inside the United States.) At his point, hereditarianism, or the view that a not insubstantial proportion of the gap is caused by differences in genes, has been removed from mainstream discourse and the academy like a heresy. The orthodoxy simply will not tolerate it, will not debate it, and will not even interact with those who promote it. It has been defeated not by evidence, but by moral bullying—and it is a victim not of falsification but of suppression.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You established yourself as a defender both of “scientism” and of “conservatism.” Yet a common criticism against the view that science (i.e., imaginative hypothesizing corroborated through quantitative, not-trivial empirical predictions) should be solicited to solve all the problems of society is that the limitations of the human mind render science unable to do as well as our cultural traditions, which have been molded—and successfully tested—over several generations of intergroup competition. How do you conciliate science and tradition?

  Bo Winegard: Great question! It’s certainly true that many conservatisms have railed against so-called scientism. But I think that is a mistake. Of course, what follows depends upon one’s definition of scientism. There is certainly a pseudoscientific pretense of knowledge that one should condemn. And there is also a “we trust science” attitude promoted often by progressives in the United States which is mendacious because, of course, they do not trust science that contradicts their sacred values. What I believe is that scientific thinking—skepticism, experimentation, reliance on evidence, et cetera—is the greatest force for generating accurate knowledge in the history of the world. And since I think conservatism is an accurate political philosophy, I think that the insights of science will generally align with the insights of conservative thought. Of course, science will contradict certain particular hypotheses. Maybe, say, the claim that homosexuality is a “chose,” which used to be popular among American conservatives, at least. That is no longer tenable. But the basic idea behind conservatism, namely that tradition is a good guide to a well-ordered, hierarchal, and cohesive society, is something that will be support by science. In fact, I’m writing a book on this right now!

  Some critics of scientism have argued that it is wrong because science can’t determine values. This is correct, I think, in an academic sense. We could find out, for example, that social policy X would increase human flourishing significantly, and some nihilist could say, “I don’t care. I don’t like human flourishing.” Sure. And science will never show that we should care about human flourishing. But most humans share the intuition that human flourishing is important and should be promoted. Once we have that shared intuition, then we can use science to assess policies. Of course, we should always be humble and recognize that we are incredibly ignorant about many things. That is an important conservative argument.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Some attempts have been made to solve moral issues on the basis of biology and evolutionary psychology. Thus abortion and contraception are deemed permissible on the grounds that population control—a mere cultural acquisition among humans, but an instinctual predisposition among a large variety of other vertebrate species—comes to implement the “natural law” that is allegedly the demographic adaptation of any population to its environment.

  As for homosexuality it is claimed that its recurrence as a genetic trait proves that homosexuals, despite being disadvantaged as concerns their reproductive success, are provided with a number of competitive advantages by reason of which homosexuality should be socially welcomed rather than sanctioned. Likewise premarital sex is justified as fulfilling an alleged hidden function of the sexual intercourse among humans, namely the function of ensuring—especially throughout pregnancy—the emotional attachment of the male to his female partner and their future progeny. Do you subscribe to such inferences?

  Bo Winegard: On these issues, I do not think evolution (or biology) is informative about what our moral values should be. In general, I think we should promote human flourishing (broadly defined). I don’t think that finding an evolutionary reason for something justifies or condemns it. I’ll give you two examples. It is possible that rape is an adaptive strategy. Not all rape. But the general behavioral predisposition. I certainly don’t think that makes rape morally acceptable. On the other hand, love is an adaptation, and I think love is often (though not always) morally laudable. What is important is the trait or behavior’s relation to social cohesion and human flourishing, not its evolutionary or genetic logic.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: You proposed an evolutionary approach to “tribalism in human nature.” How do you sum up your insights as it stands? How do you account for the ability of human individuals (to a varying degree) to identify to groups extending beyond the level of ethnical biological bonds—from multiracial nations and multiethnic religions to humanity taken as a whole?

  Bo Winegard: To be clear, there was nothing particularly unique in that approach! But the basic idea is this: Humans evolved in the context of competing coalitions and therefore evolved traits and proclivities that facilitate tribalism. They create tribes, favor members of their own tribe, and see other tribes as potential competitors. The first and most primitive tribe is the family, for straightforward reasons of kin selection. But humans collaborate with non-kin as well.

  My best guess is that ethnic affinity is a byproduct of a kin-recognition system. Humans recognize kin via certain cues. One such cue might be maternal perinatal association. Another is probably phenotypic similarity to the self or to other close kin. Experiments have found, for example, that people trust putative others in photographs that have been manipulated to look like the self more than others in non-manipulated photographs. Individuals in the same ethnic group on average look more similar to each other than individuals from different ethnic groups. Others have argued that ethnic affinity is a byproduct of tribal recognition system. I suppose it doesn’t really matter for the purposes of this question. What does matter is that humans do evince ethnic affinity. But they can of course transcend such affinities, creating large tribes called “nations” that are multi-ethnic.

  They do this mostly by inculcating norms of inclusion and tolerance and creating shared symbols (flag, national anthem). But it is worth noting that even within nations, ethnic groups often compete with each other. Ethnic diversity, in other words, often creates tension; and it appears to decrease social trust. This does not mean it is necessarily bad (or good). It’s simply a statement of empirical fact. So, it is true that humans can create large tribes that include many strangers and members of diverse ethnic groups, but those tribes are often inflicted by at least low-level tribal competition and tension.

  Grégoire Canlorbe: Thank you for your time. Would you like to add a thing or two?

  Bo Winegard: The thing that I think most important is to promote free, judicious debate about all scientifically interesting topics, at least in academia. And we are losing that audacious spirit of the pursuit of truth, replacing it with a timid spirit of obsequiousness. But the truth should not be feared. And our pursuit of it should be non-negotiable in the sciences. I’m not suggesting that we should say every thought or idea that pops in our head because we think it is true. But I am saying that we should explore every reasonable theory about the empirical world. And today that is simple not happening.


That conversation was initially published in The Postil Magazine‘s May 2021 issue

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: Bo Winegard, conservatism, Grégoire Canlorbe, race differences in psychology, scientism, tribalism

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