The motif of a god sharing the human suffering and death, then rising to reign in heaven, is not an invention of Christianity. Hercules suffering from the effects of the poisoned tunic, then going to the stake and ascending to Olympus, or Osiris dying drowned before being dismembered, then reconstituted, resurrected, and erected into sovereign of the afterlife, are all earlier iterations of a conception transmitted to Christianity, which it nevertheless pushed a step forward in recognizing a properly human character in Jesus, either as a human incarnation of God (in the case of the Trinitarian doctrine), or as a (not divine) son strictly distinct from his own father (in the case of radical-kind Arianism). My approach to God, while drawing inspiration from the Trinitarian Christian god, envisions the latter as, incidentally, symbolizing God and His relationship to the universe. I indeed approach God as an infinite, eternal, substantial, volitional, and conscious field of ideational singular models that completely incarnates itself into the universe while remaining completely external to the universe, completely ideational, and completely subject to a vertical (rather than horizontal) time; and which is not only completely sheltered from any forced effect (whether ideational or material) with one or more efficient causes in its willingness but traversed, animated, efficiently-caused, and unified by a sorting, actualizing, pulse that both stands as the acting part of God’s will and as the apparatus, the Logos, through which God incarnates Himself while remaining distinct from His incarnation. In the Trinity, I envision the Father as the symbol of the infinite, eternal, substantial, volitional, and conscious field of ideational singular models as that field both incarnates itself into the universe and remains distinct from the universe; the Son as the symbol of the universe as the latter is both the ideational field’s incarnation and an entity distinct from the ideational field; and the Holy Spirit as the symbol of the sorting, actualizing, pulse through which God incarnates Himself into the universe and yet remains distinct from the universe. The present discourse, which stands as a direct continuation to my “Preliminary considerations on the dignity of man, the Idea of the Good, and the knowledge of essences,” intends to bring whole new preliminary considerations on my part on a number of topics including the substance, emergence, creation, the Chi, war, predestination, mindfulness, freedom, trade value, economic calculation, decentralized competition, heroism, the pineal gland, and the soul’s (earthly) journey and (divine) origin. On that occasion, I will deliver an assessment of what Benedictus de Spinoza, René Descartes, Aleister Crowley, Karl Marx, Ludwig von Mises, and Robert Ardrey (and a few other philosophers) respectively wrote on some of those topics.
Beforehand a few remarks concerning my respective definition for some of my concepts should be made. A moment-relative property in an entity (whether ideational—or material) is a property (whether existential—or non-existential) that deals with the point (or points) in time at which the entity itself or one or more properties in the entity are taking place; whether time for the entity is horizontal—or vertical. In an entity (whether ideational—or material), a property preexistent to one or more other properties is a property for which one chronological point, at least, in its existence is chronologically anterior to the existence of the other property or properties in question; whether its existence is already extinguished before the existence of the other property or properties in question. An entity preexistent to one or more other entities (whether it occupies the same realm as the one or more other entities in questions) is an entity for which one chronological point, at least, in its existence is chronologically anterior to (the existence of) the other entity or entities in question; whether its existence is already extinguished before the existence of the one or more other entities in question. In a realm of reality taken in isolation (whether it is the ideational realm—or the material one), any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary property existing in an entity at some point has strictly three kinds of cause, which are all operating for any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary property in any entity. Namely a relational cause (i.e., one or more relations on the entity’s part at some point before), an existential cause (i.e., the existence of the entity both presently and at the anterior point), and an intrinsically necessary cause (i.e., an intrinsically necessary property in the entity at the anterior point). What’s more, in a realm of reality taken in isolation (whether it is the ideational realm—or the material one), any extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary entity existing at some point has strictly three kinds of cause. Namely a relational cause (i.e., one or more relations on another entity’s part: at some point before the concerned caused entity’s existence, except in a few cases), an existential cause (i.e., the existence of the other entity and hypothetically of some other entities which it is having one or more relations with: at the anterior point, except in a few cases), and an intrinsically necessary cause (i.e., an intrinsically necessary property in the other entity and hypothetically in those hypothetical other entities: at the anterior point, except in a few cases). The relational cause for some (extrinsically necessary or extrinsically contingent) property or entity is that kind of cause that can also be called the “efficient cause.” Saying of an entity that it is an efficient cause (were it the only efficient cause) for one or more extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary other entities is a convenient way of saying that one or more relations on that entity’s part are efficient causes (were the relations in question only between the entity and itself) for the one or more entities in question; just like saying of an entity that it is an efficient cause (were it the only efficient cause) for one or more extrinsically contingent or extrinsically necessary properties in that entity or in one or more other entities is a convenient way of saying that one or more relations on that entity’s part are efficient causes (were the relations in question only between the entity and itself) for the properties in question. An efficiently uncaused property is one with no efficient cause; what is only the case of any (strong-kind or weak-kind) intrinsically necessary property. An efficiently uncaused entity is one with no efficient cause; what is only the case of any (eternal or self-produced) intrinsically necessary entity and the case of that modality of an extrinsically contingent entity that is a randomly self-produced entity. A self-produced entity (whether it is intrinsically necessary) is a temporal-starting-endowed entity that is, besides, self-caused and efficiently uncaused (whether it is intrinsically necessary). When it comes to those extrinsically necessary entities that are the supramundane souls and the ideational essences (whether their realm is taken in isolation), the combination between relational, existential, and intrinsically necessary causes which results into their existence (in the ideational realm) is both internal to the ideational realm and temporally simultaneous to their existence (in the ideational realm). When it comes to those material entities (including the universe) that are considered from the angle of their incarnation-relationship to God, the combination between relational, existential, and intrinsically necessary causes which results into their existence (in the material realm) is both internal to the ideational realm and temporally simultaneous (in the ideational realm) to their existence (in the material realm). Ditto for the properties in those material entities that are considered from the angle of their incarnation-relationship to God.
Any entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is both a caused and causing entity: more precisely, a caused (though not systemically an efficiently caused) and efficiently causing entity. Any act of creation falls within production; but not any act of production falls within creation. Production is to be taken in the sense for a cause (whether it is relational, existential, or intrinsically necessary) of causing the existence of one or more properties that are (not eternal but instead) endowed with a temporal beginning; or the existence of one or more entities that are (not eternal but instead) endowed with a temporal beginning. As for creation, it is to be taken in the sense of the fact for a cause (whether it is relational, existential, or intrinsically necessary) of producing one or more (temporal-starting-endowed) properties other than moment-relative that are (completely or partly) novel with respect to what characterizes the (existential or non-existential) properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality (i.e., the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of the entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the concerned realm of reality); or the existence of one or more (temporal-starting-endowed) entities that are (completely or partly) novel in their properties (other than moment-relative) with respect to what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality. Not only any efficiently caused entity (i.e., any entity with one or more efficient causes) that is temporal-starting-endowed is a produced entity (i.e., a caused entity that is endowed with a temporal beginning); but, reciprocally, any produced entity is an efficiently caused entity that is temporal-starting-endowed. Not only any efficiently uncaused entity (i.e., any entity devoid of the slightest efficient cause) is a self-caused entity (i.e., a caused entity that is randomly self-produced or intrinsically necessary); but, reciprocally, any self-caused entity is an efficiently uncaused entity. A self-produced entity (i.e., a self-caused entity whose existence is, besides, endowed with a temporal beginning) and a substance (i.e., a self-caused entity whose existence is, besides, intrinsically necessary and, at every point, endowed with a strong intrinsically necessary eternity remaining throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity) are two distinct modalities of a self-caused entity; but both a self-produced entity and a substance are efficiently uncaused. Any entity that is (completely or partly) novel in its properties (other than moment-relative) with respect to what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality falls within emergent entities in the concerned realm of reality; just like any property other than moment-relative that is (completely or partly) novel with respect to what characterizes the (existential or non-existential) properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality falls within emergent properties in the concerned realm of reality. Any emergent entity is either ideational or material; just like any emergent property is either a property in an ideational entity or one in a material entity. In a few lines, I will deal more closely with the concept of emergence; and with the respective concepts of existential and non-existential properties. It is worth clarifying that, while the way one understands some concept lies in the way one identifies (what one believes to be) all or part of the properties in the concept’s object, the way one defines some concept lies in the way one identifies (what one believes to be) the whole of the constitutive properties in the concept’s object. One’s “understanding of some concept” and one’s “approach to some concept” are phrases that can be used interchangeably.
Emergence and creation, the substance and the Chi
A material entity is an entity endowed with some kind of firmness, consistency (for instance: a quark, the void, an idea in a parrot’s mind, a movie, or the Chi); just like an ideational entity (i.e., an Idea) is an entity devoid of any firmness, consistency. A property is what is characteristic of an entity (whether the entity in question is ideational—or material) at some point (whether time for the entity in question is horizontal—or vertical). Any property is either existential or non-existential. A non-existential property in an entity (i.e., a property in the entity that is not relative to the entity’s mode of existence) is either compositional or formal or a composite of form and of composition; what is tantamount to saying: a composite of formal and compositional properties. An existential property is a property that is, if not relative to the entity’s existence’s origin or relative to whether and how the entity’s existence is (at some point) permanent or provisory, at least relative to the entity’s mode of existence, i.e., the entity’s way of existing. A strong existential property is a property that, among the properties relative to the entity’s mode of existence, deals with the entity’s existence’s origin or deals with whether and how the entity’s existence is (at some point) permanent or provisory. Just like any strong existential property in a material entity is part of the entity’s substantial natural material essence, any strong existential property in an entity (whether it is ideational) is remaining throughout the entity’s existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, i.e., remaining throughout the entity’s existence with the entity’s existence at some point being a necessary, sufficient, condition for its remaining throughout the entity’s existence. An eternal entity is one with no (temporal) beginning and with no (temporal) ending; what falls within the entity’s strong existential properties. Not any eternal entity is an intrinsically necessary entity; but any eternal entity is eternal (at some point) in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and remains eternal (throughout its existence) by strong intrinsic necessity. A substance is an intrinsically necessary eternal entity whose eternity at some point not only occurs in a strong intrinsically necessary mode but remains throughout its existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind. Not any intrinsically necessary entity is a substance; but any entity eternal by strong intrinsic necessity (at some point) is remaining eternal (throughout its existence) by strong intrinsic necessity (and reciprocally). An innate property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is one that is, if not remaining in the entity throughout the entity’s existence, at least accompanied with the strong existential property of a temporal beginning for the entity and present in the entity at the moment of the entity’s temporal beginning; just like an eternal property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is one that, besides remaining in the entity throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity, takes place within an entity both eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and eternal in a strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. A property that is arising at some point in an entity is a property in the entity that is neither innate nor eternal in the concerned entity; just like an entity that is arising at some point is an entity (in some realm of reality) that is neither innate nor eternal in the concerned realm. Any property eternal in an entity is present at some point by strong intrinsic necessity and remaining (and eternal) in the entity throughout the entity’s existence by strong intrinsic necessity; just like any entity eternal in a realm of reality is eternal at some point by strong intrinsic necessity and remaining eternal by strong intrinsic necessity.
In an entity (whether it is ideational—or material), whether its realm is taken in isolation, a property other than moment-relative that is irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity is one that is neither completely characterized identically to any of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity nor completely characterized identically to a combination between all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity (whether all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative are still existent—or now inexistent); just like, in a realm of reality (whether it is ideational—or material), whether that realm is taken in isolation, an entity that is irreducible in its properties other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence is one for which one of its properties other than moment-relative, at least, is neither completely characterized identically to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative found in the set of those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence nor completely characterized identically to a combination between all or part of the properties other than moment-relative found in the set of those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence (whether all or part of those entities are still existent—or now inexistent). An emergent property in an entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is a property other than moment-relative that is, if not irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity, at least arising at some point in the entity (instead of being innate or eternal in the entity); just like an emergent material entity is a material entity that is, if not arising at some point in the universe (instead of being the universe itself or one of the very first entities chronologically in the universe), at least irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence. A strong emergent property and a strong emergent material entity are respectively a property other than moment-relative that, besides arising at some point in the concerned entity (instead of being innate or eternal in the entity), is irreducible to all or part of the preexistent properties other than moment-relative in the entity; and a material entity that, besides being irreducible in its properties other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence, is arising at some point in the universe (instead of being the universe itself or innate in the universe).
Any emergent property is either a quality (i.e., a non-existential property) other than moment-relative or an existential property other than moment-relative; but not any quality other than moment-relative nor any existential property other than moment-relative fall within emergent properties. An emergent entity (whether it is ideational—or material) is an entity that is, if not arising at some point in its realm of reality, at least irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence; just like an emergent ideational entity is an ideational entity that is not only eternal but irreducible in its properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) other than moment-relative to all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in those preexistent entities causing efficiently its existence. A strong emergent property and an emergent entity are both introducing—when (and only when) the strong emergent property in question and one property, at least, in the emergent entity in question are characterized in a way that is then unprecedented (whether completely or partly) in the concerned realm of reality—a certain novelty (whether complete—or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm (i.e., the properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the concerned realm). Any novelty (whether complete—or partial) introduced (at some point) in the field of what characterizes the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the ideational or material realm’s entities having been witnessed (i.e., the properties other than moment-relative that are characteristic of entities that either are or used to be or have been being in the ideational or material realm) is introduced by (and through) an (other than moment-relative) property that is either a strong emergent property or a property in an emergent entity or a property that is both; but not any strong emergent property introduces some novelty in that field, no more than does any emergent entity. The universe is both an extrinsically contingent emergent material entity from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe; and, from the angle of its relationship to God, an extrinsically necessary emergent material entity (distinct from God and yet identical to Him) whose incarnation-relationship to God is an eternal (rather than emergent) property in God Himself. Whether it is from the angle of its relationship to the chronologically anterior nothingness or from the angle of its relationship to God, the universe isn’t an intrinsically necessary entity endowed (at every point) with an eternity both intrinsically necessary in a strong mode and intrinsically necessarily remaining in a strong mode (i.e., a substance); no more than it is, generally speaking, an intrinsically necessary entity.
In the field of philosophy, translating into one’s language another philosopher’s concepts consists of expressing the latter’s concepts—and the way they’re understood and defined in the latter—through one’s concepts (such as one understands and defines them) in a way that nonetheless stays completely faithful to what are that someone else’s concepts and his understanding and definition of his concepts. To put it completely in my language, Spinoza’s approach to God in Ethics correctly portrays Him as an intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode whose eternity is remaining (throughout His existence) by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, and which is composed (at every point) of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties; and as the only entity that is composed (at every point) of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties—and as the only entity that is a substance, i.e., the only entity that is endowed (at every point) with an intrinsically necessary existence and with an eternity both intrinsically necessary in a strong mode and remaining in a strong intrinsically necessary mode throughout the entity’s existence. That approach nonetheless commits a mistake that lies in its confusing the being an eternal entity and the being an entity with no temporal ending; and in its confusing the being an intrinsically necessary entity with no temporal ending and the being an entity devoid of any temporal ending. Any eternal entity (as is the case of a substance) and any entity devoid of any temporal ending (as is the case of a substance) are respectively eternal—and devoid of any temporal ending—in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode; but, just like an eternal entity is only a modality (i.e., only a certain kind) of an entity with no temporal ending, an intrinsically necessary entity with no temporal ending is only a modality of an entity devoid of any temporal ending. Though the universe cannot end in time (whether it is with regard to the nothingness—or with regard to God), it is an extrinsically contingent (rather than intrinsically necessary) entity with regard to the nothingness chronologically anterior to the universe; and, with regard to God, an extrinsically (rather than intrinsically) necessary entity. Accordingly the fact of being devoid of any temporal ending is not (as Spinoza wrongly asserts) unique to the eternal entity that is a substance; though there is indeed only one substance as Spinoza rightly asserts. Another mistake Spinoza’s approach to God commits lies in its confusing the being an efficiently uncaused entity and the being an intrinsically necessary eternal entity whose eternity takes place in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode (i.e., a substance); and in its confusing the being an intrinsically necessary entity and the being a substance. An extrinsically contingent and efficiently uncaused entity (i.e., a self-produced entity) and an intrinsically necessary and efficiently uncaused entity (whether it is a substance) are two distinct modalities of an efficiently uncaused entity; just like an intrinsically necessarily eternal (in a strong mode), intrinsically necessarily remaining eternal (in a strong mode), and intrinsically necessary entity—and an intrinsically necessary entity that is, if not devoid of any temporal ending, at least endowed with a temporal beginning—are two distinct modalities of an efficiently uncaused entity. The universe and God are respectively an efficiently uncaused entity of an extrinsically contingent kind (with regard to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe) and an efficiently uncaused entity of an intrinsically necessary kind; just like God and the universe’s very first components chronologically (such as the quarks and the Chi) are respectively an efficiently uncaused and intrinsically necessary entity of an intrinsically necessarily remaining eternal (in a strong mode) kind and (with regard to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe) efficiently uncaused entities that are intrinsically necessary but devoid of any eternity at any point.
Accordingly the fact of being intrinsically necessary is not (as Spinoza wrongly asserts) unique to the substance; though there is indeed only one substance. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God’s complete coincidence with the universe to exclude the slightest degree and form of independence of God with regard to the universe. God is both completely identical and completely external to the universe—in that He gets completely incarnated into the universe while remaining completely distinct from the latter. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding time for God to be horizontal (rather than vertical); and in its misunderstanding God’s non-existential constitutive properties to exclude any ideational property. Though God (as Spinoza rightly asserts) is indeed the only substance, God finds itself placed under a vertical (rather than horizontal) time; and its non-existential constitutive properties find themselves to be exclusively composed of ideational properties (including ideational essences). Neither the “extension” realm nor the “thought” realm nor the indeterminate other realms which Spinoza thinks to be non-existential constitutive properties in God qualify as ideational realms (in my language). Another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God’s non-existential constitutive properties to be both infinite and of an infinite number; and God’s non-existential properties not to be all constitutive. Though the substance is indeed composed of an infinite number of non-existential constitutive properties (since the ideational essences are of an infinite number), Spinoza as much misses the fact that all the substance’s non-existential properties are constitutive as he misses the fact that not all of them are infinite. Yet another mistake in Spinoza’s approach to God lies in its misunderstanding God not to be endowed with some willingness and not to expect something from the human. Though God is indeed identical to the unique substance (as Spinoza rightly asserts), the substance is (at every point) a volitional entity (i.e., an entity endowed with willingness) and even a conscious volitional entity (i.e., an entity endowed with conscious willingness); and a conscious volitional entity that expects something from the human. Namely that the human, through rendering himself sufficiently like-divine in the material realm, render his soul completely divine in the ideational realm. I won’t discuss here whether the notion of entities or properties that are arising at some point (instead of being innate or eternal) or irreducible is lacking (were it partly) in Spinoza’s philosophy; but the cosmos in Spinoza, besides being identified to God in a way that wrongly excludes any externality of God with regard to the cosmos, is just as wrongly envisioned as a perfect and achieved entity that excludes the slightest novelty (with respect to the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities having been witnessed within the cosmos).
The fact for the human of being “in the image of God” is to be taken in the sense for the human of being endowed (in his substantial natural material essence) with suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to matter; of being in a position, not to remedy the cosmic order (were it partly), but instead to bring reparation and completion to the universe in strict conformity with the universe’s underlying order and laws; and of being in a position to know reality and the universe in a way that is irremediably perfectible. The Spinozian approach to God is a complete offense to Him in that it demeans Him to the level of nature instead of envisioning nature as His incarnation or product or even as an emergent property in Him; just like the Spinozian approach to the human grandly (though not-completely) offenses what, in the human being, is “in the image of God.” It denies just as much the slightest degree of self-determination in the human will with regard to the efficient causes at work in nature as the slightest possibility of novelty (with respect to the existential or non-existential properties other than moment-relative that have been witnessed in the entities that have been witnessed) and therefore of creation in the realm of nature as the slightest role to be played for the human’s creation with regard to an allegedly perfect nature where nothing would be to be repaired nor to be perfected. The Spinozian offense to what, in the human being, is “in the image of God” remains incomplete in that Spinoza, instead of envisioning the human as able to reach perfect knowledge of the nature, holds him for irremediable unable to have the slightest knowledge of any other “attribute” in the “substance” than the “thought” and than the “extension.” As concerns creation on a human’s part, it is worth noting that, while an idea created in a human’s mind (or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is a produced idea introducing some novelty (either complete or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties (other than moment-relative) having been witnessed in those ideas having been witnessed in the universe, a creative idea created in a human’s mind (or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is an inspirationally produced idea introducing some novelty (either complete or partial) in the field of what characterizes the properties (other than moment-relative) having been witnessed in those ideas having been witnessed in the universe. In other words, a creative idea (created in a human’s mind or, for instance, in a dachshund’s mind) is a modality of a created idea—namely that it is a created idea the efficient cause of which lies in an inspiration-relationship of the mind in question with respect to all or part of those entities having been witnessed in the concerned realm of reality. Not only not any creation on a human’s part consists of a created idea; but not any created idea on a human’s part consists either of a creative idea. An exploit is to be taken in the sense of an act that is jointly exceptionally creative (i.e., characterized with the mind’s creation of one or more exceptionally creative ideas), exceptionally successful (i.e., characterized with the complete fulfillment of an exceptionally hard goal), and exceptionally endangering for one’s subsistence. The Spinozian ethics, in that it exclusively situates the human’s happiness in the “persevering in one’s being” here below, is a (complete) offense to what in the human’s happiness cannot be reached in an earthly lifetime exclusively or primarily dedicated to the persevering in one’s material existence. That part in the human’s happiness, the highest, noblest, part, which lies in the accomplishment of exploits (i.e., the accomplishment of acts that are jointly exceptionally creative, exceptionally successful, and exceptionally endangering for one’s subsistence), is basically dismissed in what can be called Spinoza’s “conatus ethics,” which is basically an ethics of mediocrity.
Just like the entities are subdivided between those inhabiting the ideational realm and those inhabiting the material realm (which stands as the materially incarnated ideational realm), the Being (i.e., what allows for the entities to exist without being itself an entity) contains both a realm correspondent to the ideational entities; and a realm correspondent to the material entities, which stands as the material incarnation of the latter realm. “The materially incarnated Being” and “the ideational Being” are convenient ways of designating respectively that realm of the Being correspondent to the material entities; and that realm of the Being correspondent to the ideational entities. Any intrinsically necessary entity is an emergent entity; but not any extrinsically necessary entity is an emergent entity, no more than any emergent entity is an intrinsically necessary entity. Though the universe is God’s incarnation, the universe’s ideational essence does not lie in God Himself—but instead in the Idea of the universe, which is not only infinite and incomplete but in constant updating. Just like any material entity other than the universe stands as the incarnation of some ideational essence, any material entity other than the Chi and other than the universe stands as the incarnation of some finite and achieved ideational essence. The Chi stands as the incarnation of what I previously called (following Plato) the “Idea of the Good,” which would be more judiciously called the “Idea of the Chi” and that is genuinely the sorting, actualizing, pulse at work in the ideational field; but the Idea of the Chi, though it gets incarnated (like any Idea other than the Idea of the universe), is jointly infinite (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea), incomplete (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea), and in constant updating (like the Idea of the universe—but unlike any Idea other than the Chi’s Idea and than the universe’s Idea). I approach that entity known in Chinese and Japanese ontologies to be the “Chi” as a material entity (internal to the universe) that can be described as mere energy enveloping, at every point, every other entity in the universe; and which, without efficiently-causing itself the slightest entity nor causing itself (whether efficiently) the slightest property, makes it possible to cause (whether efficiently) the emergent properties (including the strong emergent properties) present (at some point) within some entity (whether innate—or arising) present (at some point) in the universe and makes it possible to cause (whether efficiently) some entity (whether innate—or arising) present (at some point) in the universe (including those entities in the universe that are emergent). Just like the Chi stands as the incarnation of the sorting, actualizing, pulse through which, at every point in the ideational realm (for which time is strictly vertical), some ideational models see their correspondent hypothetical material entities being introduced, concretized, in the material realm and others their correspondent hypothetical material entities being denied, not-concretized, in the material realm, the sorting, actualizing, pulse itself stands as the Idea of the Chi, i.e., the Chi’s ideational essence. A mistake in the Spinozian approach to the substance is to confuse the being a substantial entity and the being an entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Though there is indeed only one substance (as Spinoza rightly asserts), an intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode (i.e., a substance) is only a modality of an entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Just like the Idea of the Chi is an eternal (in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode) but extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose efficient cause lies in the substance that is God, the ideational essences other than the Idea of the Chi are eternal (in a strong intrinsically necessary and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode) but extrinsically necessary emergent entities the efficient cause of which lies in the Idea of the Chi. Just like the Chi stands as the transition between the materially incarnated Being and the other material entities (including the universe), God stands as the transition between the ideational Being and the ideational essences (including the Idea of the Chi).
The universe is a God-production (i.e., a temporal-starting-endowed entity whose efficient cause lies in God) and even a God-creation (i.e., a temporal-starting-endowed entity whose efficient cause lies in God and whose introduction in the material realm has been bringing novelty there in terms of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative); but it is so not in that the universe would be in God an emergent property (and even strong emergent property introducing such novelty in the material realm) that finds its efficient cause in God—but instead in that the universe stands as a God-incarnation. More precisely, the universe is God-created neither as a product (i.e., a production to which its efficient cause or causes remain strictly external) nor as an emergent property; but instead as a production in which God gets completely incarnated while remaining completely external to His incarnation. In any entity, the whole is only the unified sum of the parts: except in the case of the universe and in the case of the substance. As much the substance taken as a whole as its parts (and therefore the ideational essences it contains) are eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode and strong intrinsically necessarily remaining mode; but the substance taken as a whole exists independently of its parts though simultaneously to its parts, to which it communicates its eternity intrinsically necessary of the strong kind and remaining throughout existence by strong intrinsic necessity. When considered independently of their incarnation-relationship to God, as much the universe taken as a whole as its very first parts (i.e., those of its parts that, including the Chi, appeared with the “big bang”) are self-created; but the universe taken as a whole exists as much simultaneously to its parts as independently of its parts: including its very first parts, which are intrinsically necessary while the universe itself is extrinsically contingent. The substance, as it is intrinsically necessary, is self-caused and efficiently uncaused; but the substance, as it is not only intrinsically necessary but remaining eternal throughout its existence by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, is not only self-caused and efficiently uncaused but devoid of any self-produced character. The incarnation-relationship from God into the universe is, in God, neither an efficiently uncaused strong-emergent relational property nor, generally speaking, an emergent relational property; though it is indeed efficiently uncaused. While the universe (when considered from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to God) is an emergent extrinsically necessary entity finding in God its efficient cause, which is not only irreducible (in its properties other than moment-relative) to (all or part of the properties other than moment-relative in) God but introducing novelty (in terms of what characterizes the properties other than moment-relative) in the material realm, the incarnation-relationship from God into the universe is, for its part, an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary relational property. When considered from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe, the latter is an extrinsically contingent emergent entity whose existence is even devoid of any efficient cause; but, when considered from the angle of its relationship to God, the universe is an extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is the forced rather than random effect of the combination (concomitantly to the universe’s material existence in the strictly vertical time applying to the ideational realm) between God’s existence, God’s incarnation-relationship to the universe, and the character of that incarnation-relationship as an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in God. When considered from the angle of its relationship to the nothingness chronologically prior to the universe, the Chi is an intrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is therefore devoid of any efficient cause; but, when considered from the angle of its relationship to God, the Chi is an extrinsically necessary emergent entity whose existence is the forced rather than random effect of the combination (concomitantly to the Chi’s material existence in the strictly vertical time applying to the ideational realm) between God’s existence, God’s incarnation-relationship to the universe, and the character of that incarnation-relationship as an eternal and strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in God.
The role of genetic similitude in a society’s cohesion—and in the Providence’s maneuvers
The way the sorting, actualizing, pulse operates in the ideational realm expresses a part of God’s will, but only a part precisely. Namely that part of God’s will that is acting (i.e., using means for the purpose of goals); and which must be distinguished from that part of His will that involves goals without involving any means. The Providence is to be taken in the sense of the acting part of God’s will as His will’s acting part is at work in cosmic and human history. War is to be taken in the sense of a physical, coercive, struggle between groups (whether the latter are groups of living beings). When he presented war as “the world’s only hygiene,” Marinetti would have done better to present it as “one of the world’s hygienes,” alongside famine and epidemics notably. Above all, he should have specified that the hygiene of war is “God’s hygiene for His incarnation as the latter is a world tirelessly in search of progress in order and complexity.” For war is one of the hygienic apparatuses (and even one of the privileged ones) through which the Providence strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that the least sophisticated groups in terms of order and complexity (both internal and at the level of intergroup relations) at some point, instead of encumbering God for the rest of the universe’s days, end up disappearing in the short run or, failing that, in the long run. Also, war is one of the incentive apparatuses (and even one of the privileged ones) through which God strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that geniuses in the cognitive field be promoted (rather than devalued) in society; and, accordingly, their sexual reproduction (and therefore their genetic frequency) favored rather than hindered in society. Another incentive apparatus through which the Providence strives to maximize as much as possible the probability in the universe (throughout the universe’s existence) that geniuses in the cognitive field be promoted (rather than devalued) in society consists of a culture that values (instead of disdaining), if not the search for exploit in the military field, at least the transposition of the search for military exploit to the cognitive field; in other words, a culture that values (instead of disdaining), if not the search for exploit on the military battlefield, at least the search for exploit on the respective cognitive battlefield of painters, mathematicians, engineers, writers, philosophers, physicists, or movie directors (among other examples). I will come back to those two incentive apparatuses later. In addition to its character as hygiene for the world, a nevertheless fallible hygiene, war is one of the laws which God (infallibly) wanted for this world and which He (infallibly) wanted to frame the human’s reparation and completion of the divine creation. With regard to those wars implemented among societies of living beings, they as much involve societies characterized by a degree of kin-relatedness such that their members form an “extended family” or even a single family (or what is strongly or moderately a single family) as societies whose members form neither an “extended family” nor (were it only to some strong or moderate extent) a family stricto sensu.
Just like a group whose all members, at some point, are kin-related (to each other) is to be taken in the sense of a group whose members, at some point, are all biological brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, or first cousins with each other, a group whose all members, at some point, are kin-related (to each other) to some extent (rather than to a complete extent) is to be taken in the sense of a group whose members, to some extent (rather than to a complete extent), are all biological brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, or first cousins with each other at some point. Just like the degree of kin-relatedness at some point in some group is to be taken in the sense of the degree to which people in the group in question are all kin-related (to each other) at some point, the degree of genetic similitude at some point in some group is to be taken in the sense of the degree to which the respective sets of genes present in each of the members of the group in question have similitude with each other at some point. Setting aside the case of a hypothetical future group whose reproduction would occur through cloning (whether solely or partly), the level of genetic similitude in some group is necessarily a reflection (and measurement) at the genetic level of the level of kin-relatedness in the group in question. The levels of kin-relatedness and of genetic similitude are both part of the substantial natural material essence in any group of living beings. The notion that selection over the course of biological evolution (i.e., over the course of the evolution of the respective genomes in each of the individual members of the different species) only occurs at the level of the individual’s genes and at the level of those genes shared in individuals who are completely kin-related or, failing that, kin-related to a strong or moderate extent can be understood in two distinct ways strictly. On the one hand, a modality of the notion in question claiming that the struggle for life and reproduction (whether it occurs in a coercive, physical, way) only involves individuals facing other individuals and groups whose members are, at every point, all kin-related (were it only to a strong or moderate extent—rather than to a complete extent) facing other groups of that kind. On the other hand, a modality claiming that survival in the short run (i.e., over the scale of a few decades) is impossible to any group whose members are neither completely nor strongly nor moderately all kin-related to each other. Both modalities are wrong. While the former is disproved by the fact that, in some species (including the human), the intergroup struggle for survival occurs between groups who are not systemically composed strictly of individuals who are, at least to some strong or moderate extent, all kin-related to each other, the latter is disproved by the fact that, in some species (including the human), the intergroup struggle for survival doesn’t witness—whether it is in the long run or in the short run—a systematically compromised situation nor a systematic disintegration of those groups whose members are not, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, all kin-related to each other.
A commonly invoked argument in favor of the claim that, in humans, those groups whose members are not all, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, kin-related are unlikely (though not unable stricto sensu) to survive in the short run is that a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its propagation in the decades yet to come (and, generally speaking, in the centuries or millennia yet to come) only through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns favoring instead of compromising said propagation. Yet the fact that such groups sometimes manage to survive in the short run (or even in the long run, i.e., in the centuries or millennia yet to come) doesn’t only disprove the claim that those groups whose members are not all, were it only to some strong or moderate extent, kin-related to each other are unable to survive in the short run. It also corroborates the claim that, in humans, a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its propagation in the long run (and therefore in the short run) not systemically through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of its genes or, failing that, those of its genes shared with a group whose members, whether completely or to an extent that is strong or moderate, are all kin-related to each other; but instead through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of those genes it shares with (and in) a group whose members, while being not all kin-related to each other to an extent that is either complete or strong or moderate, still possess some level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of the concerned group as an “enlarged kinship,” “extended family.” Society is to be taken in the sense of that kind of group (not necessarily human), sometimes called a “superorganism,” that unites (and encompasses) children, parents, and grandparents; and which hypothetically falls within some larger group like, say, an empire. In view of a number of male partners for a queen oscillating between three and eight in the vespula maculifrons, or between four and ten for a queen in the acromyrmex octospinosus (hence a genetic similitude between sisters around 33%), or even between seven and twenty for a queen in the apis mellifera (hence a genetic similitude between workers around 30%), societies in the hymenoptera are not all a case of a society whose all members are completely (or, at least, strongly or moderately) kin-related to each other. A thus corroborated claim is that the duplicative success (in the very next decades) of those genes shared among the members of a hymenoptera society, instead of being systemically the result of kin selection (i.e., the result of that kind of group selection dealing with the genes common to some group in which the degree of kin-relatedness is either complete or strong or moderate), is not systemically proportionate to the degree to which people in a hymenoptera society are all kin-related to each other. Yet it seems that, in some species like the wasp, the ant, the bee, and the human, the duplicative success of those genes shared among the members of a society can be the result of a kind of group-selection dealing with those genes common to groups whose members, without being all kin-related to each other to a degree that is either complete or strong or moderate, nevertheless possess a certain degree of genetic similitude which remains strong enough to allow speaking of said members as forming an “extended family,” “enlarged kinship.”
Group cohesion for an individual in some group is to be taken in the sense of the joint fact of identifying oneself as a member of that group one happens to belong to, of acting on behalf of one’s perceived group-interests (i.e., the interests of one’s group such as one perceives them), of privileging in one’s relationships (including economic and professional) the other individual members within one’s group, of behaving in a way that favors (instead of compromising) the survival of one’s group (were it through compromising one’s own survival or one’s reproduction), and of being faithful, docile, with respect to the axiological and organizational principles foundational in one’s group. The average level of group-cohesion in a group’s individual members is part of the group’s substantial natural material essence. It is regrettable that, all too often, the (other) investigations of the genetic and instinctual underpinnings of a society’s group-cohesion (i.e., group-cohesion among the members of a given society) in homo sapiens remain anchored in the confusion between group-selection and kin-selection; and in the mistaken approach to the intensity of group-cohesion in a given human society as (positively) proportionate to the degree of genetic similitude in the concerned society. The differences between human societies in the degree of intra-society genetic similitude are no more systemically at the origin of the differences between human societies in the intensity of intra-society group-cohesion than the inter-species differences in the intra-species average degree of genetic similitude in the intra-species societies are systemically at the origin of the inter-species differences in the intra-species average degree of group-cohesion in the intra-species societies. It is true that a complete degree of genetic similitude in some society (whether it is one human) and a high degree of genetic similitude in some society (whether it is one human) cannot but result respectively into a correspondingly complete degree of group-cohesion—and a correspondingly high or complete degree of group-cohesion—in the concerned society; but it is just as true that a low degree of genetic similitude in a human society doesn’t result into a correspondingly low degree of group-cohesion in said society systemically. In the human, those societies who manage to survive (whether it is in the short run only or in the long run), what necessarily requires a degree of group-cohesion that is either strong or complete, are societies who are, if not composed of people all kin-related to each other to an extent that is complete, strong, or moderate, at least composed of people in which group-cohesion is strong or complete. In the human, just like those societies in which group-cohesion in people is complete (and those societies in which group-cohesion in people is high) are not systemically societies in which all people are kin-related to an extent that is either complete or strong or moderate, those societies in which the displayed degree of genetic similitude is such that their members form what can be called extended kinships are systemically societies in which the extent to which people are all kin-related to each other is neither complete nor strong nor moderate.
What’s more, in the human, those societies in which group cohesion is complete include (strictly) as much societies with an either complete or strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness as societies who—instead of approaching or forming a (single) kinship stricto sensu—are forming an extended kinship as societies who are neither approaching a single kinship nor forming a single kinship nor forming an extended kinship. Likewise those societies in the human in which group-cohesion in people is high include (strictly) as much societies with an either complete or strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness as societies who—instead of approaching or forming a (single) kinship stricto sensu—are forming an extended kinship as societies who are neither approaching a single kinship nor forming a single kinship nor forming an extended kinship. Whatever the degree of group-cohesion and whatever the degree of genetic similitude, it nonetheless turns out that, in the human (and perhaps in some other species), culture is never totally independent from genetics. Culture is to be taken in the sense of the set of those behavioral patterns in a society that are inculcated in the society in question (whether it is one human). Some of the cultural patterns (but not all) in a society are part of the society’s substantial natural material essence. When it comes to a culture totally or partly endowed with an endogenous origin, culture is not only able to contradict, in part, the average genetic features—but wholly able to include patterns that have no connection to genetics (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics). More precisely, it is then, on the one hand, wholly able to include behavioral patterns that are not genetically rooted at all (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics); on the other hand, unable to contradict the slightest average biological-ability in the group but able to contradict a part (but only a part) of those average genetic features that are about emotions and emotional needs (rather than about abilities). When it comes to a culture totally endowed with a foreign origin, culture is wholly able to include patterns with no connection to genetics (setting aside the issue of knowing whether such patterns can be in contradiction with genetics); but, also, it is wholly able to contradict the average genetic features—except that it cannot go against the average levels of biological-abilities. In turn, culture (whether its origin is completely exogenous—or instead completely or partly endogenous) has an effect on genetics in that it hampers the social integration (and therefore sexual reproduction) of those individuals unsuited to the established cultural patterns; in that it influences the tenor of the fertility gap in those individuals managing to reproduce; and in that it influences the propagative success of a certain genetic mutation through influencing the ability of those individuals endowed with the genetic mutation in question to reproduce (and their reproduction’s magnitude). It is regrettable that the (other) investigations of the gene-culture coevolution (i.e., the mutual influence between gene and culture over the course of their respective evolutions) all too often overlook the complexity of said coevolution, treating (more or less surreptitiously) a group’s culture at some point as strictly equal to the group’s average genetic features at that point in time.
In humans, just like one way a gene or team of genes can favor instead of compromising its duplication (in the long run besides in the short run, i.e., over the scale of several centuries or millennia besides over the scale of several decades) is through predisposing the individual to one or more behavioral patterns that favor instead of compromising the propagation of those genes it shares with (and in) a group whose members, while being not all kin-related to each other (were it only to some strong or moderate extent), still possess some level of genetic similitude allowing to speak of them as forming an extended kinship, one way the duplication of a gene or team of genes can be compromised rather than favored (in the short run besides in the long run) is through the individual’s inhabiting a society whose members, besides being not all kin-related to each other to a degree that is either complete or strong or moderate, exhibit some level of genetic similitude that is not sufficient to allowing to speak of them as forming an extended kinship. A human society whose members exhibit neither a level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of them as forming an enlarged family nor a level of genetic similitude that allows speaking of them as forming or approaching a single family is necessarily compromising (rather than helpful) in the short as much in the long run to the duplication of the genes present in its members; regardless of whether the society in question manages to survive (over the scale of several centuries or millennia or, failing that, over the scale of several decades) and regardless of whether group-cohesion is strong in the society in question. Group-identification here means the fact of identifying oneself as a member of some group (whether the latter is real). I guess that two instincts for group-identification successively emerged over the course of the biological evolution of homo sapiens: two instincts which are now superposed and in conflict with each other. Namely an earlier instinct for group-identification to one’s kinship—and a tardier instinct for group-identification to indeterminate groups whose level of genetic dissimilitude exceeds the level found in a kinship or in a group whose members are all kin-related to some strong or moderate extent. At first, the tardier instinct for group-identification was a blessing (rather than a curse) to the long-run duplication of genes in humans in that it contributed (and was necessary) to the constitution of societies with a strong or complete group-cohesion who, while being not restricted to kinship nor to some strong or moderate level of kin-relatedness, exhibit a level of genetic similitude that remains strong enough to allow speaking of those societies as being extended kinships. Over time, that instinct, thus becoming both a blessing and a curse to the duplication of genes (whether it is in the long run or in the short run), ended up contributing to the constitution of societies with a strong or complete group-cohesion who, besides being not restricted to people kin-related to an either strong or moderate or complete degree, don’t qualify either as extended kinships; what has been compromising (rather than helpful) to the duplicative success of genes in the short as much in the long run in that it has been allowing for such societies to survive in the long run (besides in the short run) at the expense of the duplicative success in question. In the cosmos taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to God, the emergence of that second instinct for group-identification that is the instinct for group-identification to (indeterminate) groups standing below any level of kin-relatedness that is either strong or moderate or complete is only a double-edged sword to the duplication of genes; but in the cosmos as incarnation, the cosmos as God incarnated, the emergence of such instinct is also a cunning of God. More precisely, a trick on His part falling within His wider strategy of detaching the human society, if not from any enlarged kinship, at least from any strong, moderate, or complete level of kin-relatedness, in order to bring about (and experiment) unprecedentedly high and sophisticate new forms of order, complexity, in the cosmos.
That first part was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s May 2022 issue.
The freedom-and-predestination conundrum—and what it means to be a star
St. Paul’s efforts to detach the nascent Christian message from the Jewish genome, but also from the Torah and from the Old Testament’s eschatology (i.e., the belief that human history would witness a final era of universal peace under the Torah’s universal rule), were carried out in a way reflecting what can be called the humanitarian sacrificial ethnic mind. That is, the concern for promoting what one perceives to fall within the interests of the whole of mankind even at the expense of what one perceives to fall within one’s ethnic interests. In St. Paul’s case, it consisted of condoning the collective sufferings of Jews as the counterpart of the duplicative success of Jewish-originated memes, those of Christianity (in its Paulinian version), intended to bring “salvation” to humanity. In St. Paul, the emotional, behavioural, manifestation of the tardier instinct for group-identification—that for group-identification to one or more indeterminate groups whose level of genetic dissimilitude exceeds the level found in any group whose members, at least to some strong or moderate extent, are all kin-related to each other—was characterized by the coexistence (and tension) between, at least, group-identification of some (incomplete) intensity to one’s ethnicity (beyond the level of one’s kinship within the ethnicity in question) and group-identification of some stronger intensity to the whole of mankind. In St. Paul, both the former group-identification to the whole of one’s ethnic group (and, accordingly, the whole of the Jewish ethnicity in St. Paul’s case, both including the Jews of Judea and those of the diaspora) and the latter group-identification to the whole of mankind stood beyond the level of group-identification to one’s kinship; but the latter group-identification fueled a concern for perceived humanitarian interests (i.e., what one perceives to fall within the interests of the whole of mankind) the intensity of which was stronger than the intensity of the concern for what one perceives to fall within one’s ethnic interests. Hence Saul of Tarsus came to present his own people as the deicide people (thus legitimizing in his eyes the Christian hatred and persecution against them), while highlighting what he claimed to be the God-election of Jews to prepare the coming of Jesus to propose salvation to all humans. Whether the whole of St. Paul’s destiny was both God-undesigned and nonetheless known (perfectly) in God before even St. Paul’s birth is an issue that cannot be properly addressed without addressing (and properly addressing) the distinction between the earthly soul and the supramundane soul. It cannot be properly addressed either without addressing (and properly addressing) the distinction between the two kinds of operative effective free will respectively found in an earthly soul’s human material host and in a supramundane soul.
Just like any property is either relational or un-relational, any relational property is either active (i.e., consisting of some past or present active relation on the entity’s part) or passive (i.e., consisting of some past or present passive relation on the entity’s part). Any active relational property falls either within the entity’s relations with itself or within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities; but any passive relational property falls within the entity’s relations with itself (rather than within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities). Any passive relational property is an intrinsically necessary property (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind); just like any active relational property—except when it comes to that active relational property that is God’s incarnation into the universe—is an extrinsically necessary property. Any extrinsically necessary property (at some point) is the forced effect of the combination between the entity’s existence (at the concerned present point—and, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point as well), an intrinsically necessary property in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point instead), and one or more relational properties (whether of the active kind—or of the passive kind) in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at the anterior point instead); just like any relational extrinsically-necessary property (at some point) is an active-kind relational property (either falling within the entity’s relations with itself—or within the entity’s relations with one or more other entities) that comes as the forced effect of the combination between the entity’s existence (at the concerned present point—and, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point as well), an intrinsically necessary property in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at some anterior point instead), and one or more relational properties (whether of the active kind—or of the passive kind) in the entity (at the concerned present point—or, in the strict case of a material entity taken independently of the ideational realm, at the anterior point instead). The active-kind relational property in God (at some point) that is God’s efficiently-causing some soul is an extrinsically necessary property whose existential, relational, and intrinsically-necessary causes are temporally simultaneous (rather than anterior or ulterior) to the relational property in question (and to the soul in question); but the active-kind relational property in God (at some point) that is God’s incarnating Himself into the universe is a strong-kind intrinsically necessary property remaining throughout God’s existence by strong-kind intrinsic necessity. Any soul at some point is either supramundane or earthly: it is supramundane when inhabiting the ideational realm (rather than the material realm), and earthly when inhabiting the material realm (rather than the ideational realm). Though any soul finds itself (at every point) to be an ideational entity, any earthly soul finds itself (at every point) part of the material realm. As any earthly soul finds itself lodging within a material entity in the material realm and endowing its material host with, only, consciousness, a conscious material entity can be called a material entity even though the soul inhabiting it is, for its part, an ideational entity.
At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), free will consists of a will in which not a single effect with one or more efficient causes is present; what is both tantamount to speaking of a will in which not a single effect is present—and tantamount to speaking of a will that is not operating at all. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), effective free will consists of a will in which not a single forced effect with one or more efficient causes is presents. Yet effective free will both admits an operative modality, which consists of a will in which effects are present, but effects that are all random effects with one or more efficient causes; and a not-operative modality, which consists of a will in which not a single effect (whether random or forced) with one or more efficient causes is present. What is tantamount to speaking of a will that is not operating at all. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), servile operative will consists of a will in which effects are present, but effects that are all extrinsically necessary properties. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any effect present in willingness is either a goal or a means: in both cases, an object in willingness. At any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any object in an operating will that is then completely servile is the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the entity’s present existence, the entity’s existence at some anterior point, one or more relations on the entity’s part at that anterior point, and that intrinsically necessary property (whether of the strong kind) in the entity at that anterior point that is servile operative willingness; just like, at any point, and in any volitional entity (i.e., any entity endowed with willingness), any object in an operating will that is then completely-effective free will is the random (rather than forced) effect of the combination between the entity’s present existence, the entity’s existence at some anterior point, one or more relations on the entity’s part at that anterior point, and that strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in the entity at that anterior point that is operative effective free will. In volitional-kind material entities, the endowment with operative effective free will cannot be exhibited at the anterior point in question without being part of the substantial essence, i.e., without being a strong-kind intrinsically necessary constitutive property both innate and permanent by strong-kind intrinsic necessity; but, for its part, the endowment with servile operative will can be exhibited at the anterior point in question while being external to the substantial essence.
In the human (taken independently of the ideational realm), the substantial property that is operative effective free will is indeed of a suspensible kind, i.e., of a kind consisting of allowing for the suspension every now and then of operative effective free will for the benefit of servile operative will. When occurring in a human, one way such suspension can occur is as the work of some emotional instinct whose solicitation is then too much powerful with respect to the degree to which (at the considered moment) one’s operative effective free will is not suspensible; but another way such suspension can occur is as the work of some bewitcher whose spell has rendered one unable (at the considered moment) to resist any of the bewitcher’s instructions. Accordingly two modalities of servile operative will in the human are willingness in which all objects (at some point) are the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the concerned human’s existence at that point in time, his existence at some anterior point, the especially intense solicitation of one or more emotional instincts in him at the anterior point, and the strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in him at the anterior point that is his willingness’s inability to resist such intensity in the solicitation of the instincts in question when the degree to which his effective operative free will is un-suspensible is such as the degree found at the anterior point; and willingness in which all objects (at some point) are the forced (rather than random) effect of the combination between the concerned human’s existence at that point in time, his existence at some anterior point, his receiving instructions from some bewitcher at the anterior point, and the strong-kind intrinsically necessary property in him at the anterior point that is his inability to resist any of some bewitcher’s commandments when completely put under the latter’s grip. In the human (taken independently of the ideational realm), the substantial property that is operative effective free will is not only of a suspensible kind; it is, besides, of a praxeologically forced kind, i.e., of a kind consisting for the articulation between means and goals (at some point) of being ruled by a number of praxeological laws. A praxeological law in a volitional entity’s willingness (at some point) consists of a formal regularity in the articulation between means and goals (at some point) that is correspondent to a dispositional innate property in the entity in question with strong intrinsic necessity and strong intrinsically necessary permanence that is, in turn, of the strong kind, i.e., of a kind that consists for the disposition in question of operating whenever some circumstances are present. At every point in the supramundane soul (taken independently of the material realm), willingness is not only of an operative effective free will; it is, besides, of a praxeologically-random and not-suspensible kind, i.e., of a kind consisting for willingness in the supramundane soul of being neither ruled by the slightest praxeological law nor prey to the slightest risk of suspension. At every point in a human’s mind, consciousness and willingness are respectively a property in the ideational entity that is the earthly soul inhabiting his brain—and a property in the material entity that is the brain in question. Precisely the mind (in the strict case of those mind-endowed entities that are material), instead of being itself an entity, is an assemblage between two entities, one ideational (which is the earthly soul) and one material (which is the brain).
At every point in a supramundane soul, both willingness and consciousness fall within the properties found in the supramundane soul; but, at every point in an earthly soul, the properties found in the latter exclude willingness. In any volitional entity endowed at some point with operative effective free will (whether it is a supramundane soul), self-determination in one’s willingness cannot but be extrinsic (rather than intrinsic), i.e., relative to one or more efficient causes (rather than independent of the slightest efficient cause). Just like any operative effective free will is self-determined willingness, any self-determined willingness is extrinsically (rather than intrinsically) self-determined willingness. Just like any operation of willingness at some point is either of an active kind or a passive kind, it is of an active kind when exhibiting one or more means (and not only one or more goals) among its objects, and of a passive kind when all its objects are goals (rather than means). At every point, the part of God’s willingness that is His active willingness is (completely) expressed through the sorting, actualizing, pulse that unifies God and which stands as the efficient cause of all the ideational essences other than the Chi. Both the souls (whether earthly or supramundane) and the ideational essences (including the Idea of the Chi) are extrinsically necessary entities that are (at every point) both eternal by strong-kind intrinsic necessity and eternal in a strong-kind intrinsically necessarily remaining mode. Accordingly both the souls and the ideational essences are unsubstantial though eternal entities. What’s more, while any ideational essence other than the Chi’s Idea is an extrinsically necessary ideational entity whose efficient cause is jointly internal (rather than external) to the ideational realm, situated in the Chi’s Idea, and temporally simultaneous (rather than prior) to the ideational sorting, actualizing, pulse’s existence, both the Idea of the Chi and the souls (whether earthly or supramundane) are extrinsically necessary ideational entities whose efficient cause is jointly internal (rather than external) to the ideational realm, situated in God, and temporally simultaneous (rather than prior) to their existence. The Chi’s idea and, beyond the Chi’s Idea, all the ideational essences are respectively a God-causation and God-components of which God is nonetheless independent; but, for their part, the souls (whether extramundane or earthly) are all God-causations that are external (rather than internal) to God. In metaphorical terms, God is a fire whose sparks the souls are; but those are sparks whose efficient cause, their erupting from the fire’s crackling, is simultaneous (rather than anterior) to their existence outside of the fire. Also, those are sparks which, instead of being made of fire throughout their existence, are irremediably made of water so long as they do not prove worthy (in God’s eyes) of being turned into fire-made sparks. Those are—until they prove worthy of becoming fire-made and, accordingly, divine—water-made sparks in which nothing is divine. Those liquefied sparks of God that are the earthly souls are not-volitional components of volitional material entities endowed with suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness in the material realm (taken independently of the ideational realm); but those sparks of Him that are the supramundane souls are volitional entities endowed with not-suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness in the ideational realm (taken independently of the material realm).
The freedom-and-predestination conundrum can be put as follows. Does God perfectly, completely, know the destiny of every human being (for instance, St. Paul) even before his birth because the destiny of every human being is God-designed? Or does He perfectly, completely, know the destiny of every human being because, despite Him having nothing to do with the destiny of any human being, His omniscience allows Him to know the use any human being will make of his suspensible-kind operative effective free will? The answer I propose, which comes as a synthesis between those two approaches, is that the destiny of every human being is both God-designed in the material realm taken from the angle of its (passive) incarnation-relationship to God; and nonetheless chosen by a correspondent supramundane soul whose choice, made in the ideational realm taken from the angle of its (active) incarnation-relationship to the material realm, is both God-undesigned (as the choice in question makes use of un-suspensible-kind operative effective free will) and completely, perfectly, God-known even before the choice is made. One’s destiny (as a material entity) is to be taken in the sense of a path, unfolding, for one’s material existence that has been prefixed, pre-established, before one’s starting-to-exist and even before the starting-to-exist of anything in the universe. In the material realm taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm, any human being is (at every point) completely endowed with operative effective free will (though of a suspensible-kind) in his substantial essence; what, despite the suspensible character of operative effective free will in humans, prevents the path, unfolding, of material existence in any human being from being ruled by some destiny. In the material realm taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm, any human being is (at every point) both completely endowed in his substantial essence with suspensible operative effective free will with regard to matter; and nonetheless completely endowed with servile operative will with regard to his ideational essence, in which the whole of his material existence’s path, unfolding, is engraved. Destiny is real for any material entity (whether it is human); but, instead of being a property in a material entity, it is a property in one’s ideational essence as a material entity. At every point in the sorting, actualizing, pulse’s operation in the ideational realm (taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), some ideational essences are God-concretized and others, for their part, God-dismissed, i.e., God-selected to get forever un-concretized. As, at every point in the ideational realm (taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), time is vertical (rather than horizontal) and every supramundane soul has a complete, perfect, vision both of the whole of the ideational essences and of the whole operation of the sorting, actualizing, pulse, every supramundane soul enjoys, at every point, perfect omniscience with respect to the past, present, and future of the universe. Accordingly, when (at some point in the ideational realm taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm), a supramundane soul is embarking for an earthly stay, i.e., embarking for its becoming an un-volitional, earthly, soul that will be inhabiting a volitional conscious material entity (whether of a human kind), the supramundane soul knows everything (in a perfect mode) about what will be the path, unfolding, of the material existence it’s about to enter. That is, the supramundane soul knows everything about the destiny that awaits it here below, which is engraved within the ideational essence correspondent to that material entity which the supramundane soul is about to enter. Even though any supramundane soul, when choosing some material entity here below for its upcoming earthly stay, makes such choice with un-suspensible operative effective free will, the vertical (rather than horizontal) character of time in the ideational realm allows in God perfect omniscience (at every point) about which earthly stay any of the supramundane souls will choose at some point.
Any earthly soul is part of a conscious-kind and volitional-kind material entity (whether it is, besides, of a human kind). Though any of the different material existences that are, here below, experimented in earthly souls is God-designed (with the material realm being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship to the ideational realm), the choice in supramundane souls that is, in the beyond, made of one or the other of those different material existences is, for its part, God-undesigned (whether the ideational realm is taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the material realm). Both the God-designed earthly stay experimented in some earthly soul—and the God-undesigned choice made (of some earthly stay) in some supramundane soul—are nonetheless God-known (and God-known in a perfect, complete, mode) before even starting to exist. Upon a conscious volitional material entity’s death, the earthly soul which used to inhabit the entity in question becomes supramundane again and, accordingly, gains back its willingness (and un-suspensible-kind operative effective free willingness). Only those supramundane souls who, just after some earthly stay (as an earthly supramundane soul), are turned into divine supramundane souls see the whole of their earthly stays (experienced over the course of their eternal existence) becoming part of their pasts for the rest of their eternal existence. A divine entity is to be taken in the sense of a creative conscious volitional entity (i.e., a creating conscious volitional entity which creates in the field of ideas, and the creation of which in that field is inspirationally rather than descriptively made) that is, if not worthy of being adored, at least able to intervene with exceptional creativeness (i.e., exceptionally inspirationally made creation of exceptional novelty in terms of ideas, whether such creation is translated into other-than-idea matter) in the regulation, creation, and renewal of the cosmos (or in part of all of that); and which is even able to transgress the rules of the cosmos in its creation powers (whatever the extent of those powers). Any divine entity is ideational (rather than material); but only God is that kind of divine entity that is worthy of being adored. Any divine entity that is other than God is a supramundane soul; but, just like no earthly soul is divine, not any supramundane soul is divine. Reconnecting oneself with God (as a supramundane soul) is to be taken in the sense, not of merging with God again, but instead of becoming fire-made while remaining (strictly) distinct from the divine fire. In order for some supramundane soul to reconnect itself with the divine fire of which it is a water-made spark, a necessary, sufficient, condition consists of the divine fire’s turning the spark in question into a divine, fire-made, spark. In order for the divine fire to turn some water-made supramundane soul into a divine supramundane soul, a necessary, sufficient, condition consists of the divine fire’s judging the spark in question worthy to be turned (into a fire-made spark) and proposing the spark in question to turn the latter (into a fire-made spark); and of the water-made spark’s accepting to get God-turned (into a fire-made spark). Any supramundane soul which, at some point, is God-proposed to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul is one which, at that point in time, is wanting (and about to accept) to get God-turned into a divine supramundane; just like any supramundane soul which, at some point, is God-judged to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul is one which, at that point in time, is God-proposed (or about to get God-proposed) to get turned into a divine supramundane soul.
A necessary, sufficient, condition in order for some supramundane soul to get God-judged worthy (and God-proposed) to become fire-made, divine, lies in the supramundane soul’s having experienced (as an earthly soul) a number of earthly stays in which it rendered itself worthy (at the end of the last of those stays), in the eyes of God, to become fire-made, i.e., divine. In turn, a necessary, sufficient, condition in order for some supramundane soul to have, in a number of past earthly stays, rendered itself worthy (at the end of the last of those stays), in the eyes of the divine fire, to get turned into a fire-made, i.e., divine, soul, lies in the supramundane soul’s having rendered itself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic (at the end of the last of those stays) to get God-judged to be worthy to get turned into a divine supramundane soul. Heroism and exploit are to be taken respectively in the sense of the accomplishing (as a material entity) of one or more exploits; and in the sense of an act that is jointly exceptionally creative (i.e., characterized with the mind’s creation of one or more exceptionally creative ideas), exceptionally successful (i.e., characterized with the complete fulfillment of an exceptionally hard goal), and exceptionally endangering for one’s material subsistence. No earthly stay in a conscious volitional material entity other than human can allow to render oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic (at the end of the stay in question) to get God-judged (as a supramundane soul) to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul (after the stay in question); even when adding the degree to which one would render oneself heroic in the stay in question to the respective degrees to which one would render oneself heroic in a number of past other stays in some conscious volitional material entities other than human. To render oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic at the end of one’s ongoing earthly stay (to get God-judged, as a supramundane soul, to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul), one inescapably has to have been experiencing a number of human material existences; and to become sufficiently heroic (to get God-judged, as a supramundane soul, to be worthy to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul) at the end of a human material existence (whether one also experienced a number of material existences other than human). When some supramundane soul reconnects itself with God, i.e., becomes divine alongside God (while remaining strictly distinct from God), the soul systemically does it just after getting out of its experiencing (as an earthly soul) a human material existence. What’s more, when some supramundane soul reconnects itself with God, i.e., becomes divine alongside God (while remaining strictly distinct from God), the soul is systemically about to admire and advise the sorting, actualizing, pulse’s operation for the rest of the soul’s eternal existence; and all its earthly stays experienced over the course of its eternal existence are systemically about to become part of the soul’s past for the rest of the soul’s eternal existence. As soon as a supramundane soul was just turned into a divine soul, it is divine for the rest of its eternal existence and, for the rest of its eternal existence, henceforth in a position to intervene with exceptional creativeness in the regulation, creation, and renewal of the cosmos and even in a position to transgress the rules of the cosmos in its creation powers; but, when it comes to regulating, creating, or renewing the cosmos directly, the soul in question, throughout the rest of its eternal existence, won’t make a single use of any of its creation powers. Instead the soul that was just turned into a divine soul will only make use of its creation powers in a way consisting of making use of its creativeness to advise God in His regulation and renewal of the cosmos.
It is worth specifying that, though God is (at every point) in a complete position to transgress the rules of the universe in His continuous creation, He completely abstains (at every point) from doing such a thing. Also, it is worth specifying that, though any divine ideational entity is (at every point) able to produce ideas in its very own mind, any idea it may produce is irremediably of an ideational (rather than material) kind, i.e., of a firmness-less (rather than firmness-endowed) kind. Besides the mistake in René Descartes that was his claiming (in his Discourse on the Method notably) the absence of mind in any other-than-human living material entity, another Cartesian mistake was his identifying (in The Passions of the Soul notably) the mind to the soul—and, in turn, the soul to a substance. The mind is to be taken in the sense of what, in some mind-endowed ideational or material entity, produces and hosts ideas. Just like mind is either of an ideational or material kind, it is either of a volitional or un-volitional kind; but mind in some mind-endowed entity is systemically conscious, what is tantamount to saying that any mind-endowed entity is conscious. Though any mind-endowed volitional entity is a conscious entity, not any conscious entity is a mind-endowed volitional entity; no more than any mind-endowed volitional entity is an ideational entity. Though any ideational entity is a consciousness-endowed entity, not any ideational entity is of a volitional nor of a mind-endowed kind; no more than any volitional conscious entity is of a material kind. Not any creation occurs in the field of ideas; but any creation made by a mind-endowed entity either consists of some creation in the field of ideas (whether the created idea or ideas are creative, i.e., inspirationally made rather than descriptively) or of some creation in the field of other-than-idea matter that occurs as the translation of some creation on the entity’s part in the field of ideas. In conscious volitional material entities, not any creative act (i.e., not any act characterized with one or more creative created ideas) is an exploit; but any exceptionally creative act (whether creativeness is translated from the mind into other-than-idea matter) in conscious volitional material entities is an exploit. The soul is to be taken in the sense of that kind of conscious ideational entity that is a spark of God (rather than a component of Him), which is either volitional and mind-endowed (when supramundane) or un-volitional and mindless (when earthly). In any conscious material entity (including human), the mind, instead of being a full-fledged entity (like Descartes wrongly believes), is actually an assemblage between the soul and the brain; just like, in any conscious material entity (including human), willingness, instead of being a property found in the soul (like Descartes wrongly believes), is actually one found in the brain. When occurring (at some point) in a conscious material entity, any volition (i.e., any operation of willingness), any thought-process, and any intellective creation (i.e., any creation of one or more ideas, whether descriptively or inspirationally) occur within the brain (rather than within the earthly soul); but consciousness, when present (at some point) in a conscious material entity, is present as a substantial property (i.e., a property falling within the substantial natural material essence) whose presence in the material entity has nothing to do with the brain but instead everything to do with the soul. The substantial property in that generic material entity that is the human of being made in God’s image is to be taken in a virtual sense. Namely that man (in his substantial natural material essence), on the one hand, finds himself to be occupying an intermediate rank between that kind of a living material entity that is endowed with chaotic instincts and that kind of entity that is like-divine (rather than divine stricto sensu); and, on the other hand, finds himself endowed with suspensible operative effective free will which he cannot but make use of (and make use of in some specific, correspondent, way) if he’s to fulfill what in him is virtually in God’s image. The constitutive (though neither natural nor substantial) property found at some point in some human who, at that point in time, has rendered himself like-divine of being like-divine is to be taken in the concrete (rather than virtual) sense of having fulfilled what in him is virtually made in God’s image. Such fulfillment is one that consists, not of reaching some final, optimal, degree in the fulfillment in question, but instead of progressing sufficiently (though endlessly) in the fulfillment in question, in which no optimal degree (whether attainable) is conceivable. Just like heroism and exploit are the (sole) key to fulfilling sufficiently what in oneself (as a human) is in God’s image, such fulfillment through heroism and exploit is reached, finalized, only in one’s ongoing material existence (as a human) though its execution occurs in a number (not necessarily one) of human earthly stays for one’s earthly soul (as a human).
The Cartesian approach to a human’s soul as an ideational entity finding itself located (exclusively) within the pineal gland is nonetheless a worthy-of-being-saved approach, which is quite consistent with the location of a human’s suprasensible ability (i.e., a human’s ability to reach direct perception of all or part of the ideational realm) within (exclusively) the pineal gland. Divination is to be taken in the sense of the gaining knowledge of all or part of the future in the cosmos (though irremediably in a mode that is, at best, approximative) through perceptual access to some step of reality that stands above the step that is other-than-Chi and other-than-angel matter. That material entity that is the Chi, which both allows the emergent properties to get caused (whether efficiently) and the entities to get caused (whether efficiently), without efficiently-causing itself the slightest entity nor causing itself (whether efficiently) the slightest property, finds itself enveloping (at every point) every other entity in the cosmos as mere energy. That energy is, besides, of a vibratory kind. An entity that is, at some point, finalized is to be taken in the sense of an entity that is, at some point, spurred (whether appropriately) in some direction, whether the direction in question is internal (i.e., pursued by the entity—whether means are mobilized) or external (i.e., fixed by another entity) or both. Any entity that is, at some point, internally finalized is, at every point, a volitional entity (and reciprocally); but not any entity that is, at some point, externally finalized is, at that point in time, a volitional entity. (Any entity that is, at some point, volitional is volitional at every point; just like any entity that is, at some point, mind-endowed is mind-endowed at every point. Any material entity that is, at some point, conscious is conscious at every point; just like any conscious material entity is, at every point, of a volitional kind.) At every point, the Chi is un-finalized (both internally and externally) when considered independently of its incarnation-relationship to the sorting, actualizing, pulse in the ideational realm; and nonetheless finalized (both internally and externally) when considered from the angle of that incarnation-relationship. Accordingly, the Chi, at every point, is both deprived of any directional vibration when taken independently of its incarnation-relationship to the sorting, actualizing, pulse in the ideational realm; and endowed with some directional vibrations when taken from the angle of that incarnation-relationship. A directional vibration in the Chi (with the latter being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship) is to be taken in the sense of a vibration in the Chi that indicates some Chi-pursued goal (in view of which a number of other vibrations in the Chi serve as means—and appropriate means appropriately used—in the Chi); and which, accordingly, reveals part of the future in the cosmos. Any vibration serving as some means in the Chi is an appropriate means appropriately used. As the Chi envelops every other entity in the universe (at every point), the vibrations constitutive of the Chi are spread out throughout every other entity in the universe. As concerns those vibrations constitutive of the Chi (with the latter being taken from the angle of its incarnation-relationship) that are directional, two ways as a human of gaining knowledge of all or part of the directional vibrations that are, at some point, enveloping oneself, resonating around oneself, respectively lie in tarotmancy—and in the use of a divinatory pendulum. In both cases, the knowledge one may gain is, at best, approximative. While tarotmancy and the divinatory pendulum both fall within a modality of divination that lies in perceptual access to that level of reality that is the Chi, a whole other modality of divination is the one that lies in perceptual access to the ideational realm.
Yet another modality of divination, which has nothing do with the Chi-level of reality nor with the ideational level of reality, is the one that lies in perceptual access to a number of revelations made by one or more angels about all or part of the future in the cosmos. In his writing The Book of the Law under the guidance of Aiwass, Aleister Crowley enjoyed divination of that sort, which is, at best, approximative in any human (even Crowley) as angels cannot but communicate in such a way that their message’s reception is, at best, approximative in any human. That modality of freedom that is implicitly dealt with in The Book of the Law, which can be called starlit freedom (as it is relative to what it, metaphorically, means for some conscious volitional material entity to be a star), is claimed in the book in question to lie in doing (and wanting) what one’s will would want should one know (and espouse) one’s destiny. Crowley’s received-from-Aiwass precept that one (as a human) should do (and want) what one’s will would be should one know (and espouse) one’s destiny is (quite cryptically) put as follows in The Book of the Law. “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.” As for “Every man and every woman is a star,” another claim made in The Book of the Law, it makes use of the star’s metaphor in, at least, two distinct ways. Namely, on the one hand, that every human is endowed with that eternal and immaterial entity that is a soul, which makes him look like that seemingly eternal and immaterial entity that is a star in the night sky; and, on the other hand, that every human has some unique and precise destiny ascribed to him here below (like every star has some unique and precise position ascribed to it in the night sky). In Crowley’s writings, the (respective) soul found in every human contains some divine part, the deepest part, which expects him to fulfill his destiny through fulfilling what his will would be should he be knowing (and espousing) his destiny: in Crowley’s terms, through fulfilling his “true will.” Unless made use of in some imprecise way (like it is in Crowley’s writings), the star’s metaphor applied to a human being should be intended as follows. What makes every human being a star is not only that every human has some unique destiny that is unique to him; it is that every human has some unique destiny which, besides, is engraved from all eternity within his Idea. As for the star’s freedom, it is not to want what one would want (and do) should one fulfill (and espouse) one’s destiny; it is to know directly the Idea where one’s destiny is fixed. In other words, to be free is not (for some star) to fulfill its very own destiny written in heaven (which is inevitable for any human being); it is to grasp directly what the highest will wants for the star in question, that will that expresses itself in the slightest recesses and dust heaps in the universe. Precisely that psychical state (in the human) that is mindfulness, which cannot but be enjoyed (at some point) in a way that is, at best, approximative, is one which allows one to gain (at some point) direct suprasensible knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content; what is tantamount to speaking of direct knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence. That psychical state (in the human) that is mindfulness is also one which allows one to increase (at some point) the degree of one’s enjoyment (throughout one’s existence) of that component of human happiness that is human plenitude—namely that component of happiness in the human that applies throughout a human’s existence.
Though that component of plenitude in the human that lies in persevering in one’s intactness throughout one’s material existence, which I propose to call “natural plenitude,” is to be distinguished from that component that I propose to call “supranatural plenitude,” which lies in authoring exploits regularly throughout one’s material existence, both natural and supranatural plenitudes in the human can see the degree to which they’re (throughout a human’s existence) enjoyed being increased (at some point) through mindfulness. In humans, both the enjoyment degree of any component of plenitude—and the enjoyment degree of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—cannot be experienced fully at some point. When occurring in some human, the direct suprasensible knowledge of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content cannot but occur in an ideationally, materially, interfered mode, i.e., in a mode that both witnesses a number of ideational interferences (preventing any precision in one’s suprasensible reach) and a number of material interferences (preventing any precision in one’s suprasensible reach). Some kind of ideational interference intervening in any suprasensible reach of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—and some kind of material interference intervening in any suprasensible reach of all or part of one’s ideational essence’s content—respectively lie in that interference that is one’s suprasensible reach’s finding itself majorly blinded by the light emanating from the ideational essence in question; and in that interference that is one’s suprasensible reach’s finding itself majorly diverted, lowered, by one’s perception (whether visual) of some material entities surrounding us. The human’s pineal gland’s ability to perceive in a direct suprasensible mode (though only with a number of interferences, both ideational and material) all or part of the ideational realm (or of some ideational essence within the latter) is the mark of the fact for the earthly soul occupying the gland in question of possessing the ability in question as a kind of connection with the ideational realm from which it originates. Though the earthly soul only brings consciousness within its material host (instead of bringing also willingness and mind), and is deprived of any mind and willingness within the material host, the fact that the material host’s consciousness is located within the soul (and within the soul only) both makes that the use the material host makes of its very own mind and willingness is to be imputed (and imputed only) to the host throughout the host’s (material) existence; and that the use in question is to be imputed (and imputed only) to the soul as soon as the soul has become supramundane again. In other words, when some soul leaves what was its material host here below (and, accordingly, becomes supramundane), it inherits from its past material host the imputatibility to oneself (and to oneself only) of everything the host did throughout the host’s material existence. In any earthly soul, elevation towards God, what can be called spiritual elevation, lies in rendering oneself sufficiently heroic in one’s experiencing of a number of earthly stays; just like, in any (un-divine) supramundane soul, having rendered oneself sufficiently heroic (as an earthly soul) to get God-judged worthy (as an un-divine supramundane soul) to get God-turned into a divine supramundane soul lies in having rendered oneself (as an earthly soul) sufficiently heroic and, accordingly, sufficiently like-divine. In humans, not any earthly soul finds itself occupying a human who renders the soul whose host he is sufficiently like-divine at the end of the soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but any earthly soul finds itself occupying a human who, at every point in the soul’s ongoing earthly stay, finds himself unable to escape (whether fully or partly) compliance with what his ideational essence’s content and will are about.
A renewal and unification of freedom’s understanding—and additional remarks on Spinoza and Aleister Crowley
A material entity is to be taken in the sense of an entity endowed with some kind of firmness, consistency (for instance: an atom, the void, an idea in a dog’s mind, an information, or mere energy); just like an ideational entity (i.e., an Idea) is to be taken in the sense of an entity devoid of any firmness, consistency. As much the souls as the ideational essences as God are Ideas, i.e., are ideational entities; but no entity, whether it is material or ideational, is devoid of any compositional property. To be endowed with one or more material efficient causes is to be taken in the sense of having one or more of one’s efficient causes (or even all of one’s efficient causes) that are material, i.e., that are lying in one or more material other entities; just like to be endowed with one or more ideational efficient causes is to be taken in the sense of having one or more of one’s efficient causes (or even all of one’s efficient causes) that are ideational, i.e., that are lying in one or more ideational other entities. Self-determination in one’s willingness is commonly thought to be free will; but self-determination in one’s willingness is instead a modality of that component of free will that I propose to call “effective free will.” While free will actually lies in the absence (at least, at some point) of any endured effect with one or more efficient causes in one’s willingness, the component of free will that is effective free will, which is commonly thought (wrongly) to be free will itself (rather than a component of the latter), lies in the absence (at least, at some point) of any endured forced effect with one or more efficient causes in one’s willingness. Precisely, the fact for one’s willingness of jointly enduring not a single forced effect efficiently-caused—and enduring some efficiently-caused effect nonetheless—at some point, i.e., the fact for one’s willingness of completely self-determining at some point, comes as the operative modality of effective free will. Just like the operative modality of the material component of effective free will lies in the fact for one’s willingness of self-determining (at least, at some point) with regard to matter (i.e., of jointly enduring not a single forced effect with one or more material efficient causes and enduring some effect with one or more material efficient causes nonetheless: at least, at some point), the operative modality of the ideational component of effective free will lies in the fact for one’s willingness of self-determining (at least, at some point) with regard to Idea (i.e., of jointly enduring not a single forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes and enduring some effect with one or more ideational efficient causes nonetheless: at least, at some point). Just like any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, for an ideational entity’s willingness completely self-determined, at that point in time, with regard to Idea comes as an extrinsically contingent property (of a certain kind), any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, for a material entity’s willingness completely self-determined, at that point in time, with regard to matter comes as an extrinsically contingent property (of a certain kind).
Conscious will is only a certain kind of will; just like effective free will (whether it is conscious) and conscious effective free will are respectively a certain kind of will and a certain kind of effective free will. Just like any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a volitional entity’s (operative) willingness is a property in said willingness (and reciprocally), any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a volitional entity’s (operative) willingness endowed, at that point in time, with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible) is an extrinsically contingent property that comes as a random (rather than forced) product of the fact that the entity’s present existence finds itself added to the combination (at some point before) between the entity’s existence, one or more relations on the entity’s part, and the property innate (or eternal) and intrinsically necessary (of the strong kind) not less than permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is the entity’s endowment with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible). Thus any object (whether it is a means or a goal), at some point, in a conscious volitional entity’s willingness endowed, at that point in time, with operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible) is an extrinsically contingent property that comes as a random (rather than forced) product of the fact that the entity’s present existence finds itself added to the combination (at some point before) between the entity’s existence, one or more relations on the entity’s part, and the property innate (or eternal) and intrinsically necessary (of the strong kind) not less than permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is the entity’s endowment with conscious operative effective free will (were the latter suspensible). No volitional entity (whether it is conscious—and whether it is ideational) is ever in a position to experiment the absence of the slightest object in its willingness at some point (i.e., in a position to experiment complete free will at some point); just like no volitional entity (whether it is conscious—and whether it is ideational) is ever in a position to experiment (whether completely—or partly) operative effective free will in an intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) mode at some point. At every point, operative effective free will is complete in supramundane souls both with regard to matter and with regard to Idea; but, at every point, it is also completely inexistent in humans with regard to Idea as any human is (at every point) both completely endowed with suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to matter—and, with regard to Idea, completely endowed with operative willingness completely subjected to his ideational essence’s will. The endowment with suspensible-kind operative effective free will (with regard to matter) is part of the substantial essence in a human; but said endowment both implies that the (complete) loss of willingness in a human cannot but be part of a ceasing-to-exist in the latter and that the (complete) suspension of operative effective free will (with regard to matter) in a human cannot be part of a ceasing-to-exist in the latter. At every point, God’s will—including when it comes to that part of His will that expresses itself through the way the sorting, actualizing, pulse operates—is both operative effective free will of a not-suspensible kind with regard to Idea and, with regard to matter, not-operative effective free will (i.e., willingness uncharacterized by the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes); but, for its part, the ideational essence’s will—including when it comes to that ideational essence that is the sorting, actualizing, pulse—is both not-operative effective free will with regard to matter and, with regard to Idea, servile operative will (i.e., willingness in which all objects are forced effects with one or more ideational efficient causes).
As much God as the supramundane souls are, at every point, endowed with not-suspensible-kind operative effective free will with regard to Idea; but, at every point, the (respective) will the ideational essences are endowed with is completely configured by God’s will, which expresses itself through the ideational essence’s will. Any supramundane soul, through entering that part of the body that is the brain (whether it is a human’s brain), loses both its willingness and its remembrance of its past existence in the supramundane realm; but, while some humans are likely (rather than unlikely) to remember (though only in a sporadic and fuzzy mode) some moments of their soul’s past existence in the ideational realm, willingness in any human’s mind is irremediably a property of the brain rather than a property of the soul that entered the brain. Contrary to what Aleister Crowley claims, no part in a human’s soul is actually divine: a human’s soul is admittedly a spark of God, but a spark that is no more divine in some of its parts than it is globally divine. Accordingly, and contrary to what Aleister Crowley claims, fulfilling one’s destiny (as a human) in one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay doesn’t lie in the fulfillment of what the purported divine part in one’s soul, throughout that earthly stay, wants one to do on the occasion of that earthly stay. Actually the fulfillment of one’s destiny (as a human) instead lies in the accomplishment of what one’s ideational essence (in which one’s destiny is engraved) wants one to do on the occasion of one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay. Just prior to its embarkation for the earthly stay in question, one’s soul admittedly wants for the earthly stay in question the fulfillment of one’s ideational essence’s content (and therefore of one’s ideational essence’s will); but the fact that this coincidence (just prior to one’s soul’s embarkation) between what one’s soul wants and what one’s ideational essence wants is necessarily presupposed by one’s soul’s embarkation for one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay (though not necessarily reiterated at some point of the earthly stay in question) renders Crowley only partly right in his claim that one’s destiny’s fulfillment (as a human) lies in fulfilling what the divine part in one’s soul, throughout one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay, wants one to want (and to do). What elevates one’s earthly soul in its ongoing earthly stay indeed lies, as Crowley claims, in exceptional uniqueness for one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but it should be specified, what Crowley doesn’t do, that this exceptional uniqueness itself lies in exceptional creativeness (i.e., exceptionally inspirationally made creation of exceptional novelty in terms of ideas, whether such creation is translated into other-than-idea matter) and that exceptional creativeness itself lies in exploit and, accordingly, cannot but be reached in defiance of material subsistence. Love is indeed indispensable, as implied in Crowley’s precept that “Low is the law, love under will,” to an exceptional uniqueness of one’s soul’s ongoing earthly stay; but it should be specified, what Crowley doesn’t do, that one kind of love concerned here is that which consists of praising (rather than denying) the wisdom characteristic of the cosmic order and of taking part in the repair and completion of the divine creation in strict compliance with its underlying order. Any soul which is elevating itself through its successive earthly stays has nothing divine prior to any of its earthly stays nor in any of its earthly stays; but completing its elevation here below through rendering itself (sufficiently) like-divine-here-below is what renders a soul divine-in-the-beyond after the elapse of all its successive earthly stays. To make you a star in the nocturnal firmament, there is no other way than to make you like a star under the daytime sky.
Just like speaking of a strong intrinsically necessary property permanent in a strong intrinsically necessary mode that is either innate or eternal in a material entity is tantamount to speaking of a property remaining with intrinsic necessity of the strong kind in a material entity throughout the latter’s material existence, speaking of a component of the essence is tantamount to speaking of a component of a certain kind of essence. Just like the essence for any material entity is subdivided into two kinds of essence, its Idea (i.e., its ideational kind of essence) and its material essence, one way to classify the material essence’s components (including in the universe’s case) is to distinguish between the natural material essence, the substantial natural material essence, and that component of the substantial natural material essence that is strictly composed of those innate constitutive properties both intrinsically necessary of the strong kind and permanent with intrinsic necessity of the strong kind that fall within compositional substratum. A formal property and a compositional property are respectively a property that, in an entity, deals with how the entity in question is arranged, shaped, organized, and a property that, in an entity, deals with what the entity in question is composed of. While a substratum property is a non-existential property that, in an entity, finds itself endorsing one or more other non-existential properties (whether it is itself endorsed by one or more other non-existential properties) in the entity in question, an affection property is a non-existential property that, in an entity, finds itself endorsed by one or more other non-existential properties (whether it is itself endorsing one or more other non-existential properties) in the entity in question. Any affection property is either one formal or one that is the sum of one or more formal and of one or more compositional properties; just like any substratum property is either one compositional or one that is the sum of one or more formal and of one or more compositional properties. Any non-existential property falls either within substratum or within affection or within both; but, no more than any property falling within affection falls within form, not any property falling within substratum falls within composition. Any compositional property (rather than formal or a compound of form and composition) and any formal property (rather than compositional or a compound of form and composition) respectively fall within substratum (rather than within affection) and within affection (rather than within substratum); just like any property falling within affection or within substratum or within both—and any property that comes as a compound of form and composition—are respectively one non-existential (rather than existential) and one falling within substratum or within affection or within both. In any material entity (including the universe), the substantial natural material essence includes a compartment strictly composed of substratum properties, some of which are compositional and others are a compound of form and of composition; but, no more than those substratum properties in a material entity that are compositional can be found within what, in the entity in question, stands beyond the substantial essence, those substratum properties in a material entity that are other than compositional cannot be found only within the substantial essence. In any material entity (including the universe), the substantial natural material essence includes a compartment strictly composed of affection properties, some of which are formal and others are a compound of form and of composition; but, no more than those affection properties in a material entity that are formal are restricted to those formal-kind affection properties which, in the entity in question, occupy the substantial essence, those affection properties in a material entity that are other than formal cannot be found only within the substantial essence.
Though Spinoza conceives of the “thought” and of the “extension” as two distinct “attributes” in God, any of the entities inhabiting any of God’s Spinozian “attributes” can be translated as a material entity in my language. Two mistakes in Spinoza respectively lie in his refusing to recognize the slightest separation between God and the universe—and in his pretending to prove God’s existence from God’s constitutive properties. Just like God is both identical (completely) to the universe and distinct (completely) from the latter, in that He gets incarnated (completely) into the universe while remaining (completely) external to the universe, the existence of God in an intrinsically necessary mode—and in a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternal mode remaining by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind throughout God’s existence—is both constitutive of God and not-provable from the fact that His existence in an intrinsically necessary mode—and His existence in a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternal mode remaining by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind throughout His existence—are two existential properties that fall within His constitutive properties. God’s existence could be proved from His essence if—and only if—the property of God’s existence were implied by all or part of the non-existential properties in God; but none of the existential properties in God has something to do with all or part of His non-existential properties. More about my assessment of the Spinozian approach to God can be read above. Another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse what, in its non-existential properties, is constitutive of that entity that is the universe and what, in its non-existential properties, not only remains in the universe (throughout its existence) by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind but endorses one or more formal-kind affections instead of being itself an affection; and, besides, to confuse what, in its non-existential properties, falls within affection (rather than within substratum) and what, in its non-existential properties falling within affection (rather than within substratum), falls within the formal component of affection. What Spinoza respectively calls a “mode” and an “attribute” of the substance that he claims the universe to be is, thus, respectively a formal affection that isn’t part of the substance’s constitutive properties (whether it is remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence); and a compositional substratum-property that is part of the substance’s constitutive properties and which, besides, remains by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence. Besides reducing any affection in any entity (including any substance) to a formal affection and any substratum property in any entity (including any substance) to a compositional substratum property, Spinoza reduces the set of any entity’s constitutive properties (were the entity a substance) to its formal properties, thus calling “formal essence” the set of any entity’s constitutive properties (were the entity a substance). Spinoza contradicts himself in that he both believes the set of the formal properties in any entity (were it a substance) to (strictly) coincide with the set of its constitutive properties—and the set of the constitutive properties in that kind of entity that is a substance to (strictly) coincide with the set of a substance’s “attributes.” What’s more, he mistakenly believes the universe to be a substance (i.e., an intrinsically necessary entity endowed at every point with a strong-kind intrinsically necessary eternity that remains with strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the entity’s existence); and the set of the universe’s constitutive properties (and, accordingly, the set of a substance’s constitutive properties) to be an infinite set of “attributes,” i.e., an infinite set of non-existential constitutive properties which are all compositional (rather than formal or a compound of form and composition), all remaining in the universe by strong-kind intrinsic necessity, and all endorsing one or more formal affections (rather than one or more affections other than formal).
No more than the non-existential constitutive properties in the universe entity, in a substance entity, or in any entity include only those non-existential constitutive properties which, by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, remain throughout existence, those non-existential constitutive properties which, by intrinsic necessity of the strong kind, remain throughout existence exclude neither those non-existential constitutive properties which, besides remaining by intrinsic necessity (of the strong kind) throughout existence, fall within affection (whether they fall within substratum as well) nor those non-existential constitutive properties which, besides remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout existence, fall within the other-than-compositional compartment of substratum. Accordingly, those non-existential properties in the universe which, besides remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the universe’s existence, fall within formal affection, which Spinoza judges to be what he calls “immediate infinite modes,” i.e., formal affections that are remaining by strong-kind intrinsic necessity throughout the substance’s existence but which are external to the substance’s constitutive properties, are actually part of the universe’s constitutive properties (without the universe being a substance). Yet another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse the universe’s contingent properties with those of the universe’s contingent properties that are intrinsically (rather than extrinsically) contingent; and to miss, accordingly, the existence—and inscription within the universe’s field of contingent properties—of those of the universe’s properties that are extrinsically contingent. Thus Spinoza’s approach to the cosmos excludes as much the occurrence of the slightest random (rather than forced) effect in the cosmos as the presence in the latter of the slightest self-determined willingness (whether it is completely or partly self-determined) with regard to matter; what is tantamount to excluding as much the occurrence of the slightest extrinsically contingent property, generally speaking, as the occurrence of the slightest extrinsically contingent object (whether it is a means or a goal) in the slightest willingness. Two other mistakes in Spinoza respectively lie in his identifying the “striving to persevere in one’s being” to a kind of essence he calls “actual essence;” and in his substituting the ideational essence with an alleged kind of essence he calls “objective essence,” which would consist of the (true) idea one happens to have of a material entity’s material essence. Just like the idea (whether it is true or wrong) one happens to have of a material entity’s material essence is itself neither a kind of essence nor a component of a kind of essence, the “striving to persevere in one’s being,” though it is a property included within the substantial natural material essence in some material entities, is itself neither a kind of essence nor a component of a kind of essence. The “striving to persevere in one’s being”—to put Spinoza’s idea here in more precise terms than those by Spinoza himself: the striving to persevere in one’s integrity throughout one’s existence—is not a kind of essence; but, instead, a property included within the material essence in a certain kind of entity characterized by the presence of that striving in its constitutive properties.
More precisely, the “striving to persevere in one’s being” is really a property included within the substantial stage of the material essence in a certain kind of entity defined by the presence of that striving in the substantial stage of its constitutive properties. In the human, that striving coexists at the substantial essence’s level—and, more precisely, at the instinctual level (in which it exists as an emotional impulse not necessarily translated into action) included within the human’s wider substantial essence—alongside the contrary striving to erode one’s integrity. That coexistence is not less beyond Spinoza’s understanding than is the impossibility of identifying the “striving to persevere in one’s being” to a genre or component of the essence. Another mistake in Spinoza is to confuse an entity’s “nature”—whose meaning in Spinoza’s thought and articulation with the Spinozian notion of “formal essence” are quite unclear—with what “nature” in an entity would be should the entity be wholly intact throughout its existence. Thus Spinoza says of “freedom” that it consists for an entity of being and acting by “the sole necessity of its nature;” though a more precise formulation for Spinoza’s idea here would be that freedom consists for an entity of being completely—rather than partly—compliant throughout is existence with the “necessity of its nature,” for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the “necessity of its nature” is neither wholly nor partly constrained—but instead wholly endured by the entity—throughout its existence, for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the entity remains wholly intact throughout its existence, for which a necessary, sufficient, condition is that the entity remains uncharacterized by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes. In my language, “nature” is clarified as follows. Namely that a material entity’s nature lies in the set of those of the entity’s constitutive properties (witnessed over the course of its existence) that are intrinsically necessary whether of the strong kind (namely when their occurrence at some point finds a necessary, sufficient, condition in the entity’s existence at the concerned point) or of the weak kind (namely when their occurrence at some point finds a necessary, sufficient, condition in the entity’s existence and intactness at the concerned point in time). As for that kind of freedom that Spinoza judged to be the only one existent in the cosmos, which he confusedly defined as the fact of being and acting by “the sole necessity of its nature,” it is clarified in my language as that kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of being completely compliant (throughout its existence) with what its nature would be should the entity remain uncharacterized (throughout its existence) by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes. Any cracking-effect that happens at some point with regard to one’s intactness (as a material entity) is either an efficiently-caused effect or one for which a necessary, sufficient, condition lies in the entity’s existence or intactness at the considered point in time. What I propose to call “virtual nature” in a material entity is what its nature would be should the entity be completely intact throughout its existence. What is tantamount to saying: what its nature would be should all the intrinsically necessary properties of the weak kind in the entity be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining (wholly) intact throughout its existence.
Self-determination in one’s willingness with regard to matter, of which Spinoza wrongly denied the slightest degree at any point in the human, is another component of the human’s freedom in addition to that component of the human’s freedom that is the one consisting of remaining wholly uncharacterized by the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes throughout one’s material existence; but one’s willingness’s self-determination with regard to matter cannot be complete at every point in a human’s material existence, no more than compliance with one’s virtual nature (or even with what one’s nature would be should one not endure a single cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes throughout one’s material existence) can be complete at some point in a human’s material existence. Besides his mistake that is his denying the slightest degree of self-determination (at any point) in the human’s willingness with regard to matter, another mistake in Spinoza lies in his identification of the human’s body to the human’s mind, thus saying that both are a “same thing” considered from the respective angle of those two “attributes” that are the “extension” (in the body’s case) and the “thought” (in the mind’s case). While the “extension” and the “thought” are, in Spinoza, conceived of as two realms completely distinct from each other, the body and the mind are, in him, conceived of as one single entity both belonging completely to the extension realm and belonging completely to the thought realm. As for those two sets of effects respectively endured by the body and the mind, they’re, in Spinoza, conceived of as two parallel sets of effects respectively operating in the “extension” realm only and in the “thought” realm only; so that any effect endured by the body in the “extension” realm finds its (complete) equivalent in some effect concomitantly endured by the mind in the “thought” realm, and reciprocally. On the issue of the relationship between a human’s mind and a human’s body, while Spinoza is wholly wrong, Descartes is partly right. Just like the mind and the body in the human, contrary to what Spinoza claims on the issue, are not one single entity considered from the respective angle of two constitutive properties in a certain substance (i.e., a certain intrinsically necessary entity eternal in a strong intrinsically necessary mode whose eternity remains throughout its existence by strong intrinsic necessity) identical to the universe, the mind and the body in the human, contrary to what Descartes claims on the issue, are not two distinct entities linked to each other through the pineal gland hosting that (thinking) substance that Descartes claims the soul to be. A human’s mind, instead of being a substance (as Descartes claims) or even an entity (were it identical to the body as Spinoza claims), is actually an assemblage composed (strictly) of that ideational entity that is the soul and of that part of the body that is the brain. As the soul (which neither Descartes nor Spinoza have the lucidity to distinguish from the mind) is indeed an entity (though it is not a substance) distinct from the body, and one which, in humans, indeed nests within the pineal gland, Descartes remains partly right against a completely wrong Spinoza.
Right now I intend to address further my take on freedom. Freedom lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time (whether time is horizontal—or vertical), the slightest effect with one or more of its causes that are efficient; and that, whether one or more of the effect’s efficient causes are material rather than ideational, whether one or more of the effect’s efficient causes are external rather than internal, and whether the effect itself is forced rather than random. No entity (whether it is material—or ideational) can be completely free at some point. The component of freedom that is ideational freedom lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal), i.e., the slightest effect finding one or more of its efficient causes in an ideational entity (whether the latter is another entity than the entity in question). As for the component of freedom that is material freedom, it lies in the fact for an entity (whether it is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal), i.e., the slightest effect finding one or more of its efficient causes in a material entity (whether the latter is another entity than the entity in question). As much material freedom as, generally speaking, freedom cannot be completely experimented (but only experimented to a partial extent) in the human at some point; but, just like the human is both endowed (at every point in his material existence) with material freedom to a partial extent and unable to experiment (were it only at some point in time) the slightest degree of ideational freedom (i.e., unable to experiment, whether completely or partly, the ideational component of freedom), the supramundane soul is both endowed with complete material freedom (at every point in its existence) and endowed with partial ideational freedom (at every point in its existence). The modalities of material freedom include, at least, the volitional-effective, natural, and starlit modalities of material freedom, which respectively lie in the fact for a volitional entity (whether the latter is material—or ideational) at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest forced effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of one’s willingness; the fact for a material entity at some point of not enduring (not only at that point in time but at every point in its material existence) the slightest cracking-effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of one’s intactness; and the fact for a conscious volitional material entity at some point of not enduring, at least at that point in time, the slightest interference-effect with one or more material efficient causes (whether the latter are external—or internal) in the field of the direct suprasensible reaching of the whole of one’s ideational essence’s content.
Though freedom (generally speaking) consists for an entity at some point of enduring, at least at that point in time, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes, the kind of material freedom that is natural material freedom cannot be (completely) experienced at some point in time without being (completely) experienced at every point in one’s material existence. The kind of freedom that is volitional freedom, which contains both a material component and one ideational, consists (for a volitional entity, i.e., an entity endowed with willingness) of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness; what is tantamount to not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest effect in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. Just like the material component of volitional freedom consists of not enduring in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more material efficient causes, the ideational component of volitional freedom consists of not enduring in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, at least at some point, the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes. Just like the component of material volitional freedom that is material volitional-effective freedom consists for a volitional entity of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest forced effect with one or more material efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness, the component of ideational volitional freedom that is ideational volitional-effective freedom consists for a volitional entity of not enduring, at least at some point, the slightest forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. No volitional entity (whether it is material—or ideational) can experiment, at some point, a state of complete volitional freedom, i.e., experiment, at some point, the absence of the slightest endured effect (whether the latter is forced—or random) with one or more efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness; but as much the ideational essences as the supramundane souls are experimenting, at every point, a state of complete material volitional freedom, i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest endured effect (whether the latter is forced—or random) with one or more material efficient causes in (the exercising of) one’s willingness. No volitional material entity can experiment ideational volitional freedom (whether it is completely—or only to some extent); but, just like the supramundane souls are experimenting, at every point, a state of complete ideational volitional-effective freedom (i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in their respective wills), the ideational essences are experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest degree of ideational volitional-effective freedom (i.e., experimenting, at every point, the absence of the slightest effect with one or more ideational efficient causes in their respective wills that is other than forced).
In other words, the ideational component of effective free will, i.e., the absence in (the exercising of) one’s willingness of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more ideational efficient causes, is completely experimented in the supramundane souls at every point; but, just like the ideational component of effective free will is neither completely nor partly experimented in the ideational essences (whatever the point in time considered), the ideational component of effective free will is neither completely nor partly experimented in the material volitional entities (whatever the point in time considered). As for the material component of effective free will, i.e., the absence in (the exercising of) one’s willingness of the slightest endured forced effect with one or more material efficient causes, it is, at some point, either partly or completely or not at all experimented in any human; but, just like the material component of effective free will is completely experimented in the supramundane souls at every point, the material component of effective free will is completely experimented in the ideational essences at every point. Just like the modality of material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the human is suspensible-kind operative-kind material effective free will, the modality of material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the supramundane soul and in the ideational essence is of a not-operative kind, i.e., is of a kind consisting of not enduring a single effect (whether forced or random) with one or more material efficient causes. Just like the modality of operative-kind ideational effective free will that is present (at every point) in the supramundane soul is both not-suspensible and praxeologically-random (i.e., not ruled by the slightest praxeological law), the modality of operative-kind material effective free will that is present (at every point) in the human is both suspensible and praxeologically-forced (i.e., ruled by a number of praxeological laws). The degree to which material operative effective free will in humans is suspensible not only varies, at some point, from a human to another; the degree of suspensibility even varies over the course of one’s lifetime as a human. The kind of freedom that is starlit freedom, which consists for a conscious volitional material entity (at some point) of the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence (at least at that point in time), contains an ideational component, which consists for a conscious material entity of experimenting not a single ideational interference (i.e., not a single interference with one or more ideational efficient causes) with the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence; just like starlit freedom contains a material component, which consists for a conscious volitional material entity of experimenting not a single material interference (i.e., not a single interference with one or more material efficient causes) with the direct suprasensible reach of its ideational essence. Any supramundane soul is experimenting, at every point, a direct suprasensible reach of every ideational essence (both taken in isolation and in its globality) with the absence of the slightest (either ideational or material) interference; but, in humans, the direct suprasensible reach (what is tantamount to speaking of the direct reach) of some ideational essence (both taken in isolation and in its globality) is occurring sporadically (rather than at every point) and, besides, in a mode that is prey to ideational and material interferences (rather than in a mode uncharacterized with the slightest interference, be the latter ideational or material). What’s more, it is occurring (when occurring) with an efficiency varying from an individual to another.
While a material entity’s nature, its natural material essence, lies in the sum of all the entity’s intrinsically necessary properties (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind), a material entity’s virtual nature, its virtual natural material essence, lies in what would be the sum of its intrinsically necessary properties (whether of the weak kind—or of the strong kind) should all the intrinsically necessary properties of the weak kind in the entity be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining (wholly) intact throughout its existence. Whether one speaks of the ideational essence (i.e., the ideational sum of all the properties of a material entity over the course of its existence), the material essence (i.e., the sum of all those properties in a material entity over the course of its existence that are constitutive), the natural material essence (i.e., the sum of all those constitutive properties that are intrinsically necessary—whether of the weak kind or the strong kind), or the substantial natural material essence (i.e., the sum of all those intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the strong kind that are both innate and endowed with intrinsically necessary permanence of the strong kind), a material entity cannot but be in (complete) compliance with its essence. More precisely, and whether one speaks of the ideational essence, the material essence, the natural material essence, or the substantial natural material essence, complete compliance with essence is itself an intrinsically necessary constitutive property of the strong kind that is both innate and endowed with intrinsically necessary permanence of the strong kind. Yet, in a material entity, the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature (i.e., what would be the natural material essence in the entity in question in the case where all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the entity in question would be those witnessed should the entity be remaining wholly intact throughout its existence) is no guarantee. More precisely, just like a necessary, sufficient, condition for the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature in a material entity is that the material entity in question remains wholly intact throughout its existence, the fact that a necessary, sufficient, condition for the complete unfolding, concretizing, of the virtual nature in a material entity is that the material entity in question remains wholly intact throughout its existence is itself a substantial natural material property in the entity in question. The compartment of plenitude that is natural plenitude is that compartment of plenitude consisting for a material entity of being (throughout its material existence) in (complete) compliance with its virtual nature, i.e., in (complete) compliance with what its natural material essence would be should all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the material entity in question be those which would be witnessed in the case where the entity would be remaining wholly intact throughout its existence. As for the kind of freedom that is natural freedom, it is the kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of being (throughout its material existence) in (complete) compliance, not with its virtual nature, but instead with what its natural material essence would be should the entity’s complete compliance with its virtual nature be prevented (throughout the entity’s existence) by not a single effect with one or more efficient causes.
In other words, it is the kind of freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes (whether those efficient causes are material—or ideational) consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded. Though freedom (generally speaking) consists for an entity at some point of enduring, at least at that point in time, not a single effect with one or more efficient causes, the kind of freedom that is natural freedom cannot be (completely) experienced at some point in time without being experienced at every point in one’s material existence. Not any cracking-effect (with respect to one’s intactness as a material entity) is efficiently caused; but, just like any interference-effect (with respect to one’s direct suprasensible reach of the whole of one’s ideational essence as a conscious material entity) is efficiently caused, any object in one’s willingness (as a volitional entity) is efficiently caused. Just like the component of natural freedom that is material natural freedom is the kind of material freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more material efficient causes consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded, the component of natural freedom that is ideational natural freedom is the kind of ideational freedom consisting for a material entity of enduring, throughout its existence, not a single effect with one or more ideational efficient causes consisting for the entity’s integrity of being eroded. Just like the degree to which that kind of material freedom that is natural material freedom can be reached (at some point) in humans is, at best, approximative, the degree to which that kind of ideational freedom that is natural ideational freedom can be reached (at some points) in humans is null. The fact for one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), at some point, of completely self-determining (in its exercising) is tantamount to the fact for one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), at some point, of enduring—and only enduring—one or more random (rather than forced) effects with one or more efficient causes (in its exercising); but the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, in (complete) compliance with one’s material essence is neither tantamount to the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, in (complete) compliance with one’s virtual nature nor tantamount to the fact of finding oneself (as a volitional material entity), at some point, endowed (and in complete compliance) with some material essence prohibiting (at every point) the slightest degree of self-determination in one’s willingness. Those three components of freedom in the human that are volitional-effective material freedom, natural material freedom, and starlit freedom respectively deal with one’s willingness (as a volitional entity), one’s intactness (as a material entity), and the direct suprasensible knowledge of the whole of one’s ideational essence (as a conscious volitional material entity). Obeying to one’s ideational essence’s will—and obeying to the latter completely rather than partly—are completly unavoidable in any human being throughout his material existence. Precisely, starlit freedom does not consist of obeying—whether partly or completely—to the will of one’s ideational essence; but instead consists of reaching in a direct suprasensible mode (the whole of) one’s ideational essence (taken in isolation) and, accordingly, what the will of one’s ideational essence is about. At every point, just like no human being can avoid obeying (and obeying completely) to his ideational essence’s will, no human being can avoid reaching directly what his ideational essence’s will is about to a degree that is, at best, approximative. Just like the degree to which those kinds of freedom that are material volitional freedom, natural material freedom, and starlit freedom can be reached in humans at some point is, at best, approximative, the degree to which ideational volitional freedom can be reached at some point in humans is null. In his investigating freedom in the human, Spinoza (to put his thought in my language completely) not only misunderstood natural plenitude (i.e., compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with one’s virtual nature, i.e., compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with what one’s nature would be should one remain wholly intact throughout one’s material existence) to equate natural freedom. He also misunderstood natural freedom (which should be understood as compliance throughout one’s material existence as a material entity with what one’s nature would be should one’s integrity, throughout one’s existence, not be prey to a single cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes) to lie in the fact of finding oneself (throughout one’s material existence) in compliance with one’s nature (without him even clearly distinguishing one’s nature from one’s essence); and, accordingly, the degree to which one experiments natural freedom to lie in the degree to which one finds oneself (throughout one’s material existence as a material entity) in compliance with one’s nature. What’s more, Spinoza, indeed denying the existence (at any point) of any other (partly enjoyed) kind of freedom in the human than natural freedom (which he even misunderstood), misunderstood (the partial enjoyment throughout one’s material existence of) natural freedom in the human to be never coexistent (in one’s material existence) in the human with the slightest degree (at some point) of self-determination (with regard to matter) in one’s willingness, i.e., the slightest presence (at some point) in one’s willingness of a random rather than forced efficiently-caused object (with all or part of its efficient causes lying in matter). A human being, throughout his material existence, cannot but find himself in complete compliance with his nature; but both the fact for a human being of not finding himself in full compliance with his virtual nature (i.e., in full compliance—throughout his material existence—with what his nature would be should all the intrinsically necessary constitutive properties of the weak kind in the human in question be those which would be witnessed in the scenario with the human in question remaining wholly intact throughout his material existence) and the fact for a human being of not finding himself in full compliance—throughout his material existence—with what his nature would be should his integrity endure throughout his material existence not a single cracking-effect with one or more efficient causes are completely unavoidable in any human being. Precisely, Spinoza as much missed the distinction between nature and virtual nature—and the coexistence (throughout one’s material existence) in the human of (some partial enjoyment of) the natural kind of freedom with (an extent-varying enjoyment of) suspensible-kind self-determination in one’s willingness with regard to matter—as he failed to correctly identify the essence’s different kinds and components, thus missing the ideational kind of essence (in turn for his belief in what he called the “objective essence”) and the impossibility of identifying the “conatus” to some kind or component of the essence. As for Crowley, indeed believing (wrongly) the accomplishing of one’s destiny (as a human individual) to be completely dependent on the knowing (and espousing) of one’s destiny, he misunderstood starlit freedom (which should be understood as the direct suprasensible knowledge of one’s ideational essence—and therefore of one’s destiny here below—as a conscious volitional material entity without the slightest interference, whether ideational or material) to lie in (complete) compliance (throughout one’s material existence) of one’s will as a human with what one’s will (throughout one’s material existence) would be should one be completely knowing (and espousing) one’s destiny here below. Just like no human being can ever find himself in complete compliance with his virtual nature at some point of his material existence, no human being can ever find himself in infringement (whether completely or partly) with his ideational essence at some point of his material existence.
That second part was initially published in The Postil Magazine’s September 2022 issue.
Science and scientism, metaphysics and ontology, and psychology and economics
Just like exploit is an act that is jointly characterized with exceptional creativeness (in the exploit’s author), as well as with the exploit’s author’s material subsistence’s being exceptionally endangered and with the exploit’s author’s (successfully) reaching some goal that is exceptionally hard to reach, three modalities of exploit are the following ones: namely that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of war, that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of entrepreneurship, and that genre of exploit that is effectuated in the field of helping the unfortunates and sharing their suffering. Those three genres of exploit are respectively military exploit, entrepreneurial exploit, and sainthood; and the respective authors of those three genres of exploit are the war hero, the business hero, and the saint. Besides military and entrepreneurial exploits, and sainthood, still another genre of exploit is cognitive exploit, a modality of which is artistic exploit; but all genres of exploit are characterized with the involvement of intellective virility on the part of the exploit’s author (i.e., on the hero’s part). Intellective virility, which is distinct (rather than indistinct) from the IQ, consists of the following set of intellective characteristics: an independent, critical intellect; creativeness; finesse at the level of principles; finesse at the level of ideas; and perseverance and perfectibility. Any concept is an idea, but not any idea is a concept; “idea” or “notion” can be used indiscriminately to refer to idea, just like “intellect” and “mind” can be used indiscriminately to refer to mind. Before returning a few sections later to the saint and the war hero, I intend to focus on the (sole) case of the business hero, and to proceed with some considerations in the field of economics (including the epistemology of economics) as part of my basing my approach to the business hero.
An object of knowledge and the fact of approaching knowledge of some object of knowledge are respectively are respectively an object of which one endeavors to gain knowledge—and the fact of gaining some knowledge (of some object of knowledge) that is imperfect (rather than perfect), and which is, at best, approximate. A field of knowledge and a method of knowledge are respectively a field that covers the endeavors to gain knowledge of some object of knowledge—and a method that is employed for the purpose of gaining or approaching knowledge of some object of knowledge. Epistemology is that field of knowledge whose object is the proper method (or methods) of knowledge with respect to some object of knowledge. The empirical senses and the supra-empirical sense are respectively those senses that allow for the experience of one or more material entities—and that sense that allows for the experience of one or more ideational entities. Empirical and supra-empirical experiences are respectively the experience of one or more material entities through one or more empirical senses—and the experience of one or more ideational entities through the supra-empirical sense. Corroboration and confirmation respectively consist for some claim of being supported in a way that doesn’t prove the claim in question to be true; and of being supported in a way that proves the claim in question to be true. Just like empirical corroboration consists for some claim of being empirically supported in a way that doesn’t confirm the claim in question (i.e., of being supported through some empirical experience that doesn’t confirm the claim in question), conjecture consists of some claim that is guessed from reality (whether material), but which cannot be confirmed through empirical experience nor through supra-empirical experience. Just like empirical confirmation consists for some claim of being empirically supported in a way that confirms the claim in question (i.e., of being supported through some empirical experience that confirms the claim in question), empirical refutation confirms for some claim of being empirically refuted (i.e., of being refuted through some empirical experience). Just like verification consists of determining through some empirical or supra-empirical experience whether the experience in question confirms some claim, a numerical claim consists of a claim that involves one or more measured quantities. A prediction is a claim that expresses the future occurrence of one or more entities, and/or of one or more properties in some present entity (or entities). A conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level is a conjecture that does one or more predictions (whether numerical), and which would be empirically refuted should one or more of its predictions be empirically refuted. Science is a method of approaching knowledge that consists of elaborating some conjecture that is corroborated (rather than confirmed) through the empirical corroboration of one or more numerical, empirically verifiable predictions expressed in the conjecture in question, and which would be empirically refuted should the contrary of one or more of those predictions be empirically confirmed.
Two mistakes in Karl Popper respectively lie in his approach to method as the criterion of distinction between metaphysics and science—and in his approach to science as a method of approaching knowledge that relies on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level. On the one hand, what distinguishes science from metaphysics is not some difference in what would be their respective methods; it is instead the fact that science and metaphysics are respectively a method of knowledge (rather than a field of knowledge), and a field of knowledge (rather than a method of knowledge). On the other hand, science is more than a method of knowledge based on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable through empirically falsifiable prediction: it is, more precisely, a method of knowledge that consists of approaching knowledge through elaborating some predictive conjecture whose prediction (or predictions) are numerical, not just empirically corroborated, and which would be empirically refuted should the contrary of its prediction (or of one of more of its predictions) be empirically confirmed. A claim that falls within that field of knowledge that is metaphysics can fall within that method of knowledge that is science just like it can fall within some method of knowledge that is other than science. Metaphysics is that field of knowledge whose object lies in that level of reality that stands beyond the material level. Metaphysics and ontology, instead of being indistinct from each other, are two distinct fields of knowledge that intersect. Ontology consists of studying the Being (i.e., that which, without existing itself, makes there is existence in the entities), and its articulation with the entities. Among the components of ontology, one has as its object the Idea of the Chi, which stands as the transition between the ideational Being and the Ideas; another one has as its object some material entity considered from the angle of those of its properties that do not singularize the entity in question at that level of reality at which the entity in question is situated. In other words, that other component of ontology is a field of knowledge whose object lies in those properties that, in some entity at some level of reality, are common to all entities situated at the level in question, and which form the ontological structure of that level of reality. Just like the Chi stands as the transition between the material Being and material existence, those properties in some entity (that do not singularize the concerned entity at its level of reality) stand as the transition between the Chi and the other properties present in the concerned entity.
A claim that is objectively certain and a claim that is subjectively certain are respectively a claim that one is forced to recognize to be true when addressing it without the interference of any feeling or bias; and a claim that one believes to be true, but which may be not objectively certain. A law of logic and a valid law of logic are respectively a law one finds oneself following in the way one is elaborating some line of reasoning; and a law of logic that one cannot abstain from following in some line of reasoning without rendering that line of reasoning nonsensical. Just like one must be aware not to confuse science and scientism, one must be aware not to believe to be objectively certain those claims that are conjectural. Science is a method of approaching knowledge that relies on that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the level of numerical prediction; but scientism (which can be referred to as “positivism” as well), for its part, is an epistemological, ontological claim that (strictly) holds the following positions. Namely that: any entity is subjected to the ontological laws of identity, of non-contradiction, and of the excluded middle; any property is numerical, i.e., is some measurable quantity; any property is, either an intrinsically necessary property, or an extrinsically necessary, intrinsically contingent property; no entity is self-produced; any extrinsically necessary property is identically repeated whenever some circumstances are identically repeated; any entity is material and endowed with some mass and extent, so is any property; science is the only effective way of gaining knowledge, and what science consists of is the experiencing in a numerical, empirical way, then describing in numerical terms, those extrinsically necessary properties that are numerical relationships of causation; the sole other base on which scientific statements, besides relying (inter alia) on empirical experience, are grounded is mathematical statements and, generally speaking, definitions, and definitions (including mathematical statements) are apodictically true by the sole operation of the laws of logic, which are themselves valid independently of reality; science allows for the making of objectively certain claims; science allows for omnipotence with regard to the universe, including the human society, and the latter can be centrally planned; imagination and intellective virility are burdens (rather than assets) for the pursuit of knowledge, just like they’re burdens (rather than assets) for the sound working of society. The harm that scientism did to that field of knowledge that covers human behavior includes, for instance, the restricting (human) intelligence to (human) IQ, as well as the approach to a cultural pattern as independent of human behavior and completely, strictly dependent of another cultural pattern. Further below, I will address more extensively that harm scientism did to the knowledge of human behavior, and that harm it did generally speaking.
Sociology, economics, praxeology, and, generally speaking, psychology (whether they apply to human behavior rather than to some other-than-human animal behavior) cannot gain any knowledge (other than imperfect and, at best, approximate) of their respective object of knowledge. They can approach knowledge and, accordingly, they can produce claims which, instead of being objectively certain, are conjectural; no psychological claim that would be rendered objectively certain through empirical experience is nonetheless possible. A claim that would be rendered objectively certain through supra-empirical experience is no more possible in psychology than it is possible generally speaking; the same applies to that genre of claim that would be rendered objectively certain through apodicticity. An apodictic statement and an analytic statement are respectively a statement that would be true (or wrong) by its sole terms (and, accordingly, independently of reality); and an apodictic statement that would be true (or wrong) by the sole laws of logic. A synthetic statement is a statement that is true (or wrong) depending on reality (and on reality alone). A statement that is true (or wrong) a priori and a statement that is true (or wrong) a posteriori are respectively a statement whose truth (or falsehood) could be determined independently of any experience (whether empirical); and a statement whose truth (or falsehood) cannot be determined independently of any experience (whether empirical). No statement can be true (or wrong) a priori, no more than any statement can be apodictic. The alleged synonymy between some concept and the sum of those elements that its alleged definition claims to be its object’s constitutive properties cannot be true independently of reality, what applies to the mathematical concepts: accordingly definitions (including mathematical statements) aren’t true (or wrong) a priori. As for the laws of logic, they themselves cannot be valid independently of the ontological structure of that level of reality that is considered. Yet Emmanuel Kant made the claim that any statement is, either analytic, or synthetic, and that some synthetic statements—namely those synthetic statements that are about some line of reasoning that the human mind strictly elaborates from some concepts whose respective object can lie in the human’s spatio-temporal framework taken independently of that empirical experience it is assigned to—are nonetheless true (or wrong) a priori. In the Kantian approach to apodicticity, any apodictic statement is analytic, and, while a (true) definition falls within (and is the only genre of statement to fall within) that modality of a statement true a priori that is analytic, and a mathematical statement is no definition, a (true) mathematical statement falls within that modality of a statement true a priori that is synthetic. What’s more, in the Kantian approach to apodicticity, the mathematical statements—and some part of those statements which he says fall within metaphysics—are the expression of lines of reasoning that are strictly elaborated from concepts whose object can lie in the human mind’s spatio-temporal framework (taken independently of that empirical experience to which the framework in question is assigned). Whether a line of reasoning can, indeed, be strictly effectuated from concepts whose object can lie in the spatio-temporal framework (taken independently of empirical experience) is an issue I intend to address a bit later; but, were some statement the expression of such line of reasoning, it wouldn’t render that statement true (or wrong) a priori. Though mathematical statements are definitions, the fact still remains that no definition is analytical.
That field of knowledge that is human economics is a component of that wider field of knowledge that is human psychology, and a component which, besides relying on, inter alia, that component of human psychology that is human praxeology, intersects with those components that are human thymology and human-crowd psychology. An instinct is, in some living entity, a genetic disposition for the occurrence of some intrinsically necessary or extrinsically necessary or extrinsically contingent property. Any instinct in some living entity is part of that living entity’s substantial essence. A law of nature and a pseudo-law of nature are respectively an extrinsically necessary (and intrinsically contingent) property that is a causation relationship, and which involves a substantial disposition for the forced occurrence of that causation relationship whenever some circumstances apply; and an extrinsically contingent property that is a causation relationship, and which involves a substantial disposition for the random occurrence of that causation relationship whenever some circumstances apply. Psychology is that field of knowledge whose object lies in the mind (including the human mind), and, accordingly, the mind-ruled behavior of mind-endowed entities and the way the meeting between the respective mind-ruled behaviors of some mind-endowed entities produces some order or disorder (or mix of order and disorder) at the level of that meeting. In psychology (whatever the considered component), the proper method of knowledge consists of approaching knowledge through that genre of conjecture that is empirically falsifiable at the prediction level. Among the components of human psychology, three are the following ones: human praxeology, human thymology, and human-crowd psychology. Human praxeology is that component of human psychology whose object lies in the structure that, in some human behavior, lies between the pursued end and that (or those) means that are employed for the purpose of that end. The respective instinctual dispositions for the characteristics of such structure (like the fact that an imminent reaching of some pursued goal finds itself—were it only to some extent—preferred over its reaching at some point more distant in the future) are part of the substantial essence. Human thymology and human-crowd psychology, for their part, respectively deal with those pseudo-laws that are characteristic of that human behavior in which suspensible-kind operative effective free will is at work (rather than suspended); and those laws that are characteristic of that human behavior that is crowd behavior, in which suspensible-kind operative effective free will is suspended (rather than at work).
While that genre of conjecture that is relevant in human praxeology is empirically falsifiable at a non-numerical prediction level (and only at such level), that genre of conjecture that is relevant in human thymology and human-crowd psychology is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that, depending on whether the addressed regularity is numerical (rather than non-numerical), is numerical (rather than non-numerical). A thymologic regularity in human behavior is a relationship of causation that is repeatedly, and, either in a trend manner, or without any exception, witnessed between some human behaviors (like the fact that supplying, of some genre of good or service, a quantity with some positive use value will result into a demand of all or part of that quantity at some global selling or leasing price that expresses a trade value which notably takes into account the involved abstract labor), or between some human behavior and some property other than falling within human behavior (like, for instance, the trend that the earlier availability that an increase in roundaboutness requires of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service leads those genres of good or service to be preferred as present rather than as future), but which, instead of being extrinsically necessary, falls within the pseudo-laws of nature. A crowd regularity in human behavior is a relationship of causation that is repeatedly, and without any exception, witnessed in human behavior whenever some humans are forming some crowd, and which, instead of being extrinsically contingent, falls within the laws of nature. Economics is that component of psychology whose object lies in that human behavior that consists of producing or exchanging some genre of entity or performance in some quantity, and in the way the meeting between some behaviors falling within that genre of behavior produces some order or disorder (or mix of order and disorder) at the level of that meeting. That genre of behavior is economic behavior, and the thymologic and crowd regularities in that genre of human behavior that is economic behavior, which is the object of human economics, are part of that object. That genre of conjecture that is relevant in human economics is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that is, either numerical, or non-numerical, and which is numerical especially when it comes to addressing those thymologic or crowd regularities (in economic behavior) that are numerical.
Any human thymologic regularity (whether it concerns economic behavior) is, either universal to all human beings, or unique to one or more genres of society, or unique to one or more genres of group within some society (or societies), or within all societies; but any human-crowd regularity is universal to all human crowds. Except when it comes to the case of a Robinson Crusoe economy, human economics is a component of human sociology, and one that—whenever it deals with that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology—intersects with human strong sociology. Sociology and strong sociology, when applied to human behavior, are respectively that component of psychology whose object lies in that human behavior that is effectuated in the context of some society; and that component of sociology whose object lies in that human behavior that is effectuated in the presence of some environment (in some society) making it impossible or especially hard to resort to one or more means (and/or to one or more of the respective ways of using a number of means) for the purpose of some goal, or in the presence of the respective social pressure that is exerted in support of one or more cultural patterns present in the considered society. That genre of conjecture that is relevant in human sociology is empirically falsifiable at a prediction level that is, either numerical, or non-numerical, and which is numerical especially when it comes to addressing those regularities (whether thymologic or crowd-relative) falling within its object that are numerical; the same applies to human strong sociology. Whenever some genre of human behavior is part of the object of human sociology, but outside of the object of human strong sociology, that genre of human behavior, either finds itself not falling within that genre of human behavior that is the object of human strong sociology, or finds itself happening independently of whether it falls within that genre of human behavior that is the object of strong sociology. Among the proper ways of approaching knowledge of that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology, one is contrafactual. Namely that it consists of endeavoring to approach knowledge of some genre of behavior (falling within that genre of economic behavior that falls within the object of human strong sociology) from how the genre of behavior in question would be if it found itself in the absence of one or more cultural patterns whose social pressure it is actually faced with, and/or in the absence of some social environment it is actually faced with.
Just like, among the modalities of social pressure, one is that genre of social pressure that is coercive, coercion consists of the threat of harming an individual’s physical integrity, or one or more of his possessions, against his consent and in order to get the individual in question to proceed with one or more behaviors or to abstain from proceeding with one or more behaviors. A voluntary behavior is a behavior that, in some volitional entity, proceeds from its willingness (whether self-determined), and which doesn’t comply with any coercion. The theory of trade value is the theory of the way the trade value common to those respective quantities of some genres of good and services that are voluntarily and indirectly, via the money medium, traded for each other is determined and finds a money expression. The theory of trade value, while falling within that component of human sociology that is human economics, is almost completely outside the scope of strong sociology. Besides those thymologic regularities that are characteristic of the trade value’s determination and expression being non-numerical, those genres of human behavior—labor, saving, entrepreneurship, compensation, and the use of money—that are involved with the determination of trade value, and with its expression in money terms, are involved with those determination and expression in a way that, except when it comes to the law, is completely independent of culture and social environment. The way the trade value in some indirect trade that is effectuated via the money medium is determined and expressed is completely dependent on whether the law in some society finds itself coercing the trade value—for instance, through value-added tax—of those quantities which, in the considered society, are voluntarily and indirectly (and via the money medium) traded for each other. Capitalism is that genre of economy that would be characterized with entrepreneurship, saving, money, trade value, and the division of labor; as well as with the complete private ownership both of the consumption factors and of the production and paraproduction factors, what excludes any interference of the law with the trade value’s determination and expression. Though a completely capitalist economy can hardly be, endeavoring to approach knowledge of the trade value’s determination and expression from endeavoring to approach knowledge of how the trade value would be determined and expressed in a completely capitalist economy is a proper application of the contrafactual method in human strong sociology. Thus the insights I’m about to present about the determination, and expression, of trade value, before addressing the case of trade value in an economy that is, either capitalist to some extent, or not capitalist at all, will first restrict themselves to the case of trade value in the framework of a completely capitalist economy.
Understanding trade value, profit, and diamond-and-water: the flaws of the abstract-labor and particular-utility approaches
A commodity is an entity or performance that is distinct from money, and which is, if not endowed with some positive trade value and use value, at least put on the market and intended to be endowed with some positive trade value and use value. Trade value and use value are concepts I intend to define a few lines below. A supplier and a demander are respectively an individual who is handling some supply process—and an individual who is demanding some quantity of some genre of good or service. A good and a service are respectively an entity that is a commodity—and a performance that is a commodity. A supply process is the process through which some genre of good or service is produced or extracted in some quantity and then brought to the market in the quantity in question in order for that quantity to get offered at some point, and at some place. “Supplied” and “offered” can be used indiscriminately when it comes to designating the supplied character of some supplied quantity. The reproduction of some genre of good or service in some quantity, and the modification of some genre of good or service in some quantity, are both among those modalities of the production of some genre of good or service in some quantity. A consumption good or service is a good or service that is, if not intended (by its supplier) to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of that genre of commodity that is the labor-power commodity, at least intended to meet some genre of emotional need; and which is, if not able to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of the labor-power commodity, at least unable to get—and intended to not get—involved with the supply process of any supply good or service other than (that genre of supply service that is) the labor-power commodity. As for a supply good or service, it is a good or service that is, if not able to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some genre of good or service other than that genre of commodity that is the (generic) labor-power commodity, at least unable to get involved with the supply process of any quantity of the labor-power commodity; and which is intended (by its supplier) to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some good or service other than the labor-power commodity. A direct supply good or service and an indirect supply good or service are respectively a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some consumption good or service—and a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with the supply process of some quantity of some supply good or service. Likewise a production good or service and a paraproduction good or service are respectively a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with some supply process through contributing to the production of that genre of good or service that is offered in some quantity at the end of the supply process—and a supply good or service that is, if not able, at least intended, to get involved with some supply process through contributing to the extraction, transportation, reparation, or advertising of that genre of good or service that is offered in some quantity at the end of the supply process.
Demand at some unitary price and the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at some unitary price are respectively the sum of the respective quantities that, of some quantity offered of some genre of good or service at some point and place, are bought or rented at some unitary price by a number of demanders—and the sum of the respective quantities that all those standing ready (and able) to demand some quantity (of some genre of good or service) at some unitary price, and at some point and place, stand ready (and able) to buy or rent, at the price in question, of some quantity offered (of the concerned genre of good or service) at the concerned point and place. A proposed unitary price (i.e., a unitary price at which the supplier of some offered quantity proposes to sell or lease the quantity in question) must be distinguished from a unitary price that is indeed practiced, and at which all or part of some offered quantity is indeed sold or leased. A practiced unitary price equalizing supply and demand is a practiced unitary price at which the quantity supplied at that price is equal to the quantity that is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at that price. A practiced equilibrium unitary price is more than a practiced unitary price equalizing supply and demand: it is a practiced unitary price that, besides equalizing supply and demand, equalizes the quantity supplied at that price, the quantity demanded at that price, and the quantity that one stands both ready and able to demand at that price. Any proposed unitary price at which supply is standing above demand is a unitary price that, besides having the quantity supplied at that price outweigh the quantity demanded at that price, is a unitary price at which the supplied quantity is standing above that quantity one stands both ready and able to demand at that price; but not any proposed price equalizing supply and demand is a price that, besides equalizing supply and demand, is equalizing the quantity demanded at that price and that quantity one stands both able and ready to demand at that price. The global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased is the unitary price (at which that quantity that is sold or leased is demanded) times the demanded quantity. A supply field is that field that covers the various supply processes of a same genre of good or service that is offered in some respective quantities offered at some respective points, and at some respective places. An entrepreneurial field is that field that covers the various supply processes which, of a same genre of good or service that is offered in some respective quantities offered at some respective points, and at some respective places, are handled by entrepreneurs. An entrepreneurial field is, either some supply field in which all suppliers are entrepreneurs, or that component that, within some supply field (in which not all suppliers are entrepreneurs), only includes those suppliers who (within the concerned supply field) are entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur is a supplier who acquires, hypothetically through demanding (i.e., buying or renting), a number of supply goods, and then allocates them to that supply process he is handling.
A (particular) utility of some (particular) good or service is its utility to satisfy some (particular) goal if the latter happens to be pursued. A generic good and a generic service are respectively a genre of good common to a number of particular goods and a genre of service common to a number of particular services. A generic utility of a generic good or service is a genre of utility common to those units which fall within the genre of good or service in question. Just like a generic good or service may have several generic utilities, a particular good or service may have several particular utilities. A particular utility of a generic good or service is the very same thing as a particular utility of some particular good or service that is a unit of the genre in question. In some economy that is, either completely, or to some extent, capitalist, the degree of importance attributed to some generic utility and the degree of importance attributed to some particular utility are respectively the degree of importance someone attributes to the utility of some generic or particular commodity to reach some genre of goal (whether he is demanding the generic or particular commodity in question, and whether he is enjoying the generic or particular commodity in question), and the degree of importance someone attributes to the utility of some generic or particular commodity to reach some particular goal (whether he is demanding the generic or particular commodity in question, and whether he is enjoying the generic or particular commodity in question). Just like giving more importance to the generic utilities of some generic good or service than to the generic utilities of some other generic good or service supposes those genres of goal the former generic good or service allows to reach are given more importance than those genres of goal the latter generic good or service allows to reach, giving more importance to some generic utilities of some generic good or service than to some other generic utilities of that same generic good or service supposes that the former generic utilities are given more importance than the latter generic utilities. A marginal particular utility of a generic good or service is that (particular) utility some demander or enjoyer of some generic good or service in some quantity expects from that unit he intends to consume or invest lastly. The marginal particular utility of some quantity (of some generic good or service) one is demanding or enjoying is, accordingly, that least prioritized particular utility among the particular utilities common to each of the demanded or enjoyed units of the generic good or service in question.
Any generic commodity has a number of particular use values and a number of particular trade values; but no generic commodity has any generic use value, no more than a generic commodity has any generic trade value. A particular use value of some generic commodity in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist lies in the sum of the respective degrees of importance the demanders of all or part of some quantity offered (at some place, and at some point) of the generic commodity in question (in the economy in question) are giving to the sum of those particular utilities they plan to have their respective demanded quantities of that offered quantity accomplish. Likewise a particular trade value of some generic commodity lies in the degree to which some quantity offered at some place, and at some point, of that generic commodity in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist is able to get traded for the sum of some respective quantities of those generic commodities that, at some respective places in the considered economy, are offered at the considered point in some quantities or will be offered at some ulterior point in some quantities. The particular use values of some generic commodity are too varying from some quantity offered in some place (and at some point) to an equivalent quantity offered in some other place (but at the same point), and too varying over time (as concerns some quantity repeatedly offered in the same place), in order for the generic commodity in question to have some generic use value; just like the particular trade values of some generic commodity are too varying from some quantity offered in some place (and at some point) to an equivalent quantity offered in some other place (but at the same point), and too varying over time (as concerns some quantity repeatedly offered in the same place), in order for the generic commodity in question to have some generic trade value. Whenever a number of entrepreneurs are competing in some entrepreneurial field, they’re offering at some respective points, and at some respective places, some respective quantities of a same generic good or service.
The global price at which all or part of some quantity offered of some generic commodity at some point (and in some place) is demanded, i.e, the unitary price at which all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is sold or leased at some point (and in some place) times the demanded quantity, is the money expression of the particular trade value of the offered quantity. Saying that the particular trade value of some generic commodity is, in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist, greater than the particular trade value of some other generic commodity is a convenient way of saying that the particular trade value of any offered quantity of the former generic good (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered) is, in the considered economy, greater than the particular trade value of any equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered). Likewise, saying that the particular use value of some generic commodity is, in some economy that is, either completely, or partly, capitalist, greater than the particular use value of some other generic commodity is a convenient way of saying that the particular use value of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered) is, in the considered economy, greater than the particular use value of any equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity in question is offered). A necessary, sufficient condition in order for everyone in some economy to give more importance to any of the generic utilities of some generic commodity than to any of those of some other generic commodity is that everyone in the considered economy also gives more importance to any of the particular utilities of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) than to any of those of an equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered). Likewise a necessary, sufficient condition in order for the particular use value of any offered quantity of some generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) to outweigh that of an equivalent offered quantity of some other generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) is that everyone in the considered economy also gives more importance to any of the particular utilities of any offered quantity of the former generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered) than to any of those of an equivalent offered quantity of the latter generic commodity (whenever, and wherever, the quantity is offered).
Abstract labor means some duration of labor that is involved with the supply process of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity, and which is considered from the angle of those of its properties that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity is taking into account (rather than from the angle of all its properties). The use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, of which the diamond-and-water conundrum we will address a few lines later is a particular case, can be put as follows: does the particular use value of some offered quantity (at some place, and at some point) of some generic commodity in some (completely) capitalist economy have any involvement with the determination of that quantity’s particular trade value? And if it does have some involvement, what does the involvement in question consist of? The respective answer given to those two conundrums—the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, and the diamond-and-water conundrum—will vary depending on which approach to the particular trade value it relies on. The abstract-labor approach to the particular trade value understands the particular trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity at some point, and at some place) in some capitalist economy as equal, or close, to the amount of that abstract labor that was involved with the supply process of that quantity of the concerned generic commodity. Whenever some offered quantity is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at a unitary price equalizing the quantity in question and that quantity that one plans (and is able) to buy (or rent) at the price in question, the abstract-labor approach says, the unitary price times the demanded (i.e., bought or rented) quantity is the money expression of the involved abstract labor. Whenever that equality doesn’t occur, the abstract-labor approach adds, the practiced unitary price times the demanded quantity is nonetheless close to the money expression of the involved abstract labor and stands either above the money expression of the involved abstract labor (in the case of an offered quantity standing above the quantity one plans, and is able, to demand at the practiced unitary price), or below that money expression (in the case of an offered quantity standing below the quantity one plans, and is able, to demand at the practiced unitary price). As for the particular-utility approach to the particular trade value, it understands the particular trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity at some point, and at some place) in some capitalist economy as fixed at some level that is both lower than the offered quantity’s use value in the demanders, and greater than the degree of importance the offered quantity’s supplier attributes to (the sum of) those particular utilities of the offered quantity that matter to him, and which is such that its money expression is the multiplication of an equilibrium unitary price by the demanded quantity. Whenever some offered quantity is offered, the particular-utility approach says, it is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) at a unitary price that, besides the fact that the multiplication of that price by the demanded quantity produces an amount that is both lower than the use value (in the demanders) and greater than the importance the supplier attributes to (the sum of those particular utilities that matter to him in) the offered quantity, finds itself equalizing the quantity in question and that quantity one plans (and is able) to buy (or rent) at the unitary price in question. While the abstract-labor approach to the particular trade value denies any involvement of the particular use value with respect to the particular trade value’s determination, which it conceives of as completely, strictly determined from the conjunction between abstract labor and the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand, the particular-utility approach to the particular trade value denies any involvement of abstract labor with respect to the particular trade value’s determination, which it conceives of as completely, strictly determined from the conjunction between the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the supplier and of the demanders) and the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand.
The abundance of some generic commodity on the market means the commodity in question is offered in quantities that are big and plentiful, and which are offered at cheap unitary prices. The diamond-and-water conundrum can be put as follows: if one supposes any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond to be given less importance (by everyone in some capitalist economy) than is any of the generic utilities of the generic water, may the particular trade value of the generic water be still lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond? The abstract-labor answer given to the diamond-and-water conundrum is that, if everyone in some capitalist economy finds himself giving more importance to any of the generic utilities of the generic water than to any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond, and the abstract labor that is involved with any of the offered quantities of the generic water is nonetheless lower than the abstract labor that is involved with any equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond, then the particular trade value of the generic water will be lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond. The particular-utility answer given to the diamond-and-water conundrum is that, if everyone in some capitalist economy finds himself giving more importance to any of the generic utilities of the generic water than to any of the generic utilities of the generic diamond, and the generic water is nonetheless more abundant on the market than is the generic diamond, then everyone in the considered economy will give more importance to any of the particular utilities of the generic diamond than to any of the particular utilities of the generic water, then the particular trade value of the generic water will be lower than the particular trade value of the generic diamond, and the fact the particular trade value of the generic diamond is greater than that of the generic water will allow, precisely, the generic diamond to be less abundant than the generic water on the market.
The abstract-labor answer to the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum is flawed at several levels, one of which is that its identifying to the involved abstract labor the particular trade value of some offered quantity that is sold at an equilibrium unitary price (i.e., a unitary price at which the quantity one stands able, and willing, to demand is both equal to the demanded quantity and equal to the offered quantity) brings about the implication that some demanded quantity (of some generic commodity), which is demanded at a unitary price equalizing the offered quantity and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at that price, and which is nonetheless endowed with a use value lower than the involved abstract labor, will be demanded at a unitary price that is still high enough in order for that price times the demanded quantity to equal the money expression of the involved abstract labor. The alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some non-trending thymologic regularity universal to human behavior: actually, whenever some demanded quantity of some generic commodity finds itself demanded at an equilibrium price, but associated with an abstract labor greater than that quantity’s use value, the demanders will only consent to a unitary price that is such that the quantity’s trade value is lower than that abstract labor that is involved with the supply process of that quantity. Similarly one level at which the abstract-labor answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum is flawed is that its premise that the trade value is equal to—or, failing that, situated around—the involved abstract labor brings about the following implication: any generic commodity whose particular use value is lower than the particular use value of some other generic commodity, but whose offered quantities (at some respective places, and some respective points) are associated with a respective abstract labor that is greater than the abstract labor respectively associated with those equivalent quantities that (at some respective places, and some respective points) are offered of the other generic commodity, will have each of the demanded amounts of its offered quantities demanded at a unitary price that is high enough in order for the concerned global selling or leasing price to surpass the global selling or leasing price of an equivalent demanded amount of some offered quantity of the other generic commodity, no matter whether the use value of that quantity that, of the former generic commodity, is (whether completely or partly) demanded is lower than the abstract labor involved with the supply process of that quantity. The alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some thymologic trend universal to human behavior: actually, were the generic diamond endowed with a particular use value lower than that of the generic water, and that abstract labor that is respectively involved with any of the offered quantities of the generic diamond greater than that abstract labor that is respectively involved with any equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond, but the particular use value of some of the offered quantities of the generic diamond lower than that abstract labor involved with the concerned quantities, those offered quantities of the generic diamond may be (just like they may be not) endowed with a respective particular trade value lower than that of those equivalent quantities that are offered of the generic water.
As for the particular-utility answer to the use-value-and-trade-value conundrum, it is also flawed at several levels, one of which is that its identifying the trade value of some offered quantity to that level that both satisfies the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the demanders and of the supplier) and ensures the equality between supply and that quality one stands ready (and able) to demand, brings about the implication that some offered quantity (of some generic commodity), whenever it is endowed with a (particular) use value lower than the (particular) use value of some offered quantity of some other generic commodity, will be endowed with a (particular) trade value that is also lower than the (particular) trade value of that quantity that is offered of the other generic commodity. Here again the alleged fact such implication contains is inconsistent with some thymologic trend universal to human behavior: actually, when some offered quantity of some generic commodity finds itself endowed with a use value lower than that of some quantity offered of some other generic commodity, but also finds itself costlier in terms of abstract labor than does the latter quantity, the demanders of the former quantity may be (just like they may be not) willing to pay a unitary price that covers the involved abstract labor and which, accordingly, renders the trade value of the former quantity greater than that of the latter quantity. The particular-utility answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum is also flawed at several levels, including the two following ones: on the one hand, the particular-utility answer is circular in its addressing the effect of the difference between the respective degrees of abundance of the generic diamond and water on the market with respect to the difference between the respective particular use values of the generic diamond and water. If diamond is less abundant than water on the market (whether the generic utility of the generic diamond is lower than that of the generic water), the particular-utility answer says, that lower abundance will make the particular use value of (any quantity offered of) the generic diamond greater than that of (any equivalent quantity offered of) the generic water, and the fact the diamond’s particular use value is greater than that of water will allow, in turn, the diamond to be less abundant on the market than water. On the other hand, the particular-utility answer to the diamond-and-water conundrum supposes that some asymmetry can be found between the difference in the importance given to any of the generic utilities of some generic commodity and that given to any of those of some other generic commodity, and the difference in the importance given to any of the particular utilities of the former generic commodity and that given to any of the particular utilities of the latter generic commodity. Yet no generic commodity (including water) can see the importance that is given to any of its generic utilities outweigh the importance that is given to any of the generic utilities of some other generic commodity (like diamond) without (and without that difference of importance being due to) the same difference’s finding itself between the importance that is given to any of the former generic commodity’s particular utilities and that which is given to any of the latter generic commodity’s particular utilities.
Besides the trade-value-and-use-value and diamond-and-water conundrums, another conundrum that relates to the trade value is the profit conundrum, which can be put as follows: in a capitalist economy, how can all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity (whether the supplier is an entrepreneur) be sold or leased at a global price outweighing the global cost of supply? To put it differently: upstream of money expression, how can the trade value of some offered quantity, in a capitalist economy, be greater than the sum of the respective trade values of those respective quantities which, of some supply goods or services, were demanded in the framework of the supply process (whether the latter is entrepreneurial)? Two answers—respectively by Karl Marx and Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk—were proposed to the profit conundrum on the respective basis of those two approaches to the trade value that are the abstract-labor and particular-utility approaches. The global cost of supply of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is the sum of those global prices which the supplier of the offered quantity had to pay in order for the supply process to get carried out. Just like the global cost of supply of some offered quantity whose supplier is no entrepreneur is the sum of those global prices which the supplier had to pay in order to get that quantity he is offering, the global cost of supply of some offered quantity whose supplier is an entrepreneur is the sum of those respective global prices at which the entrepreneurial supplier bought or rented (in those quantities that were involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity) the generic production or paraproduction goods or services that were involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity. Profit lies in the margin between the global cost of some offered quantity’s supply and the global price at which all or part of that quantity is sold or leased. That margin is either positive (with the global selling or leasing price then exceeding the global cost of supply), or negative (with the global cost of supply then exceeding the global selling or leasing price), or neutral (with the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply being then equal to each other). The Marxian and Böhm-Bawerkian answers to the profit conundrum, to the best of my knowledge, restrict profit to the case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some offered quantity whose supplier is entrepreneurial, thus leaving aside the case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some offered quantity whose supplier is non-entrepreneurial. Accordingly I’ll focus on the (sole) case of that profit witnessed in the global selling or leasing price of (all or part of) some entrepreneurially offered quantity when discussing their respective answers to the profit conundrum.
Direct and indirect abstract labors are respectively that part of abstract labor that is present within some supply process without being inherited; and that part of abstract labor that is present within some supply process while being inherited from some other, anterior supply processes that are integrated within it. The Marxian answer to the profit conundrum is that profit in the global selling or leasing price at which all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is sold or leased is equal to, or situated around, the money expression of some portion of that direct abstract labor that was involved with the supply of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity. The portion in question is the margin between the delivered direct abstract labor and the abstract labor required in order for that former abstract labor to get repeated, i.e., in order for the involved quantity of generic labor-power that proceeded with that former abstract labor to get reproduced and brought to the market. Profit, the Marxian answer adds, is equal to the money expression of the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor when (and only when) the supplied quantity is equal to the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the practiced unitary price. It is positive whenever equal or superior to the money expression of that surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor, but is negative whenever inferior to the money expression of that portion. Granted the involved quantity of generic labor-power is paid a global selling or leasing price equal to (rather than situated around) the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market: whenever the supplied quantity is equal to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the practiced unitary price, profit in the global selling or leasing price is both positive and equal to the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor. Under the same assumption: whenever the supplied quantity is equal to that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, but inferior to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question, profit is positive while outweighing the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor. Under the same assumption: whenever the supplied quantity is superior to that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, profit in the global selling or leasing price is both negative and inferior to the money expression of the surplus portion of the involved direct abstract labor.
To the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, profit (strictly) has two components: namely entrepreneurial profit and the interest on that capital (whether borrowed) that the supplier handling some supply process involves with the process in question, which Böhm-Bawerk claims to be the originary genre of interest, that which allows for the other genres of interest (including that interest that is paid to some money or capital lender). Interest and entrepreneurial profit are respectively the remuneration of saving (which I will define a few lines below)—and that part of profit (in the case of an entrepreneurial supply process) that is the remuneration of the handling some entrepreneur does of some supply process whose handler he is. Though Böhm-Bawerk, who prefers that qualifier that is “originary interest,” doesn’t use the following term, a proper way of calling that modality of interest that is indeed originary, which is related to capital (setting aside the case of those supply processes that are non-entrepreneurial and, accordingly, uninvolving any capital), is also “supply interest.” The Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum has supply interest and entrepreneurial profit be respectively proportionate, positively, to the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders); and proportionate, positively, to the degree to which the entrepreneur has been successful both at the level of entrepreneurial comparative fastness and at the level of price anticipation. Temporal preference in some demander and comparative fastness in some entrepreneur are respectively the degree to which some demander of all or part of some offered quantity has been preferring the imminent purchase or rental of that presently demanded quantity over its purchase or rental at some tardier point—and the degree to which some entrepreneur has been faster in ensuring the existence (in some quantity, and at some place) of some generic commodity on the market (and at the moment of its being demanded in some quantity) than have been the other suppliers operating in the same supply field. As for entrepreneurial price anticipation, it is the degree to which some entrepreneur has properly anticipated the unitary price that is indeed practiced now that the quantity he intended to offer of some generic commodity has been put on the market.
In the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to temporal preference, which his answer to the profit conundrum relies on, three thymologic trends universal to human behavior are respectively the following ones: the fact that the presently enjoyed quantities are usually (rather than universally) too scarce with regard to the present wishes leads to the trend that, granted the quality remains equal, enjoying some present quantity of some generic good or service is—whether completely or to some extent—preferred over enjoying that quantity at some future point; so does the fact that present wishes as concerns demanding are usually over-estimated with respect to future wishes as concerns demanding; so does the fact that, in order for roundaboutness to be increased (what, in turns, leads to productivity gain), some respective quantities of some generic supply goods or services must have earlier availability. That resulting trend that anyone, were it only to some extent, prefers his enjoying some quantity of some generic good or supply to be present rather than future (granted the quality remains the same) results, in turn, into the fact that those quantities that are presently demanded (of some respective generic supply goods or supply) as means for the purpose of some future quantity (of some generic good or supply) are like-future quantities, i.e., are quantities with an attributed importance that is both equal to that importance that is presently attributed to the future quantity (taken as a future quantity), and inferior to that importance that will be attributed to the future quantity once it has become a present quantity. In the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, the spread between (the sum of) those degrees of importance assigned, in the present, to some present quantity and (the sum of those) degrees of importance assigned, in the past, to those like-future quantities that were involved with the present quantity’s supply process results into supply interest. To put it differently: in the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, that component of profit that is supply interest is determined as positively proportionate to the margin between the (particular) use value of the offered quantity and the sum of the respective (particular) use values of the respective involved quantities of those various generic supply goods or services that were involved with the supply process of the offered quantity. What’s more, in that answer, the fact that any of those involved quantities is a means for the offered quantity’s purpose renders the sum of the respective use values of the involved quantities equal to—and completely, strictly determined from—the sum of those respective degrees of importance the respective demanders of the involved quantities are attributing to those utilities they’re respectively expecting from that (presently) future quantity that is yet to be offered; in turn, the future (rather than present) character of that quantity that is yet to be offered renders the sum of the respective use values of those quantities (of some genres of supply good or service) that are means for the future offered quantity’s purpose lower than (what will be) the use value of the offered quantity. Yet the degree to which the involvement (of the involved quantities) as means for the offered quantity’s purpose renders the offered quantity’s use value greater than the sum of that importance that was attributed to it (as a future quantity) is considered to be equal to—and completely, only determined from—the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the offered quantity’s demanders. Accordingly, the fact for supply interest of being positively proportionate to the margin between the offered quantity’s use value and (the sum of those) degrees of importance that were assigned to those quantities that were means for that quantity’s purpose makes supply interest positively proportionate, as well, to the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the offered quantity’s demanders.
As the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum considers supply interest to be positively proportionate to the sum of the respective degrees to which the demanders (i.e., buyers of renters) of some offered quantity have been preferring the imminent demand of (what they’re respectively demanding of) the offered quantity over that demand at some tardier point, it proposes the following relationship between temporal preference (in the demanders) and the margin between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply: the more the demanders have been preferring some imminent demand over that demand at some point more remote in the future, the higher supply interest is, the more the trade value’s money expression (i.e., the global selling or leasing price) finds itself outweighing the global cost of supply. In the Böhm-Bawerkian answer, the other component of profit (in addition to supply interest) is proportionate to the degree to which some entrepreneur has been both successful in terms of comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of some offered quantity on the market (at the moment of that quantity’s being integrally or partly demanded); and in terms of anticipation of the practiced unitary price. In the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to the (particular) trade value (of some offered quantity of some generic commodity), some offered quantity of some generic commodity is always sold in its integrality, and at a unitary price that equalizes the demanded quantity and the quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question; but the entrepreneur may have failed to properly anticipate the unitary price at which the offered quantity is integrally sold or leased. Whenever the unitary price has been properly anticipated, and the entrepreneur rapider than his rivals in the same entrepreneurial field, the practiced unitary price is at such level that the trade value’s money expression (i.e., the global selling or leasing price) finds itself outweighing the sum of supply interest and of the global cost of supply. The more the practiced unitary price has been properly anticipated, with the entrepreneur being also rapider than his competitors in the same entrepreneurial field, the more the trade value’s money expression finds itself outweighing the sum of supply interest and of the global cost of supply. About the origin of supply interest, Böhm-Bawerk nonetheless treats his claim that such origin lies in (the sum of the respective degrees of) temporal preference in the demanders as compatible with—and just as true as—some other claim he also makes. Namely: any supply process that finds itself resorting to more indirect, roundabout methods of production (than does some other supply process involving the same labor duration) is thus rendered more productive (than is the other supply process), what results, in turn, into its being associated with a greater supply interest (comparatively to that supply interest that is associated with the other supply process).
The Marxian answer to the profit conundrum is flawed at several levels, one of which is that it mistakenly believes the direct abstract labor involved with the supply of some quantity offered (at some place, and at some point) of some generic commodity to be in a position to outweigh the abstract labor required in order for that quantity of generic labor-power (i.e., that quantity of some genre of labor-power) that delivered the direct abstract labor that was involved with the concerned supply process to get reproduced and brought to the market. Just like the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of some offered quantity of some generic commodity restricts the trade value in question to the involved abstract labor (or, failing that, a level situated around the involved abstract labor), the Marxian approach to abstract labor restricts abstract labor to the duration of that labor involved with the supply process of some generic commodity. Accordingly the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of that quantity of generic labor-power that delivered the direct abstract labor that was involved with the supply process of some quantity of some generic commodity restricts the trade value in question to the labor duration that is required in order for that quantity of generic labor-power to get reproduced (or, failing that, a level situated around the labor duration in question). In other words, the Marxian approach to the particular trade value of some quantity of generic labor-power restricts that trade value to the labor duration that is required in order for that direct abstract labor the concerned quantity of generic labor-power delivered in some supply process’s framework to get repeated (or, failing that, a level situated around that required labor duration). Yet no labor duration is in a position to outweigh that labor duration that is required in order for it to get repeated. From that alleged fact that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic labor-power that delivered some direct abstract labor is equal to, or situated around, the labor duration required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market, the Marxian approach to the trade value in question wrongly infers that the trade value in question, instead of being equal to (or situated around) the delivered direct abstract labor, is equal to (or situated around) the labor duration required in order for that direct abstract labor to get repeated. From that (illogically inferred) conclusion, it (logically) infers, in turn, that the sum of the wages paid to some quantity of generic labor-power, instead of being equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that direct abstract labor that was delivered by the concerned quantity of generic labor-power, is actually equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the concerned quantity of generic labor-power to get reproduced and brought to the market. If one follows the premise that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic labor-power that delivered some direct abstract labor within some supply process is equal to, or situated around, the labor duration required in order for the quantity in question to get reproduced and brought to the market, one should instead infer that the particular trade value of that quantity of generic labor-power is equal to (or situated around) the direct abstract labor which that quantity of generic labor-power delivered within the concerned supply process, with that delivered abstract labor being itself equal to the labor duration required in order for that delivered abstract labor to get repeated (and, accordingly, in order for the quantity of generic labor-power to get reproduced and brought to the market). From that (logical) conclusion, it follows, in turn, that the sum of the wages paid to that quantity of generic labor-power that delivered some direct abstract labor within some supply process is equal to, or situated around, the money expression of that direct abstract labor that was delivered by the concerned quantity of generic labor-power, with the money expression of that delivered direct abstract labor being itself equal to the money expression of that abstract labor required in order for the concerned quantity of generic labor-power to get reproduced and brought to the market.
As for the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum, here are two levels at which it is flawed when it comes to supply interest. On the one hand, its joint claim that some component of profit is completely, strictly determined as proportionate, positively, to the degree to which the (sum of the) importance attributed to the sum of those means employed for the offered quantity (when it was yet to be offered) finds itself (in the demanders of those means) lower than the importance attributed (in the demanders of those means) to that offered quantity once rendered present, and that the degree to which the importance attributed to that quantity as a present quantity outweighs that attributed to the sum of the means for the purpose of that quantity as a future quantity is equal to—and completely, only determined from—the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the offered quantity’s demanders, notably relies on the following premise. Namely: the (sum of the respective degrees of) importance attributed to that yet-to-be-fulfilled goal that is some offered quantity is equal to the importance attributed to the sum of those means for the purpose of that future quantity, but is lower than the importance (retrospectively) assigned to that goal once the future offered quantity has been rendered present. Yet that premise is wrong: actually, the importance attributed (in someone) to the means for some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal is equal to the importance attributed (in someone) to that yet-to-be-fulfilled goal; but the importance attributed (in some individual) to some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal and the importance (in the individual in question) retrospectively attributed to that goal once fulfilled are equal to each other, except when the individual in question retrospectively thinks the goal in question should have been given less importance. The sum of those degrees of importance someone respectively attributes to his respective means for some yet-to-be-fulfilled goal is equal to the importance he attributes to that goal whenever he expects that goal to be certainly rather than hypothetically reached; it is also equal to the importance in question whenever he expects that goal to be hypothetically rather than certainly reached. Nonetheless the importance presently (and retrospectively) given to some goal that was reached is equal or inferior to that importance that was given to the goal in question when it was yet to be reached. Accordingly, were profit determined as (positively) proportionate to the degree of spread between the presently offered quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity when it was future (rather than present) and yet to be offered (rather than presently offered), and that degree itself equal to—and completely, only determined from—the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of that quantity, then the trade value’s money expression could be high to the point of equaling the global cost of supply (or low to the point of being inferior to the cost in question), but couldn’t be high to the point of outweighing the cost in question.
No sum of degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of some offered quantity) can be high enough in order for the trade value’s money expression—were profit determined as proportionate to the spread between the supplied quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity (when it was still future rather than presently supplied) and were the sum in question, for its part, equal to (and completely, only determined from) the spread in question—to witness some positive margin between the global cost of supply and the global selling or leasing price. In turn, were some component of profit determined in (positive) proportion to the spread between the supplied quantity’s use value and the sum of the respective use values of those means that were employed for that quantity (when it was still future rather than presently supplied), and that spread, for its part, equal to (and determined from) the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference, such component of profit wouldn’t be in a position to render profit positive: that positivity would require another component, and one that precisely allows for a positive margin. On the other hand, the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum is contradictory about the origin of supply interest, which it locates in temporal preference while claiming the location in question to lie in the productivity of some supply process. The contradiction that is characteristic of such approach to the origin of supply interest results into another contradiction between two respective implications of those two indiscriminately alleged origins: the higher the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part) of some offered quantity, the shorter the required length of the supply process (with respect to the sum of those degrees of temporal preference), but the higher the supply interest; in turn, the greater the roundaboutness of some supply process, the higher the productivity, the higher the supply interest. Were supply interest all the higher as the supply process is more roundabout (and, accordingly, longer), it couldn’t be all the higher as the supply process has to be shorter—and reciprocally. When it comes to entrepreneurial profit, the Böhm-Bawerkian answer to the profit conundrum is notably flawed at the following level: it approaches the effect of entrepreneurial price anticipation with respect to trade value in a circular mode. Whenever there is a practiced unitary price that the entrepreneur—whether he was rapider than his competitors in the concerned entrepreneurial field—properly anticipated, that price, it says, finds itself practiced due to the entrepreneur’s properly anticipating the price in question.
Trade value, entrepreneurial profit, and originary interest: a new approach beyond Karl Marx and Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk
Böhm-Bawerk’s claim that profit in the global price at which some offered quantity (that is entrepreneurially supplied) is demanded (i.e., bought or rented) is subdivided into entrepreneurial profit and supply interest (which he calls “originary interest”) remains true; so does his claim that temporal preference in the demanders intervenes in the determination of the profit witnessed in the money expression of the trade value of some entrepreneurially supplied quantity. Unlike with the way Böhm-Bawerk answers to the issue of knowing whether use value has some involvement with regard to trade value, the trade value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is not determined from the inequality in terms of attributed importance (on the respective side of the supplier and of the demanders), nor is it determined from the equality between supply and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand. In other words, trade value isn’t determined in such a way as to be necessarily linked to an equilibrium unitary price nor is it determined in such a way as to necessarily lie at a level that is both lower than the use value and greater than that importance the offered quantity is attributed in the supplier. The use value (in the demanders) is admittedly involved with the trade value’s determination, but in an indirect (rather than direct) mode. Unlike with the way Marx answers to the issue of knowing whether use value has some effect with regard to trade value, the trade value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is indirectly (rather than not) dependent on its use value. Marx’s claim that abstract labor intervenes in the determination of trade value nonetheless remains true. The use value of some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is consistent with some range of hypothetical global selling or leasing prices that all derive from the use value (without any of them being a money expression of the use value), each of which is lower than the use value. Though the money expression of the trade value is coincident with one (and only one) of those hypothetical prices that derive from the use value, the trade value’s determination is not directly (but instead indirectly) related to the use value. Accordingly, whenever some offered quantity (of some generic commodity) is (whether completely or partly) demanded, that amount that is demanded of the offered quantity is sold or leased at a unitary price whose multiplication by the demanded quantity is the offered quantity’s trade value’s money expression, but the trade value doesn’t have to conform to any of those hypothetical global selling or leasing prices that are consistent with, and derived from, the offered quantity’s use value; it just happens to have some money expression that is coincident with one of those hypothetical prices. Temporal preference is the intermediary through which the use value is involved with the trade value’s determination. The amount of the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part of) some offered quantity is, either equal to the amount of the use value of that quantity, or equal to half of the amount of the use value of that quantity, or situated between the amount of the use value of that quantity and half of that amount. The greater the use value, the greater the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference; but that sum cannot surpass the use value.
The global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased is the money expression of—and, on the same occasion, the money compensation for—the sum of three components that are added to each other within the trade value of the offered quantity, each of which has some inherited part and some non-inherited part. The trade value, in that it compensates for the sum of those three components each of which became involved with the supply process through the supplier’s handling of the supply process, is indeed determined in such a way as to be greater than the importance the offered quantity is attributed in the supplier. Two of those three components of the trade value are respectively the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors—and the sum of the direct and indirect abstract savings. A third and last component is some component that, at the level of its non-inherited part, witnesses the use value’s indirect intervention through the direct intervention of temporal preference. Saving lies in removing some (relative) portion of one’s money income (whether that portion is an amount of money that one has been lent) from consumption and hoarding as a way of increasing one’s ulterior consumption. Two modalities of saving are respectively the fact of spending (completely or partly) one’s money income into the demand (i.e., purchase or rental) of some respective quantities of some generic supply goods or services and then allocating those quantities to some supply process; and the fact of spending (completely or partly) one’s money income into the demand (i.e., purchase or rental) of some quantity of some generic good or service and then supplying the quantity in question. Those two modalities are respectively that modality of saving that is carried out by some entrepreneur (from the entrepreneur’s money income), and which occurs within the framework of the supply process of some quantity whose supplier is the entrepreneur in question; and that modality of saving that is carried out by some non-entrepreneurial supplier (from the supplier’s money income), and which occurs within the framework of the supply process of some quantity whose supplier is the non-entrepreneurial supplier in question. The capital, which Böhm-Bawerk mistakenly defines as that genre of production good or service that is intermediate between land and labor, on the one hand, and some produced quantity of some genre of good or supply, on the other hand, is instead that genre of good or service that is involved with an entrepreneurial supply process. “Capital good or service” and “supply good or service” are, accordingly, qualifiers that can be used indiscriminately to refer to some supply good or service.
The remuneration of that set of capital goods or services that is involved with some entrepreneurial supply process (i.e., the sum of those respective global selling or leasing prices at which those respective quantities which, of some genres of capital good or service, are bought or rented in the framework of some entrepreneurial process) is distinct (rather than indistinct) from the remuneration of that abstract saving that is involved with the concerned entrepreneurial supply process. Abstract saving means some duration of saving that is involved with the supply process of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity, and which is considered from the angle of those of its properties that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity is taking into account (rather than from the angle of all its properties). Those properties (that, of saving, are taken into account within the trade value of some offered quantity) are: the duration of the supply process (which is the very same thing as the sum of the respective durations of the various involved savings), the sum of the respective degrees to which some money incomes were saved, and the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion to proceeding with those savings. In some supply process, the final quantity and the anterior quantities are respectively that offered quantity that, of some generic good or service, is offered at the end of the supply process—and those demanded quantities that, of some generic goods or services, are demanded in the framework of the supply process. In the case of some supply process that is entrepreneurial, the anterior quantities are systemically quantities of some generic supply goods or services; in the case of some non-entrepreneurial supply process, the anterior quantities aren’t systemically quantities of some generic supply goods or services. As for abstract adjustment, it means the degree to which the comparative fastness with which the respective existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market (at the moment of their being completely or partly demanded) has been ensured is adjusted to that doable comparison between the supply process and the demanders that is taken into account within the trade value of the offered quantity (rather than from the angle of all comparisons that can be done between the supply process and the demanders). Accordingly abstract adjustment lies in the degree to which comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market at the moment of their being bought or rented (whether completely or partly) is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of abstract labor and saving.
The degree to which some labor is non-dominated is the degree to which the laborer is in a position to challenge the instructions of his master, patron, or client. The two properties of abstract labor are respectively labor duration and the degree to which the involved labor is non-dominated. Those respective parts of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment the supplier of some offered quantity introduces within the supply process of the concerned quantity without inheriting them must be distinguished from those respective parts of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment the supplier introduces within the supply process while inheriting them from some other, anterior supply processes that the supplier integrates within the supplier’s own supply process. Those inherited and non-inherited parts are respectively the indirect and direct parts. The particular trade value of some quantity offered (at some point, and at some place) of some generic commodity in some capitalist economy is the sum of three components that are the labor value, the saving value, and the adjustment value, each of which is subdivided into some direct part (i.e., some part that is present within the supply process without being inherited), and some indirect part (i.e., some part that is present within the supply process while being inherited from those anterior, other supply processes that are integrated within it). The labor value, the saving value, and the adjustment value are respectively the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors (which is the involved abstract labor), the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract savings (which is the involved abstract saving), and the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract adjustments (which is the involved abstract adjustment). While abstract labor lies in the multiplication of the involved labor’s duration by the degree to which the involved labor was non-dominated, abstract saving lies in the multiplication of the supply process’s duration, of the sum of the respective degrees to which a number of money incomes were dedicated to the involved savings, and of the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion with which the involved savings were carried out. As for abstract adjustment, it lies in the multiplication of comparative fastness in having ensured the existence of the final and anterior quantities at the respective moments of their being completely or partly demanded by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of abstract labor and saving. Adjustment profit is the money expression of the non-inherited part of abstract adjustment.
The direct and indirect abstract labors respectively lie in the multiplication of the duration of that non-inherited labor involved with the supply process by the degree to which that labor is non-dominated—and in the multiplication of the duration of that inherited labor involved with the supply process by the degree to which that labor is non-dominated. The direct and indirect abstract savings respectively lie in the multiplication of the duration of that non-inherited saving that is involved with the supply process, of the degree to which some money income is dedicated to that non-inherited saving, and of the degree of psychological aversion to proceeding with that non-inherited saving; and in the multiplication of the sum of the respective durations of that number of inherited savings that are involved with the supply process, of the sum of the respective degrees to which a number of money incomes is respectively dedicated to some inherited saving, and of the sum of the respective degrees of psychological aversion to proceeding with some inherited saving. As for the direct and indirect abstract adjustments, they respectively lie in the multiplication of the non-inherited comparative fastness by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders (of all or part of the offered quantity) outweighs the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment; and in the multiplication of the inherited comparative fastness by the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of those respective quantities (of some genres of good or service) that were involved with the supply process outweighs the sum of the indirect abstract saving and labor. While the (global) cost of supply of some offered quantity of some generic commodity lies in the money expression of the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, and of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, that were involved with the supply of that quantity, profit in the (global) price at which that quantity is completely or partly demanded lies in the money expression of the sum of the direct abstract saving and adjustment. Accordingly a necessary, sufficient condition in order for the selling or leasing global price to outweigh the global cost of supply is that the particular trade value of the concerned quantity of the concerned generic commodity outweighs the sum of the direct and indirect abstract labors, and of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, that were involved with the supply of that quantity.
My equation of trade value is as follows. Trade value = labor value + saving value + adjustment value = (labor duration x degree to which labor is non-dominated) + (degrees to which a number of money incomes are saved x duration of the supply process x degrees of psychological aversion to saving) + (comparative fastness in ensuring the existence of the final and anterior quantities on the market at the moment of their being partly or completely demanded x degrees to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the respective demanders of the final and anterior quantities outweighs the sum of labor value and saving value). That equation holds whether the practiced unitary price finds itself equalizing the supplied and demanded quantities, and whether the practiced unitary price finds itself equalizing the demanded quantity and that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at the price in question. It also holds whether the supplier of the commodity is an entrepreneur or a non-entrepreneurial supplier. Adjustment profit and supply interest respectively lie in the money expression of the direct adjustment value—and in the money expression of what remains of the direct saving value once the three components of the trade value have been added to each other. Supply interest, which admits both an entrepreneurial modality and a non-entrepreneurial modality, is the originary genre of interest indeed. The indirect and direct labor values are both positive (including in the case of the labor-power commodity), so are the indirect and direct saving values (except—as we will see more thoroughly—in the case of the labor-power commodity, which systemically displays a null direct saving value); but the indirect adjustment value is either positive or null or negative, so is the direct adjustment value. Virtual supply interest is what supply interest would be if it were equal to the money expression of the direct abstract value prior to the addition of the trade value’s three components. Whenever the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is an entrepreneur, the money expression of the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors, lies in the global cost at which the involved generic production or paraproduction goods or services were bought or rented in those respective quantities that were involved. Whenever the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is a non-entrepreneurial supplier, the money expression of the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors, lies in the global price at which the supplier bought or rented the quantity in question. Whether the supplier of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is an entrepreneur, profit in the global price at which all or part of some offered quantity is sold or leased lies in the money expression of that margin (between trade value and the sum of the indirect abstract saving and adjustment, and of the direct and indirect abstract labors) that is the sum of the direct abstract saving and adjustment.
Entrepreneurial supply interest is that modality of supply interest that is associated with the (money expression of the) trade value of an offered quantity that results of an entrepreneurial supply process, and which, accordingly, remunerates that modality of direct abstract saving that an entrepreneur proceeds with. Whenever a number of entrepreneurs are competing in some entrepreneurial field, they’re both competing to be the quickest to offer some quantity of the concerned generic good or service; and competing to get that global selling or leasing price that is the most outweighing with respect to the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply. Entrepreneurial comparative fastness (i.e., the fastness with which some entrepreneur in some supply field has sold or leased all or part of the offered quantity more rapidly than the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial other suppliers in the same supply field have sold or leased all or part of some rival offered quantity of the same generic good or service) is precisely a modality of comparative fastness in selling or leasing (i.e., the fastness with which some supplier in some supply field has sold or leased all or part of the offered quantity more rapidly than the other suppliers in the same supply field have sold or leased all or part of some rival offered quantity of the same generic good or service). Adjustment profit is the money expression of the margin between the trade value and that of which (within the trade value) the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply is the money expression. The sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity of some generic commodity (whether the supplier is entrepreneurial) is indeed taken into account within the trade value of the offered quantity; but it is taken into account within that component of trade value whose money expression lies in adjustment profit (rather than within that component whose money expression lies in virtual supply interest). Adjustment profit and entrepreneurial adjustment profit are respectively that component of profit that is the money expression of the degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supply process is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment; and that modality of adjustment profit that is the money expression of the degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supply process that is handled by some entrepreneur outweighs the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment.
The degree to which non-inherited comparative fastness in some supplier (whether entrepreneurial) is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the final quantity) outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors, direct and indirect abstract savings, and indirect abstract adjustment is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which the sum of inherited and non-inherited comparative fastnesses is adjusted to the degree to which the sum of those degrees of temporal preference outweighs the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labors and direct and indirect abstract savings. It is also indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which some supplier (whether entrepreneurial) both manages to be rapider than the other suppliers in the concerned supply field; and to offer an integrally demanded quantity whose demanders have been planning to demand immediately (rather than later) the quantity in question. Just like entrepreneurial adjustment profit is the very same thing as entrepreneurial profit, the handler (whether entrepreneurial) of some supply process always proceeds with that saving that is direct saving; for its part, indirect saving is always some saving which the handler of the supply process retrieves from some anterior supply process, but which he doesn’t proceed with himself (except when he is also the handler of that anterior supply process). Marx, who failed to discern that feature of abstract labor that is the degree to which the involved labor is non-dominated, was wrong in his restricting abstract labor to labor duration; but he was just as wrong in his restricting trade value to abstract labor (or, failing that, a level situated around abstract labor). Böhm-Bawerk, who failed to discern the fact that temporal preference (in the demanders) intervenes at the level (and at the sole level) of adjustment profit (including entrepreneurial), was wrong in his situating the intervention of the demanders’s temporal preference at the level of supply interest; but he and Marx both failed to discern that component of trade value that is abstract saving. They, accordingly, not less failed to discern that money expression that is virtual supply interest, which is the money expression of direct abstract saving as it stands prior to the addition of abstract labor, saving, and adjustment to each other. The relationship that the sum of the degrees of temporal preference finds itself having with regard to use value (namely that the sum in question is, either equal to use value, or equal to half of use value, or situated at an intermediate level) was just as much absent in their considerations.
Whenever the supplied quantity and the demanded quantity and that which (at the practiced unitary price) one stands ready and able to demand are equal, the global selling or leasing price is: either inferior to the global cost of supply, or situated between the cost in question and the sum of that cost and of the virtual supply interest, or equal or superior to the sum of the virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply. The same applies whenever the supplied quantity is equal to the demanded quantity, but inferior to that quantity one stands able and ready to demand at the practiced unitary price. Whenever the demanded quantity is inferior to the supplied quantity, the global selling or leasing price is inferior to the global cost of supply. The jointly discerning that relationship of addition that lies between abstract labor, saving, and adjustment within trade value—and that relationship of positive pseudo-proportionality that the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference finds itself having with respect to use value—is the key that allows for the diamond-and-water-conundrum to get solved. The demanders of (all or part of) some offered quantity of some generic commodity, if the quantity’s use value is lower than that of some equivalent quantity offered of some other generic commodity, but is still high enough in order for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the former quantity) to outweigh the sum of abstract saving and labor, and indirect abstract adjustment, that are involved with the supply process of the former quantity, may still consent to a unitary price that is high enough in order for the trade value of the former quantity to outweigh the trade value of the latter quantity. Accordingly the generic diamond, of which any offered quantity is costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water, may be endowed with a (particular) trade value that is also greater than that of the generic water. Let us suppose that any offered quantity of the generic diamond is supplied with some comparative fastness that is equal to that with which an equivalent quantity of the generic water is supplied. If the generic diamond—besides any of its offered quantities being costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water—is endowed with a (particular) use value that is lower than that of the generic water, but which is still high enough to allow for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of any quantity offered of the generic diamond to outweigh the sum of those abstract labor, abstract saving, and indirect abstract adjustment that are involved with the supply process of that offered quantity of diamonds, then the (particular) trade value of the generic diamond will be greater than that of the generic water. If the generic diamond—besides any of its offered quantities being costlier in abstract saving and labor, and in indirect abstract adjustment, than is any equivalent offered quantity of the generic water—is endowed with some (particular) use value that is higher than that of the generic water, but which is too low to allow for the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of any quantity offered of the generic diamond to outweigh the sum of those abstract labor, abstract saving, and indirect abstract adjustment that are involved with the supply process of that offered quantity of diamonds, then the generic diamond’s (particular) trade value will be equal to, or bigger or lower than, that of the generic water.
Hoarding and saving, monopoly and effective demand, and entrepreneurship and general equilibrium
Considering some entity independently of any other entity consists, either of considering some entity that is independent of any other entity, or of considering one or more properties which, within some entity, are independent of any other entity; and, in both cases, of doing so without paying attention to any other entity. Considering some entity as if the latter were independent of any other entity consists of considering how some entity would be if the latter were independent of those entities it is dependent on. Mere economics is the study of how that genre of entity that is an economy would be if that genre of entity were independent of any of those properties which, within that genre of entity that is a society, are non-economic. Mere economics, in other words, is the study of how economy would be if it were independent of any social fact other than economic. While a pure capitalist economy is a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic, a capitalist economy that is impure at some level is a capitalist economy that, at some level, isn’t what it would be if it were independent of all social facts other than economic. As Vilfredo Pareto, in The Mind and Society [Treatise of General Sociology], discerned, some relationship of causation taking place at the level of human behavior may be a thymologic regularity (i.e., a relationship of causation that, while devoid of any extrinsically necessary character, regularly takes place at the level of human behavior) in a pure capitalist economy and, nonetheless, cease to be regular (whether in a trend mode) in a capitalist economy that is impure at some level. A social context and a physiological context are respectively an environment that takes place within some society (instead of being indistinct from that society taken as a whole); and the degree to which some individual is physiologically healthy (rather than physiologically ill). The five genres of social fact that make some actual economy impure (i.e., which make some actual economy deviate from how that economy would be if it were independent of any social fact other than economic) are the following ones: the degree to which those laws that are required in order for the considered genre of economy to be established and soundly working are established and, besides, followed; the degree to which those goals that are pursued are identical to those goals that should be pursued in order for the considered genre of economy to be soundly working; the degree to which those positive and negative social pressures other than coercive that are at work are favorable (rather than opposed) to what is required for the sound working of the considered genre of economy; the degree to which those exceptional or average genetic characteristics that are required for the sound working of the considered genre of economy are occurring in a frequent (rather than infrequent or null) way; the degree to which those means which, in some social or physiological context, are available for some goal are compatible (rather than incompatible) with the sound working of the considered genre of economy.
A created entity or property is a modality of a produced entity or property, namely that it is a produced entity or property that is (completely) novel. Any created idea is, either created in a descriptive way (i.e., effectuated in a way that consists of describing some reality), or created in an inspirational way (i.e., effectuated in a way that consists of drawing inspiration from some reality). Likewise, any creation implementing one or more created ideas (or a set of one or more created ideas and of one or more non-created produced ideas) into some matter other than idea is, either effectuated in a descriptive way (i.e., effectuated in a way that consists of involving one or more created ideas that are all descriptively created—or a set of one or more produced ideas and of one or more created, and all descriptively created, ideas), or effectuated in an inspirational way (i.e., effectuated in a way that consists of involving one or more created ideas that are all inspirationally created—or a set of one or more produced ideas and of one or more created, and all inspirationally created, ideas), or effectuated in a way that is partly descriptive and partly inspirational. Noticing (instead of guessing or creating), then seizing, some opportunity for positive or null adjustment profit is a modality of a creation that, while implementing one or more created ideas (or a set of one or more created ideas and of one or more non-created produced ideas) into some matter other than idea, is doing so in a descriptive (rather than inspirational) way. Hearing about, then seizing, some opportunity for positive or null adjustment profit is another modality of such creation. In the former modality, what is described is some noticed (rather than guessed or yet-to-be-created) opportunity for adjustment profit; in the latter modality, what is described is some idea that is heard about, and which is about some (noticed or guessed or yet-to-be-created) opportunity for adjustment profit. Studying the way general equilibrium, in some pure capitalist economy (i.e., in some capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), is progressively established through competition between suppliers (including entrepreneurial) allows studying, in contrast, the way some social pressure (other than coercive) opposed (rather than favorable) to creativity, including those genres of entrepreneur that are creative (rather than non-creative creating actions or rather than non-creating actions), hampers the progressive establishment of general equilibrium in some capitalist economy that is impure at the level of that non-coercive social pressure that concerns competition between suppliers (i.e., in some capitalist economy that, at the level of that non-coercive social pressure that concerns competition between suppliers, deviates from how that economy would be if it were independent of any social fact other than economic).
Among the functions of money are, inter alia, the following ones: intermediation, delaying between the exchange of commodities; the remuneration of saving (through interest); and the measurement of trade value (through the global selling or leasing price), of direct adjustment value (through adjustment profit), of what remains of direct saving value after the addition of the three components of trade value (through supply interest), and of the sum of direct and indirect labor values and of indirect saving value and indirect adjustment value (through the global cost of production). Income is that amount of money someone is enjoying, whether he is lent all or part of that amount of money. While hoarding consists of removing all or part of one’s income from one’s consumption in a way that nonetheless makes that removed amount, if one should change one’s mind about that removal, remains available for one’s consumption, saving consists of removing all or part of one’s income from one’s consumption in a way that, presently, renders that removed amount unavailable for one’s consumption, but which one believes will allow to increase (or may be able to increase), at some ulterior point, one’s consumption. Investment, for its part, lies in that modality of saving that consists of spending all or part of one’s income, either into the purchase of some share on that profit some supply process (whether entrepreneurial) results in, or into the purchase or rental of some genre of production or paraproduction good or service one intends to allocate to some entrepreneurial supply process one is handling (or intends to handle). That modality of saving that consists of leasing some genre of production or paraproduction good or service to some entrepreneur in turn for some share on profit has some degree of resemblance to investment that is such that the modality in question, instead of falling within investment, is pseudo-investment.
The five modalities of hoarding are: consumption hoarding, i.e., that modality of hoarding that consists of keeping all or part of one’s income available for some unexpected consumption or for some consumption that one plans to proceed with at some future point (or at some future point that is indeterminate or more or less indeterminate); investment or pseudo-investment hoarding, i.e., that modality of hoarding that consists of keeping all or part of one’s income available for some unexpected investment or pseudo-investment or for some investment or pseudo-investment that one plans to proceed with at some future point (or at some future point that is indeterminate or more or less indeterminate); speculation hoarding, i.e., that modality of hoarding that consists of keeping all or part of one’s income available for some lending that would be made at that interest rate one is ready to practice by default; purchase/resale hoarding, i.e., that modality of hoarding that consists of keeping all or part of one’s income available for some unexpected purchase/resale or for some purchase/resale that one plans to proceed with at some future point (or at some future point that is indeterminate or more or less indeterminate); and depression hoarding, i.e., that modality of hoarding that consists of removing all or part of one’s income from consumption, saving, consumption hoarding, investment or pseudo-investment hoarding, purchase/resale hoarding, and speculation hoarding (without abandoning the removed amount in question). The five modalities of saving, for their part, are: financial investment, i.e. that modality of investment that consists of purchasing some share on some profit, which most often takes the form of stock purchase; non-financial investment, i.e., that modality of investment that consists of purchasing or renting some genre of production or paraproduction good or service in order to allocate it to some entrepreneurial supply process one is handling (or intends to handle); purchase/resale, i.e., that modality of saving that consists of purchasing some genre of good or service in order to resale it, which is that modality of saving involved with that genre of supply process that is other than entrepreneurial; non-financial pseudo-investment, i.e., that modality of saving that consists of leasing some genre of production or paraproduction good or service to some entrepreneur in turn for some share on the profit the process in question results in; and financial loan, i.e., that modality of saving that consists of leasing some amount of money in turn for some financial remuneration that is determined as some percentage of the leased amount, that loan taking, most often, the form of bond purchase in the case of a loan to some entrepreneur. A borderline case of that modality of saving that is non-financial investment consists of being freely offered (whether through inheritance) that genre of production or paraproduction good or service one intends to allocate to some entrepreneurial supply process one is handling (or intends to handle).
The four modalities of interest (i.e., the four modalities of the financial remuneration of the action of removing all or part of one’s income both from consumption and hoarding, in a way that one believes will, or may, allow for one’s consumption, at some ulterior point, to be increased) are: supply interest, i.e., interest on that saving by the handler of some entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supply process; financial-investment interest, i.e., interest on that saving by the purchaser of some share on that profit which some supply process results in; financial-loan interest, i.e., interest on that saving by the lender of some quantity of money; and non-financial pseudo-investment, i.e., interest on that saving by the lender, against some share on profit, of some means of production to some entrepreneur. The first of those interests is determined as the monetary expression of what remains of the direct saving value after addition of the three components of trade value. The second one is determined as some percentage on profit, a percentage that must be distinguished from the direct saving value and from what remains of it after addition of the three components of trade value. The third one is determined as a percentage on the loaned amount, a percentage that is indifferent—in the case of a loan to some entrepreneur—to the direct saving value and to what remains of it after addition of the three components of trade value. The fourth one is determined as some percentage on profit, a percentage that must be distinguished from the direct saving value and from what remains of it after addition of the three components of trade value. Behind the veil of that legal entity that is an enterprise, purchasing a stock is a certain way of purchasing, from an entrepreneur, a share on that profit that would be witnessed if the concerned entrepreneurial supply process were to result in the (future) sale or lease of some offered quantity; when such a share is purchased, the money spent in that purchase is always money that is offered to the entrepreneur, in exchange for the purchased share, and that—except in the case of embezzlement—is completely saved by the entrepreneur, and saved in a mode consisting of purchasing or renting some genres of production or paraproduction good or service. Similarly, behind the veil of that legal entity that is an enterprise, purchasing a bond is a certain way of lending, to some entrepreneur, some amount of money in turn for a share on that profit that would be witnessed if the concerned entrepreneurial supply process were to result in the (future) sale or lease of some offered quantity; when such a share is ceded in turn for some loan, the money lent against that share is always money that is lent to the entrepreneur, in turn for the ceded share, and which—except in the case of embezzlement—is completely saved by the entrepreneur, and saved in a mode consisting of purchasing or renting some production or paraproduction goods or services.
The degree of temporal preference must be distinguished from the degree of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding. While temporal preference lies in the degree to which some demander of all or part of some offered quantity has been willing to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point that quantity he is demanding, preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding lies in the degree to which some saver is preferring consumption and consumption-hoarding in an imminent mode over consumption and consumption-hoarding at any ulterior point. The degree of temporal presence in some demander is, either null, or positive; what’s more, the degree of temporal preference in some demander is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which the demander has been clear (rather than vague), sure (rather unsure), about demanding imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) the presently demanded quantity. Whenever the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity) is null, the offered quantity is simply non-demanded; in other words, the offered quantity finds no one who is willing, whether vaguely or assuredly, to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) all or part of the offered quantity. Whenever the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity is low, all or part of the offered quantity is demanded, but demanded by demanders who, in total, have been vague, unsure, about demanding imminently (rather than at any ulterior moment) the demanded quantity; likewise, whenever the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity is high, all or part of the offered quantity is demanded and, besides, demanded by demanders who, in total, have been clear, determinate, about demanding imminently (rather than at any ulterior moment) the demanded quantity. The degree to which some supplied quantity is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in that supplied quantity’s demanders is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which some supplied quantity is some integrally demanded quantity of which all demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity in question.
The degree of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding in some saver (i.e., the degree to which some saver is preferring consumption and consumption-hoarding in an imminent mode over consumption and consumption-hoarding at any ulterior point) must be distinguished from the degree of that aversion with which some saver is lowering his preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding (i.e., the degree of that aversion with which some saver is postponing consumption and consumption-hoarding); the degree of that aversion with which some saver is lowering his preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding must be distinguished, in turn, from the degree of that aversion with which some saver is choosing to proceed with the chosen genre of saving over proceeding with any other genre of saving than that chosen or with any genre of hoarding other than consumption hoarding. The degree of that aversion with which some saver is proceeding with some genre of saving is precisely the sum of the degree of that aversion with which the saver is lowering his preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding and of the degree of that aversion with which the saver is choosing to proceed with the chosen genre of saving over proceeding with any other genre of saving than that chosen or with any genre of hoarding other than consumption hoarding. Any genre of interest other than supply interest is determined as the money expression of the degree to which the concerned saver is dedicating his income to the concerned genre of saving, for a high duration and with a high aversion to proceeding with the concerned genre of saving. Supply interest, while it is equal to virtual supply interest (i.e., what supply interest would be if the direct saving value were left intact after the addition of the three components of trade value) when (and only when) the direct adjustment value is null or positive, is determined as the money expression of what remains of the direct saving value after the addition of the three components of trade value.
A real entity or property and a hypothetical entity or property are respectively an entity or property that, presently, and while being, either existent, or inexistent, is both in a position to exist and, indeed, existent; and an entity or property that, presently, and while being, either existent, or inexistent, is both in a position to exist and outside of existence. An individual is, either busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service, or not busy doing so: there is no intermediate degree on that level. Similarly, an individual is, either standing ready to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical offered quantity of some genre of good or service, or refusing to do so: there is also no intermediate degree on that level. The degree of importance that an individual busy demanding (i.e., buying or renting), at some practiced unitary price, all or part of some offered quantity attributes to the assortment of the respective utilities of the concerned genre of good or service must be distinguished from the degree of importance that an individual who, provided he can afford the unitary price, is standing ready to demand all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity of some genre of good or service attributes to the assortment of the respective utilities of the concerned genre of good or service; likewise, use value must be distinguished from virtual use value. The use value of some offered quantity is the sum of the respective degrees of importance that, in those individuals who are respectively busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service, and who, accordingly, are respectively in a position to afford (for their respective demands) the practiced unitary price, are attributing to the assortment of the respective utilities of the concerned genre of good or service. The virtual use value of some hypothetical or real offered quantity, for its part, is the sum of the respective degrees of importance that, in those individuals who are respectively ready to demand all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity of some genre of good or service, provided they can respectively afford (for those demands for which they are respectively ready) the unitary price that (if the quantity is and remains hypothetical) would be applied or (if the quantity is or becomes real) will be applied, are attributed to the assortment of the respective utilities of the concerned genre of good or service. The degree of temporal priority of an individual busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service is the degree to which the individual in question is preferring an imminent enjoyment of all or part of the utilities of the concerned genre of good or service over an enjoyment of the concerned utilities at some tardier point; in other words, the degree to which the individual in question is clear, certain, about opting for an imminent enjoyment of all or part of the utilities of the concerned genre of good or service rather than for an enjoyment of the concerned utilities at some tardier point. The preliminary degree of trust of an individual who is presently busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service in that unitary price that is presently applied is the degree to which an individual who is presently busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service was—prior to his action of demanding all or part of the offered quantity—confident in his ability to afford that unitary price that would be applied; in other words, the degree to which the individual in question—prior to the action of demanding all or part of the offered quantity—was (subjectively) certain that he would be in a position to afford that unitary price that would be applied, which, at that point, was not determined yet.
The use value of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service determines a range of possible levels for the total degree of temporal preference: namely that the degree in question is, either equal to the use value, or equal to half the use value, or situated at an intermediate level. The three co-determiners of the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity are: the use value, the total degree of temporal priority (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees of temporal priority), and the total degree of preliminary trust in the practiced unitary price (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees of preliminary trust in the practiced unitary price). The degree of temporal preference (i.e., the degree to which an individual who is busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity, and who, accordingly, is in a position to afford the practiced unitary price, has been certain, clear, about wanting to do so imminently rather than at any ulterior point) must be distinguished from the degree of virtual temporal preference (i.e., the degree to which an individual is certain, clear, about wanting—provided he can afford the practiced unitary price—to demand all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity imminently rather than at any ulterior point). Likewise, the degree of temporal priority (i.e., the degree to which an individual busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity is preferring his enjoyment, through the demanded quantity, of all or part of the utilities of the concerned genre of good or service to be imminent rather than at some tardier point) and the degree of trust in the practiced unitary price (i.e., the degree to which an individual busy demanding all or part of some offered quantity was confident in his ability to afford the practiced unitary price) must be respectively distinguished from the degree of virtual temporal priority (i.e., the degree to which an individual is certain, clear, that, if he were to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical offered quantity and, through the demanded quantity, to enjoy all or part of the utilities of the concerned genre of good or service, he should do that demand, and that enjoyment, imminently rather than at any ulterior point); and from the degree of virtual trust in the unitary price that will, or would, be practiced (i.e., the degree to which an individual who—provided he can afford the practiced unitary price—is standing ready to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical offered quantity is confident in his ability to afford that unitary price, presently unknown, that will be practiced in the case of some real quantity, or that would be practiced in the case of some hypothetical quantity). The virtual use value of some hypothetical or real offered quantity of some genre of good or service determines a range of possible levels for the total degree of virtual temporal preference: namely that the degree in question is, either equal to the virtual use value, or equal to half of the virtual use value, or situated at an intermediate level. The three co-determiners of the total degree of virtual temporal preference are: the virtual use value, the total degree of virtual temporal priority (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees of virtual temporal priority), and the total degree of virtual trust in the unitary price that will, or would, be practiced (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees of virtual trust in that unitary price that will, or would, be practiced).
Just like the action of demanding (i.e., buying or renting), at some practiced unitary price, all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service must be distinguished from the fact of standing ready—on the condition of being in a position to afford for the practiced unitary price—to demand all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity, the fact of standing ready—on such condition—to do so must be distinguished from the fact of standing ready to practice some unitary price to demand, at that unitary price, all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity. For its part, the fact of standing ready to practice some unitary price to demand, at that unitary price, all or part of some hypothetical or real offered quantity must be distinguished from the fact of standing ready to practice that unitary price one would like to practice ideally, and to demand, at that unitary price, that amount of some hypothetical or real offered quantity one would like to demand ideally; in turn, the fact of standing ready to practice that unitary price one would like to practice ideally, and to demand, at that unitary price, that amount of some hypothetical or real offered quantity one would like to demand ideally must be distinguished from the fact of standing ready to practice that unitary price one would like to practice in a reasoned ideal, and to demand, at that unitary price, that amount of some hypothetical or real offered quantity one would like to demand in a reasoned ideal. Virtual use value is the total degree of importance that is attributed to some genre of good or service by those individuals who—provided they can afford the practiced unitary price—are standing ready to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical quantity of the concerned genre of good or service; in other words, by those individuals who—provided they can afford the practiced unitary price—are standing ready to demand some quantity, whether that quantity is real (i.e., all or part of some real offered quantity) or hypothetical (i.e., all or part of some hypothetical offered quantity). An individual, for each genre of good or service, is ready to demand various real or hypothetical quantities (provided he can afford the practiced unitary price), and, for each of those quantities, is ready to practice various unitary prices (provided he can afford them). Nonetheless, there is a quantity that he is ideally ready to demand, and for that quantity, a unitary price that he is ideally ready to practice; likewise, there is a quantity that he is ready to demand in a reasoned ideal, and for that quantity, a unitary price that he is ready to practice in a reasoned ideal. That quantity that he is ready to demand in a reasoned ideal is the highest of those quantities he is standing ready to demand, just like it is a quantity that be believes he is in a position to demand for that unitary price that he is standing ready to practice in a reasoned ideal; for its part, that unitary price that he is standing ready to practice in a reasoned ideal, which is a unitary price at which he deems he can afford to buy or rent that quantity he is standing ready to demand in a reasoned ideal, is the lowest of those unitary prices associated with that quantity he is standing ready to demand in a reasoned ideal. That total quantity that those individuals standing ready to practice some assortment of unitary prices are standing ready to demand for that assortment of unitary prices is the sum of those respective quantities that the individuals standing ready to practice some assortment of unitary prices are standing ready to demand for that assortment of unitary prices.
Demand for some genre of good or service is that total quantity that is demanded, at a certain point, of some genre of good or service—whether the total quantity in question coincides with what would, at the concerned point, be a single quantity purchased or rented, at some place, and at some unitary price, of the concerned genre of good or service, or instead coincides with what would, at the concerned point, be the sum of several quantities purchased or rented, at some respective places and at some respective unitary prices. The determiner of demand for some genre of good or service is the sum of the respective total degrees of temporal preference that are found in the respective sets of demanders for all or part of those quantities that, of the concerned genre of good or service, are offered. Foundational demand for some genre of good or service is the assortment of those respective total quantities that those individuals ready to practice some respective assortments of unitary prices for some respective quantity are ready to demand for some respective assortment of unitary prices. The determiner of the foundational demand for some genre of good or service is the assortment of those virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of the considered genre of good or service. Ideal demand is what the total demand for some genre of good or service would be if those individuals ready to demand, at some respective ideal unitary price, some respective ideal quantity of the demanded genre of good or service, were demanding, at the respective ideal unitary prices, those respective ideal quantities they are ready to demand.The determiner of ideal demand is the fact that any individual would ideally like to demand respectively immense quantities of those genres of good or service to the utilities of which they attribute high importance, and to demand those respective quantities at extremely low respective unitary prices. The assortment of those virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of some genre of good or service has no effect on the ideal total demand for the concerned genre of good or service. Reasoned ideal demand is what the total demand for some genre of good or service would be if those individuals ready to demand, at some respective unitary price in a reasoned ideal, some respective quantity, in a reasoned ideal, of the demanded genre of good or service, were demanding, at the respective unitary prices in a reasoned ideal, those respective quantities that, in a reasoned ideal, they are ready to demand. The determiner of reasoned ideal demand, just like for foundational demand, is the assortment of those virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of the concerned genre of good or service.
Global demand is the assortment of those various total quantities that are respectively demanded of the various genres of good or service. The determiner of global demand is that assortment that is formed by the respective sums of those total degrees of temporal preference that are respectively found in the various sets of demanders of all or part of the offered quantities of some respective genre of good or service. Global foundational demand is that assortment that is formed by the various assortments of the respective total quantities (of some respective genres of good or service) that those individuals ready to practice some respective assortments of unitary prices for some respective quantity are ready to demand for some respective assortment of unitary prices. The determiner of global foundational demand is that assortment that is formed by the various assortments of those virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of some concerned genre of good or service. Global ideal demand is what global demand would be if all individuals, at those unitary prices they would like to practice ideally, were demanding those quantities they would like to demand ideally. The determiner of global ideal demand, just like for the ideal demand of some genre of good or service, is the fact that any individual would ideally like to demand respectively immense quantities of those genres of good or service to the utilities of which they attribute high importance, and to demand those respective quantities at extremely low respective unitary prices. That assortment that is formed by the various assortments of the virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of some concerned genre of good or service has no effect on global ideal demand. Global reasoned ideal demand is what global demand would be if all individuals, at those unitary prices they would like to practice in a reasoned ideal, were demanding those quantities they would like to demand in a reasoned ideal. The determiner of global reasoned ideal demand, just like for global foundational demand, is that assortment that is formed by the various assortments of the virtual use values that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical quantities of some concerned genre of good or service.
Effective demand is what global demand would be if all locally offered quantities were in tune with the respective total degrees of temporal preference in the respective sets of demanders for the respective offered quantities (i.e., if all offered quantities were in tune with what the respective sets of demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point). A necessary, sufficient condition so that, for each genre of good or service, those various quantities that are offered are all in tune with the respective total degrees of temporal preference in the respective sets of demanders is the following one: namely that, for each genre of good or service, the total offered quantity has reached that level that was both compatible with the depletion of all possibilities of extension (for the concerned supply field) and with the absence of any locally offered quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service) failing to be in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the respective set of demanders. The degree of virtual aversion to proceeding with some genre of saving is the degree to which someone standing ready to save all or part of his income has aversion for that genre (or those genres) of saving he stands ready to proceed with; for its part, the degree to which some supply field is monopolistic (rather than extensible) is the degree to which some supply field cannot contain more than a single supply process and, accordingly, more than a single offered quantity. The total duration of some supply field is the sum of the respective durations of those supply processes it contains (and, accordingly, when it contains only one supply process, the duration of that supply process); for its part, the total degree of non-domination in some supply field is the sum of the respective degrees to which those direct or indirect labors that are respectively associated with those supply processes it contains are non-dominated. The co-determiners of effective demand are: that assortment that is formed by the various assortments of those total degrees of virtual temporal preference that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical offered quantities of some genre of good or service; the degrees of virtual aversion to proceeding with some genre of saving; the total duration that, in some supply field, is required in order for those supply processes that supply field contains to result into respective quantities that are integrally demanded, and which are in tune with the total degrees of temporal preference respectively associated with the respective sets of demanders; the total degree of non-domination that, in some supply field, is required in order for those supply processes that supply field contains to result into respective quantities that are integrally demanded, and which are in tune with the total degrees of temporal preference respectively associated with the respective sets of demanders; and the respective degrees to which the various supply fields are monopolistic rather than extensible. The depletion of all possibilities of extension in some supply field (i.e., the depletion of any possibility of some other, rival supply process and, accordingly, of some other, rival offered quantity) happens, either as a consequence of the monopolistic situation of the concerned supply field, or as a consequence of the fact that the concerned supply field, while non-monopolistic, is hosting all those supply processes it is in a position to host.
In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of all social facts other than economic), global demand, provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, is progressively rendered coincident with effective demand. The process through which, in a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, global demand is progressively rendered coincident with effective demand is the process of supply competition, i.e., that process that is competition between suppliers (whether entrepreneurial) in some supply field, for the supply of some quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service) that is both supplied more rapidly than any other real or hypothetical rival offered quantity (of the same genre of good or supply) and in tune with what the demanders of the concerned quantity have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point. Adjustment profit is the money expression, and money remuneration, of direct adjustment value, i.e., the money expression, and money remuneration, of the degree to which some supplier has been more rapid than any real or hypothetical rival supplier (in the concerned supply field) to supply some quantity that is in tune with what the demanders of that quantity have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point. Direct adjustment value is, either positive, or negative, or null; so is, accordingly, adjustment profit. The profit some supplier gathers, instead of being adjustment profit only, is the sum of adjustment profit and supply interest; just like adjustment profit, the profit some supplier gathers is, either positive, or negative, or null. The degree to which some supplier is keeping the whole of his profit is completely, only dependent on whether the concerned supplier ceded some share (or some shares) on his profit.
Adjustment profit is positive when (and only when) that quantity that is supplied is integrally demanded and, besides, is some quantity that is supplied more rapidly, or less rapidly, than any real or hypothetical rival quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service), and which is in tune with what the demanders of that quantity (other than any real or hypothetical rival quantity) have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point; the degree to which some positive adjustment profit is all the more positive is completely, only dependent, positively, on the degree to which the concerned supplier has been more rapid than any real or hypothetical rival supplier in the concerned supply field. Adjustment profit is negative when (and only when) that quantity that is supplied is, either integrally demanded, or partly demanded, or non-demanded, and, besides, is some quantity that is, either supplied more or less rapidly, or supplied neither more rapidly nor less rapidly, than any real or hypothetical rival quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service), and which is, either partly in tune, or not in tune at all, with the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of that quantity (other than any real or hypothetical rival quantity), i.e., the sum of the respective degrees to which the demanders of all or part of that quantity (other than any real or hypothetical rival quantity) have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point that respective quantity they are respectively demanding; the degree to which some negative adjustment profit is all the more negative is completely, only dependent, positively, on the degree to which the concerned supplier has been less rapid than any real or hypothetical rival supplier in the concerned supply field. When (and only when) some negative adjustment profit is so negative that it makes supply interest null, profit itself is, accordingly, negative; some supplied quantity can be demanded (whether integrally) when (but not only when) adjustment profit is so negative that it makes profit itself negative, just like it can be demanded (whether integrally) when (but not only when) adjustment profit is negative but not that negative. Some supplied quantity can be integrally non-demanded when (and only when) adjustment profit is so negative that it makes profit itself negative. Adjustment profit is null when (and only when) that quantity that is supplied is integrally demanded and, besides, is some quantity that is supplied, neither more rapidly, nor less rapidly, than any real or hypothetical rival quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service), and which is in tune with what the demanders of that quantity (other than any real or hypothetical rival quantity) have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point.
In order for some supplied quantity that is integrally demanded and, besides, in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in its demanders to be, neither more rapidly, nor less rapidly, supplied than any real or hypothetical rival quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service), a necessary, sufficient condition is the following one: namely that, either the concerned supply field is monopolistic (rather than extensible), or the gradual extension of the supply field has reached the limit of that supply field’s extensibility. The two ways some supply field can be monopolistic are the following ones: either the concerned supplier is an entrepreneur who, besides, is the sole individual to be in possession of some genre of supply good or service that is required in order for any supply process of the concerned supplied genre of good or service to happen, or the concerned supplier, whether he is entrepreneurial, is selling or leasing the concerned supplied genre of good or service to the integrality of the audience for that genre of good or service, i.e., the integrality of those individuals standing ready—provided they can afford the practiced unitary price—to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical quantity of the concerned supplied genre of good or service. In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of all social facts other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of effective demands are all remaining at an unchanged respective level, that competition that, between suppliers, takes place within each non-monopolistic supply field progressively gets all offered quantities in all non-monopolistic supply fields to be integrally demanded quantities that are in tune with what their respective sets of demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point. On the same occasion, for each genre of good or service the supply of which can only result of some non-monopolistic supply field, the total offered quantity is progressively situated at that level that is both compatible with the depletion of all possibilities of extension (for the concerned supply field) and with the absence of any locally offered quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service) failing to be in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the respective set of demanders. As for those supply fields that are monopolistic, the concern (in monopolistic suppliers) for offering some integrally demanded quantity that is in tune with what its demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point gets the monopolistic supply fields, in a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of all social facts other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of effective demands are all remaining at an unchanged respective level, to see their respective unique offered quantities reach progressively those respective levels that are both compatible with the depletion of all possibilities of extension and with the property of being integrally demanded and, besides, in tune with what the concerned demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any ulterior point.
In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, that competition that, between suppliers, happens within each supply field gets all total offered quantities—including in those supply fields that are monopolistic—to become, progressively, total offered quantities that are sold or leased at respective unitary prices that are such that adjustment profit is null. Here are a few illustrations, in simplified cases, of the process through which adjustment profit, for any offered quantity, is progressively nullified. Let’s suppose that, in some monopolistic supply field, the supplier offers some integrally demanded quantity in tune with the degree of temporal preference in the demanders, then—while the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at the same respective level—handles another supply process, which is identical to the former one (including as concerns direct and indirect abstract saving, and direct and indirect abstract labor) and that, accordingly, results into an offered quantity which is equivalent to (and which has the same demanders as) that which was just offered; in that context, the latter adjustment profit will be equal to the former adjustment profit and, besides, both of them will be null. Let’s suppose, now, the following: in some non-monopolistic supply field, there is only one supplier, and one offering some integrally demanded quantity in tune with the degree of temporal preference in the demanders, then—while the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at the same respective level—the supplier remains the only supplier in the concerned non-monopolistic supply field and handles another supply process, which is identical to the former one (including as concerns direct and indirect abstract saving, and direct and indirect abstract labor), and which, accordingly, results into an offered quantity which is equivalent to (and which has the same demanders as) that which was just offered; in that context, the latter adjustment profit will be equal to the former adjustment profit and, besides, both of them will be positive.
Let’s suppose, now, the following: in the same non-monopolistic supply field, the same supplier—while the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at the same respective level—handles, once again, some supply process that is identical (to that which was just handled), and which, accordingly, results into an offered quantity which is equivalent to (and which has the same demanders as) that which was just offered; but, this time, another supplier (and only one other supplier) adds himself or herself to the first supplier, while handling some supply process that is also identical to that which was just handled (including as concerns direct and indirect abstract saving, and direct and indirect abstract labor). That other supply process results into some offered quantity that is integrally demanded and which, besides, is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the respective set of demanders; the extensibility of the supply field hasn’t been depleted. In that context, those two quantities that are simultaneously offered are equal and have an equal unitary price (as well as an equal trade value); what’s more, adjustment profit for the latter of those two simultaneously present suppliers is both positive and equal to adjustment profit for the former of those two simultaneously present suppliers and both adjustment profits are lower than that adjustment profit that was witnessed when there were only one supplier and only one supplied quantity. That inferiority of the two presently witnessed adjustment profits with respect to that adjustment profit that preceded both of them is no consequence, however, of the fact that each of the two suppliers, in order to incentivize the audience of the concerned genre of good or service to demand that quantity he is supplying (rather than that equivalent quantity the rival supplier is supplying), would have had to propose some unitary price that is both lower than the original unitary price and equal to that unitary price the rival supplier is proposing. The fact that the two presently practiced unitary prices are equal and, besides, lower than the originally practiced unitary price is, instead, a consequence of the fact that the two presently witnessed direct adjustment values are equal and, besides, lower than the original direct adjustment value.
The process through which, in a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at unchanged respective levels, adjustment profit for all supplied quantities is progressively nullified is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the process through which, in a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at unchanged respective levels, the total quantities that, of the various genres of good or service, are respectively supplied are progressively brought to those respective levels that are both compatible with the depletion of all possibilities of extension (in the concerned supply field) and with the property for any locally offered quantity (of the concerned genre of good or service) of being integrally demanded and, besides, in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the respective set of demanders. That process, in turn, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the process through which, in a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at unchanged respective levels, global demand is progressively rendered coincident with effective demand. A positive adjustment profit emits a signal to those paying attention to that signal: namely that, provided the respective total levels of virtual temporal preference (in those standing ready—provided they can afford the practiced unitary price—to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical offered quantity of the concerned genre of good or service) are remaining unchanged, there is still room for another supply process in that supply field that resulted into that positive adjustment profit that emitted the signal in question. That signal that is emitted by a positive adjustment profit does not indicate, nonetheless, whether the respective total levels of virtual temporal preference (in those standing ready—provided they can afford the practiced unitary price—to demand all or part of some real or hypothetical offered quantity of the concerned genre of good or service) will remain unchanged. In a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at unchanged respective levels, competition between suppliers (within the various supply fields) is the process through which is progressively achieved the coincidence of all total offered quantities with those total quantities that, if they were offered, would jointly get all supply processes to result into null adjustment profits and into supplied quantities that are completely demanded and which, besides, are in tune with what their respective sets of demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently rather than at any later point. The signal emitted by a positive adjustment profit is useless to suppliers in that competition in which they are engaged.
The suppliers, instead of setting up some supply process in function of their decoding (whether correct) of the signal emitted by some positive adjustment profit, do so in function of what they (whether rightly) identify as a (future) adjustment gap between some (present) supply process, which hasn’t been achieved yet, and the (future) total degree of temporal preference that will be found in those who will be the demanders of all or part of that quantity that, at the end of the supply process, will be offered. That gap is not identified through the decoding of the signal that some adjustment profit emits; it is identified through the comparison between some supply process that hasn’t been achieved yet and what the total degree of temporal preference will be in the (future) demanders of all or part of that quantity that, at the end of the supply process, will be offered. A necessary, sufficient condition in order for some adjustment profit to be positive (i.e., in order for that direct adjustment value of which some adjustment profit is the monetary expression to be positive) is that the supplier earning that adjustment profit has corrected some adjustment gap (i.e., some gap between a past supply process and the total degree of temporal preference that was found in the demanders of all or part of that offered quantity that resulted from the supply process), and that he has corrected that gap more rapidly than one or more actual or hypothetical rival suppliers in that supply field with which the supplier is involved. The two ways in which some supplier can correct some adjustment gap are the following ones: either offering in the same supply field (in which an adjustment gap was witnessed) a quantity that, for its part, is in tune with the total degree of temporal demand in the demanders of (the integrality of) that quantity; or offering in another supply field (than that in which an adjustment gap was witnessed) a quantity that, for its part, is in tune with the total degree of temporal demand in the demanders of (the integrality of) that quantity. In the first case, the correction of the observed adjustment gap consists of offering, of the same genre of good or service (of which an offered quantity was inconsistent with the total degree of temporal preference that was witnessed in the demanders of all or part of that quantity), a quantity that is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference that is witnessed in the demanders of (the integrality of) that quantity. In the second case, the correction of the observed adjustment gap consists of offering, of another genre of good or service (than that for which an offered quantity was inconsistent with the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of that quantity), a quantity that is in tune with the total degree of time preference in the demanders of (the integrality of) that quantity, and for which the demanders—in addition to being all or part of that set of individuals who demanded all or part of the previously offered quantity (of the former genre of good or service), and in turn for the decrease in the total degree to which they are standing ready to imminently demand, of the former genre of good or service, any quantity (whether real or hypothetical) equivalent to that which, of the former genre of good or service, was offered—have increased the total degree to which they are standing ready to imminently demand that quantity which, of the latter genre of good or service, is offered.
An anticipation is a prediction that someone is elaborating while thinking about the way he should prepare for what, according to that prediction, will happen. A certainty context and an uncertainty context are respectively a context in which some anticipation or prediction is objectively certain; and a context in which some anticipation or prediction, whether that anticipation of prediction is subjectively certain, is devoid of any objectively certain character. A (future) opportunity for some positive adjustment profit is a (future) opportunity to correct (in the future) some (future) adjustment gap, and to do so more rapidly (rather than more slowly) than one or more real or hypothetical rival suppliers. A (future) opportunity for some null adjustment profit, for its part, is: either a (future) opportunity to correct (in the future) some (future) adjustment gap, and to do so, neither more rapidly, nor more slowly, than any other real or hypothetical rival supplier; or a (present) opportunity to (in the future) reproduce (and bring to the market again), in some supply field whose possibilities of extension have not been depleted yet, some offered quantity in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in its demanders, and to reproduce (and bring to the market again) that quantity without any change in the demanders or in their total degree of temporal preference. No (future) opportunity for some positive or null adjustment profit can be (properly) grasped without having been (properly) predicted; whether the supplier grasping that opportunity anticipated it (or instead heard about its anticipation or prediction), the (correct) prediction of that opportunity is a necessary, insufficient condition for the grasping of that opportunity. While some (proper) prediction or anticipation, beforehand, of some opportunity for positive adjustment profit is indispensable to any grasping of that opportunity for positive adjustment profit, the anticipation or prediction that has to be effectuated (in order for some opportunity for positive adjustment profit to be grasped) occurs in an uncertainty context (rather than in a certainty context) as concerns, only, those modalities of an opportunity for positive adjustment profit that are, respectively, an opportunity for positive adjustment profit which, in order to be (properly) anticipated or predicted, has to be (properly) guessed; and an opportunity for positive adjustment profit which, in order to be (properly) anticipated or predicted, has to be (properly) created and to have a (properly) anticipated or predicted creation. As concerns that modality of an opportunity for adjustment profit that is an opportunity for adjustment profit which, in order to be (properly) anticipated or predicted, has to be (properly) noticed, the anticipation or prediction that has to be effectuated (for the grasping of some opportunity for positive adjustment profit falling within that modality) occurs in a certainty context (rather than in an uncertainty context).
General equilibrium is that situation that would be characteristic of some capitalist economy if, for each genre of production or paraproduction good or service, the allocation of the various quantities respectively allocated to some respective supply processes (and in some respective supply fields) were in equilibrium, i.e., if the allocation in question could no longer experience the slightest change and was identically repeated. A necessary, sufficient condition in order for general equilibrium to be ongoing is that global demand (i.e., the assortment of those various total quantities that are respectively demanded of the various genres of good or service) and effective demand (i.e., what global demand would be if all locally offered quantities were in tune with the respective total degrees of temporal preference in the respective sets of demanders for the respective offered quantities) coincide with each other. So long as such coincidence is ongoing, some effect of that coincidence, inter alia, is that the way in which the respectively allocated quantities of each genre of production or paraproduction good or service are allocated is frozen. Other effects that are produced by that coincidence (so long as the latter is ongoing) are the following ones: all offered quantities are equal to what is respectively demanded of those quantities; all adjustment profits are null and, accordingly, every supply interest is equal to the corresponding virtual interest; global demand is as close as it can be close to global reasoned ideal demand without being accompanied by any null or negative profit. In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of all social facts other than economic), and provided that the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, general equilibrium is progressively reached through the correction of adjustment gaps between some supply process and the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of the offered quantity.
In a pure or impure capitalist economy, the so-called law of supply and demand, namely the claim that any unitary practiced price is determined in such a way as to make that the supplied quantity equals the quantity one is both ready and able to demand at that unitary price (i.e., the sum of the respective quantities that all those ready to practice—and in a position to afford—the practiced unitary price are ready to demand at that price), applies, neither to those unitary prices practiced in general equilibrium, nor to those unitary prices practiced outside of general equilibrium. In a pure capitalist economy, whether general equilibrium is ongoing, a unitary price is not determined in such a way as to make that the supplied quantity and the quantity one is ready to demand at that unitary price are equal; in a pure capitalist economy, whether general equilibrium is ongoing, a unitary price is, instead, determined in such a way as to make that the practiced total price (i.e., the practiced unitary price times the demanded quantity) is the money expression of the sum of direct and indirect labor values, of direct and indirect saving values, and of direct and indirect adjustment values. A capitalist economy that, at some level, deviates from how that capitalist economy would be if it were pure (i.e., if it were independent of any social fact other than economic) is indistinct (rather than distinct) from a capitalist economy that, at the concerned level, is hindered (rather than unhindered). In a capitalist economy that is impure at all levels (or at some, but not all, levels), whether general equilibrium is ongoing, a unitary price is not determined, either, in such a way as to make that the supplied quantity and the quantity one is ready to demand at that unitary price are equal; in a capitalist economy that is impure at the level of the law ruling trade value (i.e., in a capitalist economy that is hindered in that the law obstructs the process through which trade value is determined as the sum of direct and indirect labor values, of direct and indirect saving values, and of direct and indirect adjustment values), and whether general equilibrium is ongoing, a unitary price ceases to be determined in such a way as to make that the practiced total price is the money expression of the sum of direct and indirect labor values, of direct and indirect saving values, and of direct and indirect adjustment values. General equilibrium, while it sees, for each genre of good or service, the supplied quantities equal the demanded quantities, doesn’t see the supplied quantities equal those quantities one is ready, and able, to demand at the respective practiced unitary price. General equilibrium, while it is progressively established in a pure capitalist economy (provided that the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level), isn’t established, whether progressively or instantly, in a capitalist economy that is impure at the level of that non-coercive social pressure that concerns competition between suppliers (i.e., a capitalist economy that is hindered in that non-coercive social pressure hinders competition between suppliers).
In a pure capitalist economy, as the opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit are being seized (and provided that the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level), positive adjustment profits are decreasing. When the remaining opportunities for non-negative adjustment profit are opportunities for null adjustment profit, and those opportunities are seized, global demand starts coinciding with effective demand and, accordingly, general equilibrium is established. The six genres of non-entrepreneurial supplier are: the non-entrepreneurial supplier who strives to be vigilant and the one who strives to be pseudo-vigilant; the non-entrepreneurial supplier who strives to be guessing and the one who strives to be pseudo-guessing; the non-entrepreneurial supplier who strives to be disruptive and the one who strives to be pseudo-disruptive. Likewise, the six genres of entrepreneur (i.e., the six genres of entrepreneurial supplier) are: the entrepreneur who strives to be vigilant and the one who strives to be pseudo-vigilant; the entrepreneur who strives to be guessing and the one who strives to be pseudo-guessing; the entrepreneur who strives to be disruptive and the one who strives to be pseudo-disruptive. An entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be vigilant and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be pseudo-vigilant are respectively an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to notice (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be noticed; and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to hear about (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be noticed. An entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be guessing and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be pseudo-guessing are respectively an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to guess (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be guessed; and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to hear about (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be guessed. An entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be disruptive and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to be pseudo-disruptive are respectively an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to create (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be created and to see their creation predicted; and an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial supplier striving to hear about (and then seize) some opportunities for positive or null adjustment profit that, in order to be anticipated or predicted, have to be created and to see their creation predicted. An opportunity for some entrepreneurial adjustment profit and an opportunity for some non-entrepreneurial adjustment profit are respectively an opportunity for some adjustment profit that only an entrepreneur can seize; and an opportunity for some adjustment profit that only a non-entrepreneurial supplier can seize. In general equilibrium, any opportunity for adjustment profit is an opportunity for null entrepreneurial adjustment profit of which the anticipation or prediction requires it to be noticed; there is no room, in general equilibrium, for any supplier other than entrepreneurial, nor for any entrepreneurial supplier other than an entrepreneur striving to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant.
Changing, whether integrally or partly, some, but not all, of the co-determiners of effective demand consists of changing, whether integrally or partly, one or more, but not all, of those assortments that co-determine effective demand. An innovation is a creation that takes place in the field of technic and which, besides, changes, whether or partly, some (but not all) of the co-determiners of effective demand, i.e., some part (but not all) of those assortments that co-determine effective demand. An innovation takes place, either at the level of the genres of good or service, or at the level of production methods or of those paraproduction methods other than related to bringing-to-the-market or to advertising, or at the level of raw material sources, or at the level of methods for bringing-to-the-market, or at the level of advertising methods, or at the level of saving apparatuses. An innovation that takes place at the level of the genres of good or service changes all or part of that co-determiner of effective demand that is the assortment of the total degrees of virtual temporal priority that are respectively associated with the various real or hypothetical offered quantities of the various genres of good or service. The same applies to an innovation that takes place at the level of advertising. An innovation that takes place at the level of saving apparatuses changes all or part of that co-determiner that is the assortment of the degrees of virtual aversion to proceeding with some genre of saving. An innovation that takes place at the level of production methods or at the level of those paraproduction methods other than related to bringing-to-the-market or to advertising changes all or part of one or more (and hypothetically all) of those assortments that are the assortment of those total durations that, in the various supply fields, are required in order for those supply processes those supply fields contain to result into respective quantities that are integrally demanded, and which are in tune with the total degrees of temporal preference respectively associated with the respective sets of demanders; the assortment of the total degrees of non-domination that, in the various supply fields, are required in order for those supply processes those supply fields contain to result into respective quantities that are integrally demanded, and which are in tune with the total degrees of temporal preference respectively associated with the respective sets of demanders; and the respective degrees to which the various supply fields are monopolistic rather than extensible. The same applies to an innovation that takes place at the level of methods for bringing-to-the-market, as well as to an innovation that takes place at the level of raw material sources. Just like a creation that occurs at one or the other of those levels is not systemically an innovation (i.e., does not systematically change one or more of the co-determiners of effective demand), a creation that changes one or more of the co-determiners of effective demand does not systemically occur in the field of technic.
A pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur must be distinguished from an innovator or pseudo-innovator. A pioneering entrepreneur and a pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur are respectively an entrepreneur who created (instead of hearing about) the idea of involving some innovation (or some innovations) with some supply process and who then became the first to involve the concerned innovation (or innovations) with some supply process (namely that supply process he is handling); and an entrepreneur who heard about (instead of creating) the idea of involving some innovation (or some innovations) with some supply process and who then became the first to involve the concerned innovation (or innovations) with some supply process (namely that supply process he is handling). For their part, an innovator and a pseudo-innovator are respectively an individual who created (instead of hearing about) the idea of creating some innovation and who then created the concerned innovation; and an individual who heard about (instead of creating) the idea of some innovation and who then created the concerned innovation. Not any pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur is also an innovator or pseudo-innovator (and reciprocally); likewise, not any innovation is, at some point, involved with some supply process. In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), any innovation puts an end to the progressive establishment of that general equilibrium that is being established (or to the existence of that general equilibrium that had been established); besides, in a pure capitalist economy, whenever some innovation becomes involved with some properly handled supply process (i.e., some supply process handled in such a way that the adjustment profit is positive or null), that fact contributes to the progressive establishment of a new general equilibrium, that of which one or more (but not all) of the co-determiners have been (totally or partially) changed as a consequence of the innovation in question. A pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur is, either an entrepreneur striving to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant, or an entrepreneur striving to be guessing or pseudo-guessing, or an entrepreneur striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive; however, not any entrepreneur striving to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant is a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur, no more than is an entrepreneur striving to be guessing or pseudo-guessing or an entrepreneur striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive.
A pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who created that innovation (or those innovations) he is involving with that supply process he is handling (whether he created the idea of creating that innovation or those innovations) must be distinguished from a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who didn’t create that innovation (or those innovations) he is involving with that supply process he is handling (whether he created the idea of creating that or those innovations). Likewise, an entrepreneur who, while striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive, is resorting to one or more innovations (in order to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive) must be distinguished from an entrepreneur who, while striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive, is, either abstaining from involving any innovation with that supply process he is handling, or abstaining from involving any innovation that would be involved in order for him or her to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive. Disruption consists, for some supplier (whether entrepreneurial), of creating, then accomplishing, the idea of changing the total degree of virtual temporal preference that is associated with that quantity which, of some genre of good or service, will be offered at the end of that supply process the supplier in question is handling; pseudo-disruption, for its part, consists, for some supplier (whether entrepreneurial), of hearing about, then accomplishing, the idea of changing the total degree of virtual temporal preference that is associated with that quantity which, of some genre of good or service, will be offered at the end of that supply process the supplier in question is handling. In order for some supplier (whether entrepreneurial) to change the total degree of virtual temporal preference that is associated with that quantity that, at the end of the concerned supply process, will be supplied, a necessary, sufficient condition is that the supplier in question changes that virtual use value and/or that total degree of virtual temporal priority that are associated with that quantity that, at the end of the concerned supply process, will be supplied.
A supplier (whether entrepreneurial) who is striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive is striving, besides, to have a way of being disruptive or pseudo-disruptive that results into the supplied quantity’s being in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of that quantity. While a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur involves one or more innovations with that supply process he is handling, a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who, besides, and through his way of pioneering or pseudo-pioneering (i.e., through those—or some of those—innovations he chose to involve, and, besides, his way of handling those innovations within his supply process), is striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive is an entrepreneur who involves, at least, that genre of innovation that is at the level of the genres of good or service or at the level of advertising. As concerns an entrepreneur who, while striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive, is, neither pioneering, nor pseudo-pioneering, or is pioneering or pseudo-pioneering in a way that is unrelated to his endeavors at disruption or pseudo-disruption, the latter is an entrepreneur who, while striving to be disruptive or pseudo-disruptive, is, either abstaining from involving any innovation, or abstaining from involving any innovation at the level of the genres of good or service or at the level of advertising. The way some entrepreneur can manage, without any innovation (at the level of the genres of good or service or at the level of advertising), to change that virtual use value and/or that total degree of virtual temporal priority that are associated with the supplied quantity is through some advertising campaign that, while devoid of any innovating character, manages to produce the change in question. As concerns a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who, besides, is, neither striving to be disruptive, nor striving to be pseudo-disruptive, the latter is an entrepreneur who, while involving one or more of those (and only of those) genres of innovation that are, neither at the level of the genres of good or service, nor at the level of advertising, is, either striving to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant, or striving to be guessing or pseudo-guessing.
My theory of entrepreneurship can be summed up as follows. Entrepreneurship is that genre of supplying that consists of acquiring (whether through demanding, i.e., whether through buying or renting) some respective quantities of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service, and then allocating those quantities to some supply process one is handling. Entrepreneurial adjustment profit is that component of profit (in the global practiced price at which all or part of some entrepreneurially supplied quantity is demanded) that is the money expression (and money remuneration) of the degree to which that entrepreneur who supplied the supplied quantity has both managed to supply some integrally demanded quantity whose demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) those respectively demanded quantities of the supplied quantity; and, besides, to be more rapid than has been any hypothetical or real other, rival entrepreneur operating in the same supply field. The other component of profit, namely supply interest, is the money expression of what remains of direct abstract saving (i.e., what remains of the entrepreneur’s saving taken from the angle of those of its properties that are taken into account within trade value) once the three components of trade value, namely abstract labor, abstract saving, and abstract adjustment, have been added to each other. Entrepreneurship is subdivided into vigilance or pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurship, guessing or pseudo-guessing entrepreneurship, and disruption or pseudo-disruption entrepreneurship. While vigilance entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about noticing, then seizing, some preexistent, manifest opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit, pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about hearing about, then seizing, some preexistent, manifest opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit. While guessing entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about guessing, then seizing, some preexistent, hidden opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit, pseudo-guessing entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about hearing about, then seizing, some preexistent, hidden opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit. While disruption entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about imagining (and being the first to imagine), then seizing, some non-preexistent, hidden opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit that have to be created, pseudo-disruption entrepreneurship is that genre of entrepreneurship that is about hearing about, then seizing, some non-preexistent, hidden opportunities for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit that have to be created. Disruption or pseudo-disruption entrepreneurship is open to pioneering or pseudo-pioneering as much as is vigilance or pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurship or guessing or pseudo-guessing entrepreneurship. In a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, general equilibrium is progressively established through competition between suppliers (including entrepreneurial). In general equilibrium, while there is room for vigilance or pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurship, there is no room for any other genre of entrepreneurship.
My theory of entrepreneurship comes as a synthesis of those three theories of entrepreneurship that are that by Ludwig von Mises, that by Israel Kirzner, and that by Joseph Schumpeter, which are respectively developed in Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, in Competition and Entrepreneurship, and in The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and The Business Cycle. In the Misesian theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship is reduced to guessing entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur is, accordingly, reduced to that entrepreneur striving to be guessing. Guessing entrepreneurship is, actually, a modality of entrepreneurship, the other modalities of which are pseudo-guessing entrepreneurship, vigilance and pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurships, and disruption and pseudo-disruption entrepreneurships. In the Misesian theory of entrepreneurship, also, any entrepreneur, whenever he operates in a certainty context (like is the case in general equilibrium), cannot find any opportunity for positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit that has to be guessed; according to that theory, a consequence of that fact is that any entrepreneur operating in a certainty context gets some null entrepreneurial adjustment profit. Actually, while it is true that any entrepreneur, whenever he operates in a certainty context (like is the case in general equilibrium), cannot find any opportunity for positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit that has to be guessed, it is just as true that, in a certainty context (as well as in an uncertainty context), whenever some entrepreneur (who is successful at supplying some integrally demanded quantity that is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders) has been more rapid (to supply some quantity) than has been any hypothetical or real other, rival entrepreneur operating in the same supply field, he will get some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit. In general equilibrium, any entrepreneurial adjustment profit is, admittedly, null; but that certainty context that is, admittedly, characteristic of general equilibrium is no cause of that nullity, the cause of the latter being, instead, that no entrepreneur operating in general equilibrium can be more rapid (or slower) than some hypothetical or real other, rival supplier operating in the same supply field.
In the Kirznerian theory of entrepreneurship, which respectively prioritizes the terms “alertness” and “alert” to refer to vigilance and vigilant, entrepreneurship is reduced to vigilance entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur is, accordingly, reduced to that entrepreneur striving to be vigilant. Vigilance entrepreneurship is, actually, a modality of entrepreneurship, the other modalities of which are pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurship, guessing and pseudo-guessing entrepreneurships, and disruption and pseudo-disruption entrepreneurships. In the Kirznerian theory of entrepreneurship, also, entrepreneurship is about handling some supply process while striving to be vigilant in that framework; any supplier striving to be vigilant—whether he is acquiring, then allocating to his supply process, some respective quantities of some genres of production and paraproduction good or service—is, accordingly, considered to be an entrepreneur in that theory. Actually, a supplier who, whether he is striving to be vigilant, is handling a supply process that doesn’t involve (the allocation of) any genre of production or paraproduction good or service is no entrepreneur; he is, instead, a non-entrepreneurial supplier. Both the Misesian and Kirznerian theories of entrepreneurship are wrong (and, besides, circular) on the issue of entrepreneurial adjustment profit, which they consider to be proportional to the degree to which some entrepreneur—from his anticipation of those quantities that the demanders will have been certain they want to demand imminently—has properly anticipated the practiced unitary price, and, besides, has been more rapid (than any hypothetical or real other, rival entrepreneur in the same supply field) to supply some quantity of some genre of good or service. Both theories are wrong on yet another issue; namely that of supply interest, which they, wrongly, consider to be proportional, positively, to the degree of spread between the importance (presently) assigned to some (presently) supplied quantity and that (which was) assigned to the means for that yet-to-be-reached goal that was the yet-to-be-supplied quantity, while, just as wrongly, treating the spread in question as equal to (and completely, only determined from) the spread between the present importance assigned to the reached quantity-goal and the past importance assigned to the pursued quantity-goal and the latter spread as equal to (and completely, only determined from) the total degree of temporal preference in the supplied quantity’s demanders. I shall leave aside those respectively Misesian and Kirznerian insights that any individual striving to be guessing may be called an entrepreneur in an extended sense; and that any individual striving to be vigilant may be called an entrepreneur in an extended sense. I shall leave aside, as well, the respectively Misesian and Kirznerian takes on the issue of monopoly.
In the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship is reduced to pioneering disruption entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur, accordingly, is reduced to that entrepreneur that is both pioneering and striving, through his way of pioneering (i.e., through those—or some of those—innovations he chose to involve, and, besides, his way of handling those innovations within his supply process), to be disruptive. Disruption entrepreneurship is, actually, a modality of entrepreneurship, the other modalities of which are pseudo-disruption entrepreneurship, vigilance and pseudo-vigilance entrepreneurships, and guessing and pseudo-guessing entrepreneurships; each of those modalities, in turn, admits some pioneering modality and some non-pioneering modality. Also, in the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship, any pioneering entrepreneur, whatever may be his way of pioneering (i.e., whatever may be that or those innovations he is involving with his supply process, and the way he is handling that or those innovations), is pioneering in a way that is such that he is striving to be disruptive. Actually, not any pioneering entrepreneur is striving, through his (way of) pioneering, to be disruptive: some pioneering entrepreneur, instead, may be striving, through his (way of) pioneering, to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant, just like he may be striving to be guessing or pseudo-guessing or even pseudo-disruptive. A pioneering entrepreneur who is striving, through (his way of) pioneering, to be disruptive (or pseudo-disruptive) is striving to be disruptive (or pseudo-disruptive) through (his way of handling) one or more innovations that are only at the level of advertising and/or at the level of the genres of good or service. As for a pioneering entrepreneur who is striving, through (his way of) pioneering, to be vigilant or pseudo-vigilant, or to be guessing or pseudo-guessing, the latter is striving to be disruptive (or pseudo-disruptive) through (his way of handling) one or more innovations that are only at a level both other than advertising and other than the genres of good or service.
Also, in the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship, any entrepreneur grasping some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit is, also, an entrepreneur changing one or more of the co-determiners of general equilibrium and, besides, contributing to spur in the direction of general equilibrium the allocation of the various genres of production and paraproduction good or service. In the Misesian or Kirznerian theory of entrepreneurship, on the contrary, any entrepreneur grasping some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit is, also, an entrepreneur leaving unchanged all co-determiners of general equilibrium and, besides, contributing to spur in the direction of general equilibrium the allocation of the various genres of production and paraproduction good or service. Actually, whenever an entrepreneur is grasping some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit, the latter is contributing to spur in the direction of general equilibrium the allocation of the various genres of production and paraproduction good or service; besides, when (and only when) the entrepreneur in question is a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who, besides, created that or those innovations he involved with that supply process he handled, the entrepreneur in question is changing one or more of the co-determiners of general equilibrium. When (and only when) the entrepreneur who is grasping some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit is, neither a pioneering entrepreneur, nor a pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur, that entrepreneur is both contributing to spur in the direction of general equilibrium the allocation of the various genres of production and paraproduction good or service and, besides, leaving unchanged the co-determiners of general equilibrium. An entrepreneur who is supplying some quantity of some new genre of good or service is a modality of a pioneering or pseudo-pioneering entrepreneur who, besides, created (whether descriptively) that or those innovations he involved with that supply process he handled; another modality of such entrepreneur is, for instance, an entrepreneur who involved, after creating (whether descriptively), one or more innovations at the level of production methods or of those paraproduction methods that are, neither related to bringing-to-the-market, nor related to advertising. I shall leave aside the Schumpeterian takes on supply interest and on entrepreneurial adjustment profit. I shall address the Schumpeterian approach to the modalities of innovation further below.
That modality of social pressure that is non-coercive is pressure that, while exerted by some society, is exerted in a way that doesn’t consist of exerting the threat of physical force. For its part, that modality of social pressure that is coercive, which is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the law, is pressure that, while exerted by some society, is exerted in a way that consists of exerting the threat of physical force. Social pressure (whether coercive) is, either positive (i.e., about some genre, or some genres, of action to have), or negative (i.e., about some genre, or some genres, of action to abstain from). In a capitalist economy that is impure at the level of that non-coercive social pressure that concerns competition between suppliers (i.e., a capitalist economy that is hindered in that some non-coercive social pressure hinders competition between suppliers), the process to general equilibrium doesn’t operate soundly as it does in a pure capitalist economy. A modality of that non-coercive social pressure that hinders competition between suppliers is that non-coercive social pressure that hinders the competition in question through opposing (instead of being favorable to) creativity. Any action consisting of grasping some positive entrepreneurial adjustment profit is an act of creation. Likewise, any action consisting, whether as an entrepreneur (rather than as a non-entrepreneurial supplier), of grasping some adjustment profit (whether positive) outside of general equilibrium is an act of creation. When (and only when) some idea lies in predicting an outside-of-general-equilibrium opportunity (whether real) for some positive, negative, or null adjustment profit is novel, the idea in question is created; when (and only when) some idea lies in predicting an outside-of-general-equilibrium opportunity (whether real) for some positive, negative, or null adjustment profit is a repeat of some identical other idea, the repeating idea in question is produced (but not created). In both cases, the same applies to an idea that lies in anticipating an outside-of-general-equilibrium opportunity (whether real) for some positive or null adjustment profit. When (and only when) some idea that lies in anticipating an outside-of-general-equilibrium opportunity (whether real) for some positive or null adjustment profit is a repeat (of some other identical idea), except the repeated idea was predicting, but without anticipating, the opportunity in question, the repeating idea is a produced idea that is partly created and partly non-created. Any created idea that lies in predicting (or anticipating), through noticing, some (real) opportunity for positive or null adjustment profit is a non-creative created idea. For its part, any created idea that lies in predicting (or anticipating) some opportunity (whether real) for positive or null adjustment profit through guessing the opportunity in question—or through figuring the opportunity in question will be created—is a creative created idea.
An entrepreneur who, besides striving to be vigilant (i.e., besides striving to notice, then seize, some to-be-noticed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually vigilant (i.e., is actually noticing, then seizing, some to-be-noticed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is doing a non-creative act of creation when acting outside of the general equilibrium, but a non-creating act of production when acting in general equilibrium. For his part, an entrepreneur who, besides striving to be pseudo-vigilant (i.e., besides striving to hear about, then seize, some to-be-noticed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually pseudo-vigilant (i.e., is actually hearing about, then seizing, some to-be-noticed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is also doing a non-creative act of creation when acting outside of the general equilibrium, but a non-creating act of production when acting in general equilibrium. An entrepreneur who, besides striving to be guessing (i.e., besides striving to guess, then seize, some to-be-guessed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually guessing (i.e., is actually guessing, then seizing, some to-be-guessed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is doing a creative act of creation. For his part, an entrepreneur who, besides striving to be pseudo-guessing (i.e., besides striving to hear about, then seize, some to-be-guessed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually pseudo-guessing (i.e., is actually hearing about, then seizing, some to-be-guessed opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is doing a non-creative act of creation. An entrepreneur who, besides striving to be disruptive (i.e., besides striving to create the idea of, then create and seize, some to-be-created opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually disruptive (i.e., is actually creating the idea of, then creating and seizing, some to-be-created opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is doing a creative act of creation. For his part, an entrepreneur who, besides striving to be pseudo-disruptive (i.e., besides striving to hear about the idea of, then create and seize, some to-be-created opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit), is actually pseudo-disruptive (i.e., is actually hearing about the idea of, then creating and seizing, some to-be-created opportunity for positive or null entrepreneurial adjustment profit) is doing a non-creative act of creation. No entrepreneur striving to be guessing, pseudo-guessing, disruptive, or pseudo-disruptive is in a position to act in general equilibrium.
Just like any society is endowed with some culture (i.e., endowed with some set of inculcated patterns), any social pressure is cultural (i.e., is part of some culture). A culture that disdains some genre of action and a culture that values some genre of action are respectively a culture exerting some social pressure (whether coercive) against some genre of action; and a culture exerting some social pressure (whether coercive) in favor of some genre of action. Coercion and pressure are respectively the exercise of some physical force and the exercise of some physical force or of some threat. Constraint lies in getting one or more volitional entities to one or more stipulated actions (or to abstaining from one or more stipulated actions) through exerting some pressure. Coercive constraint and non-coercive constraint respectively lie in exerting some coercion (rather than the threat of some coercion) in order for one or more volitional entities to have one or more stipulated actions (or to abstain from one or more stipulated actions); and in exerting some non-coercive action or some threat (which may be of resorting to some coercion) in order for one or more volitional entities to have one or more stipulated actions (or to abstain from one or more stipulated actions). Preventing some action and hindering some action respectively lie in exerting some constraint (whether coercive), and one that results into the absence of some action by some volitional entity; and in exerting some constraint (whether coercive), and one that results into the perturbation of some action that is being effectuated by some volitional entity. Offensive coercion lies in making use of physical force to, coercively, constraint one or more volitional entities to let their physical integrity be damaged, or one or more of their possessions be taken or damaged. Defensive coercion lies in making use of physical force to, coercively, prevent one or more volitional entities from exerting any offensive coercion.
Social pressure is an exercise which some society makes of the threat of resorting to coercion or to some non-coercive action, and which is intended to incentivize one or more individuals to have one or more stipulated actions (or to abstain from one or more stipulated actions). Coercive social pressure is an exercise which some society makes of the threat of resorting to coercion if (and only if) one or more individuals were to have one or more stipulated actions (or to abstain from one or more stipulated actions), and of resorting to coercion as a way of constraining, coercively, those individuals to have those actions they are expected to have (or to abstain from those actions they are expected to abstain from) and/or as a way of punishing them. Non-coercive social pressure is an exercise which some society makes of the threat of resorting to one or more non-coercive actions if (and only if) one or more individuals were to have one or more stipulated actions (or to abstain from one or more stipulated actions), and of resorting to those non-coercive actions as a way of constraining, coercively, those individuals to have those actions they are expected to have (or to abstain from those actions they are expected to abstain from) and/or as a way of punishing them. In both cases, the treat that is exerted is exerted as a way of incentivizing one or more individuals to act as they are expected to act (or to abstain as they are expect to abstain). In that culture that is characteristic of a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), the only social pressure to be exerted is a negative, coercive social pressure that is opposed to any offensive coercion and which, as a way of incentivizing all individuals (within that economy) to abstain from any offensive coercion, exerts the threat of defensive coercion.
A modality of a capitalist economy that, at the level of that non-coercive social pressure that concerns competition between suppliers, deviates from what it would be if it were pure (i.e., if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), is a capitalist economy in which some negative, non-coercive social pressure, through standing against creativity and, accordingly, those genres of entrepreneur that are creative (rather than non-creative), hampers the progressive establishment of general equilibrium. While, in a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of effective demand are remaining at an unchanged respective level, that progressive establishment is a thymologicregularity (i.e., a relationship of causation that, while devoid of any extrinsically necessary character, regularly takes place at the level of human behavior), the establishment of general equilibrium, whether progressive or instantaneous, is no regularity (whether in a trend mode) in a capitalist economy that is endowed with a cultural framework exerting some non-coercive pressure against (rather than in favor of) creativity and, accordingly, against (rather than in favor of) those genres of entrepreneur that are creative (rather than non-creative). The way a capitalist economy that takes place in a cultural framework exerting some non-coercive pressure against creativity (and, accordingly, against those genres of entrepreneur that are creative) will be hampered at the level of competition between suppliers is as follows: on the one hand, that genre of entrepreneur that is guessing (or striving to be guessing) will be hampered on behalf of the disvaluing of entrepreneurial creativity; that genre of entrepreneur that is pseudo-guessing (or striving to pseudo-guessing), likewise, will be hampered on behalf of the disvaluing of that genre of creativity that takes place in the field of predicting some opportunity for positive or null adjustment profit. On the other hand, that genre of entrepreneur that is disruptive or pseudo-disruptive, as well as that genre of innovation that is non-creatively created, will be also disdained (rather than valued) in a capitalist economy that is endowed with a cultural framework exerting some non-coercive pressure against (rather than in favor of) creativity. I shall address further below a few modalities of such genre of culture.
The process to general equilibrium and supply-and-demand, imputation and goal-and-means valuing, supply interest and actualization: some precisions
Price and cost are respectively that amount of money some supplier proposes, or some supplier and one or more demanders practice, for some unit of the supplied quantity or for the whole of the demanded (i.e., bought or rented) amount of the supplied quantity; and that genre of price, whether global or unitary, and whether proposed or practiced, that concerns some genre of production or paraproduction good or service. The global cost of supply is the sum of those respective global prices at which, in the framework of some supply process, the involved quantities of the involved genres of production or paraproduction good or service were bought or rented. Price imputation is the process through which some supplier and one or more demanders impute some practiced unitary price—and some global selling or leasing price—to that quantity that, from the supplier, the demanders are buying or renting. Interest and supply interest are respectively the money remuneration of all or part of some saving; and that genre of interest that concerns that saving which some supplier proceeds with in the framework of that supply process he is handling. Supply interest is the money remuneration of what is left of the direct saving value once the three components of trade value—labor value, saving value, and adjustment value—have been added to each other. Virtual supply interest is what supply interest would be if it were equal to the money expression of the direct saving value taken prior to the addition of the three components of trade value. “The money remuneration of some supplier’s saving” and “the money remuneration of some entrepreneur’s saving” are convenient ways of designating the money remuneration of that saving some supplier proceeds with as a supplier; and the money remuneration of that saving some entrepreneur proceeds with as an entrepreneur. In this section, as those economists I shall refer to on the topics of profit and supply interest, to the best of my knowledge, restrict the supplier to the entrepreneurial supplier, or do so more or less, I shall leave aside that supplier that is non-entrepreneurial; and those profit and supply interest that are found in the money expression of the trade value of some entrepreneurially supplied quantity. I should specify that, whenever addressing some economist’s thought, I not only translate into my own language those ideas I refer to, but, besides, may have to proceed with a clarification of some hidden, implicit architecture in those ideas.
Putting a number on some degree and measuring some degree respectively lie in expressing some degree through some number; and in expressing some degree through some number and, besides, through some reference unit. A value and a money value are respectively a degree of importance (like that importance that lies in some supplied quantity’s ability to get traded or, for instance, that importance that, in some supplied quantity’s supplier, is attributed to the supplied quantity’s utilities or which, in some demander of all or part of some supplied quantity, is attributed to the utilities of the demanded quantity); and the measured expression of some degree of importance that is expressed in a money measured mode. Some trade value expressed in money or some supplier’s saving expressed in money are both cases of money value. A diachronic repetition of some value is, of some value, a repetition that is, either occurring from some point in time till some other, ulterior point in time, or eternally occurring, or occurring in an intermediate mode. A synchronic repetition of some value is, of some value, a repetition that is, either occurring from some place at some point in time to some other place at the same point in time, or infinitely occurring at some point in time, or occurring in an intermediate mode. Some repetition of some value is, either diachronic, or synchronic, or both. Some assortment of values is, either diachronic (i.e., widespread from some point in time till some other, ulterior point in time, or eternally widespread, or in an intermediate situation), or synchronic (i.e., widespread from some place at some point in time to some other place at the same point in time, or infinitely widespread at some point in time, or in an intermediate situation), or both. A decrease in some diachronic assortment of values in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode is a decrease that affects all those values without being interrupted by any stagnation or increase. A decrease in some diachronic assortment of values in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode is a decrease that affects all those values, but which, as concerns all or part of those values, is interrupted by one or more stagnations or increases. An increase in some diachronic assortment of values in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode is an increase that affects all those values without being interrupted by any stagnation or decrease. An increase in some diachronic assortment of values in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode is an increase that affects all those values, but which, as concerns all or part of those values, is interrupted by one or more stagnations or decreases. “A diachronic increase or decrease in some assortment of values” and “an increase or decrease in some diachronic assortment of values” are interchangeable expressions; ditto for “a synchronic increase or decrease in some assortment of values” and “an increase or decrease in some synchronic assortment of values.”
The Austrian approach to the process to general equilibrium in a capitalist economy goes as follows: supply interest is the remuneration of the whole of the supplier’s saving, and that remuneration, like the payment of the global cost of supply is independent of whether the global selling or leasing price exceeds the global cost of supply, is some part (of the global selling or leasing price) that has a level independent of whether the global selling or leasing price exceeds the global cost of supply. Provided the co-determiners of general equilibrium are remaining at an unchanged respective level, the competition between suppliers in those supply fields in which each global selling or leasing price exceeds the sum of the (corresponding) global cost of supply and of (the corresponding) supply interest, the theory pursues, results into the decrease of the global selling or leasing prices and, besides, into the increase of the global costs of supply. In parallel, and provided the co-determiners of general equilibrium are remaining at an unchanged respective level, the competition between suppliers in those supply fields in which the sum of each global cost of supply and of (the corresponding) supply interest exceeds the (corresponding) selling or leasing price, the theory pursues, results into the increase of the global selling or leasing prices and, besides, into the decrease of the global costs of supply. All global selling or leasing prices, the theory pursues, end up being equal to the (corresponding) global costs of supply plus (the corresponding) supply interests. That approach to the process to general equilibrium in a capitalist economy is wrong. On the one hand, supply interest isn’t some part (of the global selling or leasing price) that has a level independent of the level of adjustment profit, or independent of whether the global cost of supply is exceeded (by the global selling or leasing price). Supply interest, instead, is null or positive depending on whether the direct adjustment value (which is expressed through adjustment profit) is negative to the point of rendering the direct saving value (which is expressed through supply interest) null. The remuneration of the supplier’s saving through supply interest isn’t systemically complete. That remuneration, instead, is complete depending on whether the direct adjustment value isn’t negative (but, instead, positive or null). In other words, that remuneration is complete depending on whether the direct adjustment value allows for the direct saving value, after addition of the three components of trade value, to remain unaffected. Supply interest is then equal to virtual supply interest.
On the other hand, in a pure capitalist economy (i.e., a capitalist economy considered as if it were independent of any social fact other than economic), and provided the co-determiners of general equilibrium are remaining at an unchanged respective level, competition between suppliers in those supply fields in which each global selling or leasing price is exceeding the sum of the (corresponding) global cost of supply and of (the corresponding) supply interest, makes, indeed, that the global selling or leasing prices and the sum of the (corresponding) global costs of supply and of (the corresponding) supply interests end up being equal to each other; but, while that equality is being accomplished, adjustment profits (and the corresponding direct adjustment values) are, either decreasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode, or decreasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode. In the case where the decrease in question is in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, the global cost of supply, in parallel to that continued decrease, are, either increasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, or decreasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, or increasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode, or increasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode; ditto for supply interests. Likewise, in a pure capitalist economy, and provided the co-determiners of general equilibrium are remaining at an unchanged respective level, competition between suppliers in those supply fields in which each sum of some global cost of supply and of (the corresponding) virtual supply interest is exceeding the (corresponding) global selling or leasing price, makes, indeed, that the global selling or leasing prices and the sum of the (corresponding) global costs of supply and of (the corresponding) supply interests end up being equal to each other; but, while that equality is being accomplished, adjustment profits (and the corresponding direct adjustment values) are, either increasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode, or increasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode. In the case where the increase in question is in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, the global costs of supply, in parallel to that continued increase, are, either increasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, or decreasing in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode, or increasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode, or increasing in a discontinued (rather than continued) mode; ditto for supply interests.
The rate of entrepreneurial profit is the ratio of the margin between the global selling or leasing price and the sum of the global cost of supply and of virtual supply interest to the sum in question. Final unitary price is that unitary price that is associated with some null direct and indirect adjustment values in the trade value. At general equilibrium, all unitary prices are final unitary prices. Adjustment value is the degree to which that supplied quantity the supply process results into—and those quantities (of some respective genres of supply good or service) the supply process involves—are quantities with respective suppliers who have been rapider than their hypothetical or real rivals to supply that quantity they’re supplying, and, besides, are integrally demanded quantities whose respective demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) those respective quantities they’re demanding. Direct adjustment value is the degree to which some supplier has been rapider than his hypothetical or real rivals in the same supply field to supply some quantity, and is, besides, supplying some quantity that is integrally demanded and of which all demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they are respectively demanding of the supplied quantity. Indirect adjustment value, for its part, is the degree to which some supplier has been rapider than his hypothetical or real rivals in the same supply field to supply some quantity, and is, besides, selling or leasing all or part of that quantity to some (other) supplier (in some other supply field) who has been certain he wants to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what he is demanding of the supplied quantity. A necessary, sufficient condition in order for all indirect adjustment values to be null is that all direct adjustment values are null. Accordingly the process through which all direct adjustment values are progressively nullified also results into the nullified character of all indirect adjustment values.
The rate of entrepreneurial profit and the (corresponding) amount of entrepreneurial profit don’t systemically evolve in a symmetrical mode. Let’s suppose some non-monopolistic supply field that sees some supply process get, in terms of abstract labor and abstract saving, diachronically (and throughout the duration of the supply field) repeated, and, besides, synchronically (and throughout the space covered by the supply field) repeated, and, in both cases, identically repeated, and which witnesses no supply process apart from that diachronically, synchronically repeated supply process. Let’s suppose, also, that, in that supply field, all supplied quantities are integrally demanded and, besides, with demanders who have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of those respective supplied quantities they’re partly or integrally demanding. In that supply field, the direct adjustment values will decrease diachronically and, besides, in a continued (rather than discontinued) mode; but the indirect adjustment values, for their part, and for a while, may remain both positive and at a diachronically, synchronically unchanged level. In that case, the rates of entrepreneurial profit, for a while, will decrease diachronically in the same proportion as the direct adjustment values will. Also, the indirect adjustment values, for a while, may both remain positive and decrease diachronically in the same proportion as the direct adjustment values do. In that case, the rates of entrepreneurial profit will remain diachronically, synchronically unchanged. Whether the indirect adjustment values, for a while, are remaining both positive and at a diachronically, synchronically unchanged level, both the direct and indirect adjustment values—and both the rates and levels of entrepreneurial profit—will end up being null. The same applies whether the indirect adjustment values, for a while, are both remaining positive and decreasing diachronically in the same proportion as the direct adjustment values are.
Foundational demand for some genre of good or service is the assortment of those respective total quantities that those individuals ready to practice—as demanders—some respective assortments of unitary prices for some respective quantity are ready to demand for some respective assortment of unitary prices. For its part, foundational supply for some genre of good or service is the assortment of those respective total quantities that those individuals ready to practice—as suppliers—some respective assortments of unitary prices for some respective quantity are ready to supply for some respective assortment of unitary prices. A centralized economy is an economy in which the common goals (in the economic field) and the common means for those goals are decided by some central authority: the collective property of production and paraproduction means and, accordingly, the absence of money are among the properties of a centralized economy. A centralized economy, as I shall develop further below, is, either centralized horizontally, or centralized vertically, or centralized in a way that is hybrid between horizontality and verticality. A capitalist economy, as I shall develop further below, is a decentralized economy that is hybrid between verticality and horizontality, and which only relies on defensive coercion (instead of relying as well on offensive coercion). The private property of production and paraproduction means and the use of money are among the properties of a capitalist economy. The alleged law of supply and demand is that the unitary price is determined in a way consisting for that price of being at a level at which the supplied quantity equals that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at that unitary price (i.e., that quantity that is the sum of those respective quantities that all those standing ready, and able, to demand some respective quantity at some unitary price are standing ready, and able, to demand at that unitary price).
The alleged law of supply and demand, strictly speaking, is about an alleged thymologic regularity rather than about an alleged extrinsically necessary regularity of causation: strictly speaking, it would be, if it were true, a pseudo-law rather than a law. It, besides, supposes the five following premises, all of which are forming a necessary, sufficient condition. Firstly, the practiced unitary prices are determined upstream (rather than downstream) the corresponding supplyprocesses. In other words, those prices are determined before (rather than after) any quantity is supplied (i.e., before any quantity is produced and then brought to the market). Secondly, the foundational demand for some genre of good or service associates to each hypothetical quantity a single unitary price; so does the foundational supply. The associated unitary price is negatively proportional to the concerned hypothetical quantity in the case of foundational demand; it is positively proportional to the concerned hypothetical quantity in the case of foundational supply. Thirdly, the supplied quantities and those demanded are respectively supplied and demanded in the framework of that modality of a centralized economy that is a centralized economy attempting to simulate a capitalist economy. In such modality of a centralized economy, the central authority decides what quantities should be supplied and what quantities should be demanded (and, accordingly, how money should be spent, saved, or hoarded) if the concerned economy were capitalist rather than centralized. Fourthly, the way the practiced unitary price is determined consists of endowing the global selling or leasing price with some level expressing some trade value that is located at a level below the degree of importance attributed in the supplier (to the utilities of the supplied quantity) and above the use value (i.e., above the sum of the respective degrees of importance attributed, in the demanders, to the utilities of what is respectively demanded of the demanded quantity). Fifthly, that way the practiced unitary price is determined is indistinct (rather than distinct) from equalization between the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at the practiced unitary price.
None of those five conditions is verified. Firstly, the practiced unitary prices are determined downstream (rather than upstream) the corresponding supply processes. In other words, each of those prices is determined after (rather than before) the (corresponding) supplied quantity has been produced and brought to the market. Secondly, the foundational demand for some genre of good or service associates to each hypothetical quantity a range of unitary prices (rather than a single unitary price); so does the foundational supply. The associated range of unitary prices remains negatively proportional to the concerned hypothetical quantity in the case of foundational demand; it also remains positively proportional to the concerned hypothetical quantity in the case of foundational supply. Thirdly, the supplied quantities and those demanded are respectively supplied and demanded in the framework of a capitalist economy (rather than in the framework of a centralized economy attempting to simulate a capitalist one). Fourthly, the practiced unitary price is determined, not in a way that consists of endowing the global selling or leasing price with some level expressing some trade value that is located at a level below the degree of importance attributed in the supplier and above the use value in the demanders, but instead in a way that consists of endowing the global selling or leasing price with some level expressing that sum of labor value, saving value, and adjustment value that is trade value. Fifthly, endowing the global selling or leasing price with some level expressing some trade value that is located at a level below the degree of importance attributed in the supplier and above the use value in the demanders would be a way of determining the practiced unitary price that would be distinct (rather than indistinct) from equalizing the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at the practiced unitary price. The actual way the practiced unitary price is determined is itself distinct (rather than indistinct) from what would be some equalization between the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at the practiced unitary price.
The supply-and-demand diagram is the graphical illustration of the alleged supply-and-demand thymologic regularity. The diagram exhibits a decreasing curve or straight line and an increasing curse or straight line, both linking some respective unitary price (on the diagram’s left side) to each hypothetical quantity (on the diagram’s bottom) of some genre of good or service. While the former curve or straight line is intended to illustrate foundational demand, the latter curve or straight line is intended to illustrate foundational supply. Both have a single intersection, and the latter is intended to illustrate the equilibrium unitary price. The alleged supply-and-demand pseudo-law supposes that, by reason of the (correctly alleged) decreasing character of marginal utility (i.e., by reason of the, correctly, alleged fact that any hypothetical or real incremental unit in some real or hypothetical quantity which, of some genre of good or service, one is enjoying or standing ready to enjoy is ascribed to some utility that one is less prioritizing), foundational demand and foundational supply respectively associate to each hypothetical quantity some respective unitary price that is negatively proportional; and some respective unitary price that is positively proportional. From the conjunction between that supposition and the alleged determination of the practiced unitary price as the equilibrium price, the alleged supply-and-demand pseudo-law infers that, given some foundational supply, the higher foundational demand is, the higher the practiced unitary price is; and that, given some foundational demand, the higher foundational supply is, the lower the practiced unitary price is. In the supply-and-demand diagram, that implication is illustrated through the fact that the intersection between both curves or straight lines is all the higher as—given some curve or straight line for foundational supply—the curve or straight line for foundational demand is closer to the right; and, besides, all the lower as—given some curve or straight line for foundational demand—the curve or straight line for foundational supply is closer to the right.
By reason of the decreasing character of marginal utility, those ranges of hypothetical unitary prices that, within foundational supply or foundational demand, are respectively associated with the hypothetical or real quantities are, indeed, positively proportional in the case of foundational supply and negatively proportional in the case of foundational demand; but the assortment of those ranges, precisely, is an assortment of ranges of hypothetical unitary prices rather than an assortment of hypothetical, single unitary prices. It is wrong that the practiced unitary price is determined as an equilibrium unitary price (i.e., is determined in a way consisting of equalizing the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at the practiced unitary price). It is just as wrong that, given some foundational supply and demand, there is only one hypothetical unitary price that is an equilibrium hypothetical unitary price (i.e., only one hypothetical unitary price that, if it were practiced, would equalize the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at that price). It is even just as wrong that the practiced unitary price’s determination takes into account foundational supply, foundational demand, or the comparison between foundational supply and foundational demand. The practiced unitary price isn’t higher depending on whether foundational supply, given some foundational demand, is higher; nor is it lower depending on whether foundational demand, given some foundational supply, is higher.
The practiced unitary price’s determination is directly dependent, inter alia, on the comparison between the supplied quantity and the total degree of temporal preference in the supplied quantity’s demanders: it is, indeed, directly dependent, inter alia, on the degree to which the supplied quantity is some integrally demanded quantity whose demanders have been certain they want to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity. Inter alia, and through the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part of) the supplied quantity, it is indirectly dependent on use value: the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of (all or part of) the supplied quantity (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees to which the demanders of all or part of the supplied quantity have been certain they want to demand imminently, rather than at any ulterior point, what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity) is, indeed, either equal to use value (i.e., to the sum of the respective degrees of importance attributed, in the demanders, to the respective sums of considered utilities of what is respectively demanded of the demanded quantity), or equal to half of use value, or situated at an intermediate level. The foundational demand for some genre of good or service derives from the assortment of those virtual use values associated with the concerned genre of good or service (i.e., the assortment that is formed by those respective total degrees of importance that are attributed in those individuals who—provided they can afford the unitary price—are respectively ready to demand all or part of some respective hypothetical or real offered quantity of the concerned genre of good or service). The indirect dependence of the practiced unitary price on use value, nonetheless, is no dependence, whether direct or indirect, on foundational demand. Given some abstract labor, saving, and indirect adjustment, and some comparative fatness (i.e., some degree to which the concerned supplier is rapider than is any of his hypothetical or real rivals in the concerned supply field), the higher the total degree of temporal preference, the higher the practiced unitary price.
Price imputation theory is that field of economics that addresses the issue of knowing whether the global selling or leasing price is imputed, whether only or notably, from the global cost of supply, or whether the latter is imputed, whether only or notably, from the former, or whether the latter is no more imputed, whether only or notably, from the former than the former is imputed, whether only or notably, from the latter. Murray Rothbard’s approach to price imputation, developed in Man, Economy, and State: A treatise on economic principles, can be put as follows: in a capitalist economy, and both at general equilibrium and outside of general equilibrium, the one who intends to handle (and launch) the supply process of some future quantity of some genre of good or service anticipates, on the one hand, the imputation of some global selling or leasing price at which the quantity he intends to supply will be integrally demanded; on the other hand, the imputation of some global cost of supply that will be below that global selling or leasing price. Both imputations, when made outside of general equilibrium, will be made in a way that jointly consists of locating the trade value at a level below the importance attributed in the concerned supplier and above the use value in the concerned demanders; and of equalizing the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready and able to demand at the imputed unitary price. Those points are borrowed from Menger’s Principles of Economics; but Rothbard’s approach to price imputation adds the following. At general equilibrium, Rothbard’s approach to price imputation says, both imputations will be made in the same way they’re made outside of general equilibrium; but, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes the global selling or leasing prices respectively imputed to the respective involved quantities of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service to be imputed in a way that consists for the sum of those prices to be imputed, notably, from the selling or leasing price of that quantity which, of some genre of good or service, the supplier is supplying. In other words, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes the global cost of supply to be imputed, notably, from the global selling or leasing price. At general equilibrium, the approach pursues, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes the way the global cost of supply is imputed to consist for that cost of being below the global selling or leasing price, and of being below in a way that consists of remunerating positively (the whole of) the supplier’s saving, but of remunerating in a null way (the whole of) the supplier’s handling of the supply process. In other words, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes supply interest to be positive, but adjustment profit to be null.
Alfred Marshall’s approach to price imputation, developed in his own Principles of Economics, exactly goes like that of Rothbard, except at the two following levels: as concerns what happens, at general equilibrium, of the way trade value is determined outside of general equilibrium, that way, Marshall’s approach to price imputation says, ceases to be ongoing at general equilibrium. As concerns the relationship, at general equilibrium, between the global cost of supply and the global selling or leasing price, the certainty, at general equilibrium, about the future imputed unitary prices, Marshall’s approach to price imputation pursues, causes the global selling or leasing price of some supplied quantity to be imputed in a way that consists for that price of being imputed, notably, from the sum of those global selling or leasing prices respectively imputed to the respective involved quantities of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service. In other words, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes the global selling or leasing price to be imputed, notably, from the global cost of supply. At general equilibrium, that approach pursues, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes the way the global selling or leasing price is imputed to consist for that price of being above that cost, and of being above in a way that consists of remunerating positively (the whole of) the supplier’s saving, but of remunerating in a null way (the whole of) the supplier’s handling of the supply process. In other words, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes supply interest to be positive, but adjustment profit to be null. While, in Rothbard’s approach to price imputation, the global cost of supply, at general equilibrium, is imputed, notably, from the global selling or leasing price, not the other way around, the global selling or leasing price, in Marshall’s approach to price imputation, is, at general equilibrium, imputed, notably, from the global cost of supply, not the other way around. As concerns those respective imputations which, of the global cost of supply and of the global selling or leasing price, take place at general equilibrium, both theories converge, nonetheless, in the claim that, at general equilibrium, the certainty about the future imputed unitary prices causes one of those two imputations to be made, notably, from that price resulting of the other imputation, and to be made in a way that results into the equality between the global selling or leasing price and the sum of supply interest (and some supply interest remunerating the whole of the supplier’s saving) and of the global cost of supply.
Both theories are wrong. In a capitalist economy, both at general equilibrium and outside of general equilibrium, the global selling or leasing price is, neither imputed in a way consisting of equalizing (through the imputed unitary price) the supplied quantity and that one stands ready and able to demand, nor imputed in a way consisting of locating the trade value at an intermediate level between the use value in the demanders and the importance attributed in the supplier, nor imputed in a way consisting of determining the global selling or leasing price from the global cost of supply (and as equal to that costs plus supply interest) or the global cost of supply from the global selling or leasing price (and as equal to that price minus supply interest). Instead, in a capitalist economy, both at general equilibrium and outside of general equilibrium, the global selling or leasing price is imputed in a way consisting of expressing in monetary terms that sum of labor value, saving value, and adjustment value that is trade value. The certainty about the future imputed unitary prices, while it is as much characteristic of general equilibrium as are the complete remuneration of the supplier’s saving through supply interest or the equality between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply plus supply interest, is no (direct) cause for any of those two other characteristics. That certainty is no cause, either, for what would be the imputation of the global cost of supply from the global selling or leasing price minus supply interest, or the imputation of the global selling or leasing price from the global cost of supply plus supply interest.
The certainty about the future imputed unitary prices doesn’t cause the global selling or leasing price to be imputed from the global cost of supply, including in a way that would consist for that price of being equal to that cost plus supply interest. That certainty doesn’t cause, either, the global cost of supply to be imputed from the global selling or leasing price, including in a way that would consist for that cost of being equal to that price minus supply interest. The cause of the presence, at general equilibrium, of some equality between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply plus supply interest lies in the null character, at general equilibrium, of all direct adjustment values. The same applies to the cause of the presence, at general equilibrium, of some complete remuneration of the supplier’s saving through supply interest: whenever the direct adjustment value is null or positive, supply interest and virtual supply interest are, indeed, equalized. Whenever the demanded quantities and the associated practiced unitary prices—and the supplied quantities and an integrally demanded situation for each of the supplied quantities—are identically, diachronically repeated, that repetition alone causes no certainty about the future imputed unitary prices. While that repetition is characteristic, indeed, of general equilibrium (and is characteristic only of general equilibrium), and that certainty is also characteristic, indeed, of general equilibrium (and is characteristic only of general equilibrium), the following conjunction is the cause of that certainty that is witnessed at general equilibrium: namely the conjunction between that repetition and the fact that the final unitary prices (i.e., those unitary prices that are linked to null corresponding adjustment values) have been previously reached. Any preexistent, manifest opportunity for some positive adjustment profit, when taking place outside of general equilibrium, is manifest in a mode that consists for the level of the future imputed unitary price of not being known precisely; ditto for the level of the future adjustment profit, and that of the future supply interest. On contrary, when taking place at general equilibrium, any preexistent, manifest opportunity for some positive adjustment profit is manifest in a mode that consists for the level of the future imputed unitary price of being known precisely; ditto for the level of the future adjustment profit, and that of the future supply interest.
The entrepreneurial supplier’s power to make use of those respective quantities (of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service) he is involving with that supply process he is handling is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the entrepreneurial supplier’s power to deliver the services of those involved quantities (i.e., the services of the involved capital). The remuneration of the power to deliver the services of the involved quantities of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service (i.e., some genres of capital good or service), likewise, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the remuneration of those involved quantities; the remuneration of those involved quantities, likewise, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the remuneration of the services of those involved quantities. In Menger’s approach to supply interest (i.e., in Menger’s approach to that genre of interest that concerns that saving some supplier proceeds with), which reduces supply interest to that supply interest that concerns some entrepreneurial supplier, supply interest is that part of the margin between the global cost of supply and the global selling or leasing price that remunerates, completely, the entrepreneur’s power to make use of those respective quantities (of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service) he involved with that supply process he handled. In Menger’s approach to supply interest, besides, the cause for such part of the margin between the global cost of supply and the global selling or leasing price lies in the conjunction of two facts the approach in question alleges: on the other hand, the fact that some entrepreneur will launch some (entrepreneurial) supply process if (and only if) the global selling or leasing price he anticipates is above the global cost of supply he anticipates, and—as the global selling or leasing price is in a position to be—above in a way that completely, only remunerates his handling of the supply process, as well as his power to make use of those respective quantities which, of some genres of capital good or service, will have been involved with the supply process. On the other hand, the fact that any trade value—including in the case of those supplied quantities that are quantities of some genres of production or paraproduction good or service—is both located at a level that is below use value and above the importance attributed in the supplier; and situated at a level for which the corresponding unitary price is an equilibrium unitary price.
In Menger’s approach to supply interest, in other words, while some entrepreneur will demand some respective quantities (of some genres of capital good or service) in the framework of some (entrepreneurial) supply process if (and only if) the anticipated margin between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply—as such margin is, indeed, in a position to do—completely, only contains some part that is some complete remuneration of his handling of the supply process, and, besides, some part that is some complete remuneration of his power to make use of those quantities, any supplied quantity of some genre of capital good or service, just like any supplied quantity of some genre of good or service, will be integrally demanded, and demanded at some unitary price at which the supplied quantity and that one stands ready and able to demand at the price in question are equal to each other. From those two premises, Menger’s approach to supply interest infers, logically, that any global selling or leasing price will contain some part that completely, only remunerates the entrepreneur’s power to make use of the involved quantities of some genres of capital good or service. Those two premises are forming a necessary, sufficient condition in order for the inferred claim to be true. Böhm-Bawerk, in Capital and Interest, criticized Menger’s approach to supply interest as follows: only some good or service, that critique says, can have some money remuneration and, precisely, no relationship between someone and some good or service is some good or service. Accordingly, that critique pursues, no money remuneration can be for the relationship between some supplier and those respective quantities that, of some genres of good or service, are involved with his supply process.
Unlike with what Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism of Menger’s approach to supply interest claims, that relationship that, for some entrepreneur, consists of being in a position to make use of those respective quantities (of some genres of capital good or service) that are involved with his supply process, has some money remuneration. That remuneration, nonetheless, doesn’t take place through some part of the global selling or leasing price nor does it through that price (taken in its entirety); it instead takes place through the global cost of supply (taken in its entirety). Despite the misplaced character of Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism of Menger’s approach to supply interest, the approach in question remains wrong. Both premises in Menger’s approach to supply interest, indeed, are wrong. On the one hand, some entrepreneur will, indeed, demand (i.e., buy or rent) some respective quantities of some genres of capital good or service only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the global cost of supply, and he will expect, indeed, the margin between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply to contain some part that is a money remuneration for the whole of his saving; but he may (just like he may not) deem such money remuneration to be distinct (rather than indistinct) from the money remuneration of his power to make use of the respective involved quantities (of some genres of capital good or service). The global selling or leasing price, besides, isn’t in a position to contain (or to be completely) some money remuneration, whether complete or partial, of the power in question: such money remuneration, instead, only happens (and can only happen) through the global cost of supply (taken in its entirety). In other words, the money remuneration for the power to make use of the services of capital isn’t paid by the demanders of (all or part of) the (entrepreneurially) supplied quantity to the (entrepreneurial) supplier of that quantity: it is paid, instead, by the (entrepreneurial) supplier to those (other) suppliers from which he is renting or buying some respective quantities of some genres of capital good or service.
On the other hand, trade value isn’t determined in such a way as to be situated at a level below use value (in the demanders) and above the importance attributed in the supplier; nor is it in such a way as to be linked to some unitary price that is an equilibrium price. If trade value were determined in such a way as to be situated at a level below use value (in the demanders) and above the importance attributed in the supplier, then, whenever some supplied quantity (of some genre of good or service) has some use value lower than that of some other supplied quantity (of the same—or some other—genre of good or service), the trade value of the former quantity would be also lower than that of the latter quantity. As noted above, the alleged fact such implication puts is inconsistent with the following (universal) thymologic trend: namely that, ceteris paribus, whenever some supplied quantity of some genre of good or service, while having some use value lower than that of some supplied quantity of some other genre of good or service, finds itself costlier in abstract labor than is the latter quantity, the demanders of the former quantity may be (just like they may be not) willing to pay some unitary price that covers the involved abstract labor and which, accordingly, renders the trade value of the former quantity greater than that of the latter quantity. The same applies when both quantities are of the same genre of good or service, or when abstract saving (rather than abstract labor) or both abstract saving and labor (rather than only abstract labor) are referred to. If trade value were still determined in a way that consists of locating trade value above the importance attributed in the supplier and below use value, such way of determining trade value would allow, indeed, any entrepreneur (whether he handled the supply process properly) to sell or lease (all or part of) the supplied quantity at some global price that, as anticipated, is above the global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for some part (of the global selling or leasing price) to remunerate, positively, the (whole of the) entrepreneur’s saving. The money remuneration such way of determining trade value would allow for (the whole of) some entrepreneur’s saving, which would take place through some part of the global selling or leasing price (whether the supply process was handled properly), would, nonetheless, remain distinct (rather than indistinct) from the money remuneration for the power to make use of the involved capital.
Nassau William Senior, John Elliott Cairnes, and Frédéric Bastiat have similar approaches to trade value—including as concerns that part of trade value of which supply interest is the money expression. In Senior’s approach to trade value, which can be found in An Outline of the Science of Political Economy, trade value is determined as follows: on the one hand, from the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price; on the other hand, from the sum of abstract labor and abstract saving. Also, in Senior’s approach to trade value, direct abstract saving—independently of the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price—remains complete after that addition which, of abstract labor and abstract saving, takes place within trade value. Trade value, that approach says, is equal to (rather than situated around) or, instead, situated around (rather than equal to) the sum of abstract labor and abstract saving depending on how is the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price. The global cost of supply, that approach pursues, is the money expression of the sum of abstract labor and indirect abstract saving. Whenever the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price are equal to each other, that approach pursues, trade value is equal to the sum of abstract labor and abstract saving and, accordingly, profit, for its part, is both positive and equal to supply interest. Whenever the supplied quantity is exceeding that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, the approach pursues, trade value is below the sum of abstract labor and abstract saving and, accordingly, profit, for its part, is both negative and lower than supply interest. Whenever the supplied quantity is both inferior to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price and equal to that quantity that is demanded at the practiced unitary price, the approach pursues, trade value is above the sum of abstract labor and abstract saving and, accordingly, profit, for its part, is both positive and higher than supply interest.
The degree to which some supplier is removing all or part of his income from consumption and consumption-hoarding is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which some supplier is abstaining from consumption and consumption-hoarding. Likewise, the duration for which some supplier is removing all or part of his income from consumption and consumption-hoarding is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the duration for which some supplier is waiting before dedicating to consumption and consumption-hoarding some amount which, of his income, he is removing from consumption and consumption-hoarding. The degree to which some supplier is taking some risk is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the degree to which some supplier is striving to seize some hidden opportunity, whether preexistent, for positive or null adjustment profit. Abstract saving (i.e., saving taken from the angle of those characteristics that are taken into account within trade value), in Senior’s approach to trade value, lies in the sum of those degrees of abstinence from consumption that are associated with the supply process (i.e., in the sum of those respective degrees to which some incomes have been removed from consumption). Cairnes’s approach to trade value, which can be found in Some Leading Principles of Political Economy, newly Expounded, goes like Senior’s approach, except at the following level: in Cairnes’s approach, abstract saving, instead of lying only in the degree of abstinence from consumption, both lies in the sum of the degrees of abstinence and in the sum of the degrees of risk-taking. As for Bastiat’s approach to trade value, which can be found in Harmonies of Political Economy, it goes like Senior’s approach, except at the two following levels: on the one hand, trade value, in Bastiat’s approach, instead of taking into account abstract labor, takes into account that abstract labor that is saved in the demanders (i.e., that abstract labor that the demanders, if, collectively, they had taken charge of the supply process themselves, would have had to involve with the supply process in question). On the other hand, abstract saving, in Bastiat’s approach to trade value, instead of lying in the sum of the degrees of abstinence, lies in the sum of the degrees of waiting. In the three cases, supply interest is the money remuneration of direct abstract saving and the latter, after the addition of abstract labor and abstract saving within trade value, remains complete; but direct abstract saving respectively lies in the degree of the supplier’s abstinence (in the case of Senior’s approach to trade value), in the degree of the supplier’s abstinence and risk-taking (in the case of Cairnes’s approach to trade value), and in the degree of the supplier’s waiting (in the case of Bastiat’s approach to trade value).
Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism against the approach to supply interest as some money remuneration for all or part of those properties in the entrepreneur’s saving (with each of the concerned properties taken in its whole) is as follows: if all or part of those properties in the supplier’s saving were to be taken into account within trade value, those properties which would be taken into account within trade value would be taken into account within some part (of trade value) which would find its money expression in the coverage of (the prior payment of) the global cost of supply. In other words, if some properties (in the entrepreneur’s saving) like the degree of abstinence or the degree of waiting were to be taken into account within trade value, the money remuneration for the entrepreneur’s saving would be indistinct (rather than distinct) from the coverage of (the prior payment of) the global cost of supply. Accordingly, Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism pursues, the money remuneration for the entrepreneur’s saving cannot lie in the money remuneration for some properties in the entrepreneur’s saving: properties like the entrepreneur’s degree of abstinence or degree of waiting. Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism, here again, is misplaced. If—as is indeed the case—all or part of those properties in the supplier’s saving were to be taken into account within trade value, the coverage of the (prior payment of the) global cost of supply would take into account all or part of those properties in that saving which the supplier, instead of proceeding with himself, inherits, but none of those properties in that saving which the supplier, instead of inheriting, proceeds with himself. As for supply interest, it would be distinct (rather than indistinct) from the coverage of (the prior payment of) the global cost of supply and would take into account all or part of those properties in that saving which the supplier, instead of inheriting, proceeds with himself, but none of those in that saving which the supplier, instead of proceeding with himself, inherits. In the actual money expression of trade value, the coverage of (the prior payment of) the global cost of supply is thus no money remuneration for direct abstract saving: it is some money remuneration, instead, for the sum of indirect abstract saving and of direct and indirect abstract labor.
Senior’s approach to trade value is mistaken at these five levels: firstly, Senior’s approach to trade value mistakenly conceives of saving as lying (only) in removing all or part of one’s income from consumption. Saving instead lies in removing all or part of one’s income both from consumption and consumption-hoarding. Secondly, Senior’s approach to trade value mistakenly reduces the components of trade value to those components that are abstract labor and abstract saving: it fails to notice, accordingly, that other component of trade value that is abstract adjustment. Thirdly, Senior’s approach to trade value conceives of supply interest as the money remuneration of direct abstract saving taken in its entirety: supply interest, instead, is the money remuneration of what remains of direct abstract saving after the components of trade value have been added to each other. Direct abstract saving, after the addition in question, may remain complete just like it may be affected. Fourthly, Senior’s approach to trade value fails to notice all the actual properties of abstract saving: while noticing the degree of abstinence (i.e., the degree to which some supplier’s income is saved), it misses, indeed, the degree of waiting (i.e., the duration of all or part of some supplier’s income’s saving) and the degree of aversion (i.e., the degree to which some supplier, while lowering the degree of his preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding, is lowering the degree in question—and proceeding with that genre of saving that is associated with the handling of some supply process—reluctantly). Fifthly, Senior’s approach to trade value mistakenly conceives of the relationship of supply to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price as having some (direct) effect on trade value. The relationship in question, actually, doesn’t have any effect, whether direct or indirect, on trade value. Those five mistakes can be found, also, in Cairnes’s approach to trade value: except, as concerns the properties of abstract saving, Cairnes’s approach to trade value reduces those properties to the degree of abstinence and the degree of risk-taking. The degree of risk-taking, actually, isn’t taken into account within abstract saving: the degree of aversion with which some risk, in the framework of some supply process one is handling, is taken is, instead, some determiner of the degree of aversion with proceeding over that genre of saving that is associated with the handling of some supply process. Bastiat’s approach to trade value also displays the same mistakes I noted in Cairnes’s approach to trade value: besides those mistakes, another one that can be found in Bastiat’s approach to trade value is that, in the approach in question, the saved abstract labor, instead of abstract labor, is taken into account within trade value. Abstract labor, not the saved abstract labor, is actually taken into account within trade value.
In Menger’s approach to trade value, trade value is determined in a way that—while involving, neither abstract labor, nor abstract adjustment, nor indirect abstract saving—consists of situating trade value at a level that is both located below use value and above the attributed importance in the supplier, and linked to some practiced unitary price that is an equilibrium unitary price. In Menger’s approach to trade value, the way trade value locates trade value between use value and the attributed importance in the supplier is some way (of doing so) that takes into account some property in the entrepreneur’s saving: namely the power that is given—through buying or renting the involved quantities of some genres of supply good or service—to make use of the involved quantities of some genres of supply good or service. In Menger’s approach to trade value, accordingly, the way trade value locates trade value between use value and the attributed importance in the supplier is some way (of doing so) that is indistinct (rather than distinct) from a way of determining trade value that takes into account direct abstract saving. In Marshall’s approach to trade value, trade value, when determined outside of general equilibrium, is determined in a way that—while involving, neither abstract labor, nor abstract adjustment, nor indirect abstract saving—consists of situating trade value at a level that is both located below use value and above the attributed importance in the supplier, and linked to some practiced unitary price that is an equilibrium unitary price. In Marshall’s approach to trade value, the way trade value—when the latter is determined outside of general equilibrium—locates trade value between use value and the attributed importance in the supplier is some way (of doing so) that takes into account some property in the entrepreneur’s saving: namely the degree of waiting. In Marshall’s approach to trade value, accordingly, the determination of trade value—when occurring outside of general equilibrium—takes into account direct abstract saving and the way that determination takes into account direct abstract saving, in turn, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from some way of locating trade value below use value and above the attributed importance in the supplier. As concerns the determination of trade value at general equilibrium, that determination, in Marshall’s approach to trade value, occurs in a way that has nothing identical to the way it occurs outside of general equilibrium: at general equilibrium, trade value, instead, is determined in a way that consists for trade value of matching some money expression that is a global selling or leasing price imputed from the global cost of supply plus supply interest. In Marshall’s approach to trade value, accordingly, the determination of trade value—when occurring at general equilibrium—takes into account that money expression of direct abstract saving that is supply interest, but takes into account, neither direct abstract saving, nor indirect abstract saving, nor the money expression of indirect abstract saving.
An economic entity or property is an entity or property that, in one way or another, concerns economic behavior. Some real (genre of) economic entity or property other than price—and some nominal (genre of) economic entity or property other than price—are respectively some (genre of economic) entity or property that is other than price, and which is taken from the angle of its material existence; and some (genre of) economic entity or property that is other than price, and which is taken from the angle of that money value that is assigned to it. That (genre of) entity or property that is wealth is some real (genre of) economic entity or property: namely that real (genre of) economic entity or property that (strictly) covers any good or service considered from the angle of its material existence. Money income—and that money income that is drawn from some action—are respectively that total sum of money someone happens to enjoy (whether he is lent all or part of that sum); and, in some money income (i.e., in someone’s money income), that amount that is some sum of money that is drawn from some action like, for instance, some genre of saving. “The money income from some good or service” is a convenient way of designating that money income that, from some action involving some good or supply, is drawn: like, for instance, that money income that is drawn from some supplier’s saving or that money income that is drawn from some supplier’s handling of the concerned supply process. The money income from some entrepreneurial supplier’s saving is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the remuneration of all or part of some entrepreneurial supplier’s saving; that remuneration, in turn, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the money expression of what remains—in some entrepreneurially supplied quantity’s trade value—of direct abstract saving after the three components of the trade value in question have been added to each other. Supply interest in the money expression of some entrepreneurially supplied quantity’s trade value, accordingly, is both the money income from—and the remuneration of all or part of—the concerned entrepreneurial supplier’s saving.
The degree of importance some group of individuals attributes to some present goal (to be reached) is the sum of the respective degrees of importance attributed (in those individuals) to the goal in question; ditto for the degree of importance some group of individuals attributes to some past goal that was reached, or the degree of importance some group of individuals attributes to the means considered for some present goal. In Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, the latter is proportional, positively, to the degree of gap (in some supplier) between the present importance attributed to that goal that is the supplied quantity now that the goal in question has been reached (i.e., once that quantity that was to be supplied has been produced and brought to the market) and the past importance attributed to those means that were about to be employed (or were being employed) for that goal when the latter remained to be reached (i.e., when that quantity that was to be supplied remained to be supplied); that gap, in turn, is equal to (and determined from) the gap (in the concerned supplier) between the present importance attributed to the quantity-goal now that the goal in question has been reached and the past importance attributed to the quantity-goal when the goal in question remained to be reached. The latter gap, in turn, is equal to (and determined from) the total degree to which the supplied quantity’s demanders have been ready to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity; the degree in question, in turn, is (systemically) positive. The five premises on which Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest relies, which are forming a necessary, sufficient condition (in order for that approach to be true), are as follows. Firstly, an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling.Secondly, trade value is determined in such way as to be located below use value and above the attributed importance in the supplier; and as to be associated with some unitary price that is an equilibrium price. Thirdly, any goal—so long as it hasn’t been reached yet—is attributed some importance equal (and determined as equal) to that attributed to those means that are about to be (or are being) employed for that goal; but the goal in question, once it has been reached, is retrospectively attributed some importance greater than that which was attributed to the goal in question when the latter was non-reached, and accordingly greater than the importance that—when the goal hadn’t been reached yet—was attributed to those means that, for that goal, were about to be (or were being) employed. Fourthly, after any (successful) action which, for some individual or group of individuals, consisted of launching, then handling, some supply process, then demanding the (whole of the) supplied quantity, the gap between the present importance attributed to the reached goal (i.e., the supplied quantity) and the past importance attributed to the non-reached goal (i.e., the non-supplied quantity that was to be supplied) is (determined as) equal to the (total) degree of temporal preference in that or those demanders; the degree in question, in turn, is positive. Supply interest—in the global selling or leasing price of that supplied quantity that is the result of such action—is positively proportional, for its part, to that degree of gap that is (determined as) equal to the (total) degree of temporal preference. Supply interest only takes place in the framework of such action—or in the framework of such action’s simulation. Fifthly, any entrepreneur is in a position to attribute some respective importance to the goal to be reached (i.e., the quantity to be supplied), and to that goal once it has been reached (i.e., to the quantity once it has been supplied), in a way that simulates that gap which, between the present importance attributed to the supplied quantity and the past importance attributed to that quantity when it was yet to be supplied, would be present in the supplied quantity’s demanders if the latter, collectively, had taken charge of the supply process themselves.
In Guido Hülsmann’s approach to supply interest, which can be found in “A Theory of Interest,” supply interest—such as anticipated in some entrepreneur—is proportional, positively, to the degree of gap (in the concerned entrepreneur) between the present importance attributed to that goal that is the supplied quantity now that the goal in question has been reached (i.e., once that quantity that was to be supplied has been produced and brought to the market) and the past importance attributed to those means that were to be employed (or were being employed) for that goal when the latter remained to be reached (i.e., when that quantity that was to be supplied remained to be supplied); that gap, in turn, is equal to (and determined from) the gap between the past importance attributed to the quantity-goal when the goal in question remained to be reached and the past importance attributed to those quantities-means that were to be employed (or were being employed) for that goal when the goal in question remained to be reached. The latter gap, in turn, is unrelated to how that gap would be if the supplied quantity’s demanders had taken charge themselves, collectively, of the supplied quantity’s supply process; it is also unrelated to the (total) degree of temporal preference in the demanders. Depending on adjustment profit, that actual supply interest the entrepreneur is paid will be equal to—or, instead, lower than—the anticipated supply interest; supply interest may be null. The five premises on which Hülsmann’s approach to supply interest relies, which are forming a necessary, sufficient condition (in order for that approach to be true), are as follows. Firstly, an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling. Secondly, some action will be undertaken on that necessary, sufficient condition that the goal is deemed more interesting than are the means; the anticipated supply interest is that anticipated remuneration that renders the quantity-goal in some entrepreneurial action more interesting than are the quantities-means that are about to be (or are being) employed for that goal. Thirdly, trade value is determined in such way as to be located below use value and above the attributed importance in the supplier; and as to be associated with some unitary price that is an equilibrium price. Fourthly, some goal, once it has been reached, is retrospectively attributed some importance equal to that which was attributed to the goal in question when the latter was non-reached, and accordingly greater than the importance that—when the goal hadn’t been reached yet—was attributed to those means that, for that goal, were about to be (or were being) employed. Fifthly, adjustment profit is, either positive, or negative, or null, and the entrepreneur may err in his anticipation of adjustment profit. The level of supply interest is determined as what—in function of adjustment profit—remains of that level supply interest would have had if supply interest had been equal to anticipated supply interest.
In Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, the (total) degree of temporal preference in the demanders of some supplied quantity is (systemically) positive by reason of some thymologic trend universal in human behavior: namely that some imminent enjoyment of some quantity (of some genre of good or service) finds itself—whether completely or to some extent—preferred over some enjoyment of the latter at any ulterior point. In Hülsmann’s approach to supply interest, some goal (to be reached) is attributed some importance greater than is that attributed to those means that are about to be (or are being) employed for that goal by reason of some praxeological law: namely that such gap is a necessary, sufficient condition in order for those means to be employed for that goal (i.e., in order for the action to be proceeded with). In Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, the entrepreneurial supplier does some simulation which allows him to ensure that some part in profit in the supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression is some money remuneration for the whole of that saving he proceeded with in the supply process’s framework; and that the other part in the profit in question is some money remuneration for the whole of his handling of the supply process. The object of the simulation in question is the gap which, between that importance attributed to the quantity-goal once it has been reached and that importance attributed to the quantity-goal while it was yet to be reached, would be found in the supplied quantity’s demanders if they, collectively, had taken charge of the supply process themselves: a gap which would have been equal to (and determined from) the (total) degree of temporal preference in the demanders. The entrepreneur, in Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, acts, precisely, as a relay for the (total) degree of temporal preference in the supplied quantity’s demanders. In Hülsmann’s approach to supply interest, the entrepreneur acts no more as some relay of temporal preference than he does some simulation of how the supply process, if, collectively, taken in charge by the demanders themselves, would have been. Also, while, in Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, the latter is systemically positive, supply interest, in Hülsmann’s approach to the latter, is, either positive, or null. In both approaches to supply interest, nonetheless, the latter is unrelated to direct abstract saving, i.e., isn’t determined in a way that would involve the supplier’s saving taken from the angle of some properties (in the saving in question) which would be taken into account within trade value.
In Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest, those respective insights that supply interest, while proportional, positively, to the gap between the importance presently attributed to the reached quantity-goal and that which was attributed to the quantities-means for that quantity-goal’s purpose, is proportional, positively, to the supply process’s duration, and that the duration in question is proportional, positively, to the degree of roundaboutness in the supply process, won’t be addressed here. In Fetter’s approach to actualization, which shall be addressed a few lines below, Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest is supposed—except at these two levels. On the one hand, the fact some imminent enjoyment of some quantity (of some genre of good or service) finds itself—whether completely or to some extent—preferred over some enjoyment of the latter at any ulterior point still underlies the positivity of the (total) degree of temporal preference, but, this time, falls within some instinctual pattern (instead of being some thymologic trend). On the other hand, supply interest, while remaining proportional, positively, to the gap between the importance presently attributed to the reached quantity-goal and that which was attributed to the quantities-means for that quantity-goal’s purpose, is no more proportional to the supply process’s duration. Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to supply interest is flawed as follows: all the premises in that approach, except for the first one, are wrong. Any goal—so long as it hasn’t been reached yet—is attributed, indeed, some importance equal (and determined as equal) to that attributed to those means that are about to be (or are being) employed for that goal; but the goal in question, once it has been reached, is retrospectively attributed some importance that cannot be greater than that which was attributed to the goal in question when the latter was non-reached. In any action, the goal to be reached and those means that are about to be (or are being) employed for the goal in question are attributed the same importance; but, after any action which reached the pursued goal, the reached goal is, either attributed some importance equal to that which was attributed to the goal to be reached, or attributed some importance lower than that which was attributed to the goal to be reached. After any successful action (i.e., any action which reached the pursued goal), likewise, the gap between the present importance attributed to the reached goal and the past importance attributed to the non-reached goal is unrelated to the degree to which that or those individuals who proceeded with the action in question had been standing ready to reach the goal imminently (rather than at any ulterior moment); that applies to that action which, for some individual or group of individuals, consists of launching, then handling, some supply process, then demanding the (whole of the) supplied quantity.
No entrepreneur is in a position to simulate the importance that would be attributed to the reached quantity-goal (once the goal in question has been reached), or that which would have been attributed to the quantity-goal (when the goal in question was yet to be reached), if the supplied quantity’s demanders, collectively, were taking charge of the supply process themselves. If, indeed, some entrepreneur were in a position to do such simulation, the gap that (between those degrees of importance which would be respectively attributed to the reached quantity-goal and attributed to the quantity-goal to be reached) would be witnessed would remain, either negative, or null. If, indeed, supply interest were proportional to the gap between the importance presently attributed to some reached quantity-goal and the importance that was attributed to that quantity-goal (when the goal in question was yet to be reached), and the gap in question were (determined as) equal to the (total) degree of temporal preference (in the supplied quantity’s demanders), then the gap between the importance presently attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the importance that was attributed to those means that were about to be (or were being) employed for the purpose of that quantity-goal (when the goal in question was yet to be reached) would be, either null, or negative, and the same would apply to supply interest. It is true that an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling. The way some entrepreneur can ensure that some part in the supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression serves as some money remuneration for the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving, nonetheless, is not through simulating the degree of gap that, between the importance presently attributed to the reached quantity-goal and that which was attributed to the quantity-goal to be reached, would have taken place if the supplied quantity’s demanders, collectively, had taken charge of the supply process themselves. In other words, it is not through exhibiting some degree of gap which, while taking place between the present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the importance that was attributed to the quantity-goal to be reached, is equal to the degree of temporal preference in the supplied quantity’s demanders. The way some entrepreneur can ensure that some part in the supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression serves as some money remuneration for the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving, instead, is through practicing some global selling or leasing price in which that part that is the direct saving value’s money expression (i.e., that part that is supply interest) is equal to how that part would be if, after the addition of the three components of trade value, the direct saving value would remain unaffected (i.e., is equal to virtual supply interest).
Hülsmann’s approach to supply interest, for its part, is flawed as follows: the five premises on which it relies, apart from the first one and the fifth one, are all wrong. It is true, again, that an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling; the fact still remains that entrepreneurial action doesn’t find any condition (whether necessary—and whether sufficient) in some gap between the present importance attributed to some quantity-goal and the past importance attributed to the quantities-means. In any action (whether entrepreneurial), the importance assigned to the goal to be reached is equal to (rather than superior to) the importance assigned to the means that are about to be (or are being) employed for that goal. The necessary, sufficient condition in order for some means to be employed for some goal (i.e., in order for some action to be proceeded with) isn’t that the goal is attributed more importance than are the means; that condition, instead, is that the goal is attributed some importance and that no choice can be made between the goal and the means. In other words, whenever some individual is employing some means for some goal, he is attributing some equal importance to the goal in question and to the means in question; but, faced with the impossibility of reaching the goal directly (i.e., without the mediation of some means), he is obliged to resort to those means he is employing if he is to reach that goal to which he is attributing some importance. The necessary, sufficient condition in order for some entrepreneurial action to be proceeded with is that the anticipated supply interest is positive and, besides, that the anticipated adjustment profit is positive or null, thus allowing for the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving to be remunerated through supply interest.
It is true that adjustment profit is, either positive, or negative, or null, and that the entrepreneur may err in his anticipation of adjustment profit and, accordingly, get some supply interest lower than expected or even null; the fact still remains that supply interest—if adjustment profit were null or positive and supply interest itself were equal to the anticipated supply interest, and the latter were proportional to the difference between the present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the past importance attributed to the quantities-means for the goal-quantity to be reached—would be null or negative. The present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal, instead of being (systematically) equal to the past importance attributed to the quantity-goal to be reached, is, either equal to the past attributed importance, or inferior to the past attributed importance. Accordingly, if, indeed, the anticipated supply interest were proportional to the difference between the present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the past importance attributed to the quantities-means for the quantity-goal to be reached, then that difference to which supply interest would be proportional would be, either null (when some equal importance is attributed to the reached quantity-goal and to the quantity-goal to be reached), or negative (when the importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal is lower than that attributed to the quantity-goal to be reached). The anticipated supply interest itself, if it were proportional to the difference between the present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the past importance attributed to the quantities-means for the quantity-goal to be reached, would be null or negative. The supply interest anticipated in some entrepreneur, instead of being proportional to the degree of gap between the present importance attributed to the reached quantity-goal and the past importance attributed to those quantities-means that were to be employed (or were being employed) for the quantity-goal to be reached, is equal to (and determined from) the money expression of direct abstract saving, i.e., the money expression of the entrepreneur’s saving taken from the angle of those properties (of his saving) that are taken into account within trade value. Trade value is the sum of abstract labor, abstract saving, and abstract adjustment.
The issue of knowing the origin of some entrepreneur’s search for profit (including that part of profit that is supply interest) is to be distinguished from the issue of knowing the origin of profit (including that part of profit that is supply interest). In Menger, the claim that an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling, is justified on the basis of the following claim. Namely: in any action, including entrepreneurial, the importance attributed to the (sum of the) means that are about to be (or are being) employed for the pursued goal is equal to the importance attributed to the goal in question; in the case of entrepreneurial action, the means are some involved quantities (of some genres of supply good or service) and, besides, some saving and handling (which are added to those quantities). In Böhm-Bawerk, the former claim is also justified on the basis of the latter claim, except at the following level: the means, in the case of entrepreneurial action, are only the involved quantities (of some genres of supply good or service); the conjunction of the entrepreneur’s saving and handling are indistinct (rather than distinct) from the use of those involved quantities. In Menger, supply interest is explained as finding its origin in direct abstract saving; the latter, is turn, is identified to the power to make use of the involved quantities of some genres of supply good or service. In Böhm-Bawerk, supply interest is differently explained: namely as finding its origin in some conjunction that is as follows. Namely: an entrepreneur, when proceeding with his entrepreneurial action, simulates how his entrepreneurial action would be if the demanders were (demanding the whole of the supplied quantity and) taking charge of the supply process themselves; if the demanders (of the whole of the supplied quantity) were taking charge of the supply process themselves, then, while the pursued quantity-goal would be attributed some importance equal to that attributed to the quantities-means, the reached quantity-goal would be attributed some importance greater than that assigned to the pursued quantity-goal, and that gap in the attributed degrees of importance would be itself determined as equal to the degree of temporal preference. Whether, in Menger, the equality between those degrees of importance respectively assigned to some pursued goal and to the means that are about to be (or are being) employed for the goal in question is some praxeological law or, instead, some thymologic regularity is an issue I won’t address here. Whether, in Böhm-Bawerk, the equality in question is some praxeological law or, instead, some thymologic regularity is an issue I won’t address here either; ditto for the gap between those degrees of importance respectively attributed to the reached quantity-goal and to the pursued quantity-goal, the gap’s dependence on the degree of temporal preference, and that simulation some entrepreneur proceeds with. In Böhm-Bawerk, the degree of temporal preference is (systemically) positive by reason of three thymologic trends that I referred to above.
In Hülsmann, the claim that an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling, is justified on the basis of the following claim. Namely: in any action, including entrepreneurial, the importance attributed to the (sum of the) means that are about to be (or are being) employed for the pursued goal is lower than the importance attributed to the goal in question; in the case of entrepreneurial action, the means are the involved quantities (of some genres of supply good or service). That conjunction of saving and handling the entrepreneur proceeds with are indistinct (rather than distinct) from his use of the involved quantities; saving, nonetheless, has to be (wholly) remunerated in order for that importance attributed to the entrepreneur’s goal to be greater than that importance attributed to the sum of his means. Also, in Hülsmann, supply interest is explained as finding its origin in what remains of the anticipated supply interest after adjustment profit and the anticipated supply interest have been added to each other; the anticipated supply interest, in turn, is explained as finding its origin in some conjunction that is as follows. Namely: some reached goal (including some reached quantity-goal) is attributed some importance that is equal to that importance the goal in question was attributed when pursued; the sum of those means that were about to be (or were being) employed for some pursued goal (including some pursued quantity-goal) was attributed some importance lower than that importance the pursued goal was attributed. In Hülsmann, the gap between the importance attributed to some pursued goal and the importance attributed to the sum of those means that are about to be (or are being) employed for the pursued goal is some praxeological law rather than some thymologic regularity; so is the equality between the importance attributed to some pursued goal and the importance attributed to that goal once it has been reached. Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Hülsmann, on the origin of the entrepreneur’s search for profit, are respectively partly right, fully right, and fully wrong. Any action (including entrepreneurial) witnesses equality between the importance attributed to the goal and the importance attributed to the (sum of the) means. In the entrepreneurial action, the (involvement of the) involved quantities is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the conjunction of saving and handling; the equality between the importance attributed to the quantity-goal and that attributed to the quantities-means—and the fact that the conjunction of saving and handling is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the involvement of those quantities-means—are the reason why an entrepreneur will launch, and handle, some supply process only if the anticipated global selling or leasing price is above the anticipated global cost of supply, and above in a way that allows for the respective remunerations of the whole of the entrepreneur’s saving and of the whole of the entrepreneur’s handling. Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Hülsmann, on the origin of supply interest, are respectively partly right, fully wrong, and fully wrong. Supply interest finds its origin in the addition of direct abstract saving: it is the money expression (and money remuneration) of what remains of direct abstract saving once the latter and direct abstract adjustment have been added to each other. The properties of direct abstract saving are the degree of abstinence, the degree of waiting, and the degree of aversion in the entrepreneur’s saving.
Logical anteriority and chronological anteriority are respectively the property for some (logically anterior) entity or property of being some necessary condition for some other entity or property; and the property for some (chronological anterior) entity or property of being preexistent to some other entity or property. Actualization is that operation which, through some rate, links a certain money value to some other money value that is logically anterior to it, and which, besides, is, either chronologically anterior to it, or like chronologically anterior to it. An actualization (money) value is some money value which, through some actualization rate applied to some other money value (to which it is both logically and chronologically or like chronologically anterior), is linked to that other money value. Actualization notably admits these six modalities: psychological actualization, i.e., that actualization that links the money income of some saving to some other, lower money value in a way that expresses the degree of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding in the concerned saver; adjustment-profit cancellation, i.e., that actualization that links the trade value’s money expression to the sum of virtual supply interest and of the global cost of supply, and which, accordingly, links the global selling or leasing price to that price minus adjustment profit; interest cancellation, i.e., that actualization that links the money expression of trade value to the sum of adjustment profit and of the global cost of supply, and which, accordingly, links the global selling or leasing price to that price minus virtual supply interest; upstream-upwelling actualization, i.e., that actualization that links the money expression of trade value to the money expression of what trade value would be if trade value had been determined upstream (rather than downstream) the supply process, and which, accordingly, links the global selling or leasing price to that price minus the money expression of abstract adjustment; that actualization simulating the marginal efficiency of capital, i.e., that actualization that equates the actualization value linked to the money expression of some trade value with the global cost of supply; and inflation-adjustment actualization, i.e., that actualization that links some money value to some other money value which, a number of years earlier, would have had the same purchasing power given the level of global money supply back then.
The function opposite to actualization, and that rate at which the function opposite to actualization is accomplished, are respectively accumulation and the accumulation rate. A simple actualization or accumulation rate and a compounded actualization or accumulation rate are respectively an actualization or accumulation rate that, while applied on one or more periods (or like-periods), only takes into account that value from which it starts; and an actualization or accumulation rate that, while applied on several periods (or like-periods), takes into account both that value from which it starts and, at the end of each period (or like-period), the increase or decrease in the concerned value. The respective formula for that actualization with a simple rate and that actualization with a compounded rate—with n, V0, Vn, and rrespectively standing for the number of periods (or like-periods) on which the actualization rate is applied, the logically (and chronologically or like chronologically) anterior value, the logically (and chronologically or like chronologically) posterior value, and the actualization rate—are: V0=Vn/(1+ n x r) and V0=Vn/(1+r)n. The respective formula for that accumulation with a simple rate and that with a compounded rate—with n, V0, Vn, and r respectively standing for the number of periods (or like-periods) on which the actualization rate is applied, the logically (and chronologically or like chronologically) anterior value, the logically (and chronologically or like chronologically) posterior value, and the accumulation rate—are: Vn=V0(1+ n x r) and Vn=V0(1+r)n. A durable unit of some genre of capital good or service (i.e., a durable unit of some genre of production or paraproduction good or service) is, of some genre of capital good or service, a unit that can be involved with several supply processes. The total product of some durable (quantity of some genre of) capital good or service—and the total trade value of the total product of some durable (quantity of some genre of) capital good or service—are respectively the sum of those quantities which, from the beginning of the use some supplier made of some durable (quantity of some genre of) good or service to the end of that use, were supplied with the help of that durable (quantity of that genre of) good or service; and the sum of the respective trade values of those supplied quantities. Whenever some actualization links to some actualization value the money expression of the total trade value of the total product of some durable (quantity of some genre of) capital good or service, the actualization rate that is involved is compounded.
Upstream trade value—and some total product’s upstream total trade value—are respectively what some supplied quantity’s trade value would be if it had been determined upstream (rather than downstream) the supply process; and what some total product’s total trade value would be if the trade values had been determined upstream (rather than downstream) the respective supply processes. A net actualization value, in the case of some trade value, is the product of the subtraction of the global cost of supply from an actualization value that, while linked to some trade value’s money expression, is equal to the global cost of supply plus adjustment profit (i.e., an actualization value that is obtained through that actualization that is interest cancellation). A net actualization value, in the case of some total product’s total trade value, is the product of the subtraction of (the sum of) the global costs of supply from an actualization value that, while linked to some total product’s trade value’s money expression, is equal to (the sum of) the global costs of supply plus (the sum of) adjustment profits (i.e., an actualization value that is obtained through that actualization that is interest cancellation). That actualization that links the money expression of trade value to the money expression of upstream trade value (i.e., trade value minus direct abstract adjustment minus indirect abstract adjustment) must be distinguished from that actualization that links the money expression of trade value to the money expression of trade value minus direct abstract saving. That actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the money expression of that total product’s upstream total trade value (i.e., that total product’s trade value minus the sum of direct abstract adjustments minus the sum of indirect abstract adjustments), likewise, must be distinguished from that actualization that links some total product’s total trade value’s money expression to the money expression of that total product’s total trade value minus the sum of direct abstract savings. A diachronic income (from some action) and a like-diachronic income (from some action) are respectively an income (which is from some action and) that lies in the difference between some money value and some chronologically anterior value that is an actualization value linked to it; and an income (which is from some action and) that lies in the difference between some money value and some like-chronologically anterior value that is an actualization value linked to it. A synchronic income (from some action) is an income (which is from some action and) that is unrelated to the difference between some value and some actualization value linked to it.
Frank Fetter’s approach to actualization, which can be found in Fetter’s The Principles of Economics, goes as follows: that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the money expression of that total product’s upstream total trade value is indistinct (rather than distinct) from that actualization that links the money expression of that total product’s total trade value to (the sum of) the global costs of supply plus (the sum of) adjustment profits; that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to (the sum of) the global costs of supply plus (the sum of) adjustment profits, in turn, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from that actualization that links that total product’s total trade value’s money expression to that total product’s total trade value’s money expression minus (the sum of) supply interests. In the case of some total product’s total trade value, the net actualization value (i.e., the result of the subtraction of the global costs of supply from that actualization money value that, while linked to that total trade value’s money expression, is equal to the global costs of supply plus adjustment profits), Fetter’s approach to actualization pursues, is positive, negative, or null depending on the sum of adjustment profits: net actualization value is positive when (and only when) the sum in question is positive; it is negative when (and only when) the sum in question is negative; it is null when (and only when) the sum in question is null. The conjectured net actualization value, Fetter’s approach to actualization pursues, is, accordingly, a tool for someone considering to invest into some durable (quantity of some genre of) capital good or service: a tool through which he is in a position to conjecture whether the sum of the anticipated adjustment profits will be positive or, instead, negative or, instead, null. The (sum of the) global costs of supply associated with those supply processes involving some durable (quantity of some genre of) supply good or service is, compared to the total product’s total upstream trade value’s money expression, an underprice when (and only when) the net actualization value is positive; it is an overprice when (and only when) the net actualization value is negative; it is an equal price when (and only when) the net actualization value is null.
At general equilibrium, Fetter’s approach to actualization pursues, some supplied quantity’s upstream trade value’s money expression—and some total product’s upstream total trade value’s money expression—are respectively equal to the global cost of supply and to the sum of the global costs of supply: at general equilibrium, the net actualization value, whether in the case of some supplied quantity’s upstream trade value or in the case of some total product’s upstream total trade value, is null. Accordingly, at general equilibrium, the (sum of the) global costs of supply associated with those supply processes involving some durable (quantity of some genre of) supply good or service, compared to the total product’s total upstream trade value’s money expression, is some equivalent price (rather than an overprice or underprice). At general equilibrium, by reason of the certainty about the future practiced unitary prices, the conjectured net actualization value and the actualization value, whether in the case of some supplied quantity’s upstream trade value or in the case of some total product’s upstream total trade value, are equal to each other. Capital, Fetter’s approach to actualization pursues, is (some) nominal rather than real (genre of entity): it isn’t some genre of good or service; it, instead, covers any good or service that is taken from the angle of its anticipated trade value expressed in money. Wealth, for its part, is any good or service that is taken from the angle of its existence as some material entity or property. The money income from capital and the money income from wealth are respectively diachronic and synchronic. The sum of supply interests in some total product’s total trade value’s money expression is both a synchronic income from the involved durable (quantity of some genre of) supply good or service taken as wealth; and, from the involved durable (quantity of some genre of) supply good or service taken as capital, some diachronic income, which lies in the difference between the total product’s total trade value’s money expression and the total product’s upstream total trade value’s money expression.
Fetter’s approach to actualization is flawed as follows. Firstly, that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the money expression of that total product’s upstream total trade value is distinct (rather than indistinct) from that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the sum of the global costs of supply and of adjustment profits. That actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the money expression of that total product’s upstream total trade value, instead, is indistinct (rather than distinct) from that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s upstream total trade value to the money expression of that value that is the result of the subtraction of the sum of abstract adjustments from the total product’s total trade value. Whether in the case of some supplied quantity’s upstream trade value or in the case of some total product’s upstream total trade value, upstream-upwelling actualization must be distinguished from interest-cancellation actualization. Secondly, that actualization that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to the sum of the global costs of supply and of adjustment profits is distinct (rather than indistinct) from that operation that links the money expression of some total product’s total trade value to that money expression minus the sum of supply interests. A necessary, sufficient condition in order for both operations to be indistinct (rather than distinct) from each other would be that supply interest is the money remuneration of the whole of the supplier’s saving (rather than the money remuneration of all or part of the supplier’s saving); that condition isn’t verified. The sum of the global costs of supply and of adjustment profits, nonetheless, is equal to (though distinct from) the total trade value’s money expression minus the sum of supply interests when (and only when) each of those supply interests is equal to the corresponding virtual supply interest. Profit in some supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression—and profit in some total product’s total trade value’s money expression—are respectively the sum of adjustment profit and of virtual interest; and the sum of adjustment profits and of virtual interests. The two parts of profit—in some supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression—are adjustment profit and supply interest when (and only when) the remuneration for the supplier’s handling and the remuneration for (all or part of) the supplier’s saving are considered independently of each other; the two parts of profit—in some supplied quantity’s trade value’s money expression—are, instead, adjustment profit and virtual interest when (and only when) the remuneration for the supplier’s handling and the remuneration for (the whole of) the supplier’s saving are considered in their relationship of addition. That distinction between the two parts of profit when considered independently of each other—and those two parts when considered in their relationship of addition—also applies to profit in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value.
Thirdly, the conjectured net actualization value (i.e., that conjectured money value that is the result of the subtraction of the anticipated global costs of supply from the anticipated sum of adjustment profits and of the global costs of supply) is, indeed, some tool to assess whether the conjectured sum of the anticipated adjustment profits will be positive or, instead, negative or, instead, null; but the conjectured net actualization value, instead of resulting of the subtraction of the anticipated global costs of supply from some anticipated total product’s anticipated upstream total trade value’s anticipated money expression, results of the subtraction of the anticipated global costs of supply from that conjectured actualization value that results of that actualization that links some anticipated total product’s anticipated total trade value’s anticipated money expression to that anticipated money expression minus the anticipated sum of virtual supply interests. The sum of the global costs of supply can be compared, indeed, to that actualization value that is equal to the result of the subtraction of the sum of virtual supply interests from the total trade value’s money expression. At general equilibrium, whether in the case of some supplied quantity’s trade value or in the case of some total product’s total trade value, the net actualization value, indeed, is null and there is equality, indeed, between the net actualization value and the conjectured net actualization value; but, at general equilibrium, while the certainty about the future practiced unitary prices causes the net actualization value and the conjectured net actualization value to be equal to each other, such certainty doesn’t cause the net actualization value to be null. At general equilibrium, the cause for such nullity, instead, lies in the nullity of all direct adjustment values. Fourthly, capital, instead of being only (some) nominal (genre of entity), has both some real modality and some nominal modality; and (the) nominal (modality of) capital doesn’t cover any good or service that is taken from the angle of its anticipated trade value expressed in money. While (the) real (modality of) capital (strictly) covers any good or service that is a supply good or service, (the) nominal (modality of) capital, for its part, (strictly) covers any entrepreneurial saving (i.e., any saving by some entrepreneurial supplier) that is taken from the angle of those (of its) properties that are taken into account within trade value. In other words, (the) nominal (modality of) capital is indistinct (rather than distinct) from that direct abstract saving that is involved with some entrepreneurial supply process (i.e., from that saving which, while considered from the angle of those of its properties trade value takes into account, is some saving the entrepreneurial handler of some entrepreneurial supply process, instead of inheriting, proceeds with). As for that nominal (genre of) entity that covers any good or service that is taken from the angle of its anticipated trade value expressed in money, that nominal (genre of) entity is pseudo-nominal-capital.
Fifthly, the money income from wealth (i.e., the money income from any good or service that is taken from the angle of its existence as some material entity) is, indeed, synchronic; but the money income from nominal capital, for its part, is like-diachronic (rather than diachronic). That money income that is the sum of supply interests (in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value) is no money income that is both diachronic (or like-diachronic) and synchronic; it is, instead, some non-synchronic money income that is like-diachronic (rather than diachronic). The sum of supply interests (in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value), indeed, lies in the difference between some money value and some actualization value linked to the latter; but that actualization value, instead of being the sum of adjustment profits and of the global costs of supply or the money expression of the total product’s total quantity’s upstream trade value, and that money value it is linked to, instead of being the total product’s total trade value’s money expression, are respectively virtual interest and that money value that is profits minus adjustment profits plus supply interests. The sum of supply interests (in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value), in other words, is a like-diachronic income that lies in the result of the subtraction of that actualization value that is the sum of virtual interests from that money value that is profits minus adjustment profits plus supply interests. The fact that the sum of supply interests (in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value) lies in what remains of the sum of direct saving values after the latter have been added to the sum of direct adjustment values is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the fact that the sum of supply interests lies in the difference between that actualization value that is profits minus adjustment profits plus supply interests and that money value that is the sum of virtual interests. The sum of adjustment profits (in the money expression of some total product’s total trade value), for its part, is some synchronic (rather than diachronic or like-diachronic) income. Supply interest and adjustment profit (in the money expression of some supplied quantity’s trade value), likewise, are respectively some like-diachronic (rather than synchronic or diachronic) income that lies in the difference between that money value that is profit minus adjustment profit plus supply interest and that actualization value that is virtual interest; and some synchronic (rather than diachronic or like-diachronic) income.
An assessment of Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism of the Marxian theory of wage exploitation
The three main arguments by Böhm-Bawerk against the Marxian theory of wage exploitation are developed in Capital and Interest and in Karl Marx and the Close of His System. I shall address the three of them, plus another Böhm-Bawerkian argument against the theory in question, which is also developed in the books in question. Any practiced unitary price, in the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to trade value, is an equilibrium price; to my knowledge, any supply process, in his approach to profit, is an entrepreneurial supply process.
Abstract labor is some labor duration (by some wage earner or some independent) that gets involved with some supply process, and which is considered from the angle of those of its properties that are taken into account within trade value. Buying some generic service in some quantity (i.e., buying some duration of some genre of service) consists of renting some generic labor-power (i.e., some genre of labor-power) for the delivery of some duration of some generic service.While, in the Marxian approach to abstract labor, the latter is reduced to labor duration, abstract labor, in the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to the latter, is considered to be non-existent. In other words, while the Marxian approach to abstract labor considers trade value to take into account—among the properties of those delivered labors that are involved with the concerned supply process—labor duration, and only labor duration, the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to abstract labor considers that trade value takes into account none of the properties of those delivered labors that are involved with the concerned supply process. In the case of that abstract labor that is involved with the supply process of some quantity of some generic service of some generic labor-power (i.e., some duration of some genre of service delivered by some genre of labor-power), the Marxian approach to abstract labor considers that abstract labor that is required for the reproduction (and return onto the market) of some generic service of some generic labor-power to lie in that abstract labor that is required in order for the concerned generic labor-power to be reproduced and re-brought to the market (and to be reproduced, and re-brought, in a way that makes it able to re-supply the supplied quantity of the concerned generic service). The Marxian theory of wage exploitation is that the wage some wage earner is paid, instead of being some (complete) remuneration—and some money expression—for the labor the wage earner is delivering, is only some (complete) remuneration—and some money expression—for that part (of that delivered labor) that is required in order for the wage earner’s labor-power to be reproduced and then re-brought to the market (and to be reproduced, and re-brought, in a way that makes it able to deliver the same delivered labor); and that, when (and only when) the practiced unitary price of that offered quantity resulting of the concerned supply process is at such level that the offered quantity is equal to that quantity one stands ready (and able) to demand at that price, profit in the global selling or leasing price is the money expression of the margin between the delivered abstract labor and that abstract labor required for the reproduction and return of the different labor-powers involved (and their reproduction and return in a way that makes them able to deliver the same delivered labors).
The three main Böhm-Bawerkian arguments against the Marxian theory of wage exploitation can be put as follows: a first of those arguments is that the wage some wage earner is paid is actually remunerating the (complete duration of the) labor that the concerned wage earner is delivering (rather than that part of the wage earner’s labor’s duration that is required in order for the wage earner’s labor-power to be reproduced, and re-brought to the market, in a way that makes it able to deliver, again, the delivered labor); and that, in the global selling or leasing price, profit is only, completely proportionate to the sum of the respective degrees to which the buyers or leasers have been ready to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) those respective quantities they’re buying or renting, and to which the entrepreneur has properly anticipated the practiced unitary price while being more rapid (than any hypothetical or real rival entrepreneur in the same supply field). A second of those arguments is that, in the case of some supply process that is only involving some (salaried) labor, some free land, and some (other) genres of supply good or service that the wage earners are producing along the way, and which is resulting into some offered quantity that is integrally demanded (i.e., integrally bought or rented), and at a practiced unitary price whose level is such that entrepreneurial profit (in the global practiced price) is null, the sum of those wages that are paid to the wage earners is the money expression of (what would have been) the trade value of the (presently) offered quantity when it was yet-to-be-offered (rather than presently offered), i.e., the money expression of what the (presently) offered quantity, if it had been demanded upstream (rather than downstream) the supply process, would have been worth in terms of tradability. In the case of such supply process, in other words, the sum of the wages that were paid to the wage earners is actually the money expression of the upstream trade value (i.e., what the trade value would have been if the presently offered quantity had been offered upstream, rather than downstream, the supply process of that quantity) of that (presently) offered quantity that is the (present) product of their (past) collective labor. A third of those arguments is that, in any entrepreneurial supply process, the entrepreneur is proceeding with some saving and, accordingly, delaying his consumption and consumption-hoarding, while the laborers, for their part, are proceeding with no saving and, accordingly, abstaining from delaying their consumption and consumption-hoarding. The degrees of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding that are found in the laborers, the argument pursues, are proven, that way, to be each higher than that degree of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding that is found in the entrepreneur: the laborers and the entrepreneur, by reason of that contrast in their respective degrees of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding, have solidary (rather than antagonistic) interests.
Concerning the first of those arguments, the latter gets to the core of the problem with which Marx deals; namely: does profit find its origin in what would be unpaid labor? The argument advances that, in any supply process, profit is determined independently of the delivered labor and, instead, is determined as proportional to the sum of the total degree of temporal preference (in the demanders of the supplied quantity) and of the degree to which the supplier correctly anticipated the practiced unitary price while being rapider. Böhm-Bawerk adds this: supply interest is all the higher the longer the supply process is, and the latter is all the longer the more roundabout it is; those respective connections between supply interest and length, and between length and roundaboutness, are independent of the delivered labor. Those two claims concerning the determination of supply interest, nonetheless, are incompatible with one another; supply interest, besides, is no more determined as proportional to the sum of the total degree of time preference than it is determined as proportional to the length of the supply process. Adjustment profit, for its part, is not determined as proportional to the degree to which the supplier, while being rapider (than the real or hypothetical other suppliers in the concerned supply field), correctly anticipated the practiced unitary price. Supply interest is determined as the money expression of what remains of direct abstract saving after addition of abstract labor, abstract saving, and abstract adjustment; the properties of direct abstract saving are: the degree of abstinence, the degree of waiting, and the degree of aversion. As for adjustment profit, it is determined as the money expression of direct abstract adjustment; the properties of direct abstract adjustment are: the degree to which the supplied quantity is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the supplied quantity) and the degree to which the supplier was rapider. In other words, direct abstract adjustment lies in the degree to which the supplied quantity was supplied more rapidly and, besides, is demanded in its integrality and by demanders who’ve been standing ready to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding. The total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some supplied quantity is the degree to which the demanders of all or part of the concerned supplied quantity have been standing ready to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity. For its part, the degree to which some supplied quantity is in tune with the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of the quantity in question is the degree to which the supplied quantity is demanded in its integrality and, besides, demanded by demanders who’ve been standing ready to demand imminently (rather than at any ulterior point) what they’re respectively demanding of the supplied quantity.
Concerning the second argument, the latter, too, gets to the core of the problem of knowing whether profit finds its origin in what would be unpaid labor. The argument advances that, in any supply process, the money expression of upstream trade value is equal to the sum of the global cost of supply and adjustment profit and that, in any supply process, the gap between the money expression of trade value and the money expression of upstream trade value has an origin other than what would be unpaid labor. That fact concerning the origin of the gap in question, the argument pursues, is brought to light as follows: in a supply process which uses wage labor and free land, and where the production goods (other than land) are produced along the way, upstream trade value is equal to the sum of wages and adjustment profit; if, besides, adjustment profit is null, the money expression of upstream trade value, then, is equal to the sum of wages. In that context, the wage laborers are collectively paid the money expression of upstream trade value; given that the (complete) remuneration of the labor delivered in such a supply process is equal to the money expression of upstream value, the gap between the money expression of trade value (of the product of that supply process) and that of upstream trade value (of the product of that supply process) could not find its origin in unpaid labor. Böhm-Bawerk, nonetheless, confuses the money expression of upstream trade value and that modality of actualization value which is the global selling or leasing price minus virtual interest; in other words, he confuses that modality of actualization value which results from an actualization of the global selling or leasing price by reduction to the money expression of upstream trade value and that modality of actualization value which results from an actualization of the global selling or leasing price by cancellation of supply interest. The money expression of upstream trade value, in any supply process, is equal to the global selling or leasing price minus adjustment profit (i.e., the money expression of direct abstract adjustment) minus the money expression of indirect abstract adjustment.
In the Böhm-Bawerkian approach to upstream trade value, the latter has as its money expression the sum of adjustment profit and of the global cost of supply; in other words, in the approach in question, the sum of adjustment profit and of the production and paraproduction costs is the money expression of what trade value would be if the supplied quantity had been demanded upstream (rather than downstream) of the supply process. That approach supposes the following premises, which form a sufficient condition for that approach to be true: firstly, one part of profit is supply interest, and the latter is determined as proportional to the gap which, in the entrepreneur, is witnessed between the present importance attributed to the supplied quantity and the past importance attributed to the means for the purpose of that quantity (when it was still to be supplied), a gap that is itself determined as equal to the gap which, in the entrepreneur, is witnessed between the present importance attributed to the supplied quantity and the past importance attributed to that quantity when it was still to be supplied. The entrepreneur simulates the gap which, in the demanders, would be witnessed between the present importance attributed to the supplied quantity and the past importance attributed to that quantity (when it was still to be supplied), if the demanders had themselves, collectively, taken charge of the supply process of that quantity; that gap which would be witnessed in the demanders (if they had themselves, collectively, taken charge of the supply process) is determined as equal to the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders. Secondly, the other part of profit is adjustment profit, and the latter is the money expression of the degree to which the entrepreneur was able to correctly anticipate the practiced unitary price and, besides, allocate the supplied quantity more rapidly than the real or hypothetical other suppliers in the concerned supply field were able to allocate another quantity of the concerned genre of good or service. Thirdly, the degree of gap between the past valuation of the means and the present valuation of the supplied quantity is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the sum of the respective degrees of aversion at which the demanders of the supplied quantity gave up demanding upstream, rather than downstream, the quantity in question (i.e., the sum of the respective degrees to which the demanders of the supplied quantity experienced aversion to giving up demanding, upstream rather than downstream of the supply process, what they presently buy or rent of the supplied quantity).
The Böhm-Bawerkian approach to upstream trade value logically infers that a quantity (presently) supplied which would have been demanded before its production and placement on the market would have had, upstream of that production and placement on the market, a trade value whose money expression is the global cost of supply plus adjustment profit: in other words, the approach in question logically infers that the actualization (of the global selling or leasing price) by cancellation of interest is indistinct (rather than distinct) from the actualization (of the global selling or leasing price) by return to upstream value. Each of those three premises is false; the truth of the first premise and/or of the third, besides, is a necessary condition of the truth of the conclusion (whereas the truth of the second premise is a sufficient, non-necessary condition). Every demander is compelled to demand downstream (rather than upstream) of the supply process and, besides, experiences a certain degree of aversion to giving up demanding upstream (rather than downstream); that degree of aversion (to giving up demanding upstream rather than downstream) is distinct (rather than indistinct) as much from the degree of temporal preference as from the degree of preference for imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding as from the degree of aversion to proceeding to one or another of the forms of saving. The degree of aversion (in a demander) to giving up a demand upstream rather than downstream, likewise, is distinct (rather than indistinct) from the degree of gap (in a supplier) between the present importance attributed to the supplied quantity and the past importance attributed to the means in view of that quantity (when it was yet to be supplied); neither of the two degrees, besides, is a determiner (or co-determiner) for the other. It is false that supply interest is proportional to the degree of gap in question; even if supply interest were proportional to the degree of gap in question, it would not thereby be proportional to the degree of aversion in question. Upstream trade value is indistinct (rather than distinct) from trade value minus direct adjustment value minus indirect adjustment value; it is distinct (rather than indistinct) from trade value minus direct saving value. That genre of actualization of the money expression of trade value which brings it back to the money expression of upstream trade value must be distinguished from that genre of actualization of the money expression of trade value which brings it back to the money expression of trade value minus the money expression of direct saving value (i.e., which brings it back to the global selling or leasing price minus virtual supply interest).
Concerning the third argument, the latter, instead of addressing the issue of knowing whether profit finds its origin in what would be unpaid labor, addresses the issue of knowing whether wage-earners are exploited at the level of their interests. An interest is a pair formed by an end and the means employed or considered for the purpose of that end, in which the means in question are suited to the end in question. Individuals have solidary interests when the concerned goals—taken independently of the employed means—can all be attained together; and, besides, when those goals are assigned means which, in addition to being suited to those objectives for the purpose of which they are employed, need one another in order to begin to exist and then to continue to exist for the time required for the action to be carried through to its completion. Individuals have antagonistic interests when, while being assigned respective means that are suited to them, the concerned goals—taken independently of the employed means—are such that, if one of them were to be attained, the others could not be attained; and/or when, while being suited to the respective objectives, the means concerned, in the case of considered (rather than employed) means, are such that none of them can prevent any of the others from beginning to exist, or, in the case of employed (rather than considered) means, are such that none of them can prevent any of the others from being mobilized to the end (i.e., can prevent any of the others from being mobilized until the action is carried through to its completion). Wage exploitation at the level of profit, if wage-earners, indeed, were exploited in that respect, would not consist merely in the product being sold or rented for more than labor-power is rented for; it would consist in all or part of the provided labor being unpaid and, besides, in a profit turning out to be positive (or a part of such profit) coinciding with the remuneration that ought to accrue to that which, in the provided labor, in left unpaid, or coinciding with the remuneration in question according to the relation of supply to that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price.
What interests Böhm-Bawerk here is to know whether there is exploitation of the employees at the level of their interests, not to know whether there is exploitation of the employees at the level of profit. The entrepreneur, according to his argument, aims to consume and hoard in relation to consumption later than the employees want, and more extensively than they want; the employees, for their part, aim to consume and hoard in relation to consumption earlier than the entrepreneur wants, and on a smaller scale. Those two goals, the argument pursues, can all be attained together; for their part, the employed means—the establishment and handling of the supply process in the case of the entrepreneur, work in exchange for wages in the case of the employees—need one another in order to come into being and continue to exist for the time needed for the respective goals to be attained. The employees and the entrepreneur, the argument pursues, therefore have solidary interests: there is, accordingly, no exploitation of the employees at the level of their interests. That argument, precisely, is indifferent to the question of knowing whether the interest of the employees is spontaneous rather than resigned: it considers that the exploitation of the employees at the level of their interests, if it existed, would exist independently of knowing whether the interest of the employees is spontaneous or, on the contrary, resigned. The solidarity between the interests of the employees and of the entrepreneur is sufficient, according to that argument, to make it the case that there is no exploitation of the employees: it does not matter, according to it, to know whether the interest of the employees is in solidarity with that of the entrepreneur and, nonetheless, resigned, in order to determine whether the employees are exploited at the level of their interests.
An end that exists in a given individual is an end that the individual in question pursues; a means, considered or employed, that exists in a given individual is a means that the individual in question considers or employs for the purpose of a given end. A spontaneous end is an end that exists in an individual whose nature does not differ from his virtual nature in a mode that would prevent, in the individual in question, one or more other ends whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing end; a spontaneous means is a means, considered or employed, that exists in an individual whose nature does not differ from his virtual nature in a mode that would prevent, in the individual in question, one or more other means, considered or employed, whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing means. A resigned end is an end that exists in an individual whose nature differs from the virtual nature of said individual in a mode that prevents, in the individual in question, one or more other ends whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing end; a resigned means is a means, considered or employed, that exists in an individual whose nature differs from the virtual nature of said individual in a mode that prevents, in the individual in question, one or more other means, considered or employed, whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing means. What causes the fact, for the nature of a given individual, when that fact occurs, of differing from the virtual nature in a mode that prevents a given end from being present in the concerned individual is a certain social or physiological context that makes it impossible for him to pursue that end, and/or the submission of said individual to a certain social pressure that is opposed (rather than favorable) to the pursuit of the end in question. What causes the fact, for the nature of a given individual, when that fact occurs, of differing from the virtual nature in a mode that prevents a given considered means from being present in the concerned individual is a certain social or physiological context that dissuades him from considering the means in question, and/or the submission of said individual to a certain social pressure that is opposed (rather than favorable) to the consideration of the means in question; what causes the fact, for the nature of a given individual, when that fact occurs, of differing from the virtual nature in a mode that prevents a given employed means from being present in the concerned individual is a certain social or physiological context that prevents him from employing the means in question, and/or the submission of said individual to a certain social pressure that is opposed (rather than favorable) to the employment of the means in question.
A spontaneous interest is an interest that exists in an individual whose nature does not differ from his virtual nature in a mode that would prevent, in the individual in question, one or more other interests whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing interest. In a spontaneous interest, while the means or means are adapted to the end for the purpose of which they are employed or considered, the end is spontaneous and/or the means or means employed or considered are spontaneous. A resigned interest, for its part, is an interest that exists in an individual whose nature differs from the virtual nature of said individual in a mode that prevents, in the individual in question, one or more other interests whose presence he would prefer to that of the concerned existing interest. In a resigned interest, while the means are adapted to the end for the purpose of which they are employed or considered, the end is resigned and/or the means employed or considered are resigned. The exploitation of the employees at the level of interests consists in the interest of the employees, either not being in solidarity with the entrepreneurial interest, or being in solidarity with the latter but resigned; in other words, it consists in the interest of the employees not being a spontaneous interest which, besides, is in solidarity with the interest of the entrepreneur. The interest of the employees and that of the entrepreneur, effectively in solidarity, are in solidarity for the reason given by Böhm-Bawerk: namely the complementarity between their respective degrees of preference for some consumption and consumption-hoarding that are imminent (rather than at any ulterior point). That solidarity, nonetheless, is not sufficient so that there is no exploitation of the employees at the level of interests; it is necessary, besides, that the interest of the employees is spontaneous rather than resigned. Yet it can happen that an employee rents out his labor-power while pursuing the end of that rental—some imminent consumption and consumption-hoarding—in a resigned rather than spontaneous mode, because of his submission to a certain social pressure; just like it can happen that an employee rents out his labor-power while employing that means that is the rental in question in a resigned rather than spontaneous mode, because of his submission to a certain social pressure and/or because of a certain social or physiological context. The employee in question is then exploited, despite the solidarity between his interest and that of the entrepreneur. That case, while not necessarily occurring, is liable to occur.
A fourth argument by Böhm-Bawerk is that Marx, in Volume III of Capital, fails to prove the alleged compatibility of two assertions made in Volume I, the first in the body of the text, the second in a footnote. Namely: profit is determined as equal to (or, failing that, determined as situated around) the money expression of a certain portion of direct abstract labor, namely that portion which is not necessary for the reproduction and re-putting on the market of the labor-power; profit, when the practiced unitary price is an equilibrium price, is determined as proportional to the advanced capital, both the labor-power and the other capital. Marx tries to prove the alleged compatibility between the two assertions as follows: the sum of profits is the money expression of the totality of those portions of direct abstract labor that are surplus; the sum of the global selling or leasing prices is the money expression of the totality of abstract labor; the sum of the global costs of supply is the money expression of the totality of indirect abstract labor. When the practiced unitary price is an equilibrium price, every profit is proportional to the advanced capital, and, more precisely, is proportional to it according to a rate which is obtained through dividing the sum of profits by the sum of the global costs of supply. The two assertions are, indeed, incompatible; Marx, in his efforts to prove that they are compatible, merely abandons that theory of profit presented in Volume I and develops a new one.
An assessment of Marxian economics and philosophy
A few precisions should be brought in my criticism of the Marxian thought, as concerns those topics of the thought in question that are infrastructure and superstructure, matter and non-matter, trade value, wage exploitation, the rate of profit, the abstract labor involved with the labor-power’s reproduction and supply, commodity fetichism, class struggle, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, oversupply, and the dialectical character of reality. I shall refer, in that framework, to those works by Karl Marx that are Manifesto of the Communist Party, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and The Capital.
1) Infrastructure in a given society lies in those ideas, relations, and technologies which, in the society in question, form a set that is the origin of other ideas, relations, and technologies in the society in question. Superstructure in a given society, for its part, lies in those ideas, relations, and technologies which, in the society in question, have as their origin the set formed by other ideas, relations, and technologies in the society in question. Infrastructure contains a lower level (composed of some of those ideas, relations, and technologies constitutive of infrastructure) and an upper level (composed of the other ideas, relations, and technologies constitutive of infrastructure); just as lower infrastructure is the origin of upper infrastructure, upper infrastructure, in turn, is the origin of superstructure. A deterministic origin is to be distinguished from a non-deterministic origin: in the case of a deterministic origin, that which issues from that origin is its forced product; in the case of a non-deterministic origin, that which issues from that origin is its random product.
An error of Marx is to conceive upper infrastructure as the deterministic origin (rather than the non-deterministic origin) of superstructure; another error on his part is to conceive infrastructure as economic, and superstructure as non-economic. Yet another error on his part is to conceive lower infrastructure as exclusively composed of technologies (and those ideas associated with them), and upper infrastructure as exclusively composed of relations (and those ideas associated with them). In the Marxian approach to infrastructure and superstructure, whereas lower infrastructure lies in technologies in the field of production and paraproduction (and those ideas associated with the technologies in question), upper infrastructure lies in economic relations (and those ideas associated with the relations in question). Likewise, in the Marxian approach to infrastructure and superstructure, technologies in the field of production and paraproduction (and those ideas associated with the relations in question) are the deterministic origin of economic relations (and of those ideas associated with them), and the relations in question (and those ideas associated with them), in turn, are the deterministic origin of superstructure.
Collective intelligence in a given society is the collective capacity of the society in question to identify and solve problems. Lower infrastructure, depending on the society under consideration, lies in religion or, instead, lies in religion and non-religious elements; for its part, upper infrastructure, whatever the society under consideration, lies in collective intelligence (including in the economic field). Lower infrastructure is the origin of upper infrastructure and, besides, finds in the latter a forced (rather than random) product of that which is or includes religion; upper infrastructure, for its part, is the origin of superstructure and, nonetheless, finds in the latter a random (rather than forced) product of collective intelligence. Religion, either is the origin of upper infrastructure (and, more precisely, its deterministic origin), or forms part of the origin of upper infrastructure (and, more precisely, of its deterministic origin); besides, when it forms part of the origin of infrastructure (instead of concentrating that origin), it itself determines what the other elements are with which it shares the situation of being at the origin of upper infrastructure. Lower infrastructure, whether it is exclusively religious or, instead, notably religious, is not only the (deterministic) origin of collective intelligence: it is, besides, the (deterministic) origin of the manner in which collective intelligence proceeds. Superstructure is the random (rather than forced) product to which the collective intelligence that religion shapes or co-shapes gives birth. I will return later to collective intelligence: the manner in which, according to the genre of society under consideration, its five elements proceed and the manner in which, according to the genre of society under consideration, religion shapes or co-shapes it.
2) Matter is that which enters into the composition of a material entity, that is, an entity endowed with consistency; form, for its part, is the manner in which that which enters into the composition of an entity, whether it is material or not (i.e., whether it is endowed with consistency or not), is arranged. Marx has this error of identifying matter with everything which, while being endowed with consistency and being a compound of form and compositional properties, falls within the economy; and of identifying the immaterial field with everything which, while being endowed with consistency and being a compound of form and compositional properties, lies outside the field of the economy. In Marx, whereas those ideas, technologies, and relations which fall within the economy are identified with matter, those ideas, technologies, and relations which do not fall within the economy are identified, for their part, with the immaterial field.
Pure economy (i.e., what the economy would be if it were independent of every social fact other than an economic one) is to be distinguished from economy that is impure on one or several levels (i.e., economy which, on one or several levels, differs from pure economy). Marx has this error of confusing infrastructure with the economic field; he has this error, besides, of conceiving the economy as impure only at the level of the impact of the social environment on means or ends. Yet another error on his part is to confuse the economic field with the material field, and to confuse the non-economic field with the non-material field.
3) The trade value of some supplied quantity of some genre of good or service is the ability of that quantity to get traded indirectly, via the money medium, against a number of other supplied quantities (whether of that genre of good or service). The use value of some supplied quantity, for its part, is the total degree of importance that, in the demanders of all or part of the quantity in question, is attributed to the utilities expected from that which of, the quantity in question, is demanded. The diamond-and-water conundrum can be put as follows: if every supplied quantity of the generic water is higher in use value than is every equivalent supplied quantity of the generic diamond, may some supplied quantity of the generic diamond be still higher in trade value than is an equivalent supplied quantity of the generic water?
Though Marx doesn’t address the diamond-and-water conundrum explicitly, his approach to trade value as lying in abstract labor (depending on the relationship between supply and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price) implicitly answers the conundrum in question. That answer can be put as follows: trade value is located in abstract labor (depending on the relationship between supply and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price) and indifferent to use value (whatever the relationship between supply and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price); more precisely, trade value, whatever the relationship between supply and the quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price, is indifferent to use value, and, whenever the supplied quantity and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price are equal, is located in abstract labor. Accordingly, if every supplied quantity of the generic water is higher in use value than is every equivalent supplied quantity of the generic diamond, but every supplied quantity of the generic water is less costly in abstract labor than is every equivalent supplied quantity of the generic diamond, and if, besides, every supplied quantity of the generic water or of the generic diamond is sold at a practiced unitary price that is an equilibrium price, then every supplied quantity of the generic diamond will be higher in trade value than is every equivalent supplied quantity of the generic water.
The Marxian approach to trade value, nonetheless, is wrong: trade value, instead of lying—as the Marxian approach to trade value claims—in abstract labor depending on the relationship between supply and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price, lies in the sum of abstract labor, abstract saving, and abstract adjustment, and lies in the sum in question whatever the relationship between supply and that quantity one stands ready, and able, to demand at the practiced unitary price.
The diamond-and-water conundrum, once trade value has been understood to be the sum of abstract labor, abstract saving, and abstract adjustment is solved as follows. If the total degree of temporal preference in the demanders of all or part of some offered quantity of some genre of good or service is greater than is the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, then the trade value of that offered quantity will be equal to, or greater than, the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, then that trade value will be greater than that of any offered quantity (whether of the same genre of good or service) that, while just as costly in comparative fastness, is less costly in the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment. Accordingly, if each offered quantity of the generic diamond sees the total degree of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of the concerned quantity) exceed the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, and, besides, compared to an equivalent offered quantity of the generic water, is just as costly in comparative fastness, but costlier in the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, then each offered quantity of the generic diamond will be endowed with a trade value that is greater than that of an equivalent offered quantity of the generic water.
Yet, whether the use value of some offered quantity of some generic commodity is high enough to allow for the total degree of temporal preference (in the demanders of all or part of that commodity) to exceed the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, is indifferent to whether the use value in question is greater than that of some other offered quantity: in other words, the use value of some offered quantity of some generic commodity can be smaller than the use value of some other offered quantity and still be high enough to allow for the total degree of temporal preference to exceed the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment. Accordingly, if the particular use value of the generic water exceeds the particular use value of the generic diamond (i.e., if each offered quantity of the generic water is endowed with a use value that is greater than that of an equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond), but each offered quantity of the generic water, compared to an equivalent offered quantity of the generic diamond, is less costly in the sum of abstract labor and saving, and of indirect abstract adjustment, but just as costly in comparative fastness, then the particular trade value of the generic diamond will be greater than the particular trade value of the generic water (i.e., each offered quantity of the generic diamond will be endowed with a trade value that is greater than that of an equivalent offered quantity of the generic water).
4) The Marxian theory of wage exploitation is false: profit, instead of being—as the theory in question claims—the money expression of a certain unpaid portion of the delivered labor, namely that portion in surplus relative to the labor required for the reproduction and re-being-brought-to-the-market of labor-power (for the carrying out of the same number of hours of delivered labor), is the monetary expression of the sum of direct abstract adjustment and direct abstract saving.
Marx, in his approach to the trade value of labor-power, commits a non sequitur: if the delivered labor is to be distinguished from the involved labor, then the former, besides being distinct (rather than indistinct) from the latter, is able to exceed the latter. In reality, if the delivered labor is to be distinguished from the involved labor, then the former, while remaining distinct (rather than indistinct) from the latter, strictly covers the latter. Marx elaborates that non sequitur as follows: if the trade value of labor-power—at the equilibrium between supply and the demand that one is ready, and is in a position, to demand at the practiced unitary price—lies in the direct and indirect abstract labor involved in its reproduction and being-brought-to-the-market (rather than in the direct abstract labor delivered by labor-power), then the trade value of labor-power—at the equilibrium in question—lies in some direct and indirect abstract labor which, hypothetically, sees the supplied direct abstract labor exceed it. In reality, if the trade value of labor-power—at the equilibrium between supply and that demand that one is ready, and is in a position, to demand at the practiced unitary price—lies in the direct and indirect abstract labor involved in its reproduction and being-brought-to-the-market, then the trade value of labor-power—at the equilibrium in question—lies in some direct and indirect abstract labor that sees the delivered direct abstract labor strictly cover it.
If the trade value of some supplied quantity (of some genre of good or service) were determined in such a mode that it is equal to abstract labor (in the case where supply and that demand that one is ready, and is in a position, to demand are equal), or, failing that, situated around the latter (when supply and that demand that one is ready, and is in a position, to demand are not equal), then: provided that the rented quantities of labor-power (i.e., the respective numbers of hours rented for the various services respectively drawn from the respective involved labor-powers) are rented at equilibrium prices and that the purchased or rented quantities of the other involved genres of supply good, likewise, are purchased or rented at equilibrium prices, the trade value of a supplied quantity equal to the demand that one is ready, and is in a position, to demand at the practiced unitary price would be equal to the trade value of labor-power plus the respective trade values of the other supplied quantities of supply good. In other words, subject to the proviso in question, the trade value of a supplied quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price would be such that profit (in the monetary expression of the trade value in question) would be null.
5) Marx contradicts himself concerning profit in the money expression of the trade value of an offered quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price: on the one hand, he sees in profit (obtained in the case of an offered quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price) the money expression of that portion of direct abstract labor which is surplus, and, in that sense, sees in it a reality proportional to the surplus portion of labor (rather than to the totality of abstract labor). On the other hand, he sees profit (obtained in the case of an offered quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price) as determined proportionally to direct and indirect abstract labor, and, in that sense, sees in it a reality proportional to advanced capital (including labor-power). If profit were determined as proportional to the surplus portion of direct abstract labor (in the case of an offered quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price), it would then be indifferent to involved abstract labor; if, on the contrary, profit were determined as proportional to involved abstract labor (in the case of an offered quantity that is demanded at an equilibrium unitary price), it would then be indifferent to the surplus portion of direct abstract labor.
Proportionality to advanced capital, contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, does not systematically occur when the practiced unitary price is an equilibrium unitary price; it occurs when entrepreneurial profit is null. When the practiced unitary price is an equilibrium unitary price, entrepreneurial profit is not systematically null, any more than it is systematically positive. Likewise, when the practiced unitary price equalizes supply and demand, entrepreneurial profit is not systematically positive, any more than it is systematically null. When entrepreneurial profit is null, the practiced unitary price sees equality between supply and demand and, nonetheless, is not systematically an equilibrium unitary price. Besides, contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, the proportionality of profit to advanced capital, when it occurs, must be understood as the proportionality of profit to direct abstract saving, and not as what would be the proportionality of profit to abstract labor. Profit, when it is proportional to advanced capital, is proportional to the latter in a mode consisting in monetarily expressing the sum of the degree of abstinence, the degree of waiting, and the degree of aversion in entrepreneurial saving; in other words, profit, when it is proportional to advanced capital, is proportional to the latter in a mode consisting in coinciding with virtual supply interest.
The rate of profit is the ratio between profit and the global cost of supply. Contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, there is no equality of rates of profit when the various observed profits (at the end of the various supply processes) are proportional to the respectively advanced capital (in the various supply processes). That equality, if it occurred (when each obtained profit is proportional to advanced capital), would have as its necessary and sufficient condition that the proportionality of profit to advanced capital (when that proportionality occurs) occur in a mode consisting, for profit, in being proportional to global cost of supply. Virtual supply interest, nonetheless, is not proportional to the global cost of supply: accordingly, profit, when it is proportional to advanced capital, is not proportional to it in a mode that would consist in being proportional to the global cost of supply. A sufficient (and non-necessary) condition for profit, when it is proportional to advanced capital, to be proportional to it in a mode consisting, for profit, in being proportional to global cost of supply would be that abstract labor be only the number of delivered labor hours and that profit, when it is proportional to advanced capital, be proportional to it in a mode consisting, for profit, in monetarily expressing abstract labor. Marx deems, wrongly, that the sufficient condition in question is satisfied.
At general equilibrium, as the Marxian approach to profit discerns, all profits are proportional to advanced capital; at general equilibrium, contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, the rates of profit, nonetheless, are not equal, any more than every practiced unitary price at general equilibrium is an equilibrium price. Every profit, at general equilibrium, is proportional to abstract saving rather than to abstract labor. At general equilibrium, every wage is indeed, as the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power discerns, a subsistence wage; just like that subsistence wage, when it is paid, and as the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power discerns, is the money expression of the required direct and indirect abstract labor for the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power (rather than the money expression of the delivered direct abstract labor). Nonetheless, contrary to what the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power claims, the paid wage, when the paid wage is a subsistence wage, does not express a trade value that would lie in a sum of direct and indirect abstract labor lower than the delivered direct abstract labor; the wage in question, instead, expresses a sum of direct and indirect abstract labor that the delivered direct abstract labor strictly covers.
The trade value of labor-power lies in the involved direct and indirect abstract labor in the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power when the direct abstract adjustment in the trade value of labor-power is null; the trade value of labor-power, contrary to what the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power claims, does not lie in the involved direct and indirect abstract labor (in the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power) according to the ratio between supply and the quantity that one stands ready to, and is able to, demand at the practiced unitary price. Besides, contrary to what the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power claims, the involved direct abstract labor in the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power does not coincide with the involved direct abstract labor in those quantities (of generic consumption goods or services) whose demand is required for the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market in question; any more than the involved indirect abstract labor in the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power coincides with the involved indirect abstract labor in those quantities (of generic consumption goods or services) whose demand is required for the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market in question. The involved direct labor, whether taken abstractly, in the supply process of labor-power in a certain quantity (i.e., the involved direct labor in the reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of the capacity of labor-power to deliver a certain number of labor hours), actually, is null. The involved indirect labor in the supply process in question, for its part, is the sum of the involved direct and indirect labor in the production and supply of the quantities which, of certain kinds of consumption good or service, have been demanded (and required) within the framework of the supply process of labor-power in a certain quantity; the same holds for the involved indirect abstract labor in the supply process of labor-power in a certain quantity and the sum of the involved direct and indirect abstract labor in the production and supply of the demanded quantities in question. The direct abstract labor that labor-power delivers strictly covers the involved indirect abstract labor; since the delivered direct abstract labor strictly covers the involved indirect abstract labor and the involved direct abstract labor is null, the delivered direct abstract labor strictly covers the sum of the delivered direct and indirect abstract labor. The supply process of labor-power in a certain quantity inherits abstract labor, and inherits it from other supply processes, namely those of the kinds of consumption good or service required for the reproduction and supply of the offered quantity of labor-power; the supply process of labor-power in a certain quantity, nonetheless, witnesses no non-inherited labor.
Contrary to what the Marxian approach to the trade value of labor-power claims, when the trade value in question lies in direct and indirect abstract labor, it does not lie in the direct and indirect abstract labor that would be involved if labor-power were next to be reproduced and re-being-brought to the market, in the same quantity as that which will have been employed in the entrepreneurial supply process that will have employed it. When the trade value of labor-power lies in direct and indirect abstract labor, the direct and indirect abstract labor in which it lies is that which has just been involved in the supply process of a certain quantity (of labor-power) that has just been brought to its end, and not that which would be involved in a hypothetical next supply process of that quantity (of labor-power) that will have been employed. When labor-power is offered in excess (i.e., when the offered number of hours in the rental of labor-power is in excess) relative to the rented number of hours, the wage does not fall below the money expression of the abstract labor that would be required for a next reproduction and re-being-brought to the market of labor-power in the capacity to deliver the same number of labor hours as the demanded (and employed) number; it falls, instead, below the money expression of that abstract labor that has been required for a reproduction and re-being-brought to the market that have just taken place, those of labor-power in the capacity to deliver the offered number of labor hours.
6) The supplied quantities of various genres of good or service, as Marx discerns, have indirect trade relations which are like the product of what would be the transformation of the human relations involved in the capitalist economy; those indirect trade relations camouflage the human relations involved in the capitalist economy at the same time as the human relations in question are like transformed into those relations between commodities. Besides, and as Marx discerns, the supplied quantities are like a reality independent of the human relations involved in the capitalist economy and external to the latter; the commodity camouflages the human relations from which it issues at the same time as it is like independent of the relations in question.
Those human relations which are camouflaged behind—and like transformed into—the indirect trade relations between supplied quantities, and which are camouflaged behind—and like independent of—those trade relations, nonetheless, are not only those relations which, at the moment when a certain quantity is supplied, were involved between the wage-earners and the entrepreneur in the supply process of the quantity in question. Marx has this error of reducing to the past relations between wage-earners and entrepreneur those human relations which the indirect trade relations between supplied quantities or the like-independent situation of the commodity camouflage; those human relations, in reality, (strictly) include the past relations between wage-earners and entrepreneur, as well as the delayed relations between the entrepreneurial saver and some suppliers of some genres of consumption good or service, the past relations between entrepreneurial competitors (in each field of supply), and the present relations between supplier and demanders (for each supplied quantity). More precisely, those human relations of which the indirect trade relations between the supplied quantities are like the transformation and of which the supplied quantities are like independent are: the past relations between wage-earners and entrepreneur, taken as past relations; the delayed relations between entrepreneurial saver and some suppliers of some consumption goods or services, taken as delayed; the relations which have begun, and continue, to be ongoing between entrepreneurial competitors, taken as they have begun, and continue, to be ongoing; and the present relations between those entrepreneurial competitors and the demanders, taken as present.
7) A social group is a group within society; a class, for its part, is a social group that, either is outside (rather than inside) the realm of the state (whatever the considered kind of society), or is outside (rather than completely or partly inside) the realm of the state depending on the considered kind of society. Social groups must be distinguished from categories of individuals present within society; a category of individuals is a certain number of individuals considered from the standpoint of one or more points they have in common. Class struggle is a struggle between some social groups, and not a struggle between some categories of individuals within society. Marx wrongly restricts class struggle to the struggle opposing economic classes; just as he wrongly restricts the struggle between economic classes in a capitalist economy to the struggle between the owners of the factors of production (other than labor-power) and the owners of labor-power. Pareto, who can be reproached for not rigorously distinguishing between a social group and a category of individuals within society, rightly raises those two points in The Socialist Systems.
Marx, besides, omits that modality of class struggle which is the struggle for social mobility, namely the joint struggle of the members of a dominated class for integration into the ranks of a dominant or co-dominant class and of the members of the dominant or co-dominant class in question to maintain themselves within the ranks in question; he equally omits the fact that a given class may be a co-dominant class (rather than the sole dominant class). Class struggle, in his approach to the latter, is restricted to the joint struggle of the members of a dominated economic class for the overthrow of the dominant economic class, and of the members of that dominant economic class for the maintenance of their class. Concerning the bourgeoisie, Marx fails to discern the fact that the latter, in the West and elsewhere in the world, was established as a co-dominant class rather than as a dominant class, and that the domination that is at work is shared between the bourgeoisie and the sacerdotal class, whether those are the priests of the democratic religion (where the democratic religion has replaced Christianity as the religion federating society) or, for instance, the Protestant pastors (where Protestantism is the religion federating society). The struggle between that economic class which is the bourgeoisie and the sacerdotal class, precisely, is absent from his considerations on class struggle in “bourgeois society.”
Marx, besides, omits that fact that the capitalist economy rests on the struggle between economic classes, but also on the struggle between economic categories and the struggle within economic categories. Concerning the struggle opposing economic categories, one modality of the latter is the struggle that opposes, for the capture of entrepreneurial profit, the three genres of entrepreneur: namely the vigilant or pseudo-vigilant entrepreneur, the guessing or pseudo-guessing entrepreneur, and the disruptive or pseudo-disruptive entrepreneur. Concerning the struggle occurring within one and the same economic category, one modality of the latter is the struggle which, within each economic category, has as its object the occupation of a place which, if general equilibrium were reached, would be maintained. A place in a capitalist economy is a position, occupied or vacant, of assignment to a given instance of a certain genre of function in a capitalist economy (among the instances associated with the concerned genre), whether it be the genre of function that is the wage function, that which is the entrepreneurial function, or yet another genre of function. A given genre of function, especially the wage function, may have instances with which several assignment positions (rather than a single one) are associated. A taken place in a capitalist economy is an occupied assignment position in a capitalist economy; an available place in a capitalist economy is a vacant assignment position in a capitalist economy. When global demand coincides with effective demand, each field of supply then has a certain number of possible numbers of places which, whereas they were available, are presently taken. In other words, when global demand coincides with effective demand, a certain number of taken places is observed in each field of supply, and what the number in question is itself admits of a certain number of possibilities; at general equilibrium, besides, no place remains available.
8) The tendency of the rate of profit to fall, namely the tendency of the ratio between profit (i.e., the margin between the global selling or leasing price and the global cost of supply) and the global cost of supply to fall, is a tendency at work in a pure capitalist economy (or in a capitalist economy that is not impure in a manner hindering or preventing the tendency in question), and which, nonetheless, strictly concerns those global selling or leasing prices where adjustment profit is null. Contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall does not apply indiscriminately in a pure or impure capitalist economy, and does not concern those global selling or leasing prices that are the monetary expression of a trade value conflated with abstract labor.
Besides, contrary to what the Marxian approach to profit claims, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (when that tendency is not prevented or hindered) is indifferent to the increase in the non-human share of capital relative to the human share. The proportion of the non-human share of capital relative to the human share, although the increase in the proportion in question is a real tendency (in a pure capitalist economy or in a capitalist economy that is not impure in a manner hindering or preventing the tendency in question), has no effect on the rate of profit observed in the case of global selling or leasing prices where adjustment profit is null. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall, instead, is linked to the following tendencies: within direct abstract saving, the degree of abstinence (i.e., the degree to which income is saved) tends to increase, but the degree of aversion (i.e., the degree to which income is saved with aversion), for its part, tends to fall, and to fall more than the degree of abstinence increases; the degree of waiting (i.e., the duration of saving), likewise, tends to fall, and to fall both more than the degree of abstinence increases and less than the degree of aversion falls. Supply processes, at the same time as they tend to become increasingly roundabout, see the stages within them tend to become increasingly short: in other words, supply processes tend to become increasingly roundabout, but increasingly roundabout in a manner that sees them become increasingly short. Virtual interest, although virtual interest is not proportional to the global cost of supply, tends to decrease to the point where the ratio itself between virtual interest and the global cost of supply ends up tending to decrease.
9) A global supply that is universally unprofitable is a global supply in which every supplied quantity is unprofitable, i.e., in which every supplied quantity presents a trade value whose monetary expression presents a null or negative profit. In the case of a certain supplied quantity of labor-power (i.e., in the case of a certain number of hours supplied for the leasing of labor-power), a null profit and a negative profit are respectively a null margin between the paid wage and the sum of the global selling or leasing prices of the consumption goods or services required for the reproduction of the supplied quantity in question; and a negative margin between the paid wage and the sum in question. An over-allocation of capital in a given entrepreneurial supply process is an allocation of capital (in the supply process in question) that results in a supplied quantity (at the end of the supply process in question) which is either supplied in excess (and, as such, associated with a null or negative profit), or fully demanded and, nonetheless, associated with a null or negative profit. In other words, capital is over-allocated in a given entrepreneurial supply process when the supplied quantity (at the end of the supply process in question) is unprofitable. The allocated capital in a given entrepreneurial supply process includes just as much the capital allocated by the entrepreneur as that allocated in those prior supply processes which the entrepreneur integrates into his own supply process. An entrepreneurially supplied quantity (i.e., a supplied quantity at the end of an entrepreneurial supply process) that is unprofitable is indistinct from (rather than distinct from) a supplied quantity at the end of a supply process in which the allocated capital is over-allocated. A global over-allocation of capital is a situation in which the respective allocated capital in the various entrepreneurial supply processes is over-allocated (from which it follows that every entrepreneurially supplied quantity is unprofitable).
The accumulation of total capital is a situation in which the various obtained profits at the end of the various entrepreneurial supply processes are allocated to the purchase or leasing of respective quantities of respective kinds of supply good or service. Marx is wrong to identify the cause of global over-allocation, when the over-allocation in question occurs, with an insufficiency of purchasing (or renting) power in order for the supplied quantities at the end of the entrepreneurial supply processes to be demanded at unitary prices allowing the profitability of the quantities in question. Marx, besides, is wrong to identify that insufficiency of purchasing power, when the insufficiency in question occurs, with what would be the over-accumulation of total capital relative to the purchasing power contained in wages: namely a situation in which the accumulation of total capital results in total capital in excess relative to the purchasing (or renting) power contained in the paid wages. The insufficiency of purchasing (or renting) power in order for the entrepreneurially supplied quantities to be profitable is one of the possible causes (rather than the sole possible cause) of the global over-allocation of capital; besides, the cause of the insufficiency in question, when that insufficiency occurs, is a disproportion in global supply (rather than an over-accumulation of total capital), and, more precisely, a disproportion that occurs in a mode consisting in rendering purchasing (or renting) power insufficient in order for the entrepreneurially supplied quantities to be profitable.
The level of global supply is the sum of the total quantities respectively supplied for each supplied kind of good or service; the level of global demand is the sum of the total quantities respectively demanded for each demanded kind of good or service. The level of global supply is universally greater than the level of global demand when every supplied quantity is greater than the corresponding demanded quantity; the same reasoning can be made for a level of global supply that is universally equal to the level of global demand, or a level of global supply that is universally lower than the level of global demand. Depression hoarding (i.e., that modality of hoarding consisting in withdrawing all or part of one’s income from consumption, saving, consumption hoarding, investment or pseudo-investment hoarding, purchase/resale hoarding, and speculation hoarding, and in nonetheless leaving the withdrawn income available for consumption and consumption hoarding), when it occurs in a given individual in a given capitalist economy, occurs at the same time in all the other individuals in the concerned capitalist economy. Global supply is disproportionate when money is not subject to depression hoarding, but the supplied quantities, despite the absence of any depression hoarding, cannot be traded against one another at profitable unitary prices; global supply is unprofitable through hoarding when the level of global supply, as a result of what happens to be depression hoarding, is universally in excess relative to the level of effective demand. Global supply is in a situation of relative disproportion when the level of global supply is universally lower than the level of effective demand, but the supplied quantities, despite that inferiority and despite what happens to be the absence of any depression hoarding, cannot be traded against one another at unitary prices ensuring the profitability of the quantities in question. Global supply is in a situation of absolute disproportion when the supplied quantities, despite what happens to be the absence of any depression hoarding, and because the level of global supply is universally greater than the level of effective demand, cannot be traded against one another at unitary prices ensuring the profitability of the quantities in question.
Global supply is in disequilibrium when some offered quantities within it, but not all those offered within it, are unprofitable. Any global supply whose level is universally equal to the level of effective demand is universally profitable; besides, any global supply whose level is universally equal to the level of demand coincides with effective demand (i.e., sees the total quantities it contains coincide with the corresponding total quantities contained by effective demand). Any global supply whose level is universally below the level of effective demand is either in relative disproportion or in disequilibrium; any global supply whose level is universally above the level of effective demand is either in absolute disproportion or unprofitable through depression hoarding. One error of Marx is that of treating separately global unprofitability in the case of labor-power and global unprofitability in the case of entrepreneurially supplied commodities: in other words, that of treating separately the situation in which all supplied quantities of labor-power are unprofitable, and the situation in which all supplied quantities at the end of the respective entrepreneurial supply processes are unprofitable. These two situations, when one of them occurs, occur jointly, and as the consequence of one and the same cause: namely a (absolute or relative) disproportion in global supply or depression hoarding.
The disproportion in global supply, when it occurs, occurs in a mode that renders purchasing (or renting) power insufficient for the supplied quantities to be profitable, or that, while leaving purchasing (or renting) power sufficient in that respect, renders purchasing (or renting) power insufficiently spent (for the supplied quantities to be profitable), or that results in a hybrid situation. That holds for relative disproportion just as for absolute disproportion. The disproportion in global supply, when it occurs, may occur in a mode that renders purchasing (or renting) power insufficient in order for the entrepreneurially supplied quantities to be profitable; just as it may occur in a mode that renders purchasing power insufficient in order for the profitability of only a part of the quantities in question. Likewise, the disproportion in global supply, when it occurs, may occur in a mode that renders purchasing (or renting) power insufficient in order for the supplied quantities of labor-power to be profitable; just as it may occur in a mode that renders purchasing power insufficient for the profitability of only a part of the quantities in question. Depression hoarding, when it occurs, leaves purchasing (or renting) power intact, whether it is sufficient or not for the supplied quantities to be profitable; but it renders purchasing (or renting) power, when the power in question is sufficient in that respect, insufficiently spent in that respect, or, when the power in question is insufficient in that respect, aggravates the unprofitability of the supplied quantities.
The global over-allocation of capital in the entrepreneurial supply processes, when the over-allocation in question occurs, occurs either as a result of an insufficiency of purchasing (or renting) power that is itself the consequence of an absolute or relative disproportion (occurring in such a mode that it causes that insufficiency in purchasing or leasing power), or as a result of an insufficient expenditure of sufficient purchasing (or renting) power that is itself the consequence of an absolute or relative disproportion (occurring in such a mode that it causes that insufficiency in expenditure), or as a result of a hybrid situation that is itself the consequence of an absolute or relative disproportion (occurring in such a mode that it causes that hybrid situation). The global over-allocation of capital in the entrepreneurial supply processes, contrary to what the Marxian approach to the unprofitability of entrepreneurially supplied quantities claims, cannot occur as a result of what would be an over-accumulation of capital in the entrepreneurial supply processes. I will return in another text to the modalities of non-rentability in global supply, and to fluctuations in the capitalist economy.
10) Concerning the evolution of human societies, the latter, in the Marxian approach to the evolution in question, sees the material field—namely, according to Marx, the field of technologies, inter-individual relations, and ideas linked to the economy—engender, and shape, the non-material field—namely, according to Marx, the field of technologies, inter-individual relations, and ideas not linked to the economy. The material field and the non-material field, actually, are respectively the field of everything that exists in a consistent mode and the field of everything that exists in a non-consistent mode; ideas occurring in a human mind or in a non-human animal mind are endowed with consistency, whereas those occurring in the mind of God or of a supramundane soul are non-material. The evolution of the cosmos, including that part of the evolution of the cosmos that lies in the evolution of human societies, sees God at one and the same time become incarnate in the material field (and thus render Himself indistinct from the material field) and remain completely distinct from the material field.
Contradictory elements are opposed elements that are engaged in a contradiction; a contradiction, for its part, is a chaotic relation between opposed elements. Opposed elements are not systematically contradictory elements; contradictory elements, nonetheless, are systematically opposed elements. Opposed elements that are not contradictory are opposed elements engaged in a harmonious relation (rather than in a relation of contradiction). In the Marxian approach to the evolution of human societies, the role of contradiction in the evolution in question consists in the fact that evolution passes through contradictions in the material field, the destruction of the contradictory elements, and the replacement of the latter by unprecedented elements each of which preserves given aspects (but not all the aspects) of one of the (immediately) anterior elements. Actually, that pattern in the evolution of human societies—contradiction between opposed elements, destruction of the latter, replacement of the latter by unprecedented elements that retain aspects of the latter—is one modality of the role of contradiction in the evolution of human societies. Another modality of the role of contradiction in the evolution of human societies lies in the repetition of three pairs of opposites—attraction and repulsion, fission and fusion, and integration and differentiation—which are engaged in harmonious relations rather than in relations of contradiction. Those pairs of opposites are transposed from one level of the cosmos to another and are found in the various human societies; they occur, each time they occur in the cosmos, according to different modalities, just as the relations between them occur according to different modalities each time those pairs of opposites occur in the cosmos. The modalities of those pairs of opposites and of their (harmonious) relations, notably, differ from one kind of society to another.
Besides, in the Marxian approach to the evolution of human societies, the arrival of a final era is determined, as is what the era in question will be; that era, precisely, will see an absence of any contradiction in the material field. Marx, and this is a point that I will address below, conceives of that final era as economically communist. Actually, no more than what occurs over the course of the eras of History is already written, a final era is not among the eras within History.
Providence—the acting part of the will of God as that part becomes incarnate into cosmic and human evolution—has a direction in mind; that direction, nonetheless, is a horizon, not an era that can be reached.
Some extracts of that third, non-final part of Preliminary discourse on The Providence’s ways, the soul’s journey and origin, The Christ’s redemption of Adam’s sin, and a variety of topics from economics to metaphysics, were initially published in The Postil Magazine’s February 2025 issue.